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Abstract 
The present world scenario is such that it is the economic prowess of a country which 
tends to determine its standing in the world order rather than its military power. The 
boundaries are disappearing and the flow of goods, services, technology, capital, 
capital, labor, etc is easier and hassle free comparatively than it was ever before. The 
production centers are no longer localized with the emergence of transnational 
corporations which have got productions centers sprawled all over the world. Foreign 
investment plays a pivotal role in the development process as it provides the much 
needed capital influx. Accordingly the domain of the policies have also shifted from 
the national to international arena as the issues to be regulated are no longer confined 
within the domestic boundaries. 
The trend of Mergers and Acquisitions is not very new in the developed world where 
consolidations and restructuring has been taking place for quite some time but in India 
« 
it has picked up only after the New Economic Policy was unveiled in 1991. The 
Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization measures led to large scale de-
licensing and de-regulation. It ushered in a new era for the Indian economy which was 
finally an open economy amidst fears and apprehensions that the domestic 
industrialists would not be able to survive the foreign onslaught. However contrary to 
the fears today the Indian Economy has made its presence felt globally and is no 
longer a soft target for foreign acquirers. In fact major cross border deals are being 
affected by Indian business houses in different parts of the world. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) have become a popular and significant tool in the 
hand of corporate and business houses for corporate restructuring. In the last decade 
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there has been a trend of consolidation where even big business houses are looking for 
an alliance in order to expand, kill completion, acquire technological competence, and 
gain entry in newer markets or for other strategic reasons. Deals worth billion are 
being announced now and then and making news. It appears that a Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) is structured for sure shot success. However there is more than 
what meets the eye and the companies which go in for this strategy has a wide range 
of complex issues to address before and after the merger in order to ensure that all the 
aspects of the fall in place and the expected synergies are realised, it is a daunting task 
to select a target company and formalize the entire process of merger or acquisition 
but the bigger challenge is to ensure successful implementation of the strategy and 
integration of the units merged or acquired. 
The Steel Industry of India was de-licensed and de-regulated in 1991 and 1992 
respectively. Since then it has come a long way to become the eighth largest steel 
producer in the world. There has been a steady increase in the demand for steel from 
both domestic and international quarters and this is expected to grow with the 
growing focus on investment in infrastructure all over the world. There has been a 
remeirkable rise in the export of steel also while shortages in the domestic market were 
met by imports. Keeping in tune with the global trend of consolidation Indian Steel 
Industry has also witnessed major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) both in the 
domestic and international sector. SAIL, a government is owned undertaking has been 
merging its loss making subsidiaries and expanding its production capabilities. Other 
major players like JSW, IMFA, and Essar Steel have also been involved in major 
restructuring. It is worthwhile to mention that Tata Steel is on a global acquisition 
spree where it acquired Thailand based Millennium Steel and Singapore based 
NatSteel. However the biggest acquisition was its acquisition of the Europe based 
Corns for approximately US$ 12.2 billion which was the largest ever cross border 
deal by an Indian corporate. 
The statement of problem as stated in the thesis here is related to analyzing the 
profitability of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) of Indian Steel Industry since 
Liberalization. Also the Researcher makes an attempt here to investigate the impact of 
the merger on the profitability of the merger. It is seen whether the merger undertaken 
is in the interest of the parties involved that is the shareholders, management, 
employees, creditors etc. of both the target and bidder firms. 
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The issues involved are Sector-wise analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) in 
the international and domestic arena is made to develop an understanding of the 
ongoing trend in the global and domestic arena. A brief study of the Indian Steel 
Industry is made in terms of growth and development and also a synoptic view of 
major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the Indian Steel Industry. The major 
issue this thesis deals with is the effect of the merger and its measurement in terms of 
the post merger financial performance. The Researcher makes an attempt to identify 
the effect of the merger on the performance of the companies involved in order to 
establish the viability of the merger. .Various statistical and accounting techniques are 
employed to calculate various variables and statistics related to the company and an 
attempt is made to find out the effect of the merger on them. 
Another issue dealt with in the thesis is yearly analysis of the movement in figures 
and studying them in the light of both macro and micro factors. A major issue faced is 
the financial crisis which hit the world economy in the year 2007 and had a deep 
impact on the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) worldwide and also the valuations 
and post merger profitability of firms where operation were affected more by the 
macro factors than the micro factors. 
The Review of Literature done sheds light on various gaps in the previous researches 
done in this field. The Researcher intends to put in an honest effort to provide her 
sincere contribution in this regard. 
It is seen that in most works, it is the trends, policies; framework and requisites are 
investigated while the profitability and financial analysis of the mergers are not given 
due importance as was done in the case of Kang, N and S. Johansson (2000) and V, 
Harsh H. and Srividya, C.G. (2004). Also it is seen that the assumptions about 
characteristics of the firm, market condition, regulatory firamework etc. might not 
apply in all cases. As in the case of Breinlich, Holger. (2006), the provisions of 
CUFTA do not apply in all Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). Some studies 
highlight the problem as in the case of Agrawal, Anup. et al. (1992) which reports that 
shareholders of acquiring firms suffer 10 percent loss as result of merger but 
appropriate measures to make the merger profitable are not dealt with. While some 
studies mention the theoretical implications of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
they do not look into the practical application of it as is seen in the case of Perry, 
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Jeffery S. and Herd, Thomas J. (2004) and Lee, Kyungmook. and Pennings, Johannes 
M. (1996). 
However the major limitation is seen that in most of the studies, post-merger analysis, 
i.e. analyzing how the merged or resultant company performs financially after the 
merger is not done which is extremely important to study the viability and success of 
the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) as is seen in Vithala, R. Rao. (1991), Jemison, 
David B. and Sitkin, Sim B (1986), Ghosh, Aloke and Lee, Chi-Wen Jevons (2000), 
Kumar, Nagesh. (2000), Lall, Sanjay (2002) and Lyons, Bruce. R (2001). 
Some studies cannot be generalized as the sample size taken is very small as in Shick, 
Richard A. (1972) while some works suffer from statistical limitations as in Slusky, 
Alexander R. and Caves, Richard E. (1991) and Shughart II, William F. and ToUison, 
Roberto (1984). 
Since 1991 the economic boundaries of India were opened due to which the 
investment climate in India underwent sweeping changes. The economic and 
corporate scene in India is discussed at length in order to investigate the past and 
present scenario of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). Also a realistic attempt is 
made to make a prediction about the future of the ongoing drive of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) on the basis of trends and reports. 
A separate section is devoted to study the impact of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) in the Steel sector predominantly. 
The study entails a detailed study of worldwide mergers and acquisitions taking place 
in various sectors worldwide. An attempt has been made to cover all relevant mergers 
which have taken in various important sectors both in the domestic and international 
scene. Also the various issues relating to mergers and acquisitions are being 
investigated in detail. The study forays into the profitability analysis of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) to study the synergies and values that are created as a result of 
the merger. 
The main objectives this thesis deals with are enlisted as below: 
1. Develop and understanding of mergers and acquisitions and also its need and 
relevance as an expansion and survival strategy in a globalized world. 
2. A study is made of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) that have taken place 
globally and in India. The trend of growth of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) as a 
tool of investment and growth is made. 
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3. The success of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is also evaluated to test its 
viability as a toll for growth and expansion. 
4. Sector-wise study of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is made both globally 
and also of those that took place in India. 
5. A study of the growth and development of the steel sector since 1991 is traced 
and also its financial performance in the last few years is evaluated 
6. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are the quickest way for the firms to grow in 
size and value. Study the value and wealth created for the shareholder's of both the 
target and bidding firm as a result of a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
7. An analysis of the pre and post merger financial reports is done to examine 
whether the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) led to a profitable situation for the 
merging and the merged firms. 
8. It is seen whether the anticipated synergies are actually created after the Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) is structured. 
9. Furthermore an investigation is made to throw light on the reaction of the market 
to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) by making a comparison of the movement of 
Market Price per Share(MPS) and Earning per Share(EPS) both before and after the 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
10. In recent times major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) have taken place in the 
Steel Sector as a part of corporate structuring both globally and at the domestic level. 
In the thesis a detailed introspection is made of the same to analyze the motives and 
success of these Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
The Hypotheses formed for the study are as follows. 
1. Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Profitability 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
Profitability 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
Profitability 
2. Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Capital Employed 
Turnover Ratio (CETR) or Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio (FATR) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger CETR 
or FATR 
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Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
CETR or FAIR 
3.Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Interest Coverage Ratio 
(ICR) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger ICR 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
ICR 
4.Testing the relationship between Pre Merger Profitability and Pre Merger 
MPS 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre-merger Profitability and 
MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre-merger Profitability 
and MPS 
S.Testing the relationship between Post Merger Profitability and MPS 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Post-merger Profitability and 
MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
6.Testing the relation between Pre Merger MPS and Post Merger MPS 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger MPS and Post-
merger MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger MPS and 
Post-merger MPS 
7.Testing the relationship between Pre Merger EPS and Post Merger EPS 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger EPS and Post-
merger EPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger EPS and 
Post-merger EPS 
S.Testing the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger Profit Margin 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger and Post-merger 
Profit Margin 
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Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger and Post-
merger Profit Margin 
9.Testlng the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger Profit Rate 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger and Post-merger 
Profit Rate 
Hu (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger and Post-
merger Profit Rate 
The analysis of the case studies are presented below where each merger and each 
company involved is analyzed individually. 
The analysis of Domestic Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is as follows 
The pre-merger analysis of Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited (VISL) does not 
have a great picture of the financial condifion of Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited. 
There was a consistent fall in the PAT, RONW and ROCE for Visvesvaraya Iron and 
Steel Limited fi-om 1994-98. For the year 1998 the total income fell by -13.12 percent 
but the main source of worry was the PAT net of P&E/total Income (Percentage) at -
7.29 percent and it was negative for consecutive five years. The hypothesis testing 
though regression analysis shows that the profitability and CETR of Visvesvaraya had 
a limited impact on the post merger financials of SAIL, i.e at -0.43 and -0.01 units. 
The correlation coefficient was negative in both cases. Visvesvaraya was a loss 
making unit and its merger with its parent company gave it a new lease of life. The 
merger made it possible for SAIL to write off its losses and get deductions on tax 
payments. The dismal state of affairs led to a proposal of its being taken over by the 
Defence Ministry as 60 percent of its products that is alloy steel were required by it. 
The proposal however did not materialise and its association with SAIL continued. It 
was in November 2004 that VISL started making profits and since then it has been a 
profitable concern for SAIL. 
The analysis of Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) in case of merger with 
Visvesvaraya shows that the profitability declined after the merger but it was due to 
the recession in the global and domestic steel industry. A restructuring plan was 
devise to bring about a turnaround in order to separate its non-core business fi-om its 
main business of production and sale of steel. The Testing of Hypothesis for various 
financial parameters reveals that the relation between the Pre and Post merger 
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Profitability, CETR and ICR is statistically insignificant. Only when six years of Pre 
merger is compared to eleven years of post merger of CETR, the relation is 
significant. Hence the testing of Hypothesis supports the notion that the merger did 
not have much impact on the financials of SAIL. The relation between the Post 
merger Profitability and MPS is however significant. The MPS is greatly affected by 
Profitability and other factors. The Profitability is affected by 0.25 units with a unit 
change in MPS while MPS is affected by 1.72 units change for a unit change in 
profitability. The intercept is high at 55.94. The study of the Profit Rate and Profit 
Margin also highlights the limited impact of the merger on the financial performance 
and greater effect on the operational performance with the increase in the post merger 
Profit Margin by 3.92 percent while the Post merger Profit Rate increased by 70.37 
percent. 
The financials of Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited (IISCO) show that the 
company was running into losses at around 20 percent and it was only in 2001 that the 
rate of losses fell to -3.26 percent. The test of the two Hypothesis relating to the Pre 
merger Profitability and CETR of IISCO with the post merger statistics of SAIL 
shows that the both the relations are statistically insignificant. The correlation 
coefficient (r) is however negative at -0.71 indicating the negative impact which was 
however only -0.19 units. IISCO was running into losses prior to the merger and 
consequently had a negative impact on the profitability of SAIL while the CETR had 
a positive impact on the CETR of SAIL. The correlation was of low degree but it 
should be kept in mind that the setting off of losses may have reduced profitability but 
at the same time the tax liability as well. In case of CETR the effect on CETR of 
SAIL is just 0.02 units. 
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) was making profits since 2004 and the 
trend continued after the merger as well. However the testing of Hypothesis shows 
that it's only the relation between the Pre and Post merger ICR which is statistically 
significant. However the degree of correlation is low at 0.21. The Pre merger analysis 
of Profitability and MPS depicts that the relation between the two parameters is 
statistically insignificant. However post merger the relation is statistically significant 
and there is a high degree of positive correlation. The Profitability is affected by 0.05 
units for a unit change of a unit of MPS while MPS is changed by 15.01 units change 
for a change in profitability. The intercept is high at -128.62. The hypothesis testing 
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the Pre and Post merger MPS and EPS shows that there is an effect of the merger on 
the two variables. For MPS the relation is moderate at 0.52 while for EPS it is of a 
low degree at 0.11. It is interesting in the light that the Pre merger profitability did not 
have a statistically significant relation with the post merger profitability. The analysis 
of Profit Margin and Profit Rate show significant improvement in the financial and 
operating efficiency. The post-merger Profit Margin increased by 1505.96 percent, 
while the post merger Profit Rate increased by 189.21 percent. Hence the merger did 
positively affect the financials of SAIL and there were also benefits in terms of 
greater size and production capabilities. 
The pre merger figures of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) show that the 
company was rurming into losses since 2001 but the volume of losses had 
considerable come down till 2005 to -1.42 percent. The test of Hypotheses reveals 
that the Profitability and ICR of ICCL had a relation with the post merger figures of 
IMFA only in the longer run. The FATR of ICCL had a statistically significant 
relation with the FATR of IMFA both in the shorter and longer run. The two variables 
had a very high degree of positive correlation at 0.91. The positive effect that the 
merger had on the operational efficiency was obvious. Even the EPS of ICCL had 
stafistically significant relation with that of IMFA both in the short and long run. The 
degree of correlation was high at 0.89. The merger seemed to fulfil its objectives of 
financial and operating synergy. 
Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA) was a steady and profitable enterprise 
with the company managing to earn profits over ten years that is from 2000 to 2009 at 
a satisfactory and steady rate. The profitability rate seemed to be picking after the 
initial slowdown just after the merger. The Hypotheses testing reveals that there is a 
statistically significant relation between the Pre and post merger FATR of IMFA 
having a moderate degree of positive correlation at 0.62. The relation between the Pre 
and Post Profitability, ICR and EPS is statistically insignificant. The Profit Margin 
after the merger shows an increase of 120 percent while the Profit Rate registered an 
increase of 66.67. Hence the merger appeared to have accrued financial and operating 
synergies after the merger in these terms. 
Bellary Steel's historical performance was dismal with losses being incurred since 
2001 and they seemed to just magnify after the merger and increased manifold over 
time. The study of Hypotheses reveals that the Pre merger Profitability, FATR and 
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ICR did not have a statistically significant relation with the post merger figures. The 
ICR in the short run was though affected having a high degree of positive correlation. 
However both in the pre merger and post merger stage there is a statistically 
significant relation between the Profitability and MPS. In the pre merger stage the 
degree of correlation is low at 0.03 while the degree of correlation is high at 0.77. 
Post merger the Profitability is affected by 31.19 units while intercept is high at 
364.51 units. In case of MPS it is affected by just 0.019 units due to a unit change in 
profitability. The Pre merger MPS and EPS also do not seem to have a relation with 
the post merger statistic. Hence individually the MPS or EPS are not affected by 
merger 
The financials for Pittsburgh Iron and Steel Limited was in a bad state with losses 
being incurred at a consistent basis. The test of Hypothesis reveals that the 
profitability of Pittsburgh had an impact on the profitability of Bellary while there 
was no effect on the EPS and FATR. The Profit Margin and Profit Rate for both the 
entities also did not pose a satisfactory picture. To sum up the merger was not going 
anywhere and both the units individually as well as jointly were making no headway. 
The decision of promoters to foray into the business of Steel by merging with Bellary 
Steel was questionable with the latter suffering from losses. 
The analysis of Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited (SISCOL) reveals that 
the losses were converted into profits in 2004 and the two undertakings were 
subsequently merged in 2008 and SISCOL got benefit of with the help of core 
competencies of JSW. The Hypothesis testing reveals that the pre merger Profitability 
and ICR of SISCOL did not have an impact on the post merger Profitability and ICR 
of SISCOL. The post merger ICR of JSW had a relation with the pre merger ICR of 
SISCOL when five years of pre merger and three years of post merger were 
undertaken. However the study of the Pre merger EPS of SISCOL and Post merger 
EPS of JSW Steel appear to have a relation revealing that the shareholders were 
affected. The degree of correlation is a high degree of positive correlation at 0.86. 
Thus it is seen that the association with JSW Steel had converted a loss making unit 
into a profitable venture. 
After running into losses for years JSW Steel finally made a turnaround in its 
operations in 2004 and started making profits on a consistent basis. There is no 
relation between the Pre and Post merger profitability on the basis of the test applied. 
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However the benefits of merger are not expected to accrue in the first few years. The 
analysis of the relation between the profitability and MPS reveals that the relation 
between the Pre merger profitability and MPS is insignificant. The relation between 
the post merger Profitability and MPS is on the contrary found to be significant with 
the correlation coefficient (r) high at 0.71. The value of Profitability is affected by 
0.098 units for a unit change in MPS while the MPS is affected by 49.84 units for a 
change of a unit in Profitability. The intercept is also high at 238.75. The relation 
between the Pre merger EPS and MPS with the post merger EPS and MPS is also 
found to be significant only in the longer run. The Profit Margin for JSW Steel 
jumped by 635 percent and for Profit Rate the change was about 74.6 percent. The 
losses incurred prior to 2004 are also responsible for this huge change in Profit 
Margin. 
The Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) undertaken for the study are as 
follows. The financials of NatSteel show that the company was running into profits 
prior to the merger but after the merger took place in 2005 there was a significant 
increase in the rate of profits indicating that the sale of its steel division was proving 
to be profitable for the enterprise. The testing of various Hypotheses shows that the 
relation between the Pre and Post merger FATR and WCTR is significant while the 
one between the pre and post merger profitability is insignificant. In case of FATR the 
correlation coefficient (r) is moderate at 0.38 while for WCTR it is high at 0.76. The 
testing of Hypothesis to determine the relation between the profitability and MPS 
before and after the merger is interesting. The relation between the Profitability and 
MPS prior to the merger is statistically insignificant while the relation between the 
Profitability and MPS after the merger is statistically significant. The degree of 
correlation is low at 0.24. the Profitability is moved by 8.84 units for a unit change in 
MPS while the MPS is affected by 0.062 units for a units change in EPS. In case of 
EPS the relation between the Pre and post merger figures is insignificant while in case 
of MPS the pre and post merger data are statistically significant. However there is a 
negative correlation between the two at -0.55. 
Tata Steel earned profits on a steady basis over the last decade. The merger had an 
impact on the profitability of the entity with a moderate degree of correlation at 0.45. 
The FATR and ICR were however unaffected and were statistically insignificant. The 
relation between the MPS and Profitability shows that both the variables had a 
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statistically significant relation both before and after the merger. However the degree 
of correlation fell from a high degree at 0.86 to a moderate degree of negative 
correlation at 0.41. The post merger MPS was affected by -140.41 units for a unit 
change in Profitability. The intercept was very high at 3407.39. Also the Pre merger 
MPS and EPS had a relation with the Post merger MPS and EPS respectively. The 
degree of correlation between the Pre and Post merger MPS is again negative at -0.62. 
The Profit Margin for both NatSteel and Tata Steel increased significantly. The Profit 
Margin for Tata Steel increased significantly by 491.67 percent indicating a mariced 
improvement in the operating efficiency as compared to a 158.54 percent increase in 
profits 
From 2000 to 2003 Corus was registering losses and it was only in 2004 that Corns 
earned profits. However the rate of profits from 2004 to 2006 was in the range of 2 
percent to 5 percent which was not very high. The test of hypothesis shows that the 
Profitability and FATR prior to the merger had a relation with that of the post merger 
Profitability and FATR respectively of Tata Steel. While Profitability had a negative 
correlation at -0.57, the FATR had a positive correlation with the post merger figure 
at 0.27. The ICR was affected only in the longer run. Pre merger EPS had a very high 
degree of positive correlation with the post merger EPS at 0.90 indicating the benefits 
accrued to the shareholders. 
The much hyped acquisition of Corus by Tata Steel reflected that the trend of 
profitability for Tata Steel continued. The merger had no effect on the figures of 
Profitability, FATR or ICR as depicted by the test of Hypothesis. The relafion 
between the Pre and Post merger figures is statistically insignificant. The relation 
between the MPS and Profitability before and after the merger is most interesting. 
Prior to the merger MPS and profitability had a stafisfically significant relafion with a 
high degree of positive correlation at 0.93. However after the merger there is a high 
degree of negative correlation at -0.96 indicating that the merger did not go down 
very well with the shareholders as per the market response. The MPS was affected by 
-1584.93 units for a unit change in Profitability with a very high intercept at 
34175.36. The EPS was affected by the merger only in the longer run while the 
merger seemed to have no effect on post merger MPS. It is fiirther seen that the Profit 
Margin for Tata Steel increased by 77.5 percent while the operational efficiency got a 
major boost with the Profit Rate moving up by 252.4 percent 
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The Profitability of Algoma Steel was impressive before the merger. Though after the 
merger it dropped, it was back on track in 2009 at 8.53 percent. The testing of 
hypotheses reveals that FATR was affected as a result of the merger both in the small 
and long run while the profitability was affected in the small run. The degree of 
correlation was positive for FATR at 0.39 while negative for Profitability at -0.39. 
The ICR was however not affected. 
Despite the huge losses incurred initially in the year 2001 and 2002, Essar Steel 
recovered and posted profits at a steady rate from 2003 onwards. The test of various 
hypotheses reveals that the merger did not have an effect on any of the parameters, i.e. 
Profitability, FATR, ICR or EPS. For Algoma Steel the Profit margin increased by 
127.94 percent and the Profit rate fell by -25.23 percent. For Essar Steel both Profit 
Margin and Profit Rate increased substantially by 700 percent and 316.36 percent 
respectively. 
The major findings of the study are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The trend of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) has greatly benefitted fi-om the 
opening up of the economy but it is only in the recent years that prominent outbound 
deals are being done. 
The global Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) increased in terms of volume fi-om 13 
in 1991 to 319 in 2007 while the value increased fi-om US$27 billion in 1991 to US$ 
70.4 billion in 2007. 
The opening of the economy has certainly gave an impetus to the trend of Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India but it has been only in the last decade that 
significant deals are being carved out as is evident firom the volume and value of deals 
depicted in the thesis. Also a major proportion of FDI is contributed by Mergers and 
Acquisidons (M&A's) deals. 
The major objective for Indian corporate for effecting a merger or takeover is related 
to financial synergies followed by increased operational base and reach to new 
markets. As per various figures, surveys and projections it is the BRIC countries 
which are expected to lead their contemporise as regards affecting a merger and 
acquisition deal. According to the 2010 Confidence Index by A.T Kearney India ranks 
third in the world behind only China and USA. 
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The ease in access and relatively cheaper rates of debt financing is facilitating a large 
number of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) which is a major reason for the 
increased activity. A major factor which affected the Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) activity in the recent times is the global recession of 2007. In India the 
domestic deals fell by -46.73 percent in volume and cross border by -22.82 percent. 
Interestingly the value for domestic deals increased by 78.60 percent while for cross 
border deals it fell by -46.81 percent indicating the interest of the India Corporate 
Sector towards the domestic economy as a result of the recession. For the world 
economy the value of the deals fell by -34.71 percent in 2008 and 81.71 percent in 
2009. The developing economy suffered the highest fall in deals due to recession by -
96.72 percent. 
For the global economy Pharmaceutical sector registered a growth of 167.82 percent 
and transport by 68.93 percent for the period 2008 to 2009. The sector having the 
most vibrant activity as regards Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India are 
telecommunication. Pharmaceutical and Steel. Among the companies involved in 
major deals in recent times are Tata, Ranbaxy Laboratories, Hindalco Industries. The 
acquisition of Corus by Tata Steel at US$ 12.2 is the largest ever cross border deal by 
an Indian Company. 
Besides acquiring and merging with new firms, many steel firms are merging with 
their subsidiaries in a bid to consolidate and expand the production faculties. This is 
in sync with the global consolidation trend where companies are engaging in huge 
restructuring and consolidation. With fierce competition the key to survival is large 
scale production and benefiting fi'om the related economies of scale. Recently major 
producers of steel that is Tata Steel, Essar Steel, JSW Steel, Jindal Steel, SAIL and 
IMFA have merged their subsidiaries to catapult as leading producers of steel 
The merger with Visvesvaraya in 1999 was beneficial for both the companies as 
Visvesvaraya got a lease of life given the losses it was incurring and SAIL expanded 
its operating capacity and also could write off its profits against the losses. However 
the loss making Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited did not have any positive impact 
whatsoever on the financials for SAIL. 
In case of merger of SAIL with IISCO in 2006 it is seen that it was again a merger of 
a loss making subsidiary of SAIL with itself The strategy was again to revive the loss 
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making unit with the merging of its operations with a profitable unit like SAIL. In 
view of the global consolidation trend of consolidation in steel industry the merger 
was helpful as it expanded the operating capacity of SAIL besides providing it with 
reduced tax liability. Also it is seen that after the merger the Profitability and MPS 
had a statistically significant relationship. Also the merger is seen to have an effect on 
the MPS and EPS after the merger. The merger had a greater impact on the financial 
performance rather than the operating performance as is evident by the movement of 
the Profit Rate and Profit Margin. 
The merger between IMFA and ICCL reflected positively on the operational and 
financial statistics of IMFA where the profitability of IMFA was affected in the 
longer run and the FATR of IMFA was affected both in the long and short run by the 
statisfics of ICCL. Also the degree of correlation was high. The EPS of IMFA and 
ICCL also had a high positive correlation. The comparison between the pre and post 
merger figures of IMFA highlights that the merger did have a positive effect as 
regards Profitability, ICR, FATR and EPS. The Profit Margin and Profit Rate also 
increased leading to the conclusion that the operating efficiencies were enhanced 
more than the financial efficiencies due to the merger. 
In case of the acquisition of Bellary Steel by Pittsburgh Iron and Steel the acquisition 
seemed to be going nowhere with the trend of losses continuing unabated after the 
merger for both the concerns involved. The Profit Margin and Profit Rate were dismal 
and the test of Hypothesis also reveals that the merger was proving to be a failure. 
The acquisition of SISCOL by JSW steel proved to be a boon for SISCOL which 
benefitted fi-om the core competencies of JSW and made a remarkable turnaround in 
operations and reported profits after the deal. It is seen that the post merger relation 
between MPS and Profitability is significant while the pre merger relation is not 
reflecting the positive impact the merger had on the MPS. The Profit Margin for JSW 
Steel jumped by 635 percent while Profit Rate increased by 74.6 percent. The losses 
incurred prior to 2004 are also responsible for this huge change in Profit Margin. 
In case of NatSteel, after the merger took place in 2005 there was a significant 
increase in the rate of profits indicating that the sale of its steel division was proving 
to be profitable for the enterprise. Here again the profitability and MPS have 
significant relation before the merger and not after the merger. While as regards MPS 
the merger had a negative impact on it. 
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Tata Steel earned profits on a steady basis over the last decade. The merger had an 
impact on the profitability of the entity. The FATR and ICR were however unaffected 
and were statistically insignificant. The relation between the MPS and Profitability 
show sthat both the variables had a statistically significant relation both before and 
after the merger. Also the Pre merger MPS and EPS had a relation with the Post 
merger MPS and EPS respectively. The Profit Margin for both NatSteel and Tata 
Steel increased significantly. The Profit Margin for Tata Steel increased significantly 
by 491.67 percent indicafing a marked improvement in the operating efficiency. 
From 2000 to 2003 Corns was registering losses and it was only in 2004 that Corns 
earned profits. However the rate of profits till 2004 to 2006 was in the range of 2 
percent to 5 percent which were not very high. The test of hypothesis shows that the 
Profitability and FATR of Tata Steel prior to the merger had a relation the post 
merger figures. While Profitability had a negative correlation the FATR had a positive 
correlation with the post merger figures. The ICR was affected only in the longer run. 
Pre merger EPS had a very high degree of positive correlation with the post merger 
EPS indicating the benefits accrued to the shareholders. 
The much hyped acquisition of Corns by Tata Steel reflected that the trend of 
profitability for Tata Steel continued.teh merger had no effect on the figures of 
Profitability, FATR or ICR as depicted by the test of Hypothesis. The relation 
between the Pre and Post merger figures is statistically insignificant. The relation 
between the MPS and Profitability before and after the merger is most interesting. 
Prior to the merger MPS and profitability had a statistically significant relation with a 
high degree of positive correlation. However after the merger there is a high degree of 
negative correlation indicating that the merger did not go down very well with the 
shareholders as per the market response. The EPS was affected by the merger only in 
the longer run. It is fiirther seen that the Profit Margin for Tata Steel increased by 77.5 
percent while the operational efficiency got a major boost with the Profit Rate moving 
up by 252.4 percent 
The Profitability of Algoma Steel was impressive before the merger. Though after the 
merger it dropped, it was back on track in 2009 at 8.53 percent. The testing of 
hypotheses reveals that FATR was affected as a result of the merger both in the small 
and long run while the profitability was affected in the small run only. The ICR was 
however not affected in either case. 
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Despite the huge losses incurred initially in the year 2001 and 2002, Essar Steel 
recovered and posted profits at a steady rate from 2003 onwards. The test of various 
hypotheses reveals that the merger did not have an effect on any of the parameters, i.e. 
Profitability, FATR or ICR. For Algoma Steel the Profit margin increased while the 
Profit rate fell. For Essar Steel both Profit Margin and Profit Rate increased 
substantially. 
The Suggestions and Recommendations based on findings of the study are as 
follows 
The selection of the target company should be done most extensively. Care should be 
taken to ensure that the target and acquirer should complement and supplement each 
other in resources. When structuring a merger or acquisition the main idea is to 
exploit the post-merger synergy. However it is most important to ensure that these are 
valued in the right earnest. Both over-valuation and undervaluation might prove 
detrimental to the interest of the acquiring company. The value of deals in the case of 
mergers and acquisitions in the recent years is running into billions. It affects the 
liquidity and capital structure of the company. The success of the deal has a bearing 
on the financial capabilifies of the company. While finalizing a deal its impact on the 
financial position for several years to come should be considered deeply. 
In the recent years there is a global trend of restructuring prevalent where Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) is proving to be a potent tool. However while taking a 
decision regarding a deal it is important to ensure that the acquisition move is not be 
solely based global trend but on individual assessment of the target company and 
other relevant details. 
Besides considering the relevant details regarding the company it is also important to 
consider the macro environment as it has a deep and profound impact on the future of 
the deals. The timing of the merger or acquisition is one of the most important aspects 
of merger and acquisition deal. The perfect time may always not be when the market 
is in the state of boom. It might be profitable to target companies which have future 
prospects and purchase them while the valuations are low. In the case of listed 
companies the parameters involve the MPS of shares which to a large extent depends 
on market psyche and sentiment and how the investors respond to the announcement 
of the deal. It is important to ensure that the confidence of the investors is maintained 
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for which disseminating information and not keeping them in the dark may prove to 
be an added advantage 
In the case of foreign acquisitions the main idea is to capture advanced technology 
and an entry in a new market. However the core competencies of the Indian Steel 
producers lie in low cost and care should be taken to ensure that the resources are not 
pushed beyond a certain extent which might affect the cost advantage adversely in the 
longer run. 
In the present global scenario the BRIC economies are making a considerable impact 
globally with their economic prowess. Besides concentrating on international markets, 
the Indian Steel Industry should undertake massive development of infrastructure and 
expansion in the domestic arena and other developing economies. Efforts should be 
made to keep a hold of the untapped domestic market which appears to have great 
potential in the near future. Even the world's largest steelmaker Arecelor-Mittal is 
looking to enter India through acquiring stake in Uttam Galva Steel. The recent trend 
of the Indian Steel Industry is towards consolidation and restructuring. The main idea 
is to increase the production capacity and gain from economies from large scale. The 
idea of merging or being acquired may be the hope for survival of small producers as 
the trend shows that there would be few big producers rather than many small 
producers. 
The acquiring company should ensure that it does not involve or get muddled in rival 
bidding too deeply and end up paying more than what the acquiring company is 
valued. In the case of the high pitched Tata-Corus battle many industry experts feel 
that Tata might have ended paying a high price and the success of the acquisition is 
yet to be finally gauged. In the recent times the banking and financial industry has 
been flourishing at a remarkable pace. Their facilities in terms of loans should be 
judiciously used and should not be used to make unnecessary deals and create a debt 
burden which might be difficult to repay. 
The acquiring and acquired commonly have to take care to bring about not only post 
merger financial and operating integration but also integration of the people involved 
in order to create a positive environment. Acquiring loss making subsidiaries might be 
a good incentive to reduce tax-liability and increase operating capacity but in a large 
scale industry it should be ensure that the practise does not lead to a big dent on the 
financial performance as maintaining balance is crucial. 
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The General Suggestions and Recommendations are as follows 
The most important aspect of a merger or acquisition is facilitating smooth post 
merger integration. For the purpose various steps need to be accorded highest level of 
importance. It might be advisable to do so in phases in order to facilitate the complex 
process. Merger and Acquisition is a potent and most useful tool to expand the global 
presence. With major companies worldwide engaging in it fiercely it might become a 
necessity rather than just an option for growth. It is necessary for big and small 
companies to recognize and accept this trend and adjust their business strategies 
accordingly. 
It is necessary to maintain balance in synergies and ensure that all aspects are given 
due importance and it does not lead to ignoring of one aspect for another. It might be 
advisable to study recent Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the same or related 
industries to develop an understanding of the same. However it cannot be solely relied 
upon and requires a detailed case by case study. The management of the company 
should be prepared to face new challenges and transform them into opportunities. A 
key aspect is innovation and creativity. The management should be prepared to accept 
changes and employ strategies keeping in mind the changed circumstances and 
ground realties rather than focus on just set conventions and rules. It might be 
advisable to develop core strategic teams which are professionally trained to facilitate 
a merger and acquisition integration. 
It is imperative to maintain a policy of tolerance and cultural integration as it is 
necessary to sort out the human resource issue in the most amicable manner for post 
merger integration. The policy of employee retention is a sensitive aspect and care 
should be taken to maintain an environment where the focus is on efficiency and 
productivity and the workers are ably simulated and motivated to work in a new work 
environment after the merger. 
The management should also keep contingency measures and back up plans intact. In 
case, the plans and strategies do not work out, risk management mechanism should be 
in place to address unforeseen circumstances. 
The Researcher has made a sincere attempt to make a contribution to the existing 
literature regarding Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The study aims to explore the 
effect of the merger on primarily the post-merger financial performance of the 
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companies involved in the Merger and Acquisition (M&A's) activity. For the purpose 
the financials of both the acquired/merged and the acquiring/merging entities are 
taken into consideration. Though, Mergers and Acquisitions is a widely researched 
topic, the studies done on the post-merger performance are limited. The Indian Steel 
Sector is taken up for analysis which is experiencing vibrant activity in the past few 
years. Significant deals that have taken place both in the domestic and international 
scene are taken up for detailed analysis. The data is classified on the basis of pre-
merger and post-merger activity and internal and external figures affecting the 
performance are accounted for. The effect of the profitability on the Market Price of 
Shares (MPS) and vice-versa is also explored. 
The study aims to study the viability of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
undertaken in the Indian Steel Industry on the basis of the post-merger financial 
performance. 
The Researcher has attempted to make a sincere attempt for making a worthy 
contribution to the existing literature regarding Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's). The study aims to explore the effect of the merger on primarily the post-
merger financial performance of the companies involved in the Merger and 
Acquisition (M&A's) activity. For the purpose the financials of both the 
acquired/merged and the acquiring/merging entities are taken into consideration. 
Though, Mergers and Acquisitions is a widely researched topic, the studies done on 
the post-merger performance are limited. The Indian Steel Sector is taken up for 
analysis which is experiencing vibrant activity in the past few years. Significant deals 
that have taken place both in the domestic and international scene are taken up for 
detailed analysis. The data is classified on the basis of pre-merger and post-merger 
activity and internal and external figures affecting the performance are accounted for. 
The effect of the profitability on the Market Price of Shares (MPS) and vice-versa is 
also explored. 
The study aims to study the viability of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
undertaken in the Indian Steel Industry on the basis of the post-merger financial 
performance. 
The Researcher suggests the following core areas for the purpose of fiiture research 
related to the topic of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
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i. The impact of the merger announcements on the share prices of the rival and 
bidding firms can be examined. 
ii. In the present era Human Resources is a vital factor in determining the success 
or failure of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) and it is a qualitative 
aspect which is difficult to measure and quantify but has become extremely 
important in the present global economy where people and cultural cohesion is 
the key and especially in a cross border deal. 
iii. Also in the wake of recent recession question marks are being raised about the 
valuations of deal done under depressed conditions where the target company 
is valued at a much lower price than it's worth. 
iv. Another important aspect is the determining the rate of exchange of currencies 
which keeps on fluctuating until the negotiations materialize and a rise or fall 
may work in favor of one company while harm another in case of cross-border 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) . There is a need to design an appropriate 
model or mechanism for that. 
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Preface 
The trend of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is not very new in the developed 
world where consolidations and restructuring has been taking place for quite some 
time. However, in India its pace picked up only after the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
was unveiled in July 1991. The Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG) 
measures led to large scale de-licensing and de-regulation. It ushered in a new era for 
the Indian economy which was finally an open economy amidst fears and 
apprehensions that the domestic industrialists would not be able to survive the foreign 
onslaught. Contrary to the fears the Indian Economy has today made its presence felt 
globally and is no longer a soft target for foreign acquirers. In fact, major cross border 
deals are being affected by Indian business houses in different parts of the world. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) have become a popular and significant tool in the 
hands of business houses for corporate restructuring. In the last decade there has been 
a trend of consolidation where even big business houses are looking for an alliance in 
order to expand, kill competition, acquire technological competence, and gain entry in 
newer markets or for other strategic reasons. Deals worth billions are being 
announced now and then and making news. It appears that a Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) deal is structured for sure shot success. However there is more 
than what meets the eye. The companies which go in for this strategy have a wide 
range of complex issues to address before and after the merger in order to ensure that 
all the aspects fall in place and the expected synergies are realised. It is a daunting 
task to select a target company and formalize the entire process of merger or 
acquisition but the bigger challenge is to ensure successfiil implementation of the 
strategy and integration of the units merged or acquired. 
The Steel Industry of India was de-licensed and de-regulated in 1991 and 1992 
respectively. Since then, it has come a long way to become the eighth largest steel 
producer in the world. There has been a steady increase in the demand for steel firom 
both domestic and international quarters and this is expected to grow with the 
growing focus on investment in infi-astructure all over the world. There has been a 
remarkable rise in the export of steel also while shortages in the domestic market were 
sufficed by timely imports. Keeping in tune with the global trend of consolidation, the 
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Indian Steel Industry has also structured major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
both in the domestic and international sector. 
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), a government owned undertaking has been 
merging its loss making subsidiaries and expanding its production capabilities. Other 
major players like JSW Steel, Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA) and Essar Steel 
have also been involved in major restructviring. It is worthwhile to mention that Tata 
Steel is on a global acquisition spree where it acquired Thailand based Millennium 
Steel and Singapore based NatSteel. However the biggest acquisition was its 
acquisition of the Europe based Corns for approximately US$ 12.2 billion which was 
the largest ever cross border deal by an Indian Corporate. 
It is necessary to examine and study these deals in depth in order to develop an 
understanding of the financial viability of these deals and also to examine as to what 
are the effects of the merger or acquisition on the performance of the company. For 
the purpose, the Researcher has taken up five domestic and three cross border deals in 
the Indian Steel Industry and has analysed various financial issues related to them. 
Various accounting and statistical measures have been employed to analyse the post 
merger performance of the companies involved for calculating the impact of the 
merger on the financial and operating performance. Problems faced in structuring 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) and strategies to counter them are also critically 
studied with illustrative examples. An honest attempt has been made by the 
Researcher to study the consolidation trend of Indian Steel Industry and to find out 
whether the post-merger results are creating the expected synergies in terms of 
financial and operating performance or not. 
The present study is a novel effort which goes into the thread-bare details as regards 
Mergers and Acquisitions in Indian perspective. This would certainly contribute to the 
existing stock of knowledge on the subject matter. 
Preview of the Thesis 
The study entails a detailed study of worldwide mergers and acquisitions taking place 
in various sectors. An attempt has been made to cover all significant deals which have 
taken in various important sectors both in the domestic and international scene. Also 
the various issues relating to mergers and acquisitions are being investigated in detail. 
A separate section is devoted to study the impact of mergers and acquisitions 
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(M&A's) in the Steel sector predominantly. The study forays into the financial 
analysis to study the synergies and values that are created as a result of the mergo:. 
Various measures are employed for that purpose to discuss the financial and opwating 
performance of the entities involved before and after the merger. The main idea is to 
assess the impact of the merger in terms of performance of the companies and find out 
if the effect has been positive or negative. 
The main objectives this thesis deals with are enlisted as below: 
i. Study the major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals that have taken 
place globally and in India. Analysis of success of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) as a tool of investment, expansion and growth, 
ii. Sector-wise study of global and domestic Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
in terms of value of deals, 
iii. Study the growth and development of Indian Steel Sector since 1991 and 
evaluate its financial performance in the last few years, 
iv. Examine the Pre and Post merger financial reports to examine whether the 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) led to a profitable situation for the 
merging and the merged firms. For the purpose various accounting and 
statistical measures are used. 
V. Investigate the reaction of the market to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
by making a comparison of the movement of Market Price per Share (MPS) 
and Earning per Share (EPS) both before and after the deal, 
vi. Analyze the relation between the movement of the Profitability and MPS 
before and after the merger to explore the reaction of the investors to a merger 
announcement, 
vii. Calculate the effect of merger on financial and operating performance before 
and after the merger, 
viii. Detailed introspection of the motives and success rate of major Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) deals that have taken place in the Steel Sector as a part 
of corporate structuring both globally and at the domestic level. In the thesis a 
detailed analysis is made of the same to analyze the motives and success of 
these Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
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The Hypotheses investigated in the study are listed below 
1. Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Profitability 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
Profitability 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-
merger Profitability 
2. Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Capital Employed 
Turnover Ratio (CETR) or Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio (F ATR) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
CETRorFATR 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-
merger CETR or FATR 
3. Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Interest Coverage Ratio 
(ICR) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
ICR 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-
merger ICR 
4. Testing the relationship between Pre Merger Profitability and Pre Merger 
Market Price per Share (MPS) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
5. Testing the relationship between Post Merger Profitability and Market Price 
per Share (MPS) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Post-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
6. Testing the relation between Pre Merger Market Price per Share (MPS) and 
Post Merger Market Price per Share (MPS) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger MPS and 
Post-merger MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger MPS 
and Post-merger MPS 
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7. Testing the relationship between Pre Merger Earnings per Share (EPS) and 
Post Merger Earnings per Share (EPS) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger EPS and 
Post-merger EPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger EPS 
and Post-merger EPS 
8. Testing the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger Profit Margin 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no effect of Merger on the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Margin 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is an effect of Merger on the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Margin 
9. Testing the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger Profit Rate 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = = There is no effect of Merger on the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Rate 
Ho (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is an effect of Merger on the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Rate 
The First Chapter provides a synoptic view of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) 
and gives a brief perspective and sheds light on the concepts related to the same. It 
gives a brief introduction of the global and domestic scenario relating to Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's). It discusses the statement of the problem and issues and goes 
on to highlight the utility and importance of the study. It also mentions the limitations 
related to the study. 
The Second Chapter discusses the legal perspective relating to Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in India and is followed by a detailed discussion of the relevant 
provisions of various Acts applicable to the same in India. It is followed by a bird's 
eye view of the procedure generally followed for effecting a Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in India. 
The Third Chapter gives a purview of the motivation for mergers and acquisitions in 
India and discusses the environment for the same in India since 1991. The growth of 
Indian economy as an investment destination and as an acquirer in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) is fiirther elucidated. It is followed by an elaborate discussion 
of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in various sectors in India. The impact of 
recession on the activity of deals if also highlighted. 
V I P a ge 
The Fovirth Chapter provides an insight into the Global Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) and also outlines the motivations for affecting a cross border deal. It is 
followed by a sector-wide description of major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
that have taken place across various sectors. The impact of recession on the scenario 
of global merger and acquisitions is further discussed. A brief description of future 
global prospects as relating to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are also 
highlighted. 
The Fifth chapter reviews a wide and extensive literature relating to Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) and provides a critical review of the same in chronological 
order. The research gap as traced by the research scholar in the process is outlined as 
well. 
The Sixth chapter deals with the Research Design and Methodology and entails a 
description of the scope of the study. A brief discussion on the sample size and paiod 
of study is followed by a discussion of the objectives and hypotheses formulated for 
the study. An insight to various statistical and accounting methods used for evaluation 
of data is provided. The limitations involving the same are also discussed. 
The Seventh Chapter deals with the Indian Steel Industry and traces its growth and 
development and provides an overview of the same. It is followed by a discussion of 
the major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the Indian Steel Industry. 
The Eighth Chapter involves an in-depth analysis of five major domestic Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in the Indian Steel Industry which involve the merger of SAIL 
with Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel. The merger of SAIL with IISCO is analyzed next. 
It is followed by the study of the merger of Indian Chrome Charge Limited and Indian 
Metals and Ferro Alloys. The two takeovers analyzed involve the takeover by Bellary 
Steel by Pittsburgh and SISCOL by JSW Steel. 
The Ninth Chapter analyses three major cross border takeovers which involve the 
takeover by Tata Steel of NatSteel and Corns and Algoma Steel by Essar Steel. 
The Tenth chapter gives a brief overview of the present Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's). It then enlists the various problems faced in fostering and planning a deal. It 
further discusses the strategies offered to counter the problems and in the end 
discusses the future prospects for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
The last and final Chapter provides the findings and sums up the work. In the end the 
Researcher suggests directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1 
A Synoptic View on Mersers and 
Acquisitions (M&A *s) 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a glimpse of the present global scenario as regards investment, 
growth and development. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) as a tool and mode for 
investment and growth is discussed at length. The concepts and terminologies 
associated with Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are examined by the Researcher. 
The global and domestic scenario for mergers and acquisitions is further examined in 
detail. 
1.2 Mereers and Acquisitions (M&A's): A Perspective 
The present world scenario is such that it is the economic prowess of a country which 
tends to determine its standing in the world order rather than its military power. The 
boundaries are disappearing and the flow of goods, services, technology, capital, 
labor, etc is easier and hassle free comparatively than it was ever before. The 
production centers are no longer localized with the emergence of transnational 
corporations which have got productions centers sprawled all over the world. Foreign 
investment plays a pivotal role in the development process as it provides the much 
needed capital influx especially in developing countries. Accordingly the domain of 
the policies have also shifted from the national to international arena as the issues to 
be regulated are no longer confined within the domestic boundaries. 
In the past decade it has been observed that a major reason for the sharp increase in 
the volume of international production and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). It is now a preferred mode of entry for starting a 
business over Greenfield investment. In contrast to M&A's that took place in the 
1980's for short-term financial gains, the mergers which are taking place in the 
present era are mainly motivated by strategic and economic gains in the longer run. 
1 I Page 
The comparison of value of deals involving FDI flows and M&A's is a complex affair 
due to the issues related to mode of financing involved in M&A's and the balance of 
payment methodology which is used in calculating FDI flows'. 
In the recent past the world has witnessed a dramatic spate of increase in the rate of 
increase of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) leading to major restructuring of 
corporate structure and also the globalization of Industry. It has become an important 
and vital mode for expansion, eliminating competition, making forays into new 
markets, creating synergies, improve economies of scale, expand profitability and a 
host of various other reasons. It has become a preferred mode of investment over 
Greenfield investment which involves investing in an area where no previous 
facilities exist. The primary concept involved in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is 
that it is done primarily with the intention of combining two firms in order to create 
synergy and shareholder value. Before going in detail it is imperative to explore the 
various concept and terms related to merger and acquisition. 
1.3 Concept: Mer2ers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
The term merger generally refers to the combination of two companies into one 
larger company. A 'pure merger' is said to occur when two companies which are 
generally of the same size pool their resources to form a new company. The merged 
companies lose their identity and they no longer operate individually. This is 
generally referred to as 'the 'merger of equals'. However a merger of this kind may 
not take place in practice and yet it may be named so, with the objective of satisfying 
and benefitting fi-om various legal and taxation provisions and also to make the 
merger appear more palatable and pleasant. It is generally observed that mergers are 
voluntary and involve stock swap or cash payment to the minor. 
A merger can be further classified into various types which are mentioned below: 
Horizontal merger: It refers to a merger between two firms which are in the same line 
or industry producing identical products. Also the companies are generally 
competitors and cater to the same market. It is carried out for enhancing economies of 
scale, scope and stocks. For example the merger between Pfizer and Warner-Lambert 
which was affected in the year 2000 was a horizontal merger that took place between 
two pharmaceutical companies^. 
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Vertical Merger: This type of merger is said to occur when two firms which deal in 
the same product at different stages of production merge. Thus, the firms basically 
produce different goods or service for the purpose of producing a common finished 
product. A major advantage of suck kind of merger is to reduce dependence on 
suppliers and also improve profitability. Standard quality of inputs, timely supply and 
control over production process is ensured. For example, the merger between Time 
Warner Incorporated, a major cable operation and the Turner Corporation which 
produces CNN, TBS and other programming in the year 1996 .^ 
Congeneric Merger: It refers to a merger between two firms which exist in the same 
industry but do not have a mutual buyer-supplier relationship. For example a merger 
between a bank and a leasing company. In this kind of merger it is generally seen that 
companies tend to share common distribution channels. Post-merger synergies are 
created which are expected to benefit both the entities. Citigroup's acquisition of 
Traveler's acquisition is a merger of such kind where both firms were involved in the 
financial services industry. However the product line and services offered by them 
were different from each other'*. 
Conglomerate Merger: These are the kind of mergers between firms which deal in 
businesses which are totally not related to each other. A conglomerate merger is 
officially defined as being "any merger that is not horizontal or vertical; in general, it 
is the combination of firms in different industries or firms operating in different 
geographic areas'''^. One example of a conglomerate merger was the merger between 
the Walt Disney Company and the American Broadcasting Company ^^^ ^'iThere are 
two kinds of Conglomerate mergers; pure and mixed. Pure conglomerate merger 
relates to merger between firms which do not have anything in common while in the 
case of a mixed conglomerate merger a product extension or market extension is 
involved. A merger of this kind is done to benefit from entry into new markets or 
expansion of product lines and gain fi-om the synergies to be created. However these 
mergers are of a complex kind and need to be executed smoothly as if the 
conglomerate becomes too large as a result of the merger or acquisition it might create 
problems for the management and the resultant firm might run into losses. 
Acquisition or takeover on the other hand may be hostile or friendly and is generally 
said to occur when a firm takes over the reins of another business house that is, it buys 
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another firm. In case of hostile takeovers the acquired firm is unwilling and against 
the proposed acquisition or the board and management is unaware of the impending 
acquisition. Friendly acquisitions are said to take place when negotiations are ent«ed 
between the target and bidding firms before the acquisition actually takes place. The 
firm that is taken over or acquired loses its identity completely and becomes a 
subsidiary of the acquiring firm. 
Generally a stronger and more powerfiil firm or entity acquires a small business, but it 
may be so that a smaller business takes over or acquires a larger and older business 
house and keeps its name. This would be termed as reverse takeover 
Basically the effect that the announcement has on the target firm's shareholders 
wealth, employee's terms, managerial team and board of directors determine whether 
the business deal is in the nature of merger or acquisition. 
1.4 Global Scenario: Mereers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
In the recent times cross border acquisitions have accelerated at a brisk pace where 
firms are looking to consolidate and restructure in order to meet the challenges of the 
globalized world. Especially since the 1990's there has been an increasing popularity 
of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) which is being preferred as a mode of 
investment over Greenfield Investment. The major reason behind it is the recent 
worldwide financial reforms which have eased trade barriers and promoted 
international mergers and acquisitions. This mode of expansion and growth is being 
increasingly used by various companies to increase their global share. Cross border 
deals provide various incentives in the form of access to newer markets, superior 
technologies, higher margins, cheaper raw materials and labor etc. It is the inherent 
desire of every undertaking to grow, develop and expand which is the major reason 
behind the increased deals. However, affecting a cross border deals is a complex 
affair and entails serious issues like cultural integration, changing laws and 
regulations etc. In order to carve out a successful deal various factors and 
determinants have to be intricately explored and studied for facilitating a successful 
merger or acquisition. 
The Researcher has highlighted the Merger and Acquisition Scenario in major 
countries through various figures and statistics below to give a brief overview of the 
global scenario. 
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USA: According to the BCG Report which was released in July 2007* there have been 
six distinct waves of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the USA since the 1990's 
and each of it was different from other in terms of features and characteristics. 
As per the report, ''At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was a drive for 
market share, followed three decades later by a longer and more ambitious wave as 
companies connected together different elements of the value chain, from raw 
materials and production through to distribution. The most recent wave, which 
started in 2004, after the internet bubble at the turn of the century and the subsequent 
downturn, is driven by consolidation motives". 
From Figure 1.4.1 we can see the six distinct merger waves that took place in the 
USA. The first wave was marked by market consolidation where the number of deals 
was also very low. The number of deals was below 5000 while the value was lower 
than US$ 500 billion. In the second wave the number of deals went up and was 
marked by vertical integration, i.e. mergers between firms engaged in the similar kind 
of business but at different stages of production. However the number of deals and 
value of deals did not register significant change over the previous period. The third 
wave involved conglomerates that are mergers between totally imrelated businesses. 
Also the number of completed deals increased significantly in this period. The 
number of deals crossed the 5000 mark while the value of deals was between US$500 
billion to US$1000 billion. The fourth wave was associated with leveraged finance 
where the number of deals increased tremendously, almost doubled. Leveraged 
finance is related to funding a company with a large proportion of debt and is 
considered a risky proposition. The present debt crisis has its roots in leverage. One 
can assume that the seeds which resulted in the present deep rooted credit crisis were 
sown almost a decade back. There was a significant jump in the number of deals and 
the value of deals that occurred in this period. Approximately 10000 to 15000 deals 
took place in this period. The value of deals on the other hand jumped up to US$ 1500 
billion. The fifth wave was the period where the number of deals completed peaked 
to the maxim\un. During this time span the 'internet bubble took place which was a 
period when the stock markets in western nations surged dramatically due to rapid 
growth in the field relating to the internet sector. It was a speculative bubble roughly 
covering the period 1998-2001. The number of deals went above 30000 while the 
value of deals was around US$ 3500 billion. The sixth and final wave saw the number 
of completed deals decline marginally where the firms undertook consolidation in 
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order to restructure, establish and regroup in order to face the enhanced competition. 
The number of deals dropped to around 25000 while the value of deals also went 
down to about US$ 3000 billion. Here we see that there has been a remarkable 
increase in the number and value of deals over the six waves highlighted in Figure 
1.4.1. 
This trend of increased mergers and acquisitions is due to various factors. The world 
economy underwent globalization and liberal regulations in terms of trade and 
commerce which hugely contributed to the increased number of deals. 
Figure 1.4.1: Six Waves of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) in USA since 1900's 
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Source: Cools , Kees "Research Report: The Brave new world of M & A - H o w to create value 
from Mergers and Acquis i t ions ," The Boston Consul t ing Group , July 2007 Retrieved from 
ht tp : / /209.83.147.85/publ ica t ions / f i les /Brave_New_WorldJVIA_Aug_2007.pdf (July 2007) 
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The Grant Thornton International Business Report has been analysed to study the 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) trend and future projections in various parts of the 
world. For the purpose 7800 PHB (Privately Held Business) from 34 economies of the 
world were undertaken^ 
Presently countries in North America are still eyeing acquisitions as a strategy to enter 
low cost markets in Asia to capitalize on the growing domestic competition. There is 
a growing interest among the entrepreneurs in USA to enter European market but 
contrary to the earlier trend where UK was used as a base, Continental Europe is now 
being used as a preferred destination. Cross border acquisitions in Canada are also on 
the rise with US continuing to be its main partner. The liquidity crisis leading to 
economic recession led to stringent economic and financial policies post 2007 but the 
market environment is still positive for the successful mid-market companies. The 
stocks became volatile and it made use borrowings for effecting deals a difficult 
option. However the crisis led to alternative modes of financing being employed in 
order to finance the deals like 'Equity Rollover' where the seller holds on to a certain 
percentage of equity in the target firm. Another mode employed is 'Seller Financing' 
through which the shortage of funds faced by the buyer is bridged. 'Eamout' is 
another tool for financing where a certain consideration is to be paid to the seller on 
the basis of the targets post-closing performance.'° 
Also the companies are eyeing major deals in Asia especially India and China which 
are registering promising growth rates and have huge unexplored economic potential. 
Deals in these countries are mainly aimed at lowering the cost of manufacturing by 
benefitting from the cheap labour services available there. At the same time USA 
continues to be an attractive merger and acquisition target for other countries due to 
its wide consumer base, conducive business and economic environment and advanced 
technologies. Being a saturated and developed market USA is not easy to enter and 
establish a base for the purpose of business. Mergers and acquisitions are being used 
as a mode of entry in this market by foreign companies. 
In Figure 1.4.2 USA stands at the second highest number after BRIC in terms of 
percentage of respondents who are planning an acquisition in the next three years. 
Canada comes at third at 42percent. The percentage for United Kingdom and Ireland 
comes at 40percent while that for mainland Europe is lower at 30percent. For the Rest 
of the World the percentage is at 28percent. Hence the figure for North America is 
very much near the global percentage of 44percent. i 
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Figure 1.4.2: Percentage of North American Respondents planning to grow 
through Acquisitions in the next three years compared to Regional Averages. 
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Source: Mergers and acquisitions: Opportunities for Global Growth; Grant Thornton 
International Business Report 2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.intemationalbusinessreport.com/files/ibr_2008_ma_report_final.pdf 
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It is interesting note that the trend and waves relating to mergers and acquisitions in 
Europe was significantly different from the one that was seen in USA. The first wave 
was during the 1920s when mergers were mainly done to enhance the level of 
production. Its main aim was to benefit fi-om the large scale economies. This wave 
resulted fi-om the advancement in technological competence during this period. The 
second wave was experienced in 1960s which resulted due to the globalization of the 
European economy. During this period it was the large companies entering in to major 
deals which led to the notion that only large companies would be able to survive, 
sustain and compete in the world economy. In the following years this concept was 
subject to widespread criticism. The third boom was centred in UK during I980's. In 
this period mergers and acquisitions were viewed and apprehended as a tool for 
corporate control, strategic management and company restructuring". There has been 
increased interest in the European market by various companies in India . 
The introduction of Europe Union in 1993 and a common currency Euro in 2002 led 
to uniformity in the legal and business fi-amework in Europe which created a positive 
investment climate. The growth in the markets has increased the level of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's). In the past few years domestic markets in central and eastern 
Europe have grown at a rapid pace and the lower labour cost is fiielling the rate of 
mergers and acquisitions in this area, it is observed that the number of hostile deals in 
Europe is very low and the transparent legislative and economic fi'amework has 
provided a major boost to the number and value of deals affected. The volume of 
deals is for the first time approaching that of American companies. However there is 
still a long way to go as the deals are majorly domestic and cross border deals have 
increased only in recent times. It is seen that 81 percent of European deals are 
domestic and UK has the highest proportion of these domestic deals that is 89 
percent'^. The changes in regulations creates an environment of uncertainty and do 
not go very well with the investors. The financing of merger and acquisition deals in 
Europe suffered a major setback due to the global recession that hit the economy in 
2007. The financial services sector of UK was boosted by the injection of liquidity 
and the takeover of some financially distressed institutions by the government. 
Figure 1.4.3 shows that in terms of cross border deals the European countries at 
40percent were much above the global percentage of 23percent. The breakings up of 
statistics show that the Netherlands seemed to be most aggressive at SOpercent. It was 
followed by Germany at 46percent and France and Greece at 42percent each. Italy 
was next at 41 percent while Sweden as lower down at 35percent. The percentage for 
Poland was the lowest at 17percent 
9 I P a g e 
Figure 1.4,3: Percentage of European Respondents anticipating an Acquisition 
who plan to grow through Cross Border Transactions in the next three years. 
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Source: Mergers and acquisitions: Opportunities for Global Growth; Grant Thornton 
International Business Report 2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.intemationalbusinessreport.com/files/ibr_2008_ma_report_final.pdf 
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UK's privately held business has been intently focussing on cross border deals 
especially in the midmarket to benefit firom the high growth with introduction of 
transparency in the legislation. Along with own fiinds, novel and innovative means of 
financing are being devised to finance the transactions in the absence of low cost debt. 
In view of the anticipated changes related to tax laws, a surge in M&A deals was seen 
in the first quarter of 2008 in order to complete the deal before these changes take 
effect. UK has had a market where investors have been confident to invest at a steady 
rate irrespective of the market conditions. Among the countries in European Union 
(EU), UK accounted for 56 percent of the cross border deals. Also in terms of the 
completed deals, UK accounted for 33 percent of all completed deals where 89 
percent were domestic.''* 
The financial recession had a deep impact on the economic activity of UK as well. 
The major reason for the fall in the number and value of deals was the fall in 
availability of credit to finance transactions and loss of confidence of investors in the 
economy. The number of deals in the first half of 2009 fell by 42 percent from the 
first half of 2008 according to Thomson Reuters'^. However, the fiiture looks bright 
with KPMG Consulting predicting growth in merger and acquisition activity in 2010 
in UK and globally. It fiirther says that the technology would register the highest 
growth among the various sectors.'^ It is seen that the European Union companies are 
the most attractive target for UK companies followed by USA and Canada. 
Manufacturing companies in EU, USA and Canada are favoured by UK companies 
over those in Asia-Pacific region. In terms of service sector companies the trend is 
opposite where UK companies favour the companies in Asia-Pacific region over those 
in the EU, USA and Canada'I 
Figure 1.4.4 highlights the level of transactions in UK. It shows the trend of deals 
taking place in UK in the mid-market. In the year 2002 the number of deals valuing 
less than US$ 200 million stood at 17percent. It increased to 21 percent in 2003 while 
it fell to 18 percent in 2004. The percentage seems to be growing at a steady pace and 
stood at 25 percent in 2007 fi-om the previous 22 percent in 2005 and 2007 reflecting 
the optimism in the market. The increasing trend is evident where the percentage is on 
the rise. The impact of global recession definitely had an impact on the number and 
value of deals that took place after 2007 though. In the fiiture private equity and serial 
entrepreneurs are expected to be important drivers for fostering growth and 
expansion. 
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Figure 1.4.4: Percentage of UK Transactions (Deal value less than US$ 200n[i) 
involving Cross Border Acquirer or Target (Percent of Business) 
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Source: Mergers and acquisitions: Opportunities for Global Growth; Grant Thornton 
International Business Report 2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.intemationalbusinessreport.coni/files/ibr_2008_ma_report_final.pdf 
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The past two decades have seen a sharp increase in the number of cross border 
mergers and acquisitions resulting from the various financial liberalization policies 
and trade agreements. This resulted in significant capital reallocation between 
countries. The motives for merger and acquisitions can be divided under the heads of 
efficiency and strategy. The efficiency motive aims at increasing the scale and scope 
of production and benefit from the economies created. On the other hand the motives 
related to strategy involve structural changes in the market which might have a 
positive impact on the operational and financial efficiencies of the companies 
involved. However it is generally seen that cross border mergers and acquisitions 
move in waves or clusters and are affected by the movement in the stock markets 
worldwide.'* Another major determinant fijelling the growth of mergers and 
acquisitions is the growth of specialised financial and consultancy institutions which 
are highly competitive and provide the necessary strategic inputs to firms interested in 
carrying out a merger or acquisition deal. 
In the past decade the year 2006 and 2007 witnessed the highest number of merger 
and acquisition deals in both developing and developed countries. A notable feature in 
this period was the increase in the number of private sector enterprises and the 
decrease in the number of public sector enterprise. The major reason behind it was the 
acquisition or merger of public sector enterprises by private enterprises''. 
With a wave of consolidation sweeping the world it is interesting to see the views of 
entrepreneurs in the Rest of the World who are planning to sell their business in order 
to foster partnerships and larger alliances. The increased demand from countries like 
India and China along with the changes in the mediiun term markets of these 
coimtries is leading to a scenario where these companies are willing to admit foreign 
companies as partners of change.^ "^  
Figure 1.4.5 highlights how the coimtries are willing to sell off their businesses in 
Australia and New Zealand where the percentage comes at 22 percent in a bid to 
expand and consolidate. Malaysia is third at ISpercent followed by South Africa at 
11 percent and Argentina at 8 percent. The percentage for Mexico and Vietnam is low 
at 3 percent while that for Japan is the lowest at 1 percent while the global percentage 
comes at 8 percent. It reveals the frend of growth of mergers and acquisitions in 
various countries where this practice is gaining acceptance and mid-market companies 
are planning to grow through merger or acquisition. 
13 I P a g e 
Figure 1.4.5: Percentage of Respondents in Rest of the World planning to sell 
their Business in the next three years 
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Source: Mergers and acquisitions: Opportunities for Global Growth; Grant Thornton 
International Business Report 2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.intemationalbusinessreport.coni/files/ibr_2008_ma_report_final.pdf 
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1,5 Indian Scenario: Mer2ers and Acquisitions (M&A 's) 
The Indian economy is firmly on a strong growth trajectory. The dynamic and 
vigorous democracy ably supported by its ambitious youth and newly emerging 
middle class has made it an economic powerhouse. 
The Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) that took place in India are specially 
associated to the financial reforms which were initiated in the year 1991. These were 
mainly targeted at reforming the Indian economy. The economy was facing an 
adverse balance payment of crisis where the foreign exchange reserves were at an 
alarmingly low level. It was then that the government took certain measures aimed at 
Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG) of the Indian economy. A new 
era of reforms was ushered in, that heralded a new beginning for our economy which 
was previously a closed and regulated economy that did not permit FDIs and FIIs. 
The Indian economy underwent sweeping changes which greatly transformed its 
structure and form. 'Size and Competence' were the watchwords and all sectors of the 
economy were gearing up to face the foreign competition at both domestic and 
intemafional levels. The businesses realized the importance of expansion and 
restructuring of enterprises. Am attempt was being made to enter new markets, 
increase scale of production, bring about innovations and newer technologies, 
improve existing products and introduce new products in order to face the competition 
and also survive the global onslaught. For the purpose Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M«&A's) was recognized as one of the most effective and potent tool in the hand of 
the corporate sector for planning and implementing long-term business strategies. The 
last decade has seen a sizeable increase in the number of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M«&A's) that have taken place.^' 
Figure 1.5.1 is a pictorial representation of the integration that occurs between various 
functions as a result of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The expected 
synergies accrue as a result of the successful integration of these functions which tend 
to complement. The Transnational Corporation (TNC) establishes its foreign affiliates 
in various countries and the subsidiaries and the apex unit are expected to 
complement each other's functional capabilities in the areas of finance, parts 
production, research and development, accovmting, procurement, training, distiibution 
etc. There are transactions related to ti-ade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
between the two. Also inter-firm and intra-firm trade in goods and services is 
facilitated between the units situated in different countries 
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Figure 1.5.1: Deep Integration as a result of Functionally Integrated 
International Production by Transnational Corporations 
Tnde and fotdin dhect iiM|^M(;|, 
Production 
ofaTMC 
Production 
ofttt 
foreign 
affniates 
Source: UNCTAD, Progranune on Transnational Coqjorations, World Investment Report 1993: 
Transnational Corporations and Integrated International Production (United Nations publication, Sales 
No.#.93.II.A.14) 
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Table 1.5.1 reveals that improvement in revenues and profitability is the most 
important objective behind a M&A deal which accoimts for 33 percent. Faster growth 
in scale and entry in new market is second most important at 28 percent. Newer 
technology acquisition is another important objective which stands at 22 percent. The 
next objective to eliminate competition and gain larger market share stands at 11 
percent followed by the objective to reduce the tax burden which accounts for 
3percent. The above discussion reveals that Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is 
basically a mode of expansion and growth in order to sustain the increased 
competition. 
Table 1.5.1: Objectives of Indian Corporate for Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) 
Objective beliind the M&A Transaction Responses 
To improve Revenues and Profitability 
Faster growth in scale and quicker time to market 
Acquisition of new technology or competence 
To eliminate competition and increase market share 
Tax shields and Investment savings 
In percentage (%) 
33% 
28% 
22% 
11% 
3% 
Source: Mantravadi, Framed and Reddy, A. Vidyadhar (2008) "Post-Merger Performance of 
Acquiring Firms fix)m Different Industries in India" International Research Journal of Finance 
and Economics ISSN 1450-2887 Issue 22 
L6 Scheme of Chapters 
The First Chapter provides a synoptic view of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
and gives a brief perspective and sheds light on the concepts related to the same. It 
gives a brief introduction of the global and domestic scenario relating to Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's). It discusses the statement of the problem and issues and goes 
on to highlight the utility and importance of the study. It also mentions the limitations 
related to the study. 
The Second Chapter discusses the legal perspective relating to Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in India and is followed by a detailed discussion of the relevant 
provisions of various Acts applicable to the same in India. It is followed by a bird's 
eye view of the procedure generally followed for effecting a Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in India. 
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The Third Chapter gives a purview of the motivation for mergers and acquisitions in 
India and discusses the environment for the same in India since 1991. The growth of 
Indian economy as an investment destination and as an acquirer in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) is further elucidated. It is followed by an elaborate discussion 
of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in various sectors in India. The impact of 
recession on the activity of deals if also highlighted. 
The Fourth Chapter provides an insight into the Global Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) and also outlines the motivations for affecting a cross border deal. It is 
followed by a sector-wide description of major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
that have taken place across various sectors. The impact of recession on the scenario 
of global merger and acquisitions is further discussed. A brief description of future 
global prospects as relating to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are also 
highlighted. 
The Fifth chapter reviews a wide and extensive literature relating to Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) and provides a critical review of the same in chronological 
order. The research gap as traced by the research scholar in the process is outlined as 
well. 
The Sixth chapter deals with the Research Design and Methodology and entails a 
description of the scope of the study. A brief discussion on the sample size and period 
of study is followed by a discussion of the objectives and hypotheses formulated for 
the study. An insight to various statistical and accounting methods used for evaluation 
of data is provided. The limitations involving the same are also discussed. 
The Seventh Chapter deals with the Indian Steel Industry and traces its growth and 
development and provides an overview of the same. It is followed by a discussion of 
the major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the Indian Steel Industry. 
The Eighth Chapter involves an in-depth analysis of five major domestic Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in the Indian Steel Industry which involve the merger of SAIL 
with Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel. The merger of SAIL with IISCO is analyzed next. 
It is followed by the study of the merger of Indian Chrome Charge Limited and Indian 
Metals and Ferro Alloys. The two takeovers analyzed involve the takeover by Bellary 
Steel by Pittsburgh and SISCOL by JSW Steel. 
The Ninth Chapter analyses three major cross border takeovers which involve the 
takeover by Tata Steel of NatSteel and Corns and Algoma Steel by Essar Steel. 
The Tenth chapter gives a brief overview of the present Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's). It then enlists the various problems faced in fostering and planning a deal. It 
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further discusses the strategies offered to counter the problems and in the end 
discusses the future prospects for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
The last and final Chapter provides the findings and sums up the work. In the end the 
Researcher suggests directions for future research. 
L7 Conclusion 
It is seen that this chapter deals with the concepts related to Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) at length. It also throws light on the global and domestic merger and 
acquisition scenario. The global scenario provides an insight to the projections 
relating to merger and acquisitions in North America, Europe and UK. The Indian 
perspective involves the study of the present conditions and also the objectives related 
to mergers and takeovers. 
The next chapter deals with the legal framework relating to Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) and provides a description and understanding of various laws and 
regulations governing Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India. 
1.8 References 
^ World Investment Report, 2000 Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and 
Development United Nations Conference on Trade and Development New York and 
Geneva, 2000 United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.00.II.D.20 
^ Pfizer, Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pfizer (22 July 2009) 
^ Fabrikant, Geraldine "Holders Back Time Wamer-Tumer Merger", Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.eom/l 996/10/11/business/holders-back-time-wamer-tumer-
merger.html, (11 October 1996) 
^ Congeneric Merger, Retrieved from 
http://www.investopedia.eom/terms/c/congeneric-merger.asp (24 May 2008) 
^ Conglomerate Merger, Retrieved from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conglomerate_merger, (24 July 2009) 
^ Campbell, R. McConnell and Stanley, L. Brue (2005), Economics, New York, 
McGraw-Hill Professional, pp. 603. 
19 I P a g e 
^ John, Leslie Livingstone and Theodore, Grossman (2001), The Portable MBA in 
Finance and Accounting, John Wiley and Sons pp. 563-564. 
* Cools, Kees "Research Report: The Brave new world of M&A - How to create 
value from Mergers and Acquisitions," The Boston Consulting Group, July 2007 
Retrieved from 
http://209.83.147.85/publications/files/Brave_New_World_MA_Aug_2007.pdf (July 
2007) 
^ Mergers and acquisitions: Opportunities for Global Growth; Grant Thornton 
International Business Report 2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.intemationalbusinessreport.com/files/ibr_2008_ma_report_final. 
'° Hogan, Joris M (2010) "Recent Financing Trends in U.S M&A Deals", Torys LLP, 
2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/AR2010-l4.pdf 
(23 May 2010) 
" Torre-Enciso, Isabel Martinez and Garcia, Javier Bilbao (1996) "Mergers and 
acquisitions Trends in Europe", International Advances in Economic Research, 
Volume 2, Number 3 / August, 1996 
•^  Ibid. p6 
^^  Campa, Jose M. and Moschieri (2008) "The European M&A Industry: Trends 
Patterns and Shortcomings", Working Paper, WP-762, September 2008. lESE 
Business School, University of Navarra, Spain 
^^Ibidp.l 
^^  Edwards, Tony and Gyring-Nielsen, Nicole (2009), " Trends in UK M&A Activity" 
Retrieved from http://www.executiveview.com/knowledge_centre.php?id=10319 (14 
September 2009) 
•^  "Reality bites but M&A market back on in 2010" Retrieved from 
http://rd.kpmg.co.uk/mediareleases/19794.htm, KPMG Report, United Kingdom, 
2009 
'^  Mohammad Faisal Ahammad and Keith W. Glaister, (2008) "Recent trends in UK 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions". Management Research News, Vol. 31 Issue: 
2, pp.86 - 98 
20 I P a g e 
'^  Coeurdacier, Nicolas (2009) "Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions: Financial 
and Institutional Forces", Working Paper Series, No. 1018, European Central Bank, 
Euro System, Germany 
'^  "Merger and Acquisition Trends" Retrieved from 
http://www.economywatch.com/mergers-acquisitions/trends.html (22 April 2009) 
°^ Ibid. p8 
^^  Mantravadi, Pramod and Reddy, A. Vidyadhar (2008), "Post-Merger Performance 
of Acquiring Firms from Different Industries in India", International Research Journal 
of Finance and Economics ISSN 1450-2887 Issue 22 
21 I P a ge 
Chapter 2 
Business Environment for Mersers and 
Acquisitions (M&A 's) in India 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Legal Perspective 
2.3 Acts Applicable to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
in India 
2.4 Legal Procedure for Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) in India 
2.5 Conclusion 
2.6 References 
Chapter 2 
Business Environment for Mersers 
and Acquisitions (M&A 's) in India 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the global 
and Indian economy. It is a tool for growth, development and expansion. However it 
is a legal process too and is subjected to various laws and regulations. The provisions 
and sections under various laws which are relevant to Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) are discussed here in order to provide an understanding about the legal 
process governing this mode of expansion. 
2.2 Lesal Perspective 
The Indian economy has predominantly been a closed economy with socialist 
regulations governing it since independence. Earlier it was marked by excessive state 
interference, public undertakings, and high degree of protection, restrictions on 
imports and export, limits on foreign capital inflows and outflows and other 
regressive policies. However, the economy faced the balance of payment of crisis in 
1991 which was caused mainly due to the fiscal imbalances traced back to the 1980's. 
As a result our foreign exchange reserves had dried up and the economy was in a 
position to finance imports for just two weeks. The foreign reserves fell to as low as 
US$ 1.2 billion in January 1991*. 
The economy was at the brink of bankruptcy and close to defaulting on the sovereign 
debt. It was then that the Central government, under the leadership of the Prime 
Minister P.V Narsimha Rao along with the Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh 
ushered in a new era for the Indian economy by introducing a host of financial 
measures. These are referred to as the Industrial Policy 1991 which came into effect 
on 24 July 1991. It aimed at opening up of the hidian economy to the private and 
foreign investors for which a host of measures were introduced. It was marked by an 
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end to industrial licensing except for a short list of industries related to security, 
strategic concerns, social reasons, hazardous chemicals and overriding environmental 
reasons, and items of elitist consumption. It was marked by the opening up of the 
economy to foreign investment, end of public monopolies, opening of passage for 
foreign technology agreements and also modifications in the MRTP Act were 
envisaged. 
The above reforms led to the creation of a liberalized India with an open economy. 
Since then various modifications and amendments have been made in various acts and 
law according to changing needs and circumstances. In this Chapter an attempt has 
been made by the Researcher to study the various laws and regulations applicable to 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India. 
2.3 Acts ApDlicable to Mer2ers and Acquisitions (M&A*s) in 
India 
The relevant Acts are discussed below which contain provisions regarding Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
2.3.1 Companies Act 1956 ^  
Section 17 deals with the special resolutions and confirmations by court required for 
alteration in the memorandum. In case of Merger and Acquisitions (M&A's) it is 
required to make a fiindamental change in the objectives, structure, functioning and 
operations of the business concern for the purpose of which alterations are required to 
be made in the Memorandvmi of Association which are to be done in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 17 of Companies Act, 1956. 
The court confirms the alteration only if it satisfied that sufficient notice has been 
duly served to all parties having an interest in the affairs of the company which might 
be affected by the alteration (Section 17 (a)). Also according to Section 17 (b) the 
court has to be also satisfied in respect of all the creditors. In case of those creditors 
who may have an objection to the proposed alteration and who makes such an 
objection to the court in the manner directed. It is required that his consent his 
obtained or his claim is settled down to the satisfaction of the court. Further the 
Registrar is to be informed and finally an order is to be received by the court in this 
regard. 
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Section 42 deals with the membership of a holding company. It provides the 
necessary provisions and arrangement relating to the membership of a holding 
company where it states that "Except in the cases mentioned in this section, a body 
corporate cannot be a member of a company which is its holding company and any 
allotment or transfer of shares in a company to its subsidiary shall be void" . Section 
108A provides for restriction on the acquisition of shares. According to it the 
approval of the central government is required for the purpose of acquisition of shares 
in a public company or a private company which is a subsidiary of the public 
company in case the proposed acquisition of shares exceed 25 percent of the paid up 
equity share capital of such an undertaking. 
The spectrum of Section 319 extends to the issues relating to the payment to 
directors etc. in connection with loss of office and transfer of undertaking or 
property. Section 391 deals with power to compromise or make arrangements with 
creditors and members. According to this section the court may order a meeting for 
making an arrangement and the outcome if sanctioned will be binding on all the 
parties concerned provided that it is filed with the Registrar and attached to all 
subsequent memorandums. Section 392 lists the powers and provisions under 
which the High Court is empowered to enforce the arrangements which are entered 
into for the purpose of which it supervises the arrangement. Section 393 deals in 
respect to the disclosure of information regarding entering into an arrangement with 
the creditors and also the associated penalties if the requisite mode of action is not 
undertaken. Section 394 deals with the provisions relating to the facilitation of 
restructuring and amalgamation of companies. The application presented to the 
court under section 391 is required to enlist the details about the proposed 
arrangement. Under section 394A a notice of all the applications received under 
Section 391 -394 are required to be sent to the Central government before passing any 
order under these sections. According to Section 395, in case the arrangement has 
within four months after the making of the offer has been approved by not less than 
9/10"' in value of shares whose transfer is involved, then a procedure is laid down by 
the court to acquire the shares of the dissenting shareholders at any time within 
two months after the expiry of the said four months. Section 396 deals with the 
powers of the Central government in providing its assent to amalgamation of 
companies and ensure that it is in the national interest. 
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At the end copies of every order under this section shall be laid before both the 
Houses of the ParHament. 
Section 396A relates to preserving the books and papers of amalgamated 
companies with or whose shares have been acquired by another company. The books 
cannot be disposed off without the prior permission of the Central Government. To 
overlook these affairs a person is appointed to examine and ascertain if the books 
contain any evidence regarding any misconduct or offence in conducting its affairs 
right from the promotion to amalgamation of its shares. 
2.3.2 Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover Resulation, 
1997* 
The Regulations under this are to be called as Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover Regulation, 1997). 
i) Chapter I: Preliminary^ 
In this Act as per Section 2 (l)(b) " 'acquirer' means any person who, directly or 
indirectly, acquires or agrees to acquire shares or voting rights in the target company, 
or acquires or agrees to acquire control over the target company, either by himself or 
with any person acting in concert with the acquirer"^ and as per 2 (1) (c) " 'control' 
shall include the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the 
management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting 
individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their 
shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements 
or in any other manner"'. Also the offer period under 2 (1)(0 is defined as " 'offer 
period' means the period between the date of entering into Memorandum of 
Understanding or the public announcement, as the case may be and the date of 
completion of offer formalities relating to the offer made under these regulations"*. 
In respect of acquisitions under clause (e)(h) and (i) of sub regulation (1), the stock 
exchanges where the shares of the company are listed have to be notified about the 
details of the proposed transaction and that too four, days in advance of the date of 
proposed acquisition in cases where the acquisition exceeds 5 percent of the voting 
share capital of the Company. As for the acquisitions under clauses (a) (b), (e) and (i) 
of sub regulation (1), the acquirer shall within 21 days of the date of acquisition give a 
detailed report to the Board along with supporting documents which would make him 
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eligible to exercise 15 percent or more of the voting rights. A fee of Rs twenty five 
thousand rupees is also required to be paid to the Board by the acquirer. 
ii) Chapter II: Disclosures of Shareholding and Control of a Listed Company^ 
In regard to the transitional provisions, Section 6(1) state that anyone holding 
shares/voting rights in excess of 5 percent is required to disclose his undertakings to 
the company within two months of the notification of the Regulation. Section 6(3) 
requires similar disclosures on the part of the promoters. Section 6(2), 6(3) list the 
requirement on the part of the companies to provide the information regarding the 
same to the concerned stock exchanges where the shares are listed. ["(2A), The stock 
exchange shall immediately display the information received fi^om the acquirer under 
sub-regulations (1) and (lA) on the trading screen, the notice board and also on its 
website.]'" 
As for the aspect of continual disclosures as per Section 8(1) (2), those holding voting 
rights or shares in excess of 15 percent including those mentioned in the Regulation 6 
are required to make yearly disclosures to the company. The same provision applies to 
the promoters. Section 8(3) (4) requires that the company is required to provide 
necessary information to the concerned stock exchanges. As per Section 8(4) ), 
"Every company whose shares are listed on a stock exchange shall maintain a register 
in the specified format to record the information received under sub-reg;ulation(3) of 
Regulation 6, sub-regulation (1) of Regulation? and sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 
8"". 
Section 9 states that the whenever required the Board has the power to ask the Stock 
Exchanges and the Companies to furnish the desired information. 
iii) Chapter III: Substantial Acquisition of Shares/voting rights in and 
Acquisition of Control over a Listed Company" 
According to Section 10 an acquirer acquiring shares or voting rights in excess of 15 
percent has to make a public announcement in accordance with the Regulation in 
order to exercise his right. Section 11(1) states that the acquirers holding more than 
15 percent and less than 55 percent cannot acquire 5 percent of additional voting 
rights unless he makes a public announcement in accordance with the Regulation. 
Section 11 (2) makes public announcement necessary for acquirers holding more than 
55 percent but less than 75 percent of shares and seeking additional voting rights. 
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However it is to be noted that, "Provided that in a case where the target company had 
obtained Hsting of its shares by making an offer of at least ten per cent. (10 percent) of 
issue size to the public in terms of clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of rule 19 of the 
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957, or in terms of any relaxation granted 
from strict enforcement of the said rule, this sub-regulation shall apply as if for die 
words and figures 'seventy five per cent. (75 percent), the words and figures 'ninety 
per cent (90 percent)' were substituted"'^. According to Section 11(3), in case of 
disinvestment of Public Sector Undertaking further announcements are not to be made 
by the acquirer at subsequent stages of acquisition provided the acquirer and seller are 
at the same stage of acquisition and all disclosures are made in the letter of offer 
issued in terms of Regulation 18 and in the first public announcement. 
"For the purposes of Regulation 10 andRegulationll, acquisition shall mean and 
include,-
(a) direct acquisition in a listed company to which the Regulations apply; 
(b) indirect acquisition by virtue of acquisition of companies, whether listed or 
unlisted, whether in India or abroad"'^. 
Section 12 states that the provisions contained herein shall not apply in cases where a 
change in control occurs as a result of a special resolution passes at the general 
meeting of the shareholders. A merchant banker who is not an associate of or group of 
the acquirer or the target company is required to be appointed by the acquirer under 
Section 13. Section 14 gives detail about the timing of the public announcement of 
the offer. 
In case the total securities held by the acquirer including Global Depository Receipts 
(GDR) and American Depository Receipts (ADR), together with voting rights exceed 
percentage specified in Regulation 10 or 11, the public announcement has to be made 
not later than four working days before the he acquires such rights according to 
Section 14(2). As per Section 14(4) where indirect acquisition or change in control is 
involved, a public announcement shall be made within the consummation of such 
rights. 
Section 15(1) states that the desired public announcement under Regulation 10, 11 or 
12 has to be made in one English daily, one Hindi daily and one Regional language 
daily with wide circulation. Also a copy of the same has to be sent to the Board 
through merchant banker, all the stock exchanges where the company's shares are 
listed and also to the target company (Section 15 (2)(i)(ii)(iii)). Section 15(4) states 
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that the offer would be assumed to be made on the date on which it appears in the 
newspapers referred in the sub-regulation 1. Section 16 states that the desired 
contents of the Public Announcement of the offer referred to in Regulation 10,11 or 
12 should contain details about the paid-up share capital, fully paid up shares, number 
of shares to be acquired by the public, minimum offer price, mode of payment, 
identity of acquirer, existing holding in the target company, salient features of 
agreement entered into , any price paid by the acquirer for shares of target company 
twelve month preceding the public announcement, object purpose and future plans 
regarding acquisition of shares, specified date mentioned in Regulation 19, date by 
which individual letters of offer would be posted to each shareholder, date of opening 
and closure of offer and also when shareholders would be informed about 
acceptance/rejection of offer, date by which payment consideration would be made, 
details about financial resources, provisions for acceptance by those who are owners 
but not registered owners of shares, statutory approval if required by any Act, 
approvals of banks and financial institutions if required, whether offer subjected to 
minimimi level of acceptance and any other relevant information. (Section 16(i) to 
(xix)). Section 17 states that the public announcement should not contain any 
misleading information. 
The letter of offer and the specified disclosures are to be filed with the Board, within 
14 days of the public announcement made under Regulation 10, 11 and 12 (Section 
18(0). The same has to be dispatched to the shareholders not earlier than 21 days from 
its submission to Board. If within these 21 days the Board asks for changes, these 
have to be made before dispatching the letter to the shareholders. Section 18(3)'^  
gives details about the fees to be submitted by the Board. 
Table: 2.3.2.1: Fees to be Submitted to the Board 
Offer Size 
Less than or equal to one crore rupees 
More than 1 crore rupees but less than or equal to five 
crore rupees 
More than five crore rupees but less than ten crore rupees 
More than ten crore rupees 
Fee (Rs) 
100000 
200000 
300000 
0.5% ofthe offer size. 
Source: Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Regulations, 1997, The Gazette of 
India Extraordinary Part ii - Section 3 - Sub Section (ii), Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI), Notified on 20 February 1997, Retrieved from 
http://www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp=SubSection&sec_id=5&sub_sec_id=5 
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The date should be specified by which the letter of offer would be sent to tiie 
shareholders which should not be later than the 30* day from date of public 
announcement (Section 19). As per Section 20 the offer price should not be lower 
than what determined as per sub- regulation (4) and (5). 
Section 20(2) gives detail about the mode of payment of offer price."The offer price 
shall be payable -
(a) in cash; 
(b) by issue, exchange and, or transfer of shares (other than preference shares) of 
acquirer company, if the person seeking to acquire the shares is a listed body 
corporate; or 
(c) by issue, exchange and, or transfer of secured instruments of acquirer company 
with a minimum 'A' grade rating from a credit rating agency registered with the 
Board; 
(d) a combination of clause (a), (b) or (c)" 
The mode of payment may be altered in case of revision of offer price and size, 
provided the amount to be paid in the formal letter has not been altered. 
As per Section 20(3), where the offer price involves consideration to be paid in form 
of securities issuance, the approval required by shareholders has to be obtained within 
seven days from the date of closure of the offer or else the consideration would have 
to be paid in cash by the acquirer. The offer price shall be the highest of the 
negotiated price under the agreement, price paid by acquirer or someone acting in 
concert with him by way of allotment in a public or rights or preferential issue or the 
average of the weekly high or low of the closing price of the shares of target on the 
stock exchanges where its shares are most frequently fraded (Section 20(4)). 
Section 20(5) provides for the shares those are not frequently traded. The offer price 
would be determined taking into account the negotiated price xmder sub regulation 1 
of Regulation 14 or highest price paid by the acquirer or persons acting in concert 
with him for acquisition by way of allotment in public/rights/preferential issue or on 
basis of return on worth, book value of shares of target company. Earning per Share, 
Price earning multiple vis-a-vis industry average. Section 20(6) states that in case of 
disinvestment of Public Sector Undertaking whose shares are not very frequently 
traded, minimum offer price shall be what the successful bidder pays, arrived after the 
process of competitive bidding to Central/State government. In case after the public 
announcement, the acquirers obtain shares from the open market negotiation or 
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otherwise at a price higher than the offer price as in the offer letter, the offer price 
paid for such acquisition shall be payable to all acceptances received under the offer 
(Section 20(7)). Section 20(8) states that in respect of incomplete agreements any 
payment made to the persons other than the target company in excess of 25 percent of 
offer price arrived under sub regulation (4), (5) or (6) shall be added to the offer price. 
Section 20(9) states that in cases where in lieu of cash payment, shares or secured 
instruments of acquired company are acquired then their value shall be determined by 
an independent merchant banker or chartered accountant. The difference between the 
offer price and amount due towards calls-in-arrear or calls remaining unpaid with 
interest shall be deemed as the calculated price for the offer price for partly paid up 
shares (Section 20 (10)). The offer letter must clearly explain the justification on the 
basis on which the price has been calculated (Section 20 (11)). In case of indirect 
acquisition or control the offer price has to be determined with reference to the date of 
the public announcement and announcement for acquisition of shares of the target 
company, whichever is higher, in accordance with sub-regulation (4) or sub-
regulation (5). 
The provisions for 'Acquisition price imder Creeping Acquisition' according to 
Section 20A state the following 
(1) An acquirer who has made a public offer and seeks to acquire further shares under 
sub-regulation (1) of regulation 11 shall not acquire such shares during the period of 6 
months from the date of closure of the public offer at a price higher than the offer 
price. 
(2) Sub-regulation (1) shall not apply where the acquisition is made through the stock 
exchanges'^. 
The details of Section 21 are given here. Section 21(1) deals with the number of 
shares to be acquired and it states that the shareholders of the target company have to 
be given a minimum public offer of 20 percent of voting capital of the company by 
the acquirer. In case as per the listing agreement the minimum level required 
regarding the public shareholding in the target company is not met then necessary 
provisions and steps have to be taken by the acquirer in this regard. (Section 21 (2)). 
Section 21 (3) deals with the minimum size of the public offer made under sub 
regulation 2A of Regulation 11, which has to be lesser than 20 percent of voting 
capital or a lesser percentage of voting capital of company that would enable the 
acquirer and those persons acting in concert with him to maximize their holdings in 
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case there is full subscription. As per Section 21(4) the option available to tfie 
acquirer should be clearly mentioned as per sub regulation (3). 
Section 21(5) states that, "For the purpose of computing the percentage referred to 
sub-regulation (1) and (3) the voting rights as at the expiration of [fifteen] days after 
the closure of the public offer shall be reckoned". Section 21 (6) states that the person 
offering to buy shares would acquire them on proportionate basis in consultation vn&i 
the merchant banker if shares offered for sale by shareholders are more than what he 
offered to buy. However, the offer may be conditional on the level of acceptance 
according to Section 21A (1). Subject to the provisions of sub-regulation (8) of 
Regulation 22, an acquirer or any person acting in concert with him may make an 
offer conditional as to the level of acceptance which may be less than twenty per cent. 
Provided that where the public oifer is in pursuance of a Memorandum of 
Understanding it shall contain a condition to the effect that in case the desired level of 
acceptance is not received the acquirer shall not acquire any shares under the 
Memorandum of Understanding and shall rescind the offer. 
Provisions of Section 22 deal with the following aspects. The obligations of the 
acquirer are mentioned in Section 22(2) which states that only when the acquirer is in 
a position to implement the offer, he shall make a public announcement to acquire the 
shares. Within fourteen days of public announcement a copy of the draft letter has to 
be sent to the Board of Directors of the target company and stock exchanges where 
the target company is listed (Section 22 (2)). The target company has to send a copy 
to all its registered shareholders within 45 days of the announcement of public offer 
(Section 22 (3)). While the date of opening up of the offer shall not be later than 55* 
day from date of public announcement, the offer to acquire shall be open for 20 days 
(Section 22 (4) (5)). All announcements, offers, brochures should clearly state an 
undertaking on the part of the directors that they take responsibility for the 
authenticity of the information (Section 22 (6)), Also during the offer period, the 
acquirer or persons acting in concert with him should not be part of the Board 
(Section 22 (7)). According to Section 22 (8), where the offer is made upon the 
minimum level of acceptances, the acquirer or any person acting in concert with him 
may acquire shares to the extent of minimum percentage specified in sub regulation 
(1) of Regulation 21, whether or not the offer received response to the minimum level 
of acceptances. However this clause would not be applicable in cases where the 
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acquirer has paid 50 percent of the amount to be received under the public offer in the 
escrow account. 
Also they cannot acquire shares in the target company during the offer period except 
by fresh issue of shares (Regulation 3) and would be liable for forfeiture of escrow 
accovmt in case of non compliance of regulations. (Section 22 (8) (ii) (iii)). As per 
Section 22 (9), an insider within the meaning of Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 if on the Board shall not participate in 
matters relating to issues concerning the offer. 
The escrow account has to be created on or before the date of issue of public 
announcement of the offer (Section 22 (10)) and the acquirer shall ensure that 
financial arrangements and necessary disclosures for public offers are duly made 
(Section 22 (11)). The formalities relating to the offer have to be made within 15 days 
of the closure of the offer (Section 22 (12)). As per Section 22 (13), if statutory 
approvals are not obtained due to the acquirers fault, the escrow amount is liable to be 
forfeited and he would be also liable for the penalties prescribed under the Regulation. 
Section 22 (14) states that no offer for acquisition of shares of the target company can 
be made for six months in case of withdrawal of offer in terms of the Regulations. 
Where the obligations of Chapter III and IV are not met, the acquirer cannot make an 
offer for acquisition of shares of any listed company for twelve months from date of 
closure of offer (Section 22 (15)). If acquirer's shareholding increases beyond 15 
percent, then it should be provided by him that in case of non-fulfilment of any clause 
of the Regulation, the agreement for sale shall not be acted upon by him. Section 22 
(16) states that within twenty-four hours of acquisition, the acquirer or persons acting 
in concert have to provide a detailed information to stock exchanges where its shares 
are listed if they acquire shares (imder sub regulation (7) of Regulation 20) at a price 
equal, less or more of offer price and also quantity, price, percentage and mode of 
acquisition. The stock exchanges would further publish the information for the public 
(Section 22 (17). If the acquirer has not stated about his intention of disposing or 
encumbering any assets of target company in the public announcement or letter of 
offer that other than in the ordinary course of business where he has acquired control, 
he shall be debarred from disposing or encumbering the assets of the target company 
for a period of two years from the date of closure of the public offer (Section 22 (18)). 
As per Section 22 (19) the acquirer and the persons acting in concert with him are to 
be collectively held responsible for the due compliance of the provisions of the 
Regulations. 
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There are various obligations to be fulfilled by the Board of Directors and there are 
also various restrictions placed on the Board of Directors of the company afto" the 
public announcement of the offer till the approval of the general body of the 
shareholders is obtained. They cannot sell, transfer, encumber or dispose off any of 
the assets of the company or issue any un-issued securities or enter into any material 
contracts. (Section 23(1) (a) (b) (c)). As per Section 23(2) within seven days of the 
request of the acquirer or within seven days from the specified date, the tai^et 
company is required to furnish all the relevant details about the registered 
shareholders, warrant holders or convertible debenture holders eligible for 
participation. 
According to Section 23 (3), after the public announcement the Board of Directors 
cannot fill any casual vacancy with a person having an interest in the acquirer till the 
date of certification firom the merchant banker (Section 23 (3) (a)). Also if a person 
having an interest in the acquirer is already on the Board, he should not be allowed to 
participate in any matters relating to the offer (Section 23 (2) (b)). Under the 
provisions of Section 23(4), the Board of Directors may also send their unbiased 
opinions about the offer to the shareholders and at the same time facilitate the acquirer 
in verification of the securities which are tendered for acceptances (Section 23 (5)). 
Section 23 (6) states that when the requirements of the Regulation are fulfilled and a 
certificate has been received by the merchant banker towards the same, the Board 
should take appropriate measures to facilitate the transfer and also make necessary 
arrangements in Board of Directors to give adequate control to the acquirer over the 
company. 
According to Section 24 general obligations of merchant banker under Section 24 (1) 
provide that before the announcement of the public offer he should ensure that the 
acquirer is in a position to implement the offer, escrow account provisions are 
fulfilled, necessary arrangement of funds to make payment has been made, public 
offer is in terms of Regulation and the previous shareholding in the target firm are 
disclosed. Section 24 (2) states the merchant banker is required to provide a diligence 
certificate to the Board along with the draft letter of offer. Timely filing of public 
announcement and letter of offer and also ensuring that it is duly dispatched to all the 
relevant stock exchanges is also the duty of the merchant banker whose job is to 
ensure due compliance of the regulations. On fulfilment of these the merchant banker 
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directs the bank for the release of the escrow account to the acquirer and send a report 
to the Board within 45 days from the date of closure of the offer. 
The provisions relating to competitive bidding are enlisted in Section 25* . According 
to Section 25 (i), in case a person other than the acquirer is desirous of making an 
offer, he shall within 21 days of the announcement of the first public offer make his 
offer. According to Section 25 (3), as for the number of shares the competitive offer 
should "at least be equal to the holding of the first bidder including the number of 
shares for which the present offer by the first bidder has been made". The acquirer 
who made the first public offer has an option to revise his offer within 14 days of the 
competitive bid announcement. For the competitive bids made under the sub-
regulation (1), the same provisions shall mutatis-mutandis apply (Section 25 (5). 
Modifications in the public offer can also be made seven days before the closure of 
the offer as per Section 25 (6). The date of closure of public offer shall be the closing 
date of all competitive bids (Section 25 (7)). Section 26 states that irrespective of the 
competitive bidding, upward revisions in the offer can be made by the acquirer. 
The provisions about the withdrawal of the offer are contained in Section 27. Section 
27 (1) states that a offer cannot be withdrawn except when statutory approval has 
been refused, sole acquirer has died or the circumstances are such that the Board 
allows withdrawal. As per Section 27 (2), if such a withdrawal is made then a public 
announcement of the same has to be made in the newspaper along with the reason and 
simultaneously the Board has to be informed along with the stock exchange where its 
shares were listed and the target company's registered office. 
Section 28 deals with all relevant matters relating to the escrow account. For the 
purpose of the security of the performance of the obligations under the Regulation, the 
acquirer is required to submit an amoimt in the escrow accoimt, such sum as specified 
in sub regulation 2. Section 28 (2) gives details about its calculations which are as 
follows: 
"(a) For consideration payable under the public offer, - up to and including Rs.lOO 
crores - 25 percent; exceeding Rs.lOO crores - 25 percent up to Rs.lOO crores and 10 
percent thereafter. 
(b) For offers which are subject to a minimum level of acceptance, and the acquirer 
does not want to acquire a minimum of 20 percent, then 50 percent of the 
consideration payable under the public offer in cash shall be deposited in the escrow 
amount". 
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Section 28 (3) states, that the total consideration is calculated assuming full 
acceptances and at higher price if offer is subject to differential pricing. 
The escrow account mentioned in sub regulation (1) should consist of cash deposited 
with a scheduled commercial bank or bank guarantee in favour of the merchant 
banker or deposit of acceptable securities with appropriate margin, with the mCTchant 
banker or cash, deposited with a scheduled commercial bank in case of clause (b) of 
sub-regulation (2) of this Regulation (Section 28 (4). Section 28 (5) empowers the 
merchant banker to instruct the bank to issue banker's cheque or demand draft for the 
amount in the escrow account as provided in the Regulation. As per Section 28 (6), 
where escrow account consists of bank guarantee it should be in favour of merchant 
banker and be valid firom announcement of public offer to twenty days after the 
closure. Section 28 (7) authorizes the merchant banker to effect the sale of securities, 
where the escrow account consists of securities. In case of loss he would be required 
to make good the loss from his own pocket. As per Section 28(8) the guarantee and 
security would not be returned by the merchant banker until the completion of all the 
obligations. Section 28 (9) provides that the value of escrow accoxmt shall be raised 
by 10 percent in case of upward revision of the offer. Sections 28 (10) states that the 
acquirer has also to deposit 1 percent of total consideration as security. Section 28 
(12) discusses about the release of the escrow account. It can be withdrawn in terms 
of Regulation 27 if certified by the merchant banker (Section 28 (12) (a) and by 
transfer to special account as per sub regulation 1 of Regulation 29. the amount 
transferred shall not exceed 90 percent of the cash deposit made under clause (a) of 
sub-regulation(2) of this regulation. As per Section 28 (12) (c)) the balance of 10 per 
cent of the cash deposit made under clause (a) of sub-Regulation (2) of this 
Regulation or the cash deposit made under sub (10)] of this Regulation can be 
withdrawn by the acquirer when all the provisions under the Regulation are fulfilled 
and a certificate towards the same has been given by the merchant banker. Upon the 
fulfilment of all the obligations the amoimt under the escrow account can be 
withdrawn by the acquirer as per Section 28 (12) (d). 
Section 28 (12) (e) provides that in case where the obligations are not fulfilled, the 
amount is forfeited and the merchant banker has entrusted to distribute it. One-third is 
provided to the target company, one-third to the regional stock exchange and the 
residual one-third to the shareholders who accepted the offer. 
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Section 29 provides that within seven days of the closure of the offer the acquirer is 
required to submit the account in a special account registered with the Board y/luch 
together with 90 percent of amount lying in escrow account makes for the amount due 
to the shareholders as consideration for acceptances received (Section 29 (1)). As per 
Section 29 (2), the unclaimed amount would be transferred to investor protection fund 
of Regional Stock Exchange of Target Company. In cases where consideration is to 
be paid through securities the acquirer should ensure that they are dispatched to tfie 
shareholders (Section 29 (3)). 
iv) Chapter IV; Bailout Takeovers " 
The provisions of Section 30 cover aspects relating to acquisitions of a 'financially 
weak company', though not categorized as a sick unit under a scheme of financial 
restructuring approved by a lead institution which is entrusted with ensuring 
compliance of the regulations (Section 30 (2)). For the purpose it will do deep 
assessment of the financial viability and needs of the concern to be acquired. A 
scheme for revival is to be drawn which is also to protect the interests of the minority 
shareholders (Section 30 (3)). Details about the scheme regarding outright purchase or 
exchange of shares or a combination of both are to be governed under Section 30 (5). 
As per the Act for the purpose of this chapter, "the expression "financially weak 
company" means a company, which has at the end of the previous financial year has 
accvmiulated losses, which has resulted in erosion of more than 50 percent but less 
than 100 percent of its net worth as at the beginning of the previous financial year, 
that is to say, of the sum total of the paid-up capital and fi"ee reserves"*'. 
The manner of acquisition of shares is explained under Section 31. Section 31 (1) 
states that at least three parties are given the offer of the acquisition and one of them 
is selected by analyzing the financial, technical and managerial capabilities (Section 
31(2)). Details are fijrnished to the bidders about the financially weak company as and 
when required by them (Section 31 (3)). According to the Section 33 the person 
selected by the lead institution for acquiring shares has to make a formal application 
to the promoters, management, financial institutions citing the negotiated price and 
other relevant details. According to Section 34, a person acquiring shares has to make 
a formal announcement containing all the relevant details about the acquisition and a 
copy of the same has to be forwarded to the shareholders, promoters and management 
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(Section 34 (3)). In case public shareholdings reduces to below 10 percent of voting 
rights, the acquirer may make an offer to buy the outstanding shares with the 
shareholders within three months of the closure of the public offer (Section 34 (4) (a)) 
or undertake to disinvest through offer for sale or fresh issue of capital to fulfil listing 
requirements (Section 34 (4) (b). As per Section 34(7), "While accepting the offer 
from the shareholders other than the promoters or persons in charge of the financially 
weak company or the financial institutions, the person acquiring shares shall offer to 
acquire from the individual shareholder his entire holdings if such holding is up to 
hundred shares of the face value of rupees ten each or ten shares of the face value of 
rupees hundred each." . 
Section 35 deals with situations arising from competitive bidding. Once the lead 
institution has accepted the bid of the acquirer and a public formal announcement is 
made, no competitive bid shall be entertained other than by promoters or persons in 
charge of the financially weak company. 
For seeking exemption from the provisions of Chapter III, all the relevant offers made 
under the Regulation 30 have to be notified to the Board through an application. For 
the purpose the Board may seek all relevant information (Section 36(2)). In case the 
shares of a financially weak company are proposed to be acquired by a State level 
Public Financial Institution, Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) shall ensure 
the compliance of these regulations (Section 37). 
v) Chapter V: Investigation and Action bv the Board '^ 
Under Section 38 an investigating officer may be appointed to look into any 
complaints received from investors, intermediaries or any other person involving 
substantial acquisition of shares and takeovers. Investigation is done to find out if 
there is any breach of regulation in order to protect the interests of the investors and 
also ensure due compliance of the provisions of the Act and the Regulations. 
Under Section 39, a 10 day notice has to be given to the acquirer, seller, target 
company, merchant banker as the case may be. However in the interest of the 
investors the Board may authorize the investigation without a notice. All the 
concerned parties are required to discharge their obligations under Section 40 which 
includes supplying all relevant documents, records, information etc. For the purpose 
they have to allow the investigating officer access to the premises and also extend 
reasonable facilities for the same (Section 40(2)). The investigating officer shall 
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submit his report to the Board after the investigation. He might submit interim reports 
if directed (Section 41). The findings of the investigating officers are communicated 
to the acquirer, seller, target company, merchant banker as the case may be and tfiey 
are also given an opportunity to be heard under Section 42(1). Appropriate measures 
are to be taken by the concerned parties as directed by the Board (Section 42 (2)). 
The Board may also appoint a qualified auditor to look into the af^urs 
notwithstanding anything contained in the Regulation (Section 43). The Directions by 
the Board are provided under Section 44 where the Board may direct appointment of 
merchant bankers for carrying out disinvestment of shares (Section 44(a)), direct 
transfer of securities or proceeds to the investor protection fund of a recognized stock 
exchanges (Section 44 (b)), cancel shares where acquisition are in breach of 
Regulation 10, 11, 12 (Section 44 (c)), direct target company to not give effect or 
fi-eeze transfers of shares acquired in violation of Regulation 10, 11, 12 (Section 44 
(d)), debar a person from accessing capital market or dealing in securities for a 
specified period (Section 44(e)), direct a person to make a public offer to the 
shareholders of target company to acquire shares of a certain number at a price 
determined by the Board (Section 44(f)), direct disinvestment of shares for disclosure 
requirement under Regulation 6,7,8 (Section 44(e)), direct the concerned person not to 
dispose the assets of the target company (Section 44(h). 
Penalty for non-compliance under Section 45 lists the actions to be undertaken 
against the violations of the Act, which might involve forfeiture of the whole or part 
of amount in the escrow amount (Section 45(2)). The Board of Directors shall also be 
liable for action if found guilty (Section 45(3)). 
The registration certificate of the intermediary found violating the regulations might 
also be suspended as per the procedure of the Regulation (Section 45(4)). The 
intermediaries may be held responsible for any misstatement or concealment of 
material information to shareholders. 
As per Section 45(6), "the penalties referred to in sub-regulation (1) to (5) may 
include-
(a) criminal prosecution under section 24 of the Act; 
(b) monetary penalties under section 15 H of the Act; 
(c) directions under the provisions of Section 1 IB of the Act. 
(d) directions under section 11(4) of the Act; 
(e) cease and desist order in proceedings under section 1 ID of the Act; 
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(f) adjudication proceedings under section 15HB of the Act." 
An appeal may be made by the aggrieved persons to the Securities Appellate Tribunal 
under Section 46^ .^ Section 47 deals with aspects relating to Repeal and Saving and 
as per Section 47(1), "The Securities and Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of 
Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, [1994] are hereby repealed." 
It shall be deemed that all actions taken, exemptions granted, applications made, 
appeals preferred to Central Government and all other measures are strictly done 
under the corresponding provisions. 
2.3.3 The Competition Act 2002^^ 
As per the Competition Act in the event of an acquisition of one or more enterprises 
by one or more persons or merger or amalgamation of companies is considered as a 
combination as per Section 5, if the parties involved in the acquisition, which 
includes the acquirer and also the entity or the enterprise which has been acquired or 
is being acquired jointly have in India assets of a value exceeding one thousand crores 
or a turnover of more than three thousand crores (Section 5 (a) (i) (A). The persons 
involved should fulfil the above condition or they should have in India or outside 
India assets valuing more than US$ 500 million or a turnover exceeding US$ 1500 
million(Section 5 (a) (i) (B) or as per Section 5 (a) (ii), the group which is being 
formed s a result of the amalgamation or merger would post-acquisition have in India 
assets valuing more than Rs 4000 crores or have a turnover exceeding Rs 1200 crores 
(Section 5 (a) (ii) (A)) or the group as per Section 5 (a) (ii) (B)should have assets 
aggregating over US$ 2 billion or a turnover of more than US$ 6 billion in India or 
outside India. 
Section 5 (b) (i) enlists the various provisions involved in cases where the person who 
is acquiring control already has a direct or indirect control over another enterprise 
engaged in production, distribution, trading of similar businesses. In these cases 
according to Section 5 (b) the enterprise to be acquired and the enterprises over which 
the acquirer already has an indirect or direct control should jointly have in India assets 
aggregating more than Rs 1000 crores or a turnover of more than Rs3000 crores as 
per Section 5 (b) (i) (A) or as per Section 5 (b) (i) (B) assets grossing more than US$ 
500 million or a turnover exceeding US$ 1500 million in India or outside India. 
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As per Section 5 (b) (ii), the group that has undertaken the acquisition should jointly 
have or after the acquisition should jointly have assets in India of a value exceeding 
Rs 4000 crores or a turnover of more than Rs 12000 crores (Section 5 (b) (ii) (A) or as 
per Section 5 (b) (ii) (B) have in India or outside India assets of a value of moreAan 
US$ 2 billion or a turnover exceeding US$ 6 billion. 
As per section 5 (b) (ii) (C), the merger or amalgamation as a result of whidi an 
enterprise is created should have in India assets valuing more than Rs 1000 crores or a 
turnover that is exceeding Rs 3000 crores or it should have in India or outside India 
assets aggregating more than US$500 million or a turnover of more than US$ 1500 
million. As per Section 5 (b) (ii) (C) (ii) the group that has been created as a result of 
the merger of the enterprise should or would have in India assets valuing more than 
Rs 4000 crores or a turnover of more than Rs 12000 crores or should have in India or 
outside India assets of a value of more than US$ 2 billion or a tximover exceeding 
US$ 6 billion. 
As per Competition Act 2002, the term group implies, "two or more enterprises 
which, directly or indirectly, are in a position to — 
(i) exercise twenty-six per cent, or more of the voting rights in the other enterprise; or 
(ii) appoint more than fifty percent, of the members of the board of directors in the 
other enterprise; or 
(iii) control the management or affairs of the other enterprise;" 
Section 6 of the Act lists the various guidelines of the prescribed framework that 
regulates the various combinations in India. According to section 6(1) if in case of a 
combination an enterprise is likely to have an adverse impact on the level of 
competition in the market it would not be allowed and any such combination would 
be declared as void. 
Section 6 (1) fiirther gives details about the relevant procedures to be followed by 
those whose propose to enter into a combination. For the purpose a notice is to be 
given to the commission along with the relevant fees and required details involving 
the proposed combination which has to be duly provided within seven days of the 
approval of the merger to be undertaken under Section 5 (c) by the Board of Directors 
of the concerned enterprises relating to the merger or amalgamation undertaken 
(Section 6 (2) (a). According to Section 6 (2) (b) all relevant documents related to the 
execution of the agreement under various appropriate sections have to be duly 
furnished. Section 6 (3) provides that the commission should deal with the notice 
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received relating to the proposed combination as per Section 29, 30 and 31. Section 6 
(4) states that the provisions should not apply to subscription of shares or financing by 
a public financial institution, foreign institutional investor, bank or venture capital 
fiind under a loan or investment agreement. 
Section 6(5) gives details about the requirements to be fiilfilled by the financial 
agencies referred above in Section 6 (4). These have to within 7 days ft"om the date of 
acquisition provide all the necessary and relevant details to the commission. 
2.3.4 The Foreien Exchan2e ManasementAct. 1999 (FEMA)" 
The process of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) especially the cross border deals 
involve foreign exchange transactions. Hence it is most appropriate to discuss a 
synoptic view of the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999 which was 
formulated as an improvement over the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 
1973 in order to facilitate external trade and payments and also promote the 
development and maintenance of the foreign exchange market in India on 29 
December, 1999. The Act extends to the whole of India and also to all branches, 
offices and agencies located outside India but owned but by an Indian citizen and 
came to force on 1 June, 2000. According to Section 3 of this Act, no person shall 
engage himself in any dealing relating to transfer of foreign exchange or foreign 
security with a person who is not authorized. No transaction should be made to or to 
the credit of a person who is not resident in India. Also the Act clearly disallows 
receipt of any payment on behalf of or by the order of a person who is not resident in 
India. Financial transactions done in India in relation to acquisition or creation of 
transfer of a right to acquire an asset outside India by any person is also prohibited by 
the Act. Apart from provisions duly provided for in the Act holding of foreign 
exchange, foreign security and immovable property outside India is also clearly 
disallowed. Current account transactions in a manner approved through an authorized 
person is allowed, provided there are no restrictions imposed by the RBI in this regard 
(Section 5). 
As per Section 6 a person may enter into capital account transactions involving 
foreign exchange but only through authorized persons. In consultation with the RBI, 
Central Government issues regulations regarding these capital account transactions as 
per Section 6 (3). However as per Section 6 (4) a person resident in India might be 
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allowed to hold foreign currency, security or immovable property outside India if he 
owned it when he was a resident outside India or he inherited it by a person who is 
resident outside India. In the same way a person who is resident outside India might 
be allowed to own Indian currency, security or immovable property if he owned it 
when he was a resident of India or he inherited by someone who was resident in India 
as per Section 6 (5). The Reserve Bank of India without any discretion might put 
restrictions on the operations of a branch or office by a resident outside India. 
Section 7 provides the various provisions and measures to be undertaken by exporters 
of goods and services which include providing all the relevant details about the goods 
to be exported and also the value to be realised for the same. All relevant information 
required for realization of the export proceeds should also be provided. Section 8 
states that in case of persons to whom foreign exchange is to be accrued, shall take all 
reasonable measures to realize and repatriate it in the manner specified within the 
stipulated period. Section 9 provides detail about certain exceptional situations where 
provisions of Section 4 andS are exempted. For example, foreign exchange is allowed 
to be held in certain permissible limits or in a limit that is specified by the RBI or that 
received as gift or inheritance or through legitimate employment or through other 
means as specified by the RBI. RBI is empowered under Section 10 to authorize a 
person to deal in foreign exchange on the basis of an application received in this 
regard. The authorization should be in written and duly comply all the provisions. 
RBI may also revoke such authorization for a reason it deems fit and a reasonable 
opportimity to be heard is required to be provided to the authorized person in this 
regard. The person authorized to deal in foreign exchange has to be utmost careful in 
his operations and take due care that his operations are not in contravention of any 
provisions laid down in this regard. 
As per Section 12, RBI can make inspections and examine operations of the persons 
so authorized and the latter are required to fiimish all particulars and information in 
this regard. Section 13 to 15 gives details about the penalties and provisions imposed 
in cases where above regulations are no complied with. In case of companies if a 
person violates any of the provision then the person who is in charge or at the helm of 
affairs at the time the contravention took place, would be held responsible. Both him 
and the company would be guilty and would be liable for prosecution and imposition 
of penalties as specified. However, such person would not be liable for punishment if 
he proves that the violation that took place was not in his knowledge and on his part 
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he carried out his duties with due dihgence. If he fails to prove so, he would be 
deemed to be held guilty for the contravention and would be punished accordingly. 
Section 36 and 37 enlists the various provisions relating to the establishment of the 
Directorate of Enforcement and also the various powers provided regarding 
investigation of Acts that are not in compliance with the provisions of this Act. 
2.3.5 Securities Contracts (Reeulation) Act. 1956^^ 
According to Section 13 of this Act, the Central Government has the power to 
evaluate the contracts that take place on the basis of the nature and volume of the 
transactions in the securities and if it feels that there are certain elements that are 
against the provisions of the Act it may through a notification in the Official Gazette 
declare it as illegal. Section 14 deals with the circumstances under which the 
contracts in notified areas can be declared void if it is in contravention with the bye-
laws mentioned under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 9 irrespective of the fact 
that whether the person has entered into such contract having knowledge of the bye 
laws or not. 
As per Section 15 a member of a recognized stock exchange shall not enter into any 
contract with a person other than a member of a recognized stock exchange as 
principal otherwise he would have to obtain the consent of such person and disclose in 
the memorandum that he is acting as a principal. Such confirmation has to be obtained 
within three days fi-om the date of the contract. 
As per Section 16, the Central Government has the power to prevent undesirable 
speculations in any area or State. For the purpose of which it may issue a notification 
in the Official Gazette disallowing any person to enter into a contract in a specified 
manner in a manner mentioned therein 
. Section 21 gives details about the various provisions relating to the listing of 
securities in the recognized stock exchanges. Section 21A deals with the various 
provisions relating to delisting of securities. 
The penalties imposed for non-compliance of regulations under the Act are dealt with 
under Section 23. 
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2.3.6 The Securities And Exchanee Board Of India Act 1992 (SEBI) 
(No.15 Of 1992), 4 April. 199f^ 
This act was mainly framed to duly safeguard to provide protection and guard the 
interests of the investors and also promote the development of the market. Regulation 
of the Securities market and other corresponding matters are also dealt with here. 
CHAPTER VA 
As an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 the 
Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Amendment) Act, 2002 was passed and it 
was to be deemed to have come on force on the 29"* day of October, 2002.This deals 
with the provisions relating to prohibition of manipulative and deceptive devices, 
insider trading and substantial acquisition of securities or control. 
As per Section 12A it shall be ensured that no manipulative or deceptive device or 
any other measure which violates the provisions of the Act in relation to the issue 
purchase or sale of any securities which is listed or proposed to be listed on a 
recognized stock exchange. The section also prohibits all measures relating to any 
defraud in connection with the issue of securities which are listed or proposed to be 
list on a recognized stock exchange. All practises or course of business which act or 
might act as deceit for any person involved are also prohibited in this Section. Insider 
trading and dealing in securities while having material or non-public information or 
commxmication of such person in a way that is against the provisions of this Act is 
also prohibited in this Section. Acquiring control of a company or securities which 
proportionately is more than the equity share capital of the company whose shares are 
hsted or proposed to be listed on the stock exchange is also disallowed in this section. 
According to Section 15H if a person fails to disclose his shareholding before 
acquiring shares in a body corporate or fails to make a public announcement 
regarding acquiring offer to the shares at a minimum price or make a public offer by 
sending a letter of offer to the shareholders of the company concerned or make 
payment to the shareholders who sold their shares as per the letter of offer they 
received, shall be liable to a penalty up to twenty five crores or three times the amount 
of profit as a result of failure to do the above whichever is higher. 
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2.3.7 Securities And Exchanee Board Of India (Disclosure And 
Investor Protection) Guidelines. 200(f^ 
These guidelines have been issued by the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
under Section 11 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. These 
Guidelines may be called the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Disclosure and 
Investor Protection) Guidelines, 2000. These guideline are applicable to all the public 
issue by both the listed and the unlisted companies. These are also applicable to all the 
listed companies for offers of sale and rights issue whose equity share capital is listed 
except in the cases where the aggregate value of securities is less than Rs 50 lacs. In 
these cases a letter of offer is prepared and the same is filed with the Board for 
providing the requisite information and putting it on the SEBI website. Except in 
cases where explicably stated these guidelines are also applicable to all offers to the 
public by the unlisted companies. 
According to Section 2(2)(4), in case of equity shares or any other security that can be 
converted into equity shares of a company in future an offer for sale cannot be made 
unless the provisions which are laid down in clause 2.2.2 or 2.2.2 whichever 
applicable and in clause 2.2.2A are satisfied. 
According to Clause 8.3.5.1.1, an unlisted company might request the Board to 
exempt it from the provisions of the clause (b) to sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 of the 
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957 for the purpose of listing of its shares 
without making an initial public offer if it satisfies the following conditions. Under a 
scheme of reconstruction or amalgamation vinder the Companies Act 1956, which is 
approved by the High Court the shares of the unlisted company (transferee) have been 
allotted to the holders of a listed company that is the transferor. The unlisted 
company which is the transferee and is seeking listing should have a 25 percent of the 
paid up share capital, post scheme allotted to the shareholders of the listed transferor 
company and the unlisted company has not issued/reissued any shares which are not 
covered under this scheme. The above calculation of 25 percent paid up capital should 
be made taking into consideration any outstanding warrants, instruments or 
agreements the holder of which has a right to take up shares in the unlisted transferee 
company. The share certificates in relation to the above scheme should have been 
dispatched to the shareholders or they should be marked as the beneficial owner in the 
depositories. 
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2.3.8 Securities And Exchange Board of India (Delistine Of 
Securities) Guidelines - 2003^^ 
These guidelines were issued under Section 11(1) of SEBI Act, 1992. These are read 
with sub-section (2) of Section llA of SEBI Act. Its primary objective is to protect 
the interests of the investors in the securities market. 
These guidelines primarily apply to the delisting of the securities of the company and 
shall apply to the voluntary delisting being wanted by the promoter or acquisition of 
shares by the promoters or any other person such that the public shareholding falls 
below the minimum limit specified in the listing conditions leading to a situation 
warranting delisting of securities, promoters seeking voluntarily to delist their 
securities from all or some of the stock exchanges, persons who is in control of the 
management increase his shareholding due to which the public shareholding falls 
below the limit specified leading to the company being unlisted or the company being 
compulsorily delisted by the stock exchange. As per Schedule III (Guideline 17.1) 
there are certain norms to be followed for delisting of securities by the Stock 
exchanges. The proportion of equity capital has to be seen which is in the hands of the 
public investors with reference to the existing paid-up equity capital, market lot, 
movement in share prices, market capitalisation, SEBI's Takeover Regulation 21 (3) 
and Clause 40A of the Listing Agreement. Also the Companies should appoint market 
makers and ensure that there is liquidity in every trading cycle for which there should 
be some volume of trading for price discovery on the market. The financial and 
business aspects needs to be evaluated as whether it is making profits in the past two 
or three years and whether it is in public interest for it to be listed. The tangible assets 
held by the company are also a consideration for the same. The past record regarding 
compliance of various listing agreements is also a consideration in this regard. 
Maintenance of books and accounts, submission of annual reports and other 
documents, payment of listing fee, services to investors, maintenance of fair 
accounting practises, changes in accounting year, name, agent etc. The track record of 
the promoter particular in areas of deceptive and insider trading are examined or they 
are not in touch or accessible for communication with exchange or the company has 
become sick and not able to fiilfil its obligations are all criterions for preparing a 
profile of the company on the basis of which the exchange takes a decision as regards 
delisting. The decision regarding delisting should be taken by a panel which 
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comprises of two Directors of exchange, one representative of the investors, one 
representative of the Central Government and the Executive Director or Secretaiy of 
the Exchange. A notice relating to the delisting is to be duly sent to the company and 
the Stock exchanges where its shares are listed. A notice of the termination of the 
listing agreement is to be provided. However an appeal against the compulsory 
delisting may be made to SEBI. 
2.3.9 Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Merchant Bankers) 
Rules. 199 f' 
These rules may be called the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Merchant 
Bankers) Rules, 1992 and these rules are made under the powers conferred to the 
Central Government under Section 29 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
Act 1992, (15 of 1992) and shall come into force on the date of their publication in the 
official gazette. According to these rules no person shall act as a merchant banker 
unless he has registered himself and holds a certificate with him which is granted by 
the Board under the Regulations, for granting the certificate there are certain 
conditions to be followed by the Board. Prior permission is required to be obtained by 
the Board for carrying on operations, fess has to be paid as required in the regulations 
for registration or renewal, adequate measures have to be taken to effectively address 
the grievances of the investors within a month of the receipt of the complaint and the 
Board has to be apprised of the details related to it. All the provisions of the 
regulations have to be duly followed by the merchant banker. The certificate issued 
shall be issued for a period of four years fi-om the date of issue. 
2.3.10 Securities and Exchange Board of India Depositories Act. 1996 
This Act is called the Depository Act, 1996 and extends to the whole of India. It is 
deemed to have come to force on 20"" September, 1995. It was published in The 
Gazette of India (no. 51) dated August 12, 1996. Section 5 provides that any person 
can enter into an agreement for availing the services of the depository through a 
participant as per the laws and regulations set out for the same. Section 7 deals with 
the registration of transfer of securities and provides that on the receipt of intimation 
by the participant the depository s required to register the transfer of the security in 
the name of the transferee and if the beneficial owner desires to have the custody of 
the security the issuer has to be informed accordingly. Section 10 provides that the 
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depository should be considered as the registered owner of the securities for the 
purpose of effecting transfer of ownership on the behalf of the beneficial owner. The 
depository is required to maintain a record of the index of the registered owner as per 
Section 11 according to Sections 150, 151 and 152 of the Companies Act 1956 (1 of 
1956). The issuer is required to be provided timely with all the relevant information 
by the depository regarding the transfer of securities in the name of beneficial owners 
as per the manner specified according to Section 13. 
Section 21 provides that in case of any offence committed by the company relating to 
this Act, all the persons who were in charge of the affairs of the company are liable to 
be prosecuted for the same unless a person proves that the reported offence was not 
committed in his knowledge and he had carried out his duties in the best of faith and 
diligence to prevent the occurring of such an offense. 
2.3.11 Income Tax Act 196 f^ 
According to Section 2 (IB) of this Act the term amalgamation means "When or more 
companies merger with another existing company or two or more companies merge to 
form a new company, it is known as amalgamation. The company which so merges is 
the amalgamating company and the company with which the merger takes place or 
the company which is formed as a result of the merger is known as the amalgamated 
company."^^ 
From the above definition it is observed that the Income Tax Act, 1961 does not 
differentiate between amalgamation and absorption and a valid amalgamation should 
satisfy the following conditions. Amalgamated company becomes the owner of all the 
properties and also of all the liabilities of the amalgamating companies which it had 
before the amalgamation took place. The total shareholders, i.e. the equity and 
preference shareholders holding not less than 75 percent in value in the shares of 
amalgamating company become the shareholders of the amalgamated company. In 
calculating the above value of 75 percent, the value of shares that are held before the 
amalgamation by the amalgamated company or its nominee or by a subsidiary 
company should be excluded. 
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Tax incentives for Amalgamation: 
a) Amalgamating Company: In case the amalgamated company is an Indian 
company the amalgamating company shall be exempted from capital gains tax on 
transfer of capital asset (Section 47 (vi)). Where there is an agreement between two 
foreign companies to transfer shares of an Indian company it shall be exempted fiom 
capital gains tax if at least 25 percent of the shareholders of amalgamating fweign 
company continue to be shareholders of the amalgamated foreign company and such a 
transfer does not attract tax liability in the country of origin of the amalgamating 
company (Section 47 (via). 
b) Shareholders of Amalgamating Company: When assesses gets a share as 
property in consideration of shares transferred in amalgamation, the period for which 
the shares were held by assesses in the amalgamating company shall be considered. 
Also they would not be liable to capital gains tax for transfer of shares which they get 
due to the amalgamation. 
c) Amalgamated Company: In case full deduction has not been claimed 
regarding expenditure on scientific research or acquisition of patent or copyrigjit, 
obtaining license to operate telecommunication services, preliminary expenses, 
voluntary retirement scheme, prospecting of certain minerals or petroleum and natural 
gas, capital expenses on family platming, the amalgamated company can claim the 
unabsorbed amount. Deduction is allowed in respect of amalgamation expenses @ 20 
percent of expenditure for each of five successive previous years beginning with the 
previous year in which amalgamation takes place. If a debt transferred to the 
amalgamated company becomes bad it would be allowed to consider it as bad debt. 
Where assets are transferred in cases where amalgamated company is Indian, the 
actual cost of the asset as owned by the amalgamating company should be considared. 
In case of depreciable asset the written down value of the asset would be considered. 
It can also claim deductions under Section 80-IABor 80 IB or 80 IC or 80IE on 
fulfilment of certain conditions. Also in case of amalgamation of companies in Free 
Trade Zones, 100 percent Export Oriented Undertakings, Special Economic Zone then 
the exemption shall be allowed to the other unit for the unexpired period. 
According to section 72A the accumulated loss and the xmabsorbed depreciation of 
the amalgamating company shall be deemed to be the loss or unabsorbed depreciation 
of the amalgamated company of the previous year in which the amalgamation was 
49 IP a g e 
effected and would be entitled to set it off as its own upon the fulfilment of the given 
conditions. 
a) The amalgamating company is engaged in the business in which the loss or 
depreciation has occurred for three or more years and it has held on the date of 
amalgamation continuously three fourth of the book value of fixed assets held by 
it two years before the amalgamation took place. 
b) The amalgamated company should hold at least 75 percent of book value of fixed 
assets as a result of the amalgamation of the amalgamating company and should be 
in the business of the amalgamating company at least till five years after the 
amalgamation. 
2.3.12 The Industries (Development and Reeulation) Act 1951 
As Per Chapter III-A, 'Direct Management or Control Of Industrial Undertakings By 
Central Government In Certain Cases' the Central Government has the power to 
assume management or control of an industrial undertaking under Section 18A if the 
investigations undertaken under Section 15 or 16 reveal that the business is being 
conducted in a manner which is not in the best interest of the concerned industry and 
the public. For the purpose a person or a body of persons may be authorized to take 
over the undertaking in respect to functions and control either in whole or part as 
specified in the order for a period which shall not be effective for a period exceeding 
five years as specified. However the period may be extended after the expiry for five 
years for two years at a time if the Central Government deems it fit for the best 
interest of the public and the industry. Under Section 18AA the government may pass 
such orders for taking over the operations by a person or a body of persons without 
undertaking an investigation in this regard if it has evidence to prove that the people 
managing the affairs have been reckless, the company has been closed for not less 
than 3 months which is not in the best financial interest of the company, industry, 
public and it can be restarted. As per Section 18B as result of the order under Section 
18 A the persons in charge prior to the order would have been deemed to have vacated 
their offices and new management would take over the operations. 
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2.3.13 The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985 
This Act provides for the reconstruction of the Companies which have become ack in 
the sense that they have accumulated losses more than its net worth. For the purpose 
the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) would investigate the 
financial situation of the company and find out if it can be declared sick under the 
provisions of this Act under Section 15 and recommend measures for the same. 
Under Section 18 the scheme has to be prepared and sanctioned which may involve a 
change in the management of the sick company by change in or takeover of the 
management of the company or the amalgamation of the sick industrial company with 
another company or any other company with the sick industrial company. Section 18 
(2) provides for the relevant measures to be undertaken for fulfilling the sdieme 
passed under Section 18 (1) relating to bringing into effect the scheme of takeover or 
amalgamation which provides for transfer of properties and liabilities, changes in 
Board of Directors, alteration in Memorandum of Association and Articles of 
Association, continuation of cases registered against the sick company. 
2.4 Leeal Procedure for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in 
India^^ 
Once the transferor and transferee company have been agreed, i.e. the merger partner 
has been identified and terms of merger regarding amount, terms, management, 
control and other formalities have been finalised, there is a legal procedure to be 
followed. The scheme that has been finalised to bring about the merger or 
amalgamation should provide all the relevant details regarding transferor and 
transferee company, date on which the merger is to be finalised, terms and conditions 
of transfer of assets and liabilities, description of the terms and consequences of 
scheme, details about the share capital structure regarding authorized, issued, 
subscribed and paid up capital of both the transferor and transferee company, terms 
for transfer of shares regarding share exchange ratio, allotment and listing of shares, 
conditions regarding payment of dividend, status of employees and various funds and 
schemes relating to employees afler the merger, accounting and income tax provisions 
to be followed post merger, applications to be made under Companies Act 1956, 
procedure to be followed for getting approval from different agencies, description of 
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cancellation scheme if approvals not obtained. Once the scheme has been prepared the 
Board of Directors are required to approve it. They should approve the scheme only 
when the scheme has been approved by specialised financial institutions, banks, 
trustees for debenture holders. Approval of RBI is required where there is 
involvement of payment to foreign exchange to NRI's or foreign nationals under the 
provisions of FEMA. The stock exchanges have also to be duly informed about the 
proposed amalgamation which is followed by an application to the relevant High 
Court for which a copy of the Memorandum of Articles, Company's latest audited 
balance sheet and a copy of the resolution of the Board authorising the Director to 
make an application to the High Court is submitted. The High Court acts upon the 
application and gives direction for conducting a meeting for which instructions 
relating to the date, time, venue and quorum are fixed by it. It also appoints an 
Advocate Chairman to preside over it and submit a report to the court. If requested 
similar meeting of creditors is also called for. The approval of the Registrar of High 
Court to notice for calling the meeting of the members and creditors is essential. A 
notice of the same is to be dispatched to the members or shareholders or an 
advertisement is to be made at least twenty-one days before the meeting. 
Confirmation about the notice being served to shareholders and the advertisement 
notice being complied with have to be done at least one week before the meeting. The 
meeting has to approve the move for merger/amalgamation and pass a resolution for 
the same. For the same a majority vote of three-fourth of the members who vote in the 
poll in terms of the value of shares held has to be obtained. The resolution as passed 
which approves the scheme of the proposed merger/amalgamation has to be filed with 
the Registrar of Companies. The chairman of the general meeting has to submit a 
detailed report to the court giving all the details about the same within seven days 
from the date of the meeting. Within seven days of the submission of the report a 
joint petition signed by both the companies has to be submitted to the High Court and 
a notice of the hearing has to be advertised not less than 10 days before the hearing. 
The Court will issue a notice of the same to Regional Director, Company Law Board 
under Section 394A. On hearing the petition the Court will take into the account the 
objections from the entitled persons if any pass and then pass an order allowing the 
merger/amalgamation to proceed. The court order has to be filed with the Registrar of 
Companies by both the companies. As per the scheme of merger/amalgamation the 
assets and liabilities are acquired and shares are also allotted to the shareholders of 
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Transferor Company. Following the transfer the company taking over the assets and 
liabilities would apply to the relevant stock exchanges requesting for the listing of 
new shares. The court order has also to be armexed to the memorandum of the 
transferee company and the books and papers of the amalgamated company have to 
be duly preserved. The secretarial obligations regarding the transfer in terms of 
transfer of investments, filing with Registrar, intimating banks and creditors and other 
post-merger reorganization of the transferee company have to be done with. Once the 
scheme has been passed by the requisite number of shareholders and creditors it 
cannot be withdrawn by passing resolutions against it in the subsequent meetings. 
However due to certain circumstances cancellation of the scheme and winding-up 
order can be made under Section 392 (2). 
2,5 Conclusion: 
The above discussion throws light on the gradual growth of the bidian economy over 
the years, from a closed economy to a liberal economy. Prior to 1991 the Indian 
borders were closed to foreign investors and even the domestic players faced major 
legal hurdles but with the liberalization measures undertaken a new era was ushered 
in. hi comparison to its foreign counterparts the Indian economy is still having 
stringent regulations regarding trade and investment especially relating to foreign 
investments. However, being a developing economy it is the priority of the 
government to protect the interest of all classes of societies. Opening up of the 
economy to cross border deals may negatively impact the domestic producer. On the 
other hand, major domestic deals might result in monopoly and exploitation of 
customers. Keeping in mind the various facets the Researcher concludes that the 
complexity of our legal system needs to be reduced but protecting the rights of the 
domestic producer and customer should be accorded the highest priority. 
The succeeding chapter throws light on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) that have 
taken place in the Indian economy in the recent years. The major deals in various 
sectors are showcased along with the impact of the recession on the number and value 
of deals. 
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Chapter 3 
Mer2ers and Acquisitions 
(M&A ^ s) in India 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter dealt with the legal framework relating to mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A's) in order to provide an understanding about the legal framework 
in which M&A's take place in India. This Chapter deals with the M&A's in India. The 
liberalization of Indian economy and its growth as one of the fastest growing 
economy post-liberalization is discussed. The waves of mergers and consolidations 
over time is studied which is followed by the motivation behind the mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A's) deals in India. The chapter further traces the growth of India as 
a major destination for foreign investment and also as a major investor in foreign 
countries in the last few years. Further sector-wise analysis of major mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A's) deals in India is carried out. In the end, impact of recession on 
the number and volume of deals after 2007 is studied. 
3.2 Motivation for Mersers and Acquisitions fM&A'S) in 
India 
The Indian corporate sector has used Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) as a tool to 
expand and gain global recognition. The low cost structure of resources in the form of 
capital, labor (skilled and unskilled) and technology has been used as an effective 
leverage to capitalize and build upon. Through this strategy it is easier to foray into 
both new and emerging markets worldwide and in the process increase expertise and 
market share. With the level of competition towering, this strategy is also appearing 
as a mode of survival in the present era. There are certain Indian enterprises which are 
using this tool to diversify their business as it easier to acquire businesses dealing in 
different product lines rather than to initiate a new product line from scratch.' Another 
frend being followed by the Indian enterprises is to acquire well-established 
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counterparts which have greater exposure and experience as compared to their 
acquirers. Such an approach makes the post-merger management a simpler issue for 
the acquiring firm. The well-experienced management team is not disturbed and it 
continues to play a pivotal role in the management of the resulting firm. It serves 
various purposes. Firstly, the management team is boosted and motivated by the trust 
of the acquirers and secondly it makes the cultural integration of the acquirer and 
acquiring firm a much easier issue to handle. Integration of work force is a critical 
issue for ensuring post-merger success and retaining the old management helps ease 
the task. 
The favorable economic environment is another incentive which is spurring the rate 
and volume of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals. India is firmly on the growth 
trajectory and unlike earlier times finance and capital is available through means 
which are more accessible than they were ever before. The banking and financial 
structure in India has improved by many leaps and bounds and it is easier to procure 
finances. It has made it possible for Indian companies to acquire companies which are 
larger than them in terms of size. Various modes of financing are available in the form 
of debt, private equity, foreign capital etc. Indian companies are firmly placed on the 
global map and their recent Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) activities have been 
hitting the headlines all across the world 
3,3 Indian Scenario for Merger and Acquisitions (M&A *S) 
since 1980*s 
On studying the past trends and history of corporate restructuring it can be said that 
the present phase is the fourth wave in the mergers and acquisition movement. The 
first wave can be traced back to the 1980's when reforms were introduced under the 
leadership of Rajiv Gandhi. Corporate like Swaraj Paul, Manu Chaabria and R.P 
Goenka were the business wigs at that time. Legal provisions for the purpose of 
expansion were very stringent in terms of licensing, quota, foreign exchange 
regulations etc. due to which merger and acquisition was a popular option for the 
entrepreneurs envisaging expansion plans. The first major IPO was also issued at that 
time. 
The opening up of the economy in 1990's with the new Industrial Policy unveiled in 
1991 ushered in a new era where stiff competition began to emerge both at the 
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domestic and international level. An effective way to counter it was Corporate 
Restructuring which marked the second wave of mergers and acquisitions. Another 
round of IPO issue took place then. It was notable that during the 1990's there was a 
global slowdown experienced in foreign investment outflows which fell from $232 
billion in 1990 to $171 billion in 1992. Recovery was staged in 1993 with FDI 
outflows reaching $195 billion. The inflows also fell from $208 billion in 1990 to 
$162 billion in 1991 and $ 158 billion in 1992. It recovered to $194 billion in 1993.^  
Also the global economic scenario was such that there was a general uprising of 
developing countries due to upsurge in economic growth, rapid industrialization 
activity, availability of low cost skilled labor as a result of which there was a marked 
increase in the flow of FDI's to countries like China and India especially. 
The economic scenario in the wake of balance of payment crisis underwent large 
scale financial reforms where there was a marked shift in the policies. Liberalization 
measures were introduced where licensing was removed, participation of private 
sector was promoted, restrictions on FDI were eased, MRTP Act was abolished, and 
EPZ's were promoted. The period was also marked by sfrengthening or organizations 
like ASEAN, AFTA etc whose primary motive was to promote regional frade and 
cooperation. 
There was a time when there were serious doubts, whether the global system will ever 
emerge and now when the political and economic boundaries have been wiped off, we 
have indeed come a long way from where India stood prior to the 1990's. During that 
period Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was concentrated among few industrial and 
developed economies of the world, which was called the Triad and there was a group 
of developing countries and economies around each Triad member as shown in Figure 
3.3.1. However during that period trade was regionally concentrated and there were 
lot of bottlenecks in developing integrated international production. Linkages were 
yet to be developed as regards mobility of capital, technology, labor and other factors 
ofproduction. 
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Figure 3.3.1: Foreign-Direct-Investraent Clusters of Triad Members, 1990 
(Economies in which a Triad member dominates inward 
Foreign-direct-investment stocks and/or flows) 
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However, there were still many apprehensions that existed regarding structuring of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&;A's). The entire world economy was gearing to evolve 
a system where all economies of the world would evolve various policy changes to 
facilitate international production and at the same time effectively meet the challenges 
of effective competition. The investment climate in India with liberalization measure 
in place, were indeed more favorable than they were ever before. 
The third wave was seen in the early 2000 which was marked through consolidation 
among the business units to dominate and effectively meet competition. Various 
agreements and joint ventures took place between companies in order to expand, for 
example Bharti and Hutch bought smaller competitors to establish themselves across 
the nation. Major IPO issues were made in this phase too. 
The present fourth wave is distinct from the earlier ones in the sense that India has 
become a force to reckon with in the global arena with abundant foreign exchange and 
a strong rupee. Indian companies are making their presence felt by attracting 
investments in the country and also acquiring companies worldwide like the 
acquisition of Corns by Tata in 2007.Among the Asian countries China and India are 
proving to be the most attractive target where multinationals are attempting to enter 
by formulating various deals. Though Taiwan, Pakistan and Vietnam are also 
progressing, it is India and China which are presently leading the pack in Asia. In an 
annual survey conducted by economic intelligence unit the interest in India for 
mergers rose to 39percent from 36percent while for China it declined from 52percent 
to 47.3percent.^  
The recent spurt in the economies of the Asian coxmtries has made them a hot 
destination for investors worldwide. FII's and FDI's have been flowing in at a 
tremendous rate and therefore major deals are being inked in this region. In the past 
decade a large volume of mergers and acquisitions have been taking place in Asia by 
large business houses to take advantage of the boom in the economy. Asian 
entrepreneurs are making their presence felt by effecting various mergers and 
acquisitions in Europe and other Western countries. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India have taken a huge turnaround, something 
which was difficult to fathom few years back. It is no longer the usual practice when 
Multinationals and Transnational Corporations would enter Indian markets by 
acquiring and merging with firms here. It is the hidian corporate sector which is out 
on a buying spree and making deep inroads in to the American and European market. 
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It is one of the fastest growing economies along with China and its sheer economic 
strength has made it a power to reckon with worldwide. 
3,4 Growth of Indian Economy as an Investment Destination 
Figure 3.4.1 shows the standing of India as compared with other countries as regards 
foreign attractiveness where India Ranks third, next only to China and USA in terms 
of investment destination on the confidence index. It is notable that India had dropped 
from the second position in 2009 to the third position in the index.'* However on the 
global map it still stood at a high position and given the rate at which the economy is 
growing and the vast untapped potential of the country it is expected to climb up the 
ladder along with China. On the basis of the large population along with the cheaper 
raw material, labor and other resources India and China are projected to be the next 
boom destination due to which investors worldwide are flocking towards them. 
Figure 3.4.1: 2010 Confidence Index 
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Table 3.4.1 highlights the growth in cross border M&A sales and purchases over the 
year. The purchases increased from US$ 1 million in 1991 to US$ 2649 million in 
2005 and US$ 2069 in 2996. However the recessionary forces played a role in the 
declining purchases to US$ 1610 in 2007 by -22.9percent. It picked up by 
16.58percent in 2008. The year 2009 was slated to be positive but the figures here are 
for six months only. The M&A sales also registered an increase over the years where 
from US$ 35 million in 1992 they peaked to US$ 4210 in 2005. Here again the 
recessionary forces had a role in the dip of sales but it recovered well. It slumped to 
US$ 185 million in 2008 but is expected to recover soon. 
Table 3.4.1: Value of Cross-border M&A Sales and Purchases in India 
Figures in US Millions of Dollars 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009* 
M&A 
Purchases 
1 
3 
219 
109 
29 
80 
1287 
11 
126 
910 
2195 
270 
1362 
863 
2649 
2069 
1610 
1877 
14 
Percentage 
Change over 
previous year 
200 
7200 
-50.2283 
-73.3945 
175.8621 
1508.75 
-99.1453 
1045.455 
622.2222 
141.2088 
-87.6993 
404.4444 
-36.6373 
206.9525 
-21.8951 
-22.1846 
16.58385 
-99.2541 
M&A 
Sales 
-
35 
96 
385 
276 
206 
1520 
361 
1044 
1219 
1037 
1698 
949 
1760 
4210 
531 
2977 
185 
139 
Percentage 
Change 
over 
previous 
year 
-
174.2857 
301.0417 
-28.3117 
-25.3623 
637.8641 
-76.25 
189.1967 
16.76245 
-14.9303 
63.74156 
-44.1107 
85.45838 
139.2045 
-87.3872 
460.6403 
-93.7857 
-24.8649 
Note: For 2009 figures for January to June only 
Source: Compiled and calculated from World Investment Reports (1991 to 2009) 
Retrieved from http://www.unctad.orgrremplates/Page.asp?intItemID=l485&lang=l 
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The above analysis further asserts the fact that India is on a progressive trail to growth 
where future growth prospects are very bright.^ A survey^ which polled 230 financial 
executives in Asia, Europe, North America and the Middle East, showed interest in 
India had increased slightly from 37percent in 2005 to 39percent in 2007. By 
comparison, 47percent executives answered that they expected to execute a merger or 
buyout in China in the next few years. Among those surveyed, nearly three quarters 
predicted that their companies would undergo a significant merger or acquisition 
sometime in the next five years, up firom 68percent last year. 
3.5 Rise of Indian Economy as an Acquirer in Mer2ers and 
Acquisitions (M&A 's) 
The Indian Economy grew at 9percent during the first half of the fiscal year 2007-08 
(April-September). In the past two years huge deals have taken place by Indian 
Companies especially in the Iron and Steel, Energy and Pharmaceutical sectors. In 
2006 there were more outbound than inbound deals in 2006 in value terms. Largest 
portion of outbound acquisitions in Europe (42percent) followed by North America 
(24percent). The year 2007 was indeed a landmark year that saw the largest 
acquisition by an Indian Company in the form of Tata-Corus deal. Value of M&A 
deals reached US$ 44.3 billion spread over 1048 transactions representing growth of 
over 65percent in value over 2006. "Unlike the European market, the dominant 
domestic players in the more mature markets in particular areas of Asia, are yet to 
fully flex their muscles on a regional basis," the report said.^  
The buoyancy in Indian economy can be attributed to various factors like 
liberalization, easing of government restrictions, increasing profitability and goodwill 
of Indian corporate as compared to their foreign counterparts, etc. Riding on this 
wave, Indian entrepreneurs are aggressively entering the European and American 
markets and entering into various mergers and acquisition deals 2hich is shown in 
Table 3.5.1 which highlights major acquisitions made by Indian Companies in various 
parts of the world. 
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Table 3.5.1: Major Acquisitions made by Indian Companies Worldwide 
Acquirer 
Videocon 
Dr. Reddy's 
Labs 
Suzlon Energy 
HPCL 
Ranbaxy Labs 
$Tata Steel 
Videocon 
VSNL 
Target Company 
Daewoo 
Electronics Corp. 
Betapharm 
Hansen Group 
Kenya Petroleum 
Refinery Ltd. 
Terapia SA 
Natsteel 
Thomson SA 
Teleglobe 
Country 
Targeted 
Korea 
Germany 
Belgium 
Kenya 
Romania 
Singapore 
France 
Canada 
Deal Value 
($ 
millions) 
729 
597 
565 
500 
324 
293 
290 
239 
Industry 
Electronics 
Pharmaceutical 
Energy 
Oil and gas 
Pharmaceutical 
Steel 
Electronics 
Telecom 
Source: Indian Mergers and Acquisitions- The changing face of Indian Business 
Retrieved from http://trak.in/tags/business/2007/08/l 6/indian-mergers-acquisitions-
changing-indian-business/ (16 August, 2007) 
Earlier it was the India Information Technology (IT) sector which was forging ahead 
in terms of global deals but now other sectors are also steadily making their presence 
felt and taking active part in the globalization process. The top ten deals account for 
nearly US $ 21500 million which is more than double the amount involved in US 
company's acquisition of Indian counterparts^. This speaks volume of the increasing 
stature, profitability and cash available with the Indian finns. 
From Figure 3.5.1 below we can see that the Indian outbound deals are on the 
inflexion point and are expected to soar to great heights and break all previous 
records. From a mild US $ 0.7 billion in 2000-01 it has gone to US $ 4.3 billion in 
2005 and further crossed US $ 15 billion in 2006 and expected to reach 50 US $ 
billion in 2007-08 and 95 US $ billion in 2008—09. These trends justify the current 
global interest in Indian markets. The year 2006 will however be remembered as a 
golden period for Indian markets where substantial strategic acquisitions were made 
worldwide. This comprised 60 percent of the total mergers and acquisitions activity in 
2006 and the remarkable fact is that almost 99 percent of acquisitions were made with 
cash payments which highlights the liquidity of Indian firms.' 
65 I P a g e 
Figure 3.5.1: Graphical Representation of Indian Outbound Deals since 2000 
(US $ billions) 
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Source: Indian Mergers and Acquisitions- The changing face of Indian Business Retrieved 
from http://trak.in/tags/business/2007/08/16/indian-mergers-acquisitions-changing-indian-
business/ (i 6 August, 2007) 
An opportunity is also available for Indian enterprises in the ongoing era of global 
recession where due to serious credit crunch in developed countries, the level of 
competition has subsided and Indian companies can use their resources to make 
acquisitions worldwide. Table 3.5.2 below gives a synoptic view of the profile of 
major India companies making Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) and also the major 
deals affected by them. 
Table 3.5,2: Profile of Major Companies making Mergers and Acquisitions Deals 
Name of 
Company 
Bennet 
Coleman& 
Co 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
20 
Timeline 
6 in 2005, 
7 in 2006, 
14 in 2007 
Target Industries 
Automotive, 
Consumer Goods & 
Services, Electronics 
& High Technology, 
Industrial 
Equipment, IT 
Services, Media & 
Entertainment, 
Outsourcing, 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Healthcare, Retail, 
Telecommunications 
Target 
Countries 
India 
Average 
Size of 
Acquisitions 
US$2.34 
million 
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Ranbaxy 
Laboratories 
HCL 
Technologies 
Wipro 
Tata 
Consultancy 
Services 
Hindalco 
Industries 
Hindustan 
Unilever 
Dr. Reddy's 
Laboratories 
16 
14 
14 
11 
11 
10 
10 
1 in 1998, 
1 in 1999, 
I in 2000, 
1 in 2001, 
2 in 2002, 
1 in 2003, 
1 in 2005, 
5 in 2006, 
3 in 2007 
1 in 1998, 
4 in 2001, 
2 in 2002, 
2 in 2003, 
2 in 2004, 
1 in 2005, 
1 in 2008 
1 in 2000, 
2 in 2001, 
4 in 2002, 
3 in 2003, 
3 in 2006, 
1 in 2007 
2 in 2002, 
3 in 2004, 
3 in 2005, 
2 in 2006, 
1 in 2007 
3 in 2000, 
3 in 2002, 
2 in 2003, 
1 in 2005, 
1 in 2006, 
1 in 2007 
3 in 1999, 
4 in 2000, 
1 in 2002, 
1 in 2003, 
1 in 2007 
1 in 1998, 
5 in 1998, 
1 in 2000, 
1 in 2002, 
1 in 2004, 
1 in 2006 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Healthcare 
Capital Markets, 
Consumer Goods & 
Services, Insurance, IT 
Services, 
Telecommunications 
Consumer Goods & 
Services, Energy, 
IT Services, 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Healthcare, 
Telecommunications 
Capital Markets, 
Consumer Goods 
& Services, IT 
Services 
Chemicals, Metals & 
Mining 
Consumer Goods & 
Services 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Healthcare 
Belgium, 
France, 
Germany, 
India, 
Romania, 
South 
Africa, 
Spain, US 
India, 
Thailand, 
UK, USA 
Finland, 
India, 
Singapore, 
US 
Australia, 
Brazil, 
Chile, 
India, 
Philippines, 
Switzerland 
Australia, 
India 
India 
Germany, 
UK, India, 
USA 
US$80.80 
million 
US$43.73 
million 
US$47.85 
million 
US$30.66 
million 
US$117.41 
million 
US$17.28 
million 
US$87.78 
million 
Source: Accenture Analysis of Thomson Financial Data, "High Performance through Mergers 
and Acquisitions: India's new dynamics", Accenture, India, 2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.accenture.com/NR/rdonlyres/9D 1FCD86-09BF-4E87-8 AD3-
10FAD689B22B/0/IndiaMADynamics.pdf 
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The top eleven deals done by the Indian corporate sector are discussed in the Table 
3.5.3. 
The Tata-Corus deal worth $12.2 Billion was the largest ever takeover of a foreign 
company by an Indian company when it took place. The deal also catapulted Tata 
Steel to the fifth largest steel group in the world and displaying the economic prowess 
of Indian corporate sector. 
After many deliberations Vodaphone finally took over Hutchison-Essar by buying out 
the controlling 67percent interest. Hindalco's acquisition of Canadian based Novelis 
made it a global leader in aluminium rolled products and also one of the largest 
aluminum producers in Asia.Daiichi Sankyo's acquisition of Ranbaxy was the largest 
ever deal to have taken place in the pharmaceutical sector and it also created the 15 
largest drug-maker in the world. 
A whopping 96.8percent shareholder of the London listed firm's Imperial Energy 
accepted the acquisition bid of ONGC whose total number of projects have risen to 39 
in 17 countries while it started fi-om a single project in Vietnam. Another major deal 
was the Japanese telecom giant NTT DoCoMo acquisition of Tata Teleservices in 
which it picked up a 26 per cent equity stake. 
HDFC Bank became the second largest bank in India with its acquisition of the 
Centurion Bank of Punjab which is also slated as one of the largest mergers in the 
Indian financial sector. 
Close on the heels after acquiring Tata Group again put India on the world map 
through Tata Motors acquisition of the coveted luxury brands Jaguar and Land Rover 
fi-om Ford. The acquisition of the German based Repower made Suzlon Energy the 
largest wind turbine maker in Asia and the fifth largest in the world. Reliance 
Industries scripted a consolidation through its takeover of its subsidiary Reliance 
Peti-oleum (RPL). 
The Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) story looks large and promises to loom even 
larger firom its current position. A deal is proposed between Bharti and South Afiica's 
MTN which if finalized would be the largest ever deal to have taken place in India 
amounting to $23 Billion almost double the Tata Corns Deal which was valued at 
$12.2 billion. 
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Table 3.5 J: Top 11 Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India 
Year 
30 January, 2007 
11 February, 2007 
February 2007 
June 2008 
January 2009 
November 2008 
February 2008 
March 2008 
March 2008 
May 2007 
March 2009 
Acquirer 
Tata Steel 
Vodaphone 
Hindalco 
Daiichi Sankyo 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Company(ONGC) 
NTT DoCoMo 
HDFC Bank 
Tata Motors 
Sterlite 
Suzlon Energy 
Reliance 
Industries(RIL) 
Acquired 
Corns Group 
Hutchison Essar 
Novelis 
Ranbaxy 
Imperial Energy 
Tata Teleservices 
Centurion Bank 
Jaguar-Land Rover 
Asarco 
RePower 
Reliance 
Petroleum(RPL) 
Value of Deal 
$12.2 Billion 
$11.1 Billion 
$ 6 Billion 
$4.5 Billion 
$2.8 Billion 
$2.7 Billion 
$2.4 Billion 
$2.3 Billion 
$1.8 Billion 
$1.7 Billion 
$1.68 Billion 
Source: India's 11 largest M&A deals. Retrieved jfrom 
http://business.rediff.coni/slide-show/2009/may/29/slide-show-l-indias-l 1 -largest-m-and-a-
deals.htm (29 May 2009) 
Different sectors have been attracting M&A deals in India including metals, 
pharmaceuticals, industrial goods, automotive components, beverages, cosmetics and 
energy in manufacturing; and mobile conununications, software and financial services 
in services, with pharmaceuticals, IT and energy being the prominent ones among 
these. 
3.6 Industry-wise Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) 
The industry-wise analysis of mergers and acquisitions in the Indian economy is as 
follows: 
i. Aviation Industry 
The major deals in Indian Aviation Industry are highlighted in Table 3.6.1. Jet 
Airways in its bid to get monopoly in the Indian aviation sector acquired its 
competitor Sahara for approximately US$ 300 million in a fiercely contested battle 
which went to the court also for settlement. The other big player Kingfisher also 
consolidated its position with the acquisition of the low cost airline Deccan for 
approximately US$ 5.5 billion. Indian Airline was formed through the merger of 
Deccan airways, Airways-India, Bharat Airways, Himalayan Aviation, Kalinga 
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Airlines, Indian National Airways; Air Services of India after the legislation to 
nationalize airlines was passes in 1953. In 2007 Air-India and Indian airlines were 
merged and the new entity was named as Indian in a bid to save the loss making 
enterprise. 
Table 3.6.1: M&A in Indian Aviation Industry 
Acquiring 
Company 
Jet airways 
Kingfisher 
Air India 
Acquired 
Company 
Sahara 
Deccan 
Indian Airlines 
Year of deal 
2007 
2007 
2007 
Value of deal 
Rs 1450 crore 
or 
US$ 300 million (approx) 
Rs 550 crore 
Or 
US$ 5.5 billion 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites and 
Articles 110)111)1121 
ii. Telecommunication Industry 
The M&A's activity trend in this sector has particularly seen a remarkable increase in 
recent period. The vibrant activity is boosted by the ease in government regulations as 
regards de-licensing, de-regulation, advent of modem technologies and services etc. 
The first M&A deal in this sector as shown in Table 3.6.2 was between Max Group 
of Delhi and Hutchison Group of Hongkong where 41 percent stake of Orange was 
acquired by the latter in 1998. In 2003 Sterling Group acquired Aircel Chennai firom 
RPG group by acquiring 79.24percent stake in it. The trend continued with the 
acquisition of Idea Cellular in 2005 by Aditya Birla Group in 2005 fi-om the Tata 
Group. The year 2007 saw a major deal where global Telecom giant Vodaphone 
acquired Hutchison with intentions to tap the rural market, expand infi-astructure and 
also increase the number of mobile users in the country. Having lost the bid for 
Hutchison Reliance Communications went on to acquire the US based Yipes 
Holdings in 2007 in a move to be a global communications leader and provide a 
platform for global service delivery with wide coverage and capability. Etisalat based 
in Arab and the second largest company based on market values acquired a 45percent 
stake in Swan Telecom Private Ltd for YS$ 900 million in 2008. Telenor which is 
based in Norway and is the seventh largest phone firm on the basis of number of 
customers made an entry in the growing Indian market through a merger with Unitech 
wireless for US$ 1.23 billion. Quippo Telecom which is the world largest independent 
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telecom infrastructure company acquired Tata Tele Services for US$ 533.33 miUioiL 
The alliance with the Japanese firm DOCOMO which was a leader in mobile services 
in the world was expected to provide Tata with cutting edge technology and 
DOCOMO got access to the expanding Indian market. 
Table 3.6.2: M&A in Indian Telecom Industry 
Company/Service 
Name 
Orange, Mumbai 
Aircel, Chennai 
Idea Cellular 
Hutch Essar 
Hutch, India 
Hutch Essar, India 
Aircel, TN, 
Chennai and NE 
Hutchison Essar 
Reliance 
Communication 
Emirates 
Telecommunication 
Corp (Etisalat) 
Telenor 
Quippo Telecom 
DOCOMO 
Buyer 
Hutchison 
Group, Hong 
Kong 
Sterling Group, 
Chennai 
Aditys Birla 
Group 
Essar Group 
Max India 
Hutchison 
Group, Hong 
Kong 
Maxis, Malaysia 
Vodaphone 
Yipes 
Swan Telecom 
Private Limited 
Unitech 
Wireless 
Tata Tele 
Services 
Tata Tele 
Services 
Seller 
Max Group, 
Delhi 
RPG Group 
Tata Group 
Max India 
Kotak 
Mahindra, 
India 
Hinduja 
Sterling Group 
Year 
1998 
2003 
2005 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2009 
2009 
Deal size 
(US$) 
560 million 
210crore 
Na 
146 million 
225 million 
450 million 
750 million 
11.1 billion 
300 million 
US$900 
million 
US$1.23 
billion 
US$ 533.33 
127.4 billion 
Indian Rs 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites and 
Articles f'^ t^'^ ll'^ 1 
iii. Pharmaceutical Industry 
Another area of growth in the sphere of mergers and acquisitions is slated to be the 
pharmaceutical sector. The pharmaceutical industry is expected to grow by more than 
13 per cent to $6.5 billion in 2007 and reach a market size of $9.5 billion by 2010, 
surpassing the growth trends of 9.5 per cent recorded over the last 5 years'^. The 
Indian pharmaceutical market known for its cost-effectiveness, generics, 
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competitiveness and huge size is attracting global players worldwide and Indian 
companies are also expected to capitalize on acquisition opportunities worldwide 
especially in the regulated market of USA. 
Table 3.6.3 enlists the major M&A's in the Pharmaceutical Industry in India. Fastest 
growing pharmaceutical company, Sun Pharmaceuticals acquired Able Laboratories 
in 2005 in order to strengthen its presence in the US generic market. It further went on 
to acquire the loss ridden multinational generic producer Taro in 2008 which had 
operations in US, Israel and Canada. In the biggest overseas acquisition by an Indian 
pharmaceutical company Dr. Reddy's acquired Betapharm, fourth largest German 
drug company in 2006 which gave the former a chance to establish its presence in all 
key markets. The acquisition of Be-Tabs made Ranbaxy, which was its fourth major 
acquisition in 2006, the fifth largest pharmaceutical company in South Africa. The 
Japanese firm Daiichi Sankyo acquired a major stake in Ranbaxy in India for US$ 4.2 
billion. Fresenius Kabi (Singapore) which is a global health care group acquired a 
major stake in Dabur Pharma for Rs 1000 crore. Abbot of USA acquired Mumbai 
based Wockhardt to accelerate its nutrition business in India. 
Table 3.6.3: M&A in Indian Pharmaceutical Industry 
Acquiring company 
Sun Pharmaceuticals 
Dr. Reddy's 
Laboratories 
Ranbaxy 
Laboratories 
Wockhardt 
Julian Organosys 
Zydus Cadila 
Sun Pharmaceuticals 
Daiichi Sankyo 
Sanofi Pasteur 
Fresenius Kabi 
Abbot 
Acquired company 
Able Laboratories 
Betapharm 
Be-Tabs 
Negma Laboratories 
HoUister Steir 
Laboratories 
Nikkho 
Taro 
Ranbaxy 
Shantha Biotechnics 
Dabur Pharma 
Wockhardt 
Year of deal 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2009 
2009 
Value of deal 
US$23.15 million 
US$ 570 million 
US$ 70 million 
US$ 26 million 
US$122.5 million 
US$ 26 million 
US$ 454 million 
US$4.2 billion 
US$664.89 million 
Rs 1000 crore 
US$ Dominion 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites and 
Articles "^ •f'^ J-l"'! 
iv. Cement Industry 
Recent years have seen various MNC's entering India and making a foray in the 
cement sector. The market is expected to expand considerably in the future as well 
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and to meet the surge in demand consolidations and restructuring would be required 
in the industry. The major deals are discussed in Table 3.6.4 
In order to strengthen its presence in India, Italcementis Group of Italy, fifth largest 
producer in the world acquired Zuari cement, its joint venture in India. Purchase of a 
stake in Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd in 2005 gave Holcim to establish itself in the 
Indian subcontinent and also opened windows for further growth and expansion. 
Aditya Birla Group, eighth largest cement producer in the world acquired L&T 
cement and named it Ultratech cement making it the third big cement brand of the 
flagship Grasim Industries. While India cement mergerd its subsidiary visaka Cement 
in 2007, the ,merger between Ultra Tech and Samruddhi cement in 2009 created the 
tenth largest cement company in the world and largest in India. 
Table 3.6.4: M&A in Indian Cemen 
Acquiring 
Company 
Lafarge S.A 
Ital Cement 
Holcim 
Aditya Birla Group 
India Cement 
Ultra tech 
Acquired 
Company 
Bleu Circle 
Industries 
Zuari Cement 
Ambuja 
Cement India 
Ltd 
L&T cement 
division 
Visaka 
Cement 
Samruddhi 
Cement 
t Industry 
Year Of 
Deal 
2000 
2000 
2005 
2007 
2010 
Value Of Deal 
Rs 785 crore 
Rs 370 crore 
Rs 27.3 billion 
1 equity share of Indian cement 
for every 10 shares of Visaka 
cement 
4 shares of ultra Tech for every 7 
shares of Samruddhi 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites and 
Articles'^ "It^ 'l 
V. Automobile Industry 
The Indian auto component industry is likely to almost double to $18.7 billion by 
2009 and reach about $40 billion by 2014. Further, India is expected to move ahead of 
the UK and Canada as a car-producing country by 2008. Its car production capacity is 
expected to surpass 2 million units by 2008 from the current capacity of more than 1.4 
million imits. It has already surpassed Korea to become the third largest car market in 
Asia-Pacific after China and Japan^ .^ Table 3.6.5 depicts the first ever overseas 
acquisition by Indian automobile company Tata motors, the sixth largest commercial 
vehicles manufacturer in the world which acquired Daewoo in 2004. Another 
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automobile giant of India, Mahindra and Mahindra (M&M) entered into a joint 
venture with Jiangling Motor Corporation Group in 2004 to roll out the first M&M 
branded tractor in China. Sakhti Auto Components got an opportunity to enter the 
European market with the acquisition of Intermet Europe in2007 and also got access 
to the latter's technology. M&M went onto acquire Punjab Tractors Limited and 
decided to let its brand Swaraj Mazda to exist separately in 2007. Tata motors created 
history by acquiring luxury brands Jaguar and Land Rover from Ford Motors 
establishing themselves as takeover tycoons. The merger with Mahindra and 
Mahindra (M&M) which is among the top industrial houses of India opened avenues 
for growth and expansion for Punjab Tractors Limited (PTL) which was its 
subsidiary. 
Table 3.6.5: M&A in Indian Automobile Industry 
Acquiring 
company 
Tata 
Mahindra and 
Mahindra (M& M) 
Tata Motors 
Sakhi Auto 
Components 
Mahindra and 
Mahindra (M& M) 
Tata Motors 
Mahindra and 
Mahindra (M&M) 
Acquired company 
Daewoo 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
Jiangling Motor 
Corporation Group 
Hispano Carrocera 
SA 
Intermet Europe 
Swaraj Mazda 
Jaguar and land 
Rover 
Punjab Tractors 
Limited (PTL) 
Year of deal 
2004 
2004 
2005 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Value of deal 
Rs 465 crore 
Rs 70crore 
US$129 million 
US$154 million 
US$ 2.3billion 
1 share of MandM 
for every 3 shares 
of PTL 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites and 
Articles'" '^"' 
vi. Energy Industry 
Energy sector has been predominantly regulated and owned by government agencies. 
The energy sector is undergoing restructuring in the wake of liberalization process. Of 
late it is witnessing the entry of the entry of private players. Economic growth largely 
depends on availability of energy inputs at economical prices. It is expected to be 
laced with cross border merger and competition issues in the future in the backdrop of 
opening up of the sector.^ ^ 
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The major deals in this Industry are highlighted in Table 3.6.6. With an increased 
global demand for green power projects Suzlon Energy and Repower Systems merged 
in 2007, as a result of which both companies were in a stronger position to derive 
synergy benefits fi-om the collaboration. The acquisition of the Italian company 
Sofinter gave Gammon India a stronghold over the value chain in power and access to 
superior technology. Through its foreign company OVL, ONGC got hold of Imperial 
Energy of UK. The number of overseas projects increased from 17 to 39 in seven 
years for ONGC with the help of support from the government. The acquisition of BP 
Energy Private limited by Green Infra Ltd made it a big name in the renewable energy 
sector 
Table 3.6.6: M&A in Indian Energy Industry 
Acquiring company 
Tata Power 
Company 
Suzlon Energy 
Indian Oil and Oil 
India Ltd. 
Gammon India 
ONGC 
Tata Power 
Green Infi-a 
Acquired company 
PT Kaltim Prime 
Coal and PT Arutim 
Repower Systems 
Suntera (Nigeria) 
Sofinter 
Imperial Energy 
Geodynamics 
BP Energy 
Year of deal 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
Value of deal 
US$ 1.1 billion 
US$1.35 billion 
US$ 60 millions 
Euro 50 million 
US$1.9 billion 
US$ 37.5million 
Source: Compiled fi-om Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites 
and Articles[*JP7][28] 
vii. Technoiogy Industry 
Asia and in particular India has been playing a significant role in this sector both on 
the domestic and international front. In the year 2007 a tenfold increase in the value of 
Asian forays into North America were witnessed. The domestic technology market in 
Asia has developed by leaps and bounds which saw the M&A's activity in India 
increase by a significant73percent. Europe also saw Asian acquisitions increase by 
three fold in value and this trend is expected to continue in fijture also.^ ^ 
Table 3.6.7 highlights major deals in this industry. Polaris and Orbitech merged in 
2002 to provide a diversified portfolio of services and access to a library of several 
hundred proven banking solutions components. It has created the fifth largest listed 
Indian IT Company. As a part of its strategy to focus on off-shore development 
Mascot Systems acquired e-Jiva and its Hyderabad based exclusive offshore services 
provider Aqua Regia Technologies in 2002. The acquisition of Cognitive Arts gave 
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NUT an access to US corporate knowledge solutions market. Tech Mahindra acquired 
Satyam after winning the bidding with the hope to gain from Satyam's experience and 
geographical presence. 
Table 3.6.7: M&A in Indian Technology Industry 
Acquiring 
company 
Polaris 
Mascot Systems 
Mascot Systems 
NUT 
Tech Mahindra 
Acquired company 
Orbitech 
e-Jiva 
Aqua Regia 
Technologies 
Cognitive Arts 
Satyam 
Year of deal 
2002 
2002 
2002 
2003 
2009 
Value of deal 
ND 
US$ 9.46 million 
US$ 0.5 million 
ND 
US$ 576 million 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites and 
Articles'^ °«''«^ '^ 
viii. Beverages Industry 
Future developments in this sector consists of newer economies like Brazil, Russia, 
India and China which are expected to act as a stimulus and driver for growth of the 
drinks industry in future. Table 3.6.8 highlights major deals in this sector. Acquisition 
of Willianson Tea Assam by Mc Leod Russel India made the latter the largest 
producer of bulk tea in India. The purchase of Shaw Wallace brands which operate in 
volume segment in 2005 contributed to United Spirits which is currently the third 
largest distiller in the world. Fiuther the acquisition of Whyte Mackay filled the 
lacuna of a scotch whisky brand in the portfolio of brands for United Spirts. 
Table 3.6.8: M&A in Indian Beverages Industry 
Acquiring company Acquired company Year of deal Value of deal 
Mc Leod Russel India Willianson Tea 
Assam 
2005 Rs 2.1 billion 
United Brewery Group Shaw Wallace 2005 Rs 16.2 billion 
Tata Coffee Eight 'o' Clock 
Coffee Company 
2006 US$ 220 million 
United Spirits Whyte Mackay 2007 US$1.6 billion 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Aimual Reports, Websites and 
Articlesf""'*^  
Table 3.6.9 enlists the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) of Tata Group which is one 
of the biggest and most successftil business groups in India 
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Dl -'.C' 
Table 3.6.9: 
Tata 
company 
Indian 
Hotel 
Tata 
Autocomp 
Systems 
Tata 
Chemicals 
Tata Coffee 
Tata 
Consultancy 
Services 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) of Tata Group 
Acquired 
Company 
Starwood 
Group (W 
Hotel) 
The Pierre 
Regent Hotel 
(renamed Taj 
Lands End) 
Campton 
Palace Hotel 
Wundsch 
Weidinger 
General 
Chemical 
Industrial 
Products 
Brunner Mond 
Indo Maroc 
Phosphore S.A 
(IMACID) 
Hind Lever 
Chemicals 
Eight ' 0 Clock 
Coffee 
Company 
Citigroup 
Global 
Services 
Tata Infotech 
Comicrom 
Pearl group 
Financial 
Network 
Country 
Sydney 
US 
India 
US 
Germany 
US 
UK 
Morocco 
India 
US 
US 
India 
Chile 
UK 
Australia 
Stake 
acquired 
100 per cent 
(wholly 
owned) 
USD 9 million 
Effective 100 
percent stake 
100 percent 
stake 
63.5 per cent 
36.5 per cent 
Equal partner 
Amalgamation 
100 per cent 
(wholly 
owned) 
100 per cent 
Structured 
deal 
Value 
USD 29 
million 
Lease of 
property 
Rs450 
crore 
US$58 
million 
Euro 7 
million 
Rs508 
crore 
Rs290 
crore 
USD 38 
million (Rs 
166 crore) 
USD 220 
million (Rs 
1015 crore) 
US$512 
million 
Year 
December 
2005 
July 2005 
September 
2002 
April 2007 
September 
2005 
January 
2008 
December 
2005 
March 
2006 
March 
2005 
June 2004 
June 2006 
December 
2008 
February 
2006 
November 
2005 
October 
2005 
October 
2005 
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Tata 
Industries 
Tata 
Interactive 
Tata 
Metaliks 
Tata Motors 
Tata 
Projects 
Services 
Phoenix Global 
Services 
Aviation 
Software 
Development 
Consultancy 
India (ASDC) 
Airline 
Financial 
Support 
Services 
Indigene 
Pharmaceutical 
sine 
Tertia Edusoft 
Gmbh 
Tertia Edusoft 
AG 
Usha Ispat, 
Redi Unit 
Hispano 
Carrocera SA 
Jaguar and 
Land Rovers 
brands 
Tata Finance 
Hispano 
Carrocera 
Daewoo 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
Company 
Geodynamics 
Acquired 
Coastal Gujarat 
Power 
PT Kaltim 
India 
India 
India 
US 
Germany 
Switzerland 
India 
Spain 
UK 
India 
Spain 
Korea 
Australia 
India 
Indonesia 
< 30 per cent 
90 per cent 
90.38 per cent 
100 per cent 
(wholly 
owned) 
Remaining 79 
per cent 
Merger 
21 percent 
100 per cent 
(wholly 
owned) 
10 per cent 
30 per cent 
Not 
disclosed 
Not 
disclosed 
Rsl l5 
crore 
$2.3 billion 
approximat 
ely 
Euro 12 
million (Rs 
70 crore) 
KRW120 
billion 
(USD 102 
million, Rs 
465 crore) 
$37.5 
million 
July20O4 
March 
2004 
January 
2004 
July 2005 
January 
2006 
January 
2006 
October 
2009 
March 
2008 
April 2005 
February 
2005 
March 
2004 
September 
2008 
April 200 
June 2007 
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Tata 
Projects 
Tata Steel 
Tata Sons 
Tata 
Sons(TCS) 
Tata Sons 
through 
Tata Ltd 
and Tata 
Tea through 
TTGB 
Investments 
Tata Tea 
and Tata 
Sons 
Tata Tea 
through 
Tata Tea 
(GB) 
ATata Tea 
through 
Tata 
Tea(GB) 
Tata Tech 
Prima Coal 
and 
PT Arutmin 
Indonesia 
Artson 
Engineering 
Rawmet 
Industries 
Millenium 
Steel 
Natsteel Asia 
Corns 
VSNL 
Computer 
Maintenance 
Corporation 
Energy Brands 
Inc 
Tetley Group 
Joekels Tea 
Packers 
Good Earth 
Corporation & 
FMali Herb Inc 
INCAT 
International 
India 
India 
Thailand 
Singapore 
UK 
India 
India 
US 
UK 
South Africa 
US 
UK 
equity stake 
67.11 per cent 
100 per cent 
(wholly 
owned) 
100 percent 
30 per cent 
100 per cent 
(wholly 
owned) 
33.3 percent 
100 per cent 
(wholly 
owned) 
RslOl 
crore 
USD 167 
million 
(Baht 6.5 
million) 
S$468.10 
million 
USD 677 
million 
GBP 271 
million 
GBP 0.91 
million 
USD 31 
million 
January-
zoos 
March 
2007 
April2O06 
February 
2005 
January 
2007 
February 
2002 
November 
2001 
October 
2006 
February 
2000 
September 
2006 
October 
2005 
August 
2005 
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Tata 
Teleservices 
Telco 
Constructio 
n 
Equipment 
Company 
(Telcon) 
Trent 
VSNL 
TRF 
Voltas 
Hughes 
Telecom 
(India) 
Serviplem SA 
Lebrero SA 
Landmark 
Tata Power 
Broadband 
Teleglobe 
International 
Tyco Global 
Network 
Dishnet DSL's 
ISP division 
Gemplex 
Hewitt Robins 
International 
Dutch Lanka 
Trailer 
Manufacturers 
York Transport 
Equipment 
(Asia) 
Rohini 
Industrial 
Electricals 
India 
Spain 
Spain 
India 
India 
US 
US 
India 
US 
UK 
Sri Lanka 
Singapore 
India 
50.83 per cent 
79 per cent 
60 per cent 
76 percent 
51 percent 
51 per cent 
stake 
51 per cent 
Rs 858.83 
crores 
USD 24.09 
million (Rs 
103.60 
crore) 
£3 million 
$8.67 
million 
Rs62 crore 
Decembo: 
2002 
Mardi 
2008 
Mardi 
2008 
August 
2005 
September 
2005 
July 2005 
November 
2004 
Mardi 
2004 
July 2003 
April 2010 
July 2009 
October 
2007 
August 
2008 
Source: Tata, Mergers and Acquisitions, Retrieved from 
http://www.tata. com/0_about_us/tatam&as.htm#top 
3.7 Impact of Recession on Mereers and Acquisitions (M&A *s) 
The global economic crisis which hit USA in 2007 had repercussions on economies 
worldwide. In India the focus shifted back to making domestic deals with the global 
markets in disarray. In 2009 there were approximately deals worth 10 billion dollars 
and 60percent of them constituted domestic transactions. Even the foreign buyers 
were lured into some sectors by the strong economic fundamentals of India^^ 
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Table 3.7.1 defines the impact of recession where the number of deals fell by -
32.84percent and value of deals by 39.44percent in 2008. The fall to -41.19percent in 
terms of number of deals and 67.59 percent in 2009 further highlights the recessionary 
impact. 
Table 3.7.1: Grant Thornton Report on Impact of Recession on Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Number of 
Deals 
676 
454 
267 
Percentage 
Change 
-
-32.84 
-41.19 
Value of 
Deals 
51.11 
30.95 
10.03 
Percentage 
Change 
-39.44 
-67.59 
Source: "India Inc looks within for Merger & Acquisitions" Retrieved from 
http://business.rediff.com/report/2009/dec/30/india-inc-looks-within-for-merger-and-
acquisitions.htm (30 December 2009) 
Economies worldwide have been in the grip of serious recession since the end of the 
year 2007 and its impact is visible in the form of decreasing growth rates, shrinking 
economies, fall in unemployment, fall in demand and consumption and other 
economic parameters which are depicting a downswing. Table 3.7.2 highlights that 
while the domestic deals fell by -46.73percent the value of the deals had actually 
increased by 78.60percent in 2008. In terms of cross border deals the number of deals 
fell by -22.82 and value by -46.81percent in 2008. The inbound deals fell by a larger 
percentage that is -27.68percent against -20.58percent of outbound deals in 2008 as 
regards volume of deals. In terms of value the outbound deals suffered more with a 
fall of-59.86percent against a -19.48percent fall in inbound deals in 2008. The total 
M&A"s fell by -34.17percent and PE Investment by -24.44percent in terms of 
number. In terms of value total M&A"s fell by -39.89percent and PE Investment by -
45.24percent. The total fall for M&A and PE investment was -30.53percent in terms 
of number and -41.36percent in terms of value. 
Hence it is concluded that the fall in recession had a greater impact on the value of 
mergers and acquisitions deals as compared to the number of deals. 
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Table 3.7.2: Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) Deals after Recession 
Year 
I. Domestic Deals 
II. Cross Border 
a) Inbound 
b) Outbound 
III. Total M&A's 
(I +11) 
IV. PE Investment 
Total (III +IV) 
Volume 
2007 
321 
355 
112 
243 
676 
405 
1081 
Volume 
(Number) 
Volume 
2008 
171 
274 
81 
193 
445 
306 
751 
% 
Change 
-46.73 
-22.82 
-27.68 
-20.58 
-34.17 
-24.44 
-30.53 
Value 
(US$ BiUions) 
Value 
2007 
2.85 
48.26 
15.50 
32.76 
51.11 
19.03 
70.14 
Value 
2008 
5.09 
25.63 
12.48 
13.15 
30.72 
10.42 
41.13 
% 
Change 
78-60 
-46.81 
-19.48 
-59.86 
-39.89 
-45.24 
-41.36 
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, 2009, pp. 57-62. Retrieved from 
http://www.epwrf.res.in/upload/MER/merl0906008.pdf 
Table 3.7.3 is symbolic of the deep impact the ongoing financial crisis has had on 
deals that have taken place in India in the first half of the financial year 2009. The 
inbound and domestic deals increased at the rate of lOpercent in 2009. There was a 
drastic drop in outbound deals by a percentage of -22percent largely to the gloomy 
economic outlook prevalent and loss of liquidity. Also the depreciation of the 
exchange rate of rupee means that outbound deals would lead to a further loss of 
valuable foreign exchange. The number of deals fell by -53.58percent to 136 in 2009 
while the value of deals crashed by -73percent which in itself tell the story about the 
fall in rate of deals involving Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
Table 3.7.3: Mergers and Acquisitions (Mi&A's) in India in the year 2009 
Particulars 
1. Percentage of Deals 
a. Inbound Deals 
b. Outbound Deals 
c. Domestic Deals 
2. Number of Deals 
3. Value of Deals 
HI 2008 
(First 6 months of 
2008) 
100% 
15% 
45% 
40% 
293 
US$20 billion 
HI 2009 
(First 6 months 
of 2009) 
100% 
25% 
23% 
52% 
136 
US$5.4 billion 
% Change 
-
10 
-22 
12 
-53.58 
-73 
Source: Chaudhry, Deepti "Mergers and acquisitions in fu t^ half of 2009 worst in five years" 
Retrieved fi-om http://www.livemint.com/2009/07/20223600/Mergers-and-acquisitions-in-fi.html, 
(20 July, 2009) 
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3.8 Conclusion 
The Chapter has given a detailed overview of the major Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M«&A's) in India and abroad by India Companies. In this Chapter the Researcher 
makes an attempt to trace the growth of the Indian economy and entrepreneurs over 
the years. The financial growth of the Indian economy is reflected in the number and 
value if deals through which the Indian economy has left an imprint worldwide where 
it is accepted and recognized as a major investor. In its bid to expand, grow and 
acquire technological and other related skills the Indian entrepreneurs have been on an 
acquisition spree. 
Having traced the economic scenario for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India 
the next Chapter sheds light on the consolidation scene in the global economy. 
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Chapter 4: 
International Mer2ers and 
Acquisitions (M&A ^s): An Insi2ht 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an insight into the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
scenario in India. It showcased the major merger and acquisition deals that have been 
taken place in India. In this chapter the Researcher makes an attempt to study the 
global economic scenario from the point of mergers and acquisitions (M&A's). The 
recent growth in the number of deals is studied in general and also in various sectors 
and economies. The motivation behind structuring mergers and acquisitions (M&A's) 
is also deliberated at length. It is followed by a description of major deals that have 
taken place in the recent past in prominent sectors. In the end impact of recession and 
future prospects related to M&A's in the global scenario are discussed.. 
4.2 Global Mer2ers and Acquisitions (M&A's): An Insi2ht 
With a wave of globalization sweeping all over the world there was a tendency among 
firms to make forays into newer markets, as an opportunity to expand and also to 
survive and sustain the competition from global onslaught. In the backdrop of 
increased foreign investments, liberalization and greater cooperation between 
economies all over the world, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) emerged as a 
potent, viable and strategic tool for corporate entities. As a result Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) were undertaken on an extensive scale by firms both at the 
domestic and international level. In the present era cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) are the most common mode of foreign direct investment as a 
result of which transnational corporations are emerging as dominant forces in the 
changed global scenario. These are instrumental in increasing the pace at which 
corporate restructuring is taking place globally. They are recorded as elements and 
responses of such restructuring. Elements in the sense that they result in fijrther 
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change in the economic scenario and response in the sense that these structural 
changes have a close relation with the merger and acquisition activity'. 
A look at the international scene reveals that, betweenl 988-95, the value of all cross 
border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) doubled to $229 billion, including those 
involving portfolio investments. It was USA which was dominating the scene of cross 
border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) by 1995 with $49 billion worth of sale and 
and38 billion worth of purchase in that year. Mainly it was the energy distribution, 
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and financial services industry which were 
dominating the scene in cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The small, 
medivim sized and services related enterprises were playing increasingly active role in 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The FDI surge was boosted by Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) by 1995 while it was earlier hit by recession in the early 
1990's^ 
Table 4.2.1 analyses the Cross-border mergers that took place in the period 1991-2008 
valued at over US$1 billion. In the year 1991 there was a sharp decline recorded 
where the number of deals fell by a huge 269.23percent and the value by 
62.37percent. The rate of decline decreased in the following year to 7.69percent and 
24.44percent regarding the number of deals and value respectively. The scenario of 
mergers was back to boom with marked increases being recorded in both the aspect of 
number and value of deals. In 2001 however, again a downfall was recorded which 
extended till the year 2003 where the number of deals fell by 25.71percent and the 
value by 30.67percent. From the year 2004 onwards again an increase was reported. 
The year 2007 was very conducive for mergers with an increase of 48.37percent being 
recorded in the number of deals and 68.31 percent in terms of value of deals. By the 
end of 2007, the entire global economy was in the midst of severe financial recession. 
With banking crisis and liquidity crunch to deal with, the momentimi of mergers was 
sure to take the brunt. As a result the number of deals fell by 21.32percent and value 
of deals fell by 31.25percent in 2008. For the year 2009 the figures taken for 
consideration are fi-om January to June only. Hence, it is not fair to compare the 
percentages. The global economy is back on the recovery stage and the number and 
value of deals is expected to increase. The scenario of recession can also be exploited 
as an opportunity, where the valuations of the company are at a low and it may be 
cheaper to carve out a merger or acquisition deal. In the recent times it is the global 
crisis of a financial, economic or political nature which has posed as a deterrent in this 
regard. The rate of increase of M&A's is expected to be back on track with the 
recovery of the economy. 
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Table 4.2.1: Cross-border M&A's valued at over $1 billion, 1987-2009* 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009* 
Number 
of Deals 
19 
24 
31 
48 
13 
12 
18 
36 
44 
48 
73 
111 
137 
207 
137 
105 
78 
111 
182 
215 
319 
251 
40 
Percentage 
Increase 
over 
previous 
year 
-
26.32 
29.17 
54.84 
-269.23 
-7.69 
50 
100 
22.22 
9.09 
52.08 
52.06 
23.42 
51.09 
-33.82 
-23.36 
-25.71 
42.31 
63.96 
18.13 
48.37 
21.32 
84.41 
Percentage 
of Total 
1.6 
1.3 
I.l 
1.4 
0.3 
0.3 
0.5 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
1.1 
1.4 
1.5 
2.1 
1.7 
1.6 
1.2 
1.5 
2.1 
2.4 
3.0 
2.6 
1.2 
Value 
($ 
billions) 
39.1 
53.2 
68.2 
83.7 
31.5 
23.8 
37.7 
72.6 
97.1 
100.2 
146.2 
408.8 
578.4 
999.0 
451.0 
265.7 
184.2 
291.3 
569.4 
711.2 
1197 
823 
171 
Percentage 
Increase 
over 
previous 
year 
36.06 
28.20 
22.73 
-62.37 
-24.44 
58.40 
92.57 
33.75 
3.19 
45.91 
179.62 
41.49 
72.72 
-54.85 
-41.09 
-30.67 
58.14 
95.47 
24.90 
68.31 
31.25 
79.22 
Percentage 
of Total 
40.1 
38.7 
40.8 
41.7 
27.0 
21.0 
30.5 
42.5 
41.9 
37.9 
39.4 
59.0 
64.0 
74.0 
61.7 
55.0 
44.8 
51.5 
61.3 
63.6 
70.4 
68.3 
67.2 
Source: Collected and Compiled from World Investment Report 2009, Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.09.II.D.15, New 
York and Geneva, 2009 
Note: * January-June only. 
Table 4.2.2 gives sector-wise sales of cross border merger and acquisition sales that 
have taken place in various economies. It shows that overall it is the manufacturing 
and services sector which is accounting for most of the merger and acquisitions taking 
place all over the world. It highlights the number of deals in various sectors in the 
year 2007. The numbers of deals in the primary sector are the highest for the 
transition economies followed by the developing economies. It is lower in the case of 
the world and developed economies. The deals are higher in the manufacturing sector 
for the world and developed economies as compared to the developing economies. It 
is lowest for the transition economies. The number of deals is high for the developing 
economies and transition economies as regards service sector are concerned. The 
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share of service sector is the highest among the various sectors for the world and 
developed economies as well. 
Table 4.2.2: Cross-border M«&A Sales, by Sector and by Group of Economies 
(2007) 
(Figures in Millions of dollars) 
Group of 
Economies 
World 
Developed 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Transition 
Economies 
(South-
East 
Europe and 
CIS) 
All 
Industries 
1031100 
903430 
96998 
30671 
2007 
Primary 
73299 
55806 
9268 
8225 
Manufacturing 
336310 
311264 
22859 
2187 
Service 
621491 
536360 
64871 
20259 
Source: Collected and Compiled from World Investment Report 2009, Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.09.II.D.15, New 
York and Geneva, 2009 
Figure 4.2.1: Cross-border M«&A Sales, by Sector and by Group of Economies 
(2007) 
(Figures in Millions of dollars 
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Source: Table 4.2.2 
For the year 2008 as per Table 4.2.3 the share of primary sector in terms of Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals is lowest for developing economies while it is low 
for the developed economies, world and transition economies as well. There is a sharp 
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increase in the share of the manufacturing sector in terms of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) deals in the world and the developed economies. In case of developing 
economies as well the share of manufacturing sector is substantial while it is 
comparatively the lowest for transition economies. In case of cross border Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) the share of services is highest for the transition economies 
followed by the developing economies. It is substantial but still low for the world and 
developed economies. 
Table 4.23: Cross-border M«&A Sales, by Sector and by Group of Economies 
2008 
(Figures in Millions of dollars) 
Group of Economies 
World 
Developed Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Transition Economies 
(South-East Europe 
and CIS) 
2 
All Industries 
673214 
551847 
100862 
20505 
008 
Primary 
86101 
80514 
3186 
2401 
Manufacturing 
302582 
261139 
38273 
3169 
Service 
284531 
210194 
59403 
14934 
Source: Collected and Compiled from World Investment Report 2009, Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.09.II.D.15, New 
York and Geneva, 2009 
Figure 4.2.2: Cross-border M«&A sales, by sector and by Group of Economies 
(2008) 
(Figures in Millions of dollars 
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Table 4.2.4 and Figure 4.2.3 highlight that the share of primary sector in terms of 
cross border M&A deals is low in the case of the world, developed economies and the 
developing economies. It is low for the transition economies as well but as compared 
to other economies it is on the higher side. There is a surge in the deals for the 
manufacturing sector in the transition economies and its share is comparatively lower 
for the world, developed and developing economies. The share of service sector is 
highest in all the economies; the world, developed economies, developing economies 
and transition economies as well. 
Table 4.2.4: Cross-border M&A Sales, by Sector and by Group of Economies 
2009(First Half) 
(Figures in Millions of dollars) 
2009: First Half 
Group of Economies 
World 
Developed 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Transition Economies 
(South-East Europe 
and CIS) 
All 
Industries 
123155 
102313 
19837 
1005 
Primary 
10004 
8294 
1541 
168 
Manufacturing 
22698 
18967 
3371 
360 
Service 
90453 
75051 
14925 
477 
Source: Collected and Compiled from World Investment Report 2009, Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.09.II.D.15, New 
York and Geneva, 2009 
Figure 4.2.3: Cross-border M&A Sales, by Sector and by Group of Economies 
2009(First Half) 
(Figures in Millions of dollars) 
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Various global blocks have been created with the purpose of promotion free trade and 
to do away with tariffs quotas and restrictions in certain regions. For example EU, 
NAFTA, ASEAN, SAARC, etc aim at promotion regional coordination and 
cooperation in a certain region. They have played a significant role in promoting cross 
border rate immensely. 
Apart from financial, economic and business perspectives Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) also act as a tool in the hand of entrepreneurs to use it for establishing global 
presence and prestige and to dominate in the global scenario. In these cases, financial 
and economic analysis and also the valuation of expected synergies and benefits 
arising out of the merger or acquisition may take a back seat and the entire focus of 
the entrepreneur might be on fiilfilling his global aspirations. 
Creating and increasing shareholders value is a major motivation for entering into a 
merger or acquisition. The announcement of a merger or acquisition may greatly help 
in boosting the stock quotes and if it does not go well with the market sentiments it 
might lead to a downward movement in stock. Acquiring firms with low-priced 
assets, competitive edge, superior technology, greater market presence or competent 
management may go well with the psyche of the shareholders and lead to a 
corresponding boost in the value of shares. When deciding whether to enter into a 
merger or acquisition, one of the most common parameter on the basis of which 
various valuations are made is the quantum of expected synergies. The acquiring firm 
makes a detailed analysis about the various gains and benefits it is expected to make 
against the cost that it is required to pay for the proposed deal. 
For the increased spate in the ongoing merger and acquisition activity a large number 
of factors are playing a vital role. Figure 4.3.1 discusses these in detail. Earlier the 
economic regulations were such that there were procedural and legal bottlenecks in 
finalizing a merger or acquisition deal. However, there have been vast changes 
incorporated in the economic framework of countries that has made the procedure of 
entering into an alliance much easier than ever before. In terms of regulations, the 
global economy is gradually becoming integrated and large scale privatization and 
deregulations measures are being undertaken by economies all across the globe. It has 
been further facilitated with the ease of restrictions earlier imposed on FDI, free trade 
and capital markets. It is imperative for the developing countries to enhance their 
technological competence in order to survive. It can be done through transfer of 
technology via mergers and acqmsitions which would also provide them the necessary 
competitive edge to survive. This has been made possible with the increased 
coordination and control of the global production systems. 
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Figure 4.3.1: Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's): A Conceptual 
Framework 
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Source: Chapman, Keith (2003) "Cross Border Mergers/Acquisitions: A Review and 
Research Agenda", Journal of Economic Geography 3, (2003), pp. 309-334 
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4.4 International Scenario of Mersers and Acquisitions 
(M&A 's) 
In the International scenario mergers and acquisitions seem to be catching the fancy 
of entrepreneurs worldwide. However, the phenomenon is not new. The movement 
can be traced to the Great Merger Movement which was predominantty a US 
phenomenon which took place from 1895 to 1905^ It marked consolidation by small 
firms, which included merging of firms engaged in similar business in ordo" to 
become powerfiil and dominate in their respective market or sector. The vehicles used 
were so-called trusts. 
It was then in the I980's that the world witnessed a dramatic increase in the number 
of takeovers and acquisitions. In the United States, the 1980's may legitimately be 
characterized as a decade of "merger mania".^. While the exact number and value of 
mergers and acquisitions that occurred during that time period cannot be accurately 
be known, it is estimated that 57000 mergers took place between 1980 and 1990, an 
increase of 119percent from the previous decade^ (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). It was 
in this period that takeover and mergers attracted considerable media attention and 
aroused public interest. It was followed by a significant rise in globalization which 
made the world economies integrated and the era of cross border mergers set in. The 
mindset of entrepreneurs and industrialists broadened and attempts were being made 
to explore the world market. Mergers and acquisitions proved to be a potent tool for 
easy and quick entry in new markets 
Table 4.4.1 highlights the major mergers engineered in the 1990's. WorldCom and 
MCI Communications merged to create MCI WorldCom in 1997 which made it the 
largest merger in the history of USA at that time. The Exxon Mobil merger was a 
strategic and complementary one creating the third largest company in the world in 
1998. Bell Atlantic and GTE merger was done for the purpose of further expansion 
and facing competition. Vodaphone purchased AirTouch Communications Inc. and 
altered its name to Vodaphone Airtouch Pic. Pfizer Warner-Lambert merger created 
world's largest pharmaceutical company. US West, Inc. was acquired by Quest 
Communications in a deal which many analysts termed as hostile. Citicorp and 
Travelers group merger aimed to serve the financial needs of customers by offering 
personalized services through multiple distiibution channels. The SBC and Ameritech 
merger was expected to benefit customers, employees and investors through expanded 
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scale, scope, resources, innovation, creation of value etc. Vodafone purchased 
Airtouch which gave it 35percent share of Mannesmann, owner of largest German 
mobile network. 
Table 4.4.1: Major M & A's in the 1990s 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Year 
1997 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
Purchaser 
Worldcom 
Exxon 
Bell Atlantic(5) 
BP(6) 
Vodafone Airtouch 
PLC 
Pfizer 
US West 
Citicorp 
SBC 
Commimications 
Vodafone Group 
Purchased 
MCI Communications 
Mobil 
GTE 
Amoco 
Mannesmann 
Warner-Lambert 
Qwest 
Communications 
Travelers Group 
Ameritech 
Corporation 
Airtouch 
Communications 
Transaction value 
(m million US$) 
42000 
77200 
53360 
53000 
183000 
90000 
48000 
73000 
63000 
60000 
Source: "Mergers and Acquisitions" Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, Retrieved 
fi'om http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mergers_and_acquisitions (27 May 2008) 
4,5 Industry-wise Analysis ofMersers and Acquisitions 
(M&A 's) in the Global Economy 
i. Metal Industry 
The mining reserves are limited and require constant replenishment. The sector 
thrives on two kinds of strategies, i.e. exploration and mergers or acquisitions. While 
the former is an expensive method, the latter is gaining popularity in the present 
scenario of increased competition and global cost cutting where exploration cost is 
difficult to absorb. In 1998 the industry spent more than $25 billion on M&A's, which 
was twice the amount was spent two years earlier. 
Table 4.5.1 shows the significant mergers in the mining sector where despite 
apprehensions about mode of financing due to volatility in the debt market, significant 
mergers and acquisitions took place in the mining sector. Sims Group merged its 
operations with Hugo Neu Company in 2005 to create the world's largest metal 
recycler in the world based on market capitalization. Falconbridge Ltd. was acquired 
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by Xstrata which was Swiss based in 2006. CVRD purchased the words second 
largest producer of nickel, hico in 2006. Sims group went on to merge with Metal 
Management to create North America's largest metal recycler. Steel Dynamics Inc. 
(SDI), Fort Wayne, Ind. and Omnisource Corp merged to create second largest 
ferrous scrap recycler in the United States in 2007. However, the most significant 
merger in the industry was the one between the world first and second largest 
company, Rio Tinto and Alcan. It created an aluminium agent and was the largest 
ever deal engineered in the industry. With China and other developing economies 
continuing to grow and demand in Europe and North America remaining stable, 
consolidation in the industry is expected to continue. The acquisition of Omni Source 
gave Steel Dynamics a platform to expand in North America. The world's largest 
steel maker Arcelor-Mittal acquired the Canadian Bakermet which was a maricet 
leader in scrap metal 
Table 4.5.1; M&A in Scrap Metal 
Company 1 
Hugo Neu Company 
Xstrata 
CVRD 
Metal Management 
Inc 
Steel Dynamics Inc. 
(SDI), Fort Wayne, 
Ind. 
Rio Tinto 
Steel Dynamics 
Sims Group Limited 
ArcelorMittal 
Company 2 
Sims Group Ltd 
Falconbridge 
Inco 
Sims Group 
Omnisource Corp 
Alcan 
Omni Source Corp 
.Weinert Recycling 
Canadian Metals 
Recycler Bakermet 
Year 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
Value of deal 
US$ 500 million 
£9.1 billion 
£ 9.4 billion 
US$1.6 billion 
US$ 1 billion 
US$ 38 billion 
US$1 billion 
Not Disclosed 
Source: Compiled fi-om Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports , Websites 
and Articlesf«^9Jt'°5 
ii. Pharmaceutical Industry: 
Keeping in line with the global trend of growth and expansion, M&A is proving to be 
one of the most desired tools in this direction. Health has no boundaries, which is the 
reason behind the pharmaceutical sector having no global or political boundaries. 
However, it entails huge amount of finance in research and development for 
producing new drugs and bringing improvements in the old ones. M&A's is a viable 
tool in this direction where it is possible to takeover companies that already made 
progress rather than establishing a new unit. 
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With the expiry of patent, the profits of the original drug producer company are wiped 
away by generic competitors. These do not have any expenses relating to drug 
discovery and development but just convince the customers that, the drug produced 
by them is the same as produced by other companies and is also much cheaper. 
Entering into a merger with these firms eliminates competition and economies accrue 
due to economies of scale. The globalization phenomenon and the tremendous 
development in the financial institutions and markets have made capital easily 
available to entrepreneurs. This has made financing mergers and acquisitions easy. 
Table 4.5.2 enlists the important pharmaceutical mergers of 1990's. Bristol Myers 
merged with Squibb Corp in 1989 to create the world's second largest pharmaceutical 
company. American home Products took over American Cynamide in 1994 to create 
one of world's largest company with a broad range of products in its basket. Ciba 
Geigy and Sandoz merged in 1996 to form Novartis Ag which was one of world's 
largest company. Astra and Zeneca merged in 1998 in one of the largest European 
merger ever and form the fourth largest drug company in the world which would be 
named AstraZeneca. 
Table 4.5.2: Top Pharmaceutical Companies Mergers in the World in the 1990's 
Merging Company 
Dow Chemicals 
Bristol Myers 
Beecham Group 
America Home Products 
Hoffman La Roche 
Eli Lyly 
Sandoz 
Smith Kline Beecham 
Glaxo 
Hoechst 
Pharmacia 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorers 
BASF 
Ciba Geigy 
Hof&nan La Roche 
Hoechst A.G 
Astra 
Merged Company 
Marion Labs 
Squibb Corp 
Smith, Kline & French 
American Cynamide 
Syntex Lab 
PCS Health System 
Gerber 
Sterling 
Burroughs Wellcome 
MMD Roussel 
Upjohn 
Fison 
Boots 
Sandoz 
Coamge Ltd 
Rhone Poulenc 
Zeneca 
Year of 
merger 
1986 
1989 
1989 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1998 
Value of merged 
Company 
$6.21 billion 
$ 12.09 billion 
$7.9 billion 
$9.7 billion 
$5.3 billion 
$4 billion 
$3.7 billion 
$2.9 billion 
$14.2 billion 
$7.2 billion 
$7 billion 
$2.7 billion 
$1.3 billion 
$30.1 billion 
$11 billion 
$67 billion 
Source: Dubey, D.P "Globalisation and its Impact on the Indian Pharmaceutical 
Industry" Retrieved from 
http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv5nl/pharmacy.htm (29 August 2008) 
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Table 4.5.3 highlights other significant mergers in pharmaceutical sector. In 2000 
Pfizer took over Warner-Lambert in a hostile merger which was one of the biggest 
deals in this sector then. Glaxo Wellcome and Smithkline Beecham merged in 2000 
and it was expected to control 70percent of world's pharmaceutical market making it 
equal with Pfizer as world's largest company. Johnson and Johnson in its biggest 
move, merged with Alza to bring one and half percentage points to the growth rate of 
Johnson and Johnson (J«&J) revenue during next five years. In 2004 Sanofi-
Synthelabos took over Aventis to benefit fi-om the complementary nature of the 
combined group's existing product portfolio. UCB Pharma merged with Celltech 
Group Pic in 2004 to create Europe's largest biotechnology company and fifth largest 
worldwide. The merger between Alliance Unichem and Boots Group was viewed as a 
merger of equals to create a global healthcare company by creating a platform for 
both companies to grow. Boston Scientifics' Corp purchase of Guidant Corp 
(Stentmaker) in 2006 was regarded as a disastrous purchase which led to 40percent 
drop in Boston Scientifics share price. The takeover of Genentech by Roche was 
slated to be the largest in the Swiss corporate history. The acquisition by Pfizer's of 
its competitor Wyeth in 2009 combined the two strong companies who expected to 
benefit fi-om each other's expertise but resulted in job losses too. The deal with 
Schering-Plough was expected to boost the presence of Merck in biopharmaceuticals. 
Table 4.5.3: M&A in Pharmaceutical Sector 
Company 
Pfizer 
Glaxo Wellcome 
Johnson & Johnson (J & J) 
Bristol-Myers-Squibb 
Pfizer Inc 
Pfizer 
British Biotech Pic 
Sanofi-Synthelabos 
Bayer Pic 
Celltech Group Pic 
Atrix Laboratories Inc. 
Bioglan Pharmaceuticals 
MJ Research Inc 
Respironics Inc 
pSivida Ltd 
OrthoLogic Corp 
Merger 
Warner Lambart 
Smithkline Beecham 
Alza 
Du Pont Pharmaceuticals 
Pharmacia Corp 
Esperion Therapautics 
Vemalis Group Pic 
Aventis 
Roche Consumer Health 
UCB Pharma 
QLT Inc 
Bradley Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc 
Profile Therapeutics Pic 
QinetiQ Ltd 
Chrysalis BioTechnology 
Inc 
Year 
2000 
2000 
2001 
2001 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
Value of deal 
$90 billion 
$182 billion 
$10.5 billion 
$7.8 billion 
$60 billion 
$1,3 billion 
£ 48 million 
$63.2 biUion 
EUR 2.38 billion 
$2.7 billion 
€750 million 
$183 million 
$ 47 million 
$45 million 
$41 million 
$34 million 
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Actavis 
Amgen Inc (AMGN) 
Alliance Unichem 
Boston Scientific Corp 
Abbott Laboratories 
TEVA Pharmaceutical 
Industries 
Merck and Co. (MRK) 
Johnson and Johnson (J & 
J) 
Watson 
Merck and Co. 
Roche 
Pfizer 
Alpharma 
Abgenix 
Boots Group 
Guidant Corp (stentmaker) 
Kos Pharmaceuticals Inc 
IVAX Corporation 
Sima Therapautics 
Conor Medsystems (small 
stent developer) 
Andrx 
Schering-Plough 
Genentech 
Wyeth 
2005 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2009 
2009 
$810millioa 
$2.2 billi(m 
$12 billion 
$27 billion 
$3.7 billioa 
$7.4 billion 
$1.1 billion 
$1.4 billion 
$1.9 billion 
$41 billion 
$ 46 billion 
$68 million 
Source: Compiled fi-om Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites 
andArticW^t'^^f'^l 
iii. Aviation Industry: 
In the past decade the aviation sector has been hit hard by the global recession and the 
September 11 attack on the World Trade Center twin towers. It shook the confidence 
of the passengers which had an adverse impact on the profitability of various airlines. 
This sector is in dire need of restructuring in order to be financially viable and break 
even. There is a need of consolidation among the large number of airlines existing in 
Europe and USA in order reduce cost and ensure efficient operations and profitability. 
However it should also be kept in mind that majority of mergers have proved to be 
unsuccessful. Hence, careful and systematic assessment of resulting synergies should 
be made before actually implementing the proposed mergers 
The various mergers that have taken place in the international scenario have been 
classified in Table 4.5.4. Air Canada finally managed to acquire Canadian Airlines 
which was Canada's second largest carrier which made it the 12* largest airline. The 
horizontal merger of Air France and KLM group which took place between 
September 2003 and May 2004 led to the creation of Europe's biggest airline where 
KLM was the target firm and Air France the bidder firm. It was the first major cross 
border merger in airline sector since decades which not only created synergies but 
was also beneficial to customers of both airlines. We generally see that an 
announcement of a merger leads to significant changes in the share prices of both the 
target and bidder firms. The movement of the share prices of KLM and Air France 
can be depicted in the following diagram. Based on the closing share price of Air 
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France on September 29, 2003 the public exchange offer valued the common share 
capital of KLM at approximately EUR 784m or each KLM share at EUR 16.74, 
which represented a premium of 40percent over KLM's closing share price of EUR 
11.96 at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange on September 29, 2003.The US airways and 
America West merger was finalized in 2005 and the value of the deal approximated at 
US $1.5 billion. The world's largest airline Delta was created after the merger 
between Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines. 
Table 4.5.4: M&A in Aviation Industry 
Merging Company 
Air Canada 
Air France 
America West Airlines 
Delta 
Merged Company 
Canadian Airlines 
KLM 
US Airways 
North West Airlines 
Year of 
merger 
2000 
2004 
2005 
2008 
Value of merged 
Company 
$92 million 
$1.5 billion 
US$3.1 billion 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports , Websites 
and Articles''* 
Figure 4.5.1: History of Air France and KLM 
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The case of Air France and KLM (Dipl.- Kfm. Mark Friesen, March 2005) 
iv. Telecommunication Industry: 
Telecommunication Sector is viewed as one of the most promising and rapidly 
developing industries in the world. There has been stiff competition in this sector and 
M&A is proving to be a potent tool for entering into strategic alliances. The trend of 
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the number of mergers and acquisitions is constantly on the rise and is expected to 
escalate further at a rapid pace. It is further boosted by the increased interest of 
foreign institutional investors and private players. Recent mergers and acquisitions in 
this sector are shown in Table 4.5.5. These mergers provide a series of advantages 
like better infrastructure, easier licensing options, wider coverage of network and 
customer base etc. 
Table 4.5.5 displays a list of significant mergers in telecom sector where GTE and 
Bell Atlantic merged to create Verizon in one of the largest merger in order to sustain 
the ongoing competition day by day which was getting stiffen AT and T merged with 
Cingular in 2004 to create nation's biggest wireless carrier in terms of subscribers and 
serve top 100 US metropolitan areas. Nokia and Siemens merged their 
telecommunication network which would make it among the top three companies in 
infrastructure indicating growing competitive pressure in the telecom supplier market. 
ATandT and Bell South merged to create world's single largest telecommunication 
company. Verizon Wireless acquisition of Alltel made it the largest wireless carrier in 
USA. The merger between Orange and T-Mobile was expected to create synergies 
and also reduce cost by using each other's infrastructure and market base. 
Table 4.53: M&A in the Telecommunical 
Company 1 
Bell Atlantic 
SBC 
GTE 
Deutsche Telekom 
AG 
ATandT 
SBC 
Nokia 
Lucent 
ATandT 
Verizon 
Orange 
Company 2 
NYNEX 
Pacific Telesis 
Bell Atlantic 
Voice Stream 
Wireless Corp. 
Cingular 
ATandT 
Siemens 
Alcatel 
Bell South 
Alltel Wireless 
T-Mobile 
tion Industry (Figures in US $) 
Year of 
merger 
1996 
1997 
2000 
2000 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Value of Deal 
27 billion 
16.7 billion 
116 billion 
50.7 billion 
41 billion 
$16 billion 
31.6 billion 
13.4 billion 
$86 billion 
$28 billion 
400-600 million pounds 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports, Websites 
and Articles IS 
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V. Financial and Banking Industry 
The drive for mergers and acquisitions in the financial sector is mainly a part of 
expansion efforts of financial institutions. The growth in revenues has been stagnant 
and cost reduction through internal restructuring has already been done to the 
maximum possible extent. The stock price movement serves as financial motivator to 
pursue merger and acquisition deals. 
Among the significant mergers as shown in Table 4.5.6, Nation's Bank took over 
Bank America in 1998 to compete more efficiently in an international industry that 
increasingly emphasizes on size to create the largest US Bank ranked by assets in the 
second largest takeover in corporate history. Banc One Corp acquired first Chicago 
NBD Corp to create the fifth largest US Bank and the largest in the Midwest. Merger 
between Bank of America and Fleet Boston Bank in 2003 ushered in a new banking 
leader by creating the first banking institution with a truly national scope and fourth 
most profitable company in the world. JP Morgan Chase and Bank One merger 
combined two of the biggest banks in USA. It was the third largest merger in US 
financial services and made it a rival to country's largest bank Citigroup. Wachovia, 
nation's fourth largest bank acquired Golden West Financial in 2007 to make a strong 
footing in California to fiirther its aim of becoming a national retail bank despite the 
apprehensions its shareholder's had about the deal. Capital One acquired Northfork 
Ban Corp to create one of the ten largest banks in United States based on deposits and 
managed loans and third largest retail depository institution in the New York region. 
Regions Financial acquired South Ban Corp in a merger to create nearly US$ 140 
billion in assets . Lincoln National acquired Jefferson-Pilot in a deal which executives 
believed would create largest publicly traded Life Insurance Companies in the nation. 
Aviva, world's fifth largest insurance and investment group acquired Amer US to 
establish a leading position in a high growth segment of the world's largest saving 
market. The merger between Bank of America and Merill Lynch made it the largest 
securities firm in the world in 2008 while the one between Wells Fargo and Wachovia 
created the fourtii largest bank in USA. The MDM and URSA bank created one of the 
largest financial institutions in India. 
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Table 4.5.6: M&A in the Financial and Banking Industry (Figures in US $) 
Company 1 
Bank America 
First Chicago Corp 
Sun Trust Bank 
Bank of America 
JP Morgan Chase 
Banco Santander 
Wachovia 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Sun Trust 
North Fork 
Regions Financial Union 
National City 
Sovereign 
Bank of America 
Wachovia 
Wachovia 
Citizens Banking 
Corporation 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria 
Bank of America 
State Street Corporation 
Bank of New York 
Company, Inc. 
Wachovia 
Wachovia 
Capital One 
Regions Financial 
Corporation 
Lincoln National 
Aviva 
TD Banknorth 
Bank of America 
Wells Fargo 
PNC Financial Services 
MDMBank 
Company 2 
Security Pacific 
NBD Bancorp 
Crestar Financial 
Fleet Boston Bank 
Bank One 
Abbey National 
South Trust 
Charter One 
National Commerce 
Greenpoint 
Planters 
Provident Financial 
Seacoast Financial 
MBNA Corporation 
Westcorp Inc. 
Golden West Financial 
Republic Bancorp 
Compass Bacshares 
LaSalle Bank 
Investors financial 
Services Corporation 
Mellon Financial 
Corporation 
World Savings Bank 
A.G Edwards 
North Fork Bancorp. 
AmSouth 
Bancorporation 
Jefferson Pilot 
Amer US Group 
Commerce Bancorp 
Merill Lynch 
Wachovia 
National City Corp 
URSA Bank 
Year of 
merger 
1992 
1995 
1998 
2003 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
Value of deal 
4.1 billion 
5.3 billion 
9.8 billion 
49.3 billion 
58.7 billion 
15.6 billion 
14.3 billion 
10.6 billion 
7.0 billion 
6.4 billion 
6.0 billion 
2.1 billion 
1.1 billion 
35 billion 
3.91 billion 
25 billion-
1.048 billion 
9.8 billion 
21 billion 
4.2 billion 
18.3 billion 
25 billion 
6.8 billion 
13.6 billion 
10.5 billion 
8.2 billion 
2.8 billion 
$8.5billion 
$50 billion 
$15.1 billion 
$5.08 billion 
NA 
Source: Convpiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual 
and Articles 
Reports , Websites 
vi. Cosmetic Industry 
There has been a noticeable increase in the investments in the cosmetic sector 
especially in 2007 with natural and organic cosmetics emerging as a hot destination 
for investment. Though scattered, the mergers in cosmetic sector have shown a steep 
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upward movement. M&A is a popular tool in this sector as it offers viable 
opportunities for growth due to the increase in sales they enjoy from positive response 
of customers to launch of new products, entering a new market, wider distribution 
network, integrating R«&D, production and capital resources. 
Table 4.5.7 gives a purview of the various mergers taking place in the cosmetic arena. 
Among the noticeable ones is the acquisition of Body Shop by L'oreal which gave the 
former a worldwide perspective, access to advanced research and development and 
also proved as a complement to the latter's diversified portfolio. Clorox acquired 
Burtbees in 2007 mainly to foster growth and also take advantage of Burtbess 
extensive capabilities and credibility. Colgate-Palmolive's acquisition of Tom Maine 
was viewed as an attempt by the former to make a foray in naturals segment and 
personal care in which Tom Maine was a leader. Tom Maine also got access to the 
diversified customer base of Colgate. The second biggest cosmetic surgery provider 
of UK, The Hospital Group acquired control in the Spain based Mills and Mills 
medical tourism company. 
Table 4.5.7: M&A in the Cosmetics Industry 
Acquirer 
Company 
L'oreal 
Clorox 
Colgate-Palmolive 
L'oreal 
L'oreal 
Parfum d' Image 
Beierdorf 
The Hospital Group 
Acquired Company 
Body Shop 
Burt bees 
Tom's of Maine 
Maly's West 
Canan 
Latitudes 
C-Bons hair 
Mills and Mills 
Year 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2009 
Value of deal 
US$1.14 billion 
US$ 925 million 
US$ 100 million 
Euro 269.45 million 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports , Websites 
andArticlesf'^f"'5I"l 
vii. Technology Industry 
. The global credit crunch and unfavorable economic environment had little effect on 
this sector. It was driven by increased consumer demand and integrated solutions. In 
future also the M&A activity is expected to be critical tool for expansion and survival. 
Table 4.5.8 highlights major deals in this sector. The merger between AT & T 
Broadband and Comcast was expected to create world's pre-eminent broadband 
services and one of the leading and most powerful communications media and 
entertainment companies in the world. At and T further acquired Bell South in 2007 
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to benefit from the union of wired and wireless networks through combination of two 
leading providers. Alcatel's acquisition of Lucent Technologies was mainly to face 
competition and complement resources especially in the research and development 
area. The acquisition of Scientific Atlanta by Cisco created an entity with a world 
class end-to-end triple play solution for carrier networks and digital home. Oracle's 
acquisition of Siebel systems was viewed as a high price move but it also provided it 
with rival customer's base in its hold. The acquisition by Seagate Technology of 
Maxtor enabled the resultant company to compete more effectively in a highly 
competitive data storage industry to meet challenges and opportunities and also 
generate significant synergies. Anteon's acquisition by General Dynamics is regarded 
as one of largest defensive mergers. 
There has been vibrant activity in the technology in the last few years where a large 
volume of M«&A deals were affected. The merger of SPSS was expected to strengthen 
the information agenda of IBM. Agilent Technologies acquired Varian which was 
expected to provide new product offerings and cost synergies. 
Table 4.5.8; M&A in Technology Industry 
Acquirer Company 
AT and T Broadband 
Adobe Systems 
Intuit Corp 
Intuit Inc 
Cisco 
IBM 
Acer 
AT and T 
Alcatel 
Cisco Systems 
Oracle 
Seagate Technology 
General Dynamics 
Sun 
Oracle 
Hughes Conmiunication 
Inc. 
20-20 Technologies 
IBM 
Agilent Technology 
Acquired Company 
Comcast 
Macromedia 
Digital Insight Inc 
Homestead 
Technologies 
Securrent 
Cognos 
Gateway 
Bell South 
Lucent Technology 
Scientific Atianta 
Siebel Systems 
Maxtor 
Anteon 
MySql 
BEA Systems Inc. 
Helius Inc. 
Icovia 
SPSS 
Varian 
Year of 
deal 
2002 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
2009 
Value of deal 
US$ 72 billion 
US$3.4 billion 
US$1.35 billion 
US $170 million 
US$ 100 million 
US$ 5 billion 
US$710 million 
US$ 85.6billion 
US$ ll.Tbillion 
US$ 5.2billion 
US$ 3.7billion 
US$ 2.4 billion 
US$ 2.1 biUion 
US$ 1 bilHon 
US$ 7.85 billion 
US4 30.5 million 
US$ 1.6 million 
$1.2 billion 
$1.5 billion 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annua 
andArticlest2*"2'«221t"][24] Reports, Websites 
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viii. Health Industry 
The Health Sector witnessed a huge number of mergers and acquisitions in 2007 and 
the trend continued in 2008. The sector has seen a remarkable boom in the past in the 
background of growing interest and consciousness of consumers towards health issues 
and also due to the increase in the number of diseases. Table 4.5.9 highlights the 
mergers undertaken in Health sector. Dada Behring Holdings, world's largest clinical 
diagnostics company and Siemens, the first and currently only fijll service diagnostics 
company merged to become the largest provider of clinical diagnostics products and 
services all over the world. Plethico Pharmaceuticals acquired Natrol Inc. to position 
itself as a globalplayer in herbal healthcare products. Royal Philips and VISICU Inc 
merged together to bring together Greater Baltimore's fastest growing public 
companies with one of world's biggest makers of patient monitoring technology. The 
merger between Astellas Pharma US Inc. and Agensys was viewed as a rare 
combination which would benefit investors and employees of both the merged 
entities. Boston Scientific acquired Guidant in order to create a strategic partnership 
for creating a broadly diversified medical technology company. Novartis acquired 
Chiron in order to expand its vaccine business. Fresenius Medical Care, world's 
largest provider of dialysis products and services acquired Renal Care Group, a fast 
growing and highly profitable dialysis provider in order to complement its business 
and create a common vision of high quality of care. 
Table 4.5.9: M&A in Health Industry 
Acquiring Company 
Siemens 
Inovo Inc 
Plethico Pharmaceuticals 
Radnet Inc. 
Amerigroup Community 
Care 
Royal Philips 
Astellas Pharma US Inc. 
Boston Scientific 
Novartis 
Fresenius Medical Care 
Inverness Medical 
Innovations (IMA) 
SRL Ranbaxy 
Merge Healthcare 
Acquired Company 
Dade Behring Holdings 
Chad Therapautics Inc 
Natrol Inc 
Papastavros Associates 
Medical Imaging LLC 
Memphis Health Plan 
VISICU Inc. 
Agensys Inc. 
Guidant 
Chiron 
Renal Care Group 
Matria Healthcare 
(MATR) 
Fortis Health 
AMIAS 
Year of 
Deal 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2010 
Value of Deal 
US $ 7 billion 
US$ 5.3 million 
US$ 80.7 million 
US$21.6million 
US$ 12 million 
US$ 430 million 
US$ 537 milUon 
US$ 25.1billion 
US$ 5.2billion 
US$ 3.5billion 
$248 million 
Source: Compiled fi-om Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports , Websites 
and Articlest2™t"]t2«^ 
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ix. Business Services Industry 
In recent years M&A's have been taking place globally and have become increasingly 
diverse in terms of nature of services involved. Global restructuring of the economy 
and rising competitive pressure are among the major reasons for the merger mania in 
the business services sector which is experiencing vast technological changes. Also 
merged entities attempt to maximize from the creation of synergies and reduction in 
costs. 
Table 4.5.10 gives an insight about relevant mergers that have taken place in the 
Business Services Sector. The merger between Macrovision Corp and All Media 
Guide LLC was expected to create synergies and benefit consumers by redefining 
consumer entertainment and also provide additional stockholder value to investors. 
Hub International acquired FLF Inc with the main object of expanding its operation in 
Northern California and provide a better pool of services and expertise. Quigo was 
the fourth acquisition for AOL LLC in 2007, in order to give its advertisers more 
control over where their ads appear. Impedal Capital LLC acquired USBX Inc as a 
part of its efforts to expand and also add strong resources to its existing base of M«&A 
expertise and deep sector knowledge. The acquisition of Aviva Global services which 
was based in UK gave WNS a huge presence in India and Sri Lanka. The acquisition 
of Citigroup Financial Services by TCS was the largest purchase of a foreign captive 
BPO in India. Wipro maintained its acquisition spree with the purchase of Citi 
Technology Services Ltd (Citos) 
Table 4.5.10: M&A in Business Services Industry 
Acquiring Company 
Macrovision Corp 
Hub International of 
California Inc. 
AOL LLC 
Manatt Phelps and 
Philips LLP 
Impedal Capital LLC 
WNS 
Babel Media 
TCS 
Wipro 
Acquired Company 
All Media Guide LLC 
FLF Inc. 
Quigo Technologies Inc 
Steefel, Levitt and Weiss 
USBX Inc. 
Aviva Global Services 
Quattro 
Citigroup Global Services 
Citi Technology Services 
Ltd (Citos 
Year of 
Deal 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
Value of Deal 
US$ 74.8 
million 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
$32-34 million 
$100-125 
million 
$505 million 
$127 million 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports , Websites 
and Articles t^ l^f^ "^  
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X. Consumer Industry 
With the market in the consumer sector getting competitive and margins getting 
tighter for manufacturers, M«&A is appearing as a viable tool to survive and sustain. 
The expenditure on marketing products has also seen a sharp decline and pooling of 
resources and capital through restructuring appears as a relevant option. 
Table 4.5.11 gives a bird eye view about recent mergers and acquisitions in Consumer 
Sector. Few important ones have been explained below. Thermo Electron acquired 
Fisher Scientific in order to create a leading provider of laboratory products and 
scientific equipment and offer strong future prospects which would have been 
difficult for either company to create individually. R.H Donnelley acquisition of Dex 
Media created the third largest Print and Internet Directory Publisher in the United 
States.MC Clatchy acquired Knight Ridder in a bid to become the second largest 
publisher in the United States. Hughes Supply purchase by Home Depot was its 
largest purchase ever and expected to aid it in its expansion in e-commerce. Godrej 
acquired the South African Kinky Group which was one of the biggest in the business 
in South Africa. It gave the former an opportunity to enter a new market and diversify 
its portfolio. GfK Switzerland AG, FMCG Retail Measurement and Consumer Panel 
Business was acquired by the Nielsen Company for undisclosed terms which was 
expected to enable the merged unit to provide more integrated consumer services. 
Table 4,5.11; M&A in Consumer Industry 
Acquirer Company 
Thermo Electron 
R.H Donnelley 
Aecom Technology 
Corp 
Mc Clatchy 
Noble Private Equity 
Funds 
Isonics Corp 
Home Depot 
Brentwood Associates 
General William Lyon 
Godrej Consumer 
The Nielsen Company 
Source: Compiled fi-om ^  
and Articles t^ ]t32][33][34] 
Acquired Company 
Fisher Scientific 
Dex Media 
Economics Research 
Associates 
Knight-Ridder 
Richardson Hotel 
Universal Guardian Holdings 
Hughes Supply 
Zoe's Kitchen USA LLC 
Lyon Homes 
Kinky Hair Brand 
GfK Switzerland AG, FMCG 
Retail Measurement and 
Consumer Panel Business 
/arious Business Dailies, Reports 
Year 
of Deal 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2009 
, Annual 
Value of Deal 
USSll.lbiilion 
US$ 4.2billion 
ND 
US$ 3.2billion 
ND 
US$ 10.3 
milHon 
US$ 3.2billion 
ND 
US$ O.Sbillion 
$33 million 
ND 
leports, Websites 
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xi. Beverages Industry 
This sector is viewed as highly fragmented yet financially stable. The trend of M&A 
in this sector has been to exploit opportunities on case by case business and not in an 
aggressive mode in the least. However consolidation may prove a key to leverage 
resources to its benefit. Major deals are shown in Table 4.5.12. 
In order to boost its sales Coca-cola acquired Pan-American beverages which was 
much larger but debt ridden as a result of which the second largest bottling giant in 
the world was created. Cadbury Schweppes sold a large portion of its overseas 
business to Coca-cola which gave it a strong push in the beverages sector by giving it 
a huge cash reserve. Amoskeag Beverages Inc. of Hooksett and Capitol Distributors 
Inc. of Bow have merged into a new entity, Amoskeag Beverages LLC, which will be 
one of the largest beer distributors in the state in 2008. The acquisition of Scottish and 
New Castle was expected to make Carlsberg and Heinekenthe fastest growing 
brewers in the world. 
Table 4.5.12: M&A in Beverages Industry 
Acquiring Company 
Coca- cola 
Anheuser-Busch Co 
Coca-cola 
Fiji Water LLC 
Amoskeag Beverages 
Inc. 
Vina Tarapaca 
Carlsberg and Heineken 
Acquired Company 
Panamerican beverages 
Harbin Brewery Group 
Cadbury Schweppes Pic 
Neptxine Shipping Line 
Capitol Distributors Inc. 
Vina San Pedro 
Scottish and Newcastle 
Year of 
deal 
2003 
2004 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
Value of deal 
US$ 3.6 billion 
US$139 million 
US$ 700million 
ND 
ND 
Stock Transaction 
US$15.4 billion 
Source: Compiled from Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports , Websites 
and Articlesf"^ ^^ '^ 
xii. Energy Industry 
In case of energy sector it is observed that the post-transaction litigation increases the 
risk of the merger and hence, should be duly considered. Despite the negative political 
and legal factors in the international arena, M&A's have proved to be an important 
strategy for growth which is boosted by the investment made by private player 
contributing towards the increase in capital growth and competitiveness. 
Table 4.5.13 gives a brief synoptic view of the mergers and acquisitions that took 
place in energy sector. Sony Corp of America, Royal Philips Elecfronics NV and 
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other investors agreed to acquire Inter Trust Technologies. The purchase was affected 
through Fidelio Acquisition Company LLC which was new company especially 
formed for the purpose. In order to advance the development of its gas storage 
products Arcapita acquired Falcon Gas Storage Company in 2005. Conoco Philips 
acquired Burlington to create synergies in order to benefit shareholders. Anadarko 
Petroleum's acquisition of Kerr-Mc-Gee and Western Gas Resources in 2007 made it 
the second largest producer of natural gas and seventh largest producer of crude oil 
and natural gas liquids in the United States. The acquisition of Maverick Tube gave 
Tenaris full access to the energy sector in the US and Canada. As a result of the 
acquisition of Trans- Montaigne by Morgan Stanley the former ceased to be publicly 
traded and was no longer listed in NYSE. Consol Energy acquired CNX Gas in order 
to achieve greater flexibility in the access, allocation and utilization of capital in 
growing its diversified portfolio. The purchase of Brono Drilling gave Allis Chalmers 
Energy a chance to exploit domestic and international growth opportunities. The 
combination of Smith with WH energy was expected to provide Smith with a strategic 
edge in its operations. The deal between Suncor energy and Petro Canada made it the 
largest player in Canada. 
Table 4.5.13: M&A in Energy Industry 
Acquiring Company 
Trigen Energy 
General Electric Power 
Systems 
Fidelio Acquisition 
Company 
R/DTech 
GE 
GE Energy 
Arcapita 
Allegro Biodiesel Corp 
Sherwood Investment 
Overseas 
Weiss Family Trust 
Consol Energy (CNX) 
AUis-Chalmers Energy 
(ALY) 
Smith International 
Suncor Energy 
Source: Compiled from Vi 
Acquired Company 
Elyo S.A 
Panametrics Inc. 
Intertrust Technology 
Corporation 
Panametrics 
Agfa Gevaert 
BHA Group Holdings Inc. 
Falcon Gas Storage 
Company 
Community Corp 
Rentech Inc. 
Superior Oil and Gas 
Company 
CNX Gas (CXG) 
Bronco Drilling (BRNC) 
W-H Energy Services 
Petro-Canada 
uious Business Dailies, Repc 
Year of 
Deal 
2000 
2002 
2002 
2003 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
)rts, Annua 
Value of Deal 
US$ 290 million 
US$ 220 million 
US$ 453 billion 
ND 
US$ 480 million 
US$ 260 million 
US$100 million 
US$ 1 million 
US$ 440 million 
US$ 3 million 
US$ 932 million 
US$ 437.8 
million 
$3.2 billion 
Stock transaction 
Reports , Websites 
andArticW"lf^«l["^ 
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xiii. Industrial Industry 
A weak economy has led to financial crunch in this sector which has adversely 
affected the M&A's activity. The deals are highlighted in Table 4.5.14. 
The merger between Alanco and Star Trak systems was mutually beneficial. The 
former managed to create more shareholder value and Star Trak Systems 
supplemented its position as well. Housatonic Partners and Tucker Partners took over 
Aircraft Fasteners Inc. which was a specialized distributor of aerospace, electronics 
and defense industry hardware with primary emphasis on electronic applications. The 
acquisition of Carter and Burgess gave Jacobs engineering Group Inc. important 
contacts within the US military and in public infi-astructure projects. Performance 
Transportation Services Inc.. proposed to fill for bankruptcy as a part of a US$ 67 
million deal to sell nearly all of its assets to Allied Systems Holdings. The merger 
between Tong Yang and Taiwan Kai Yih Industrial Co Ltd. in 2009 was expected to 
make a big increase in the revenues of the former. The merger of Byres Research and 
Exida produced the first safety and security certification and consulting company 
Table 4.5.14: Mi&A in Industrial Industry 
Acquiring Company 
Alanco 
TSI Group Inc 
TSI Group Inc 
TSI Group Inc 
Housatonic Partners, 
Tucker Partners 
Jacobs Engineering 
Group Inc 
Calnetix Inc 
Hinkley Lightning Inc 
Simco America 
Allied Systems 
Holding Inc 
Freudenberg 
Nonwovens 
Porvair 
Tong Yang Tong 
Yang Industrial Co., 
Ltd 
Byres Research Inc 
Acquired Company 
Star Trak Systems LLC 
ADB Industries 
Thompson Industries 
CGR Technologies 
Aircraft Fasteners Inc 
Carter and Burgess Inc 
Elliott Energy Systems Inc 
Fredrick Ramond Inc 
Leo Motors 
Performance Transportation 
Services Inc 
Spasciani Air Filter SpA 
Tooltum Engineering 
Taiwan Kai Yih Industrial 
Co., Ltd. 
Exida 
Year of 
deal 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2009 
2009 
Value of dal 
US4 15 million 
ND 
ND 
ND 
US$13.8 million 
US$ 233.79 
million 
ND 
ND 
ND 
US$ 67 million 
ND 
£ 1 million 
Stock Deal 
ND 
Source: Compiled fi-om Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports , Websites 
andArticles*']t^^«^31 
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xiv. Media Industry 
There has been a dramatic turnaround in the media sector where companies are 
making an effort to restructure and realign themselves with current trends keeping in 
view the changing consumer demographics. The huge profits at stake in the media 
sector are luring private investors towards it. The major deals can be seen in Table 
4.5.15. hi a move to add strategically to its slate of companies worldwide Deluxe 
Entertainment Services acquired Rainmaker Entertainment which was Canada's 
leading post-production facilities. In an attempt to further bolster its emerging music 
merchandising business Live Nations Inc. acquired Signatures Network Inc. Amazon 
acquired the audiobook company Audible which was expected to provide a wider 
choice to customers and scope for more innovation. The acquisition of Maven 
Networks, a video platform provider for US$ 160 million by Yahoo was expected to 
boost the latter's features related to video content. AOL acquired the social 
networking service of Bebo which is the second largest in UK for a whopping US$ 
850 million. The acquisition of CNET Networks for US$1705.6 million made CBS 
Corporation one of the most popular internet companies in USA. Getty Images which 
was one of the largest providers of photographs was taken over by Helman and 
Friedman for US$ 2100 million. The merger of Pro-Bel and Snell and Wilcox was 
expected to provide better research and development infirastructure. The merger 
between Bahrain based Orbit and Dubai based Showtime expanded the customer base 
for both the companies. 
Table 4.5.15: M&A in Media Industry 
Acquiring 
Company 
Deluxe Entertainment 
Services 
Live Nation Inc 
Amazon.com 
Yahoo Inc. 
AOL LLC 
CBS Corporation 
Helman and 
Friedman 
Pro-Bel 
Orbit 
Acquired 
Company 
Rainmaker Entertainment 
Signatures Network Inc. 
Audible Inc. 
Maven Networks Inc. 
Bebo 
CNET Networks Inc. 
Getty Images 
Snelland Wilcox 
Showtime 
Year of 
deal 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
2009 
Value of deal 
US$31 million 
US$ 79million 
US$ 300 million 
US$160 million 
US$ 850 million 
US$1705. 6million 
US$2100 million 
ND 
ND 
Source: Compiled fi-om Various Business Dailies, Reports, Annual Reports , Websites 
and ArticlesW l^t^ l^l^ ^^ 
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4.6 Impact of Recession on Global Mersers and 
Acquisitions (M&A *s) 
The global economy was hit by a severe financial crisis in the year 2007 as a result of 
the banking and liquidity crisis in USA arising from the sub-prime mortgage crisis. It 
is interesting to see the impact of the economic fallout on merger activity. As a result 
of the financial crisis the valuations of the companies were at a low. However, it was 
not strong enough motivation for merger and acquisition deals. The value and 
volumes took a severe beating which is reflected in the analysis below. 
The impact of global recession is reflected in Table 4.6.1 where a significant fall in 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) activity is witnessed. In the year 2008 the value of 
deals fell by -33.29percent, the volume fells by 18.50percent and the size of an 
average deal fells by IB.lSpercent. In the following year that is in 2009 the value of 
deals fell by -27.01, volume by -26.50 percent while the size of an average deal by 
0.70percent. The investment climate was gloomy where major investors found the 
idea of a merger or acquisition risky. The impact of the financial crisis was strongly 
felt on the merger activities. 
Table 4.6.1: Global Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) Activity 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Value 
(in$ 
billions) 
3635 
2425 
1770 
% change 
in value 
over year 
-33.29 
-27.01 
Volume 
15675 
12775 
9390 
% change 
in value 
over year 
-18.50 
-26.50 
Size of 
Average 
Deal 
231;90 
189.82 
188.50 
% change 
in value 
over year 
-18.15 
-0.70 
Source: Sharma, Nimesh "Mergers and Acquisitions in times of Financial Crisis" 
Retrieved fi-om http•.//www.da^e.co.in/st^ategy^usiness-essentials/mergers-and-
acquisitions-in-times-of-financial-crisis.htm (1 March 2010) 
Figure 4.6.1 highlights the change in the valuation across various sectors where the 
financial, business and consumer sector saw a fall in the valuation by -39.89percent, -
4.15percent and -48.92percent respectively. In case of Energy and TMT sector die 
valuation increased by 18.97percent and 6.81percent respectively. Transport, 
Pharmaceutical and Construction were the major gainers at 68.93percent, 
167.82percent and 28.28percent respectively. Real Estate, Defense and Chemicals 
were again the losing sectors where the valuations fell by -15.47percent, -
50.35percent and 6.91percent respectively. Here we see that the effect of the recession 
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was somewhat mixed where the loss of one sector seemed to be the gain of the other 
sector. Pharmaceutical and Transport were the major gainers while Defense, 
Consumer and financial sector were the biggest losers. 
Figure 4.6.1: Change in Sector-wise Valuations Levels across 2008-09 
Change In Sectoral Valuations Levels across 2008-09 
200 
150 
100 
50 
-100 
167.82 
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18.97 • • H 
• . 1' . _ , I . I . • 
— ^ 1 1 HHi 1 ^ 1 ^ 1 ^ ^ 1 • • • 1 M | 1 1 1 HHi 1 1 1 ^ 1 
-50;J«^^ ^ ^ ^ JS' 
-39.89 " -'W-924 \^ cf' ^ ^ -15.48 -50.35 -6.91 
^ 
• Percentage 
Source: Sharma, Nimesh "Mergers and Acquisitions in times of Financial Crisis" 
Retrieved from http://www.dare.co.in/strategy/business-essentials/mergers-and-
acquisitions-in-times-of-financial-crisis.htm (1 March 2010) 
4,7 Future Global Prospects 
Having seen the impact of recession on the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals 
it is interesting to have a look at the Grant Thornton, International Business Report, 
2009 which provides a survey about the potential future Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) deals. In Figure 4.7.1 while the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) rank the highest in 2008 at 59percent, their rank falls in 2009 as the percentage 
falls to 41 percent. North America also ranks high with the percentage in 2008 at 
48percent and that in 2009 at 44percent. The percentage for UK for 2008 is at 
40percent while for 2009 it falls to 39percent. Europe stands at 30percent in 2008 and 
36percent in 2009. The Global average is at 44percent in 2008 while 37percent in 
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2009. Hence it is seen that it is just Europe which is expected to actually do a larger 
number of deals in 2009. From the above discussion we see that that global picture is 
altering where the economic focus is shifting to the developing countries from the 
developed countries. It can be said that the decline in Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) is felt less in the developing countries. Hence the trend of consolidation and 
global structuring seems to be undergoing a paradigm shift in structure. 
Figure 4.7.1: Planning to grow through Acquisition in the next Three Years 
Average Percentage of Business) 
70 
30 
36" 
28 
22 
North America BRIC United 
Kingdom and 
Ireland 
Mainland 
Europe 
Rest of the 
World 
Global 
12008 ^2009 
Source: Mergers and acquisitions: Opportunities for Global Growth; Grant Thornton 
International Business Report 2008. Retrieved ft-om 
http://www.intemationalbusinessreport.com/files/ibr_2008_ma_report_final.pdf 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter showcases the development and popularity of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A's) as a tool for expansion and development. It is seen that the developing 
economies and especially the BRIC economies are moving on the scale of merger and 
acquisition deals at a very rapid pace and are appearing as an attractive destination for 
investment for major economies. The motivation behind cross border deals is 
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discussed at length to highlights its use as a potent tool for investment and growth. 
The analysis of deals reveal that the pharmaceutical sector along with construction 
and energy is attracting maximum merger and acquisition deals. In fact even in the 
wake of recession these sectors are managing to register a growth in the number of 
deals affected. The future global prospects stress on the growing economic prowess 
of the developing economies which intend to indulge in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A's) at a brisk pace. 
Having discussed international scenario related to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
the next chapter throws light on the problems and issues dealt with in this thesis. A 
brief review of literature of various studies on mergers and acquisitions (M&A's) is 
made. It reviews relevant journals, books and theses to develop an understanding of 
the topic and traces the research gap on the basis of which the study has been 
designed. 
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Some of the tools of oracle are:-
• SQL/PLUS. 
• Oracle Form Builder. 
• Oracle Report Builder. 
• Oracle Graphics Builder. 
• Oracle Designer. 
The system contains three main forms as follows:-
1- System Variables: It is used to define document type, languages, 
Universities. 
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the documents like title, year of publication, language, document 
type, authors, and subjects. 
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3. inquiry Form: It is used to inquire about any field of 
information concerning the document, and can combine more 
than one fields, such as year of publication and language of 
document. 
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The Oracle database also contains many reports and statistics as 
follow:-
Research by author number, 
Research by author gender, 
Number of research, 
Authors' list. 
Subjects' list. 
Dynamic statistic report, 
Dynamic general report, this report allows user to build his own report 
by choosing field and determining the condition of report. 
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Chapter 5 
Statement of Problem and 
Review of Literature 
5.1 Introduction: 
The antecedent chapter dealt with Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the global 
economy and analyzed the deals that have taken place in the international arena in 
various sectors. Its growth as a tool for development and expansion is evident by the 
recent trend examined by the Researcher. In the present Chapter the statement of 
problem and issues relating to the thesis are stated. It is followed by a critical review 
of various literatures available on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The Researcher 
has reviewed research papers, books and thesis dating from 1972 to 2010 for the 
purpose to provide an insight in to the work related to Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's). An attempt has been made to make a critical review of the available 
literature in order to trace the research gap and design the study for the thesis. 
5.2 Statement of Problems and Issues 
5.2.1 Statement of Problem 
The study under investigation here is related to analyzing the profitability of Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) of Indian Steel Industry since Liberalization. Also the 
Researcher makes an attempt here to investigate the impact of the merger on the 
profitability of the merger. It is seen whether the merger undertaken is in the interest 
of the parties involved that is the shareholders, management, employees, creditors etc. 
of both the target and bidder firms. 
5.2.2 Issues 
a. Synoptic view of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's): 
Sector-wise analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the international and 
domestic arena is made to develop an understanding of the ongoing trend in the global 
and domestic arena. 
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b. Indian Steel Industry^ 
A brief study of the Indian Steel Industry is made in terms of growth and development 
and a synoptic view of major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is made. 
c. Post Merger Valuation: 
The major issue this thesis deals with is the effect of the merger and its measurement 
in terms of the post merger financial performance. The Researcher makes an attempt 
to identify the effect of the merger on the performance of the companies involved in 
order to establish the viability of the merger. 
d. Identifying the Variables Effected by the Merger^ 
Various statistical and accounting techniques are employed to calculate various 
variables and statistics related to the company and an attempt is made to find out the 
effect of the merger on them. 
e. Identifying the Cause for Movement in Figures: 
Another issue dealt with in the thesis is yearly analysis of the movement in figures 
and studying them in the light of both macro and micro factors. 
f. Impact of Recession 
A major issue faced is the financial crisis which hit the world economy in the year 
2007 and had a deep impact on the Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) worldwide and 
also the valuations and post merger profitability of firms where operation were 
affected more by the macro factors than the micro factors. 
The year 2007 was marked by a global financial crisis which started due to the sub-
prime mortgage crisis in the United States of America and later caused a severe 
liquidity and credit crisis adversely impacting almost all the major economies of the 
world. However it did not have a major impact on the number of M&A's deals 
affected in the financial Year 2007 which amounted to $1637 billion which was 
21 percent higher than the previous record which was set in 2000'. As a matter of fact 
the latter half of 2007 witnessed the $98 billion acquisition of ABN-AMRO Holding 
NV by the consortium of Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis, and Satander which was the 
largest deal in banking industry at that time and the acquisition of Alcan (Canada) by 
Rio Tinto (United Kingdom). Despite the environment of uncertainty and fear 
prevailing in the economic sector it is worth noting that FDI inflows in developing 
countries surged by 33percent in 2007 to reach $1248 which was another world 
record. Also, the United States continued to be the world's largest FDI recipient 
country. In the European Union there was a fresh wave of M«feA's due to the 
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revamping exercise which took place in the enlarged European Union maik^ 
However the global financial crisis is having its toll on FDI with M&A's in the first 
half of 2008 slowing down as compared to the latter of 2007 .^ 
From the Indian perspective the growth rate is shrinking today. While it averaged 
8.8percent in the past five years a negative growth rate of l.Spercent was recorded for 
February, 2009 although it was over Qpercent during the previous year. The 
movement of the BSE Sensex was also between 8000 to 10000 points which is 
symbolic of the weakness of the Indian markets. The status of FDI's was indeed the 
surprise factor with it being not influenced much by the economic turmoil. As a 
matter of fact FDI for the year ending March 2009 was at US $ 27309 million which 
was 1 Ipercent increase over previous year .^ The withdrawal of FII's severely affected 
our fore reserves. However, one can safely say that the fiindamentals of Indian 
economy have shown resistance due to which the global financial crisis has not 
crippled our economy as it has done many other world economies. A tight monetary 
policy was pursued as a result of that which eventually dried domestic liquidity and 
firms had look for external financing which had an adverse impact due to the 
prevalent financial turmoil and depreciation of Indian rupee. Though the bank rates 
have been cut considerably, a lot more is desirable to be done in this field keeping 
into account the depth of the crisis. 
5.3 Chronolosical Review of Literature 
Shick, Richard A. (IQTl)* worked on a paper whose main purpose was to determine 
if mergers and acquisitions increase return on investment for the shareholders of 
acquiring firms for which an equation is formulated. Samples of chemical industry are 
taken for the analysis. He also questioned earlier works that stated mergers do not 
create value for shareholders. Though the sample size is relatively small for 
evaluating mergers in general, results indicate that success or failure of mergers was 
immediate and fairly constant and that this merger evaluation technique can be 
successfiilly employed. Aaronovitch, Sam and Sawyer, Malcolm C.(1975)^ studied 
in their paper the impact of mergers on growth and concentration of firms and 
attempted to find the relation between the size of firms and acquisition intensity and 
also whether acquisition activity by firms persists through time. The authors 
suggested that for concentration purposes the dynamic aspect should be considered 
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along with the static aspect. The findings of the study were that acquisition 
contributed to the growth only marginally. There was no trade-off between internal 
and external growth and also found that large firms had better survival record than 
smaller firms. Also it was found that growth was not systematically related to growth. 
However, the study has been drawn fi-om a study of a sample for a particular period 
and caimot be applied generally and especially in today's circumstances. Attempts 
have been made previously to evaluate the effects of mergers but suffer fi^om 
shortcomings. Honeycutt, T. Crawford (1975)' mentioned the Lev and Mandelkar's 
(L&M) attempt to highlight corporate mergers effect upon various aspects of a firm's 
performance by using a paired sample technique, pairing merging firms with control 
firms that are non-merging but are of identical size and within same industry but the 
conditions of pure competition that are assumed seldom exist indicating that that the 
LM samples were poorly selected where only 18 out of 62 met requirements. Other 
contradictions were also reported and it can be seen that the observed results of the 
study are not conclusive. 
Nagaraj, K. (1977)^ made a study of issues related to iron and steel production in 
India. India's competency in producing iron and steel is highlighted where all vital 
raw materials are available in abundance. An analysis of the five year plans is made to 
scrutinize government policy towards steel and also the rationale behind keeping steel 
under public sector as it required heavy capital investment. However, the public sector 
instead of becoming an exchequer to the government ran into financial losses and 
became a burden instead which paved the way for the growth of private sector. The 
production and growth in demand for steel during the period was analyzed and the 
impact of the worldwide recessionary trend was also examined. However, the study is 
dated a long period back and various changes have been incorporated since then and 
its relevance is questionable. Firth, Michael (1979)* , examined the profitability of 
recent takeover and mergers using an efficient market theory fi-amework. Conflicting 
earlier works the author found that there were no gains associated with takeovers and 
there was actually a very small loss incurred in the period 1972-4. The stock market 
reactions were generally correct and needed no corrections on an average. The study 
found that takeovers were generally were for growth purposes. It also found that 
acquired firms earned huge profits which were set off by the losses made by the 
acquiring firms and the premium paid was a major determinant for that. Also 
maximizing the management utility was found to be a major objective behind 
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takeovers. However, lots of conflicts with earlier works are found here and this study 
cannot be relied in totality. Yeager, Mary A. (1980)' discussed trade protection 
which is granted as a subsidy and a protection measure to an industry. It is a common 
phenomenon for USA and American Steel Industry depicts the mechanism for the 
application of trade protection as a commodity input into Steel Industry. Protection is 
viewed as a 'commodity input in the production of steel' and a vital factor in the ever 
changing national and international economy. In the post-war era steel as viewed as a 
priority sector for empowering self-sustained growth and trade protection was vital to 
compete in the international market. However the relevance of the study in the present 
arena is questionable where tariffs and protections measures employed by countries 
are a burning issue with the failure of the WTO talks. The increasing growth and 
stature of developing countries like India and China has forced the developed 
countries to re-think their strategies towards providing heavy subsidies and protection 
to its domestic industries. 
Shughart II, William F. and Toliison, Robert D (1984)'" prepared a paper by using 
annual data on US mergers from 1895 to 1979. Though the sample size is small it was 
earlier deuced from the same data that mergers occur in 'waves' but this study fails to 
reject the hypotheses that merger levels are characterized by a white-noise process or 
by a stable first-order autoregressive scheme. However the authors accept the various 
limitations and assumptions 
Jemison, David B. and Sitkin, Sim B (1986)" in their paper suggested that choice 
perspective be supplemented with a process perspective according to which 
acquisition process itself is a critical factor determining acquisition activities and 
outcomes. According to them attention should be focused on acquisition process 
which is discontinuous and fractionated and it re-enforces four impediments, i.e. 
activity segmentation, escalating momentum, expectational ambiguity and 
management system misapplication. The paper focuses on acquisition process prior to 
the merger but overlooks the post-merger implications. 
Polonchek, John A. and Sushka Marie E. (1987)'^ viewed mergers as an outcome 
of a firm's capital budgeting process where the two explanatory variables are I) cost 
of capital and related financial effects 2) output effects. A model on merger activity is 
developed by integrating the literature on aggregate investment in fixed capital into a 
micro-finance framework. The results from the model indicate that mergers pattern is 
considerably affected by economic activity and financial conditions. They also 
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emphasized that conglomerate boom of merger activity in 1967-9 was in line with 
merger behavior during the remaining of the period. However financial and economic 
reasons do not alone determine the level of merger activity. Lubatkin ,Michael. and 
O'Neill, Hugh M. (1987)'^  examined the relation between merging firms and risk 
components by dividing 297 mergers into four relatedness categories and three 
measures of risk- unsystematic, systematic and total. They claimed that mergers can 
be used as a tool to reduce external risks but the reasons attributed to it are not true. 
They used various statistical tools in their research and found that despite the 
relatedness of the mergers, unsystematic risk for the acquiring firm increase post-
merger. They noted a considerable decrease in systematic risk in case of related 
mergers. Also single, unrelated and vertical mergers were found to be not associated 
with minor decrease in total risk. They concluded that mergers are closely related with 
increased levels of systematic and total risk and are strongly influenced by market 
conditions. However their study suffers fi"om various statistical limitations where 
various characteristics and conditions of merging firms are ignored. Nahavandi, 
Afsaneh and Malekzadeh, Ali R (IQSS)'** presented a model which focused on 
process of adaptation and acculturation in M&A. They observed that the degree of 
congruence between acquirer and acquired organization's preferred modes of 
acculturation will affect the level of acculturation stress. They even proposed an 
interdisciplinary model of planning and implementation of mergers as a strategic 
alternative. However the model explores only three variables and more theoretical 
exploration is required. Davidson III, Wallace N. et al. (1989) '^  did a study that re-
examined the revaluation of shares surrounding the cancellation of mergers over the 
years 1976-85. They concluded that the revaluation that Dodd (1980) found 
disappears when target firms do not get engaged in consequent mergers but they do 
persist when targets take part in subsequent mergers irrespective whichever party 
cancels the merger. However, if the mergers are cancelled by a party other than 
target^idder firms there is no permanent share revaluation as these firms are not 
involved in subsequent mergers. Also bidders generally do not gain from mergers that 
fail. The paper concentrates on failed mergers and not profitability of mergers. 
Trautwein. Friedrich (1990)" surveyed theories of merger motives and divided 
them in to seven groups. He attempted to order them according to plausibility and 
consistence with the evidence. He suggested that merger motives be viewed in the 
fi-amework of decision processes, conflicting goals and ambiguous private 
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information. The importance of capital market efficiency theory was highhghted and 
the study was based on actual performance rather than stock market studies. However 
the validity of efficiency theory and merger prescriptions is debatable. 
Slusky, Alexander R. and Caves, Richard E. (1991)'^, tested the value created by 
mergers on premia paid in a sample of 100 recent acquisitions. They analyzed the 
determinants which were responsible for creation of value in mergers, i.e. real and 
financial synergies, behavior of mangers in both target and acquiring firm, arbitrage 
between real and financial assets. The evidence indicated that there was no evidence 
of real synergies, some evidence of arbitrage and clearly significant effects of both 
agency and financial synergy. Statistical limitations however do exist. Vithala, R. 
Rao. (1991)'* dealt with the recent spurt in M«&A activity in USA which has created a 
situation where firms are looking to identify complementary firms to carry out 
expansion and diversification plans. Based on Farquhar and Rao, Balance Model an 
attempt is made to evaluate and screen the potential acquisition partners using 
experimental methods where the context of the cosmetic industry is taken for the 
application of the model. They concluded that the balance model is quite appropriate 
for taking decisions related to acquisition, multi-firm acquisitions and evaluating the 
role and impact of brand strength in acquisition/divestment. According to them, the 
success of a merger depends to a large extent on the balance between the merging 
partners. However, the model was tested in a limited manner and there is scope to test 
it further. Due to complex nature of each merger its predictions cannot be generalized. 
Evaluation of post-merger profitability is absent. Levy, Haim (1991)*' talked about 
the CAPM and GCAPM model for explaining synergies from mergers. As per the 
CAPM model all the investors hold risky assets, the mean return should not be related 
to the size of the firm and the risk premium should not be related to the specific risk 
of the firm and the value additivity principle holds. The fourth implication is harder to 
test. The GCAPM suggest about the breakdown in the value additivity which explains 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). It further suggests that profits may become 
negative in the case of additional mergers if they are continued beyond a certain limit. 
Also small firms earn an abnormal profit. These results are not in sync with what is 
predicted by the CAPM model. The paper concludes that that Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in general can be explained by GCAPM and economies of 
scale in production do not characterize the conglomerate merger waves. However the 
assumptions undertaken in the model may not be always applicable in the real market. 
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Mcguckin, Robert H. (1992)^ " studied the effect of horizontal merger by analyzing 
the share prices of the rivals to the merging firms. For the purpose a standard market 
model is developed and it is found that that merger premium for rivals is much less 
than that for the merging firms. However the study relies on mainly market data and 
information which is ambiguous and cannot be relied on. Also the study cannot be 
used in cases where the merged firm has no rivals. There is a scope to use other 
options like bond, options and future prices too. Agrawal, Anup. et al. (1992) 
attempted to investigate the post-merger performance of acquiring firms using a 
virtually comprehensive sample of mergers between NYSE acquirers and 
NYSE/AMEX targets and it is found that stockholder's of acquiring firms suffer a 
loss of lOpercent which is statistically significant. The study also reveals that the firm 
size effect and beta estimation are not the cause of the negative post-merger returns. A 
hypothesis is also assumed to find whether this result is caused by a slow adjustment 
of the market to the merger event but the results do not support the hypothesis. 
However the reasons leading to the wealth loss are not studies in this paper. 
Schumann, Lawrence (1993)^ ^ examined the impact of the announcement of the 
mergers on stock prices and suggested that it is difficult to identify the source of gains 
accruing to the target and bidder firms. Abnormal stock returns of the firms which 
undertook horizontal mergers and their rivals were examined. A study is made of the 
mergers challenged by the Federal Trade Commission over the period 1987-89. It 
examines and questions the effect of such mergers in mitigating the competition as 
according to the Researcher abnormal returns on an average are earned by the rivals 
when the announcement of the merger is made. Also the anti-trust complaints on the 
smaller and larger rivals are scrutinized and it is suggested that the abnormal returns 
might be causing higher prices. According to the Researcher, the results do not 
support the view that the challenged mergers were anti-competitive and the federal 
anti-trust authorities generally challenge the horizontal mergers which would enhance 
competition and lead to lower prices. According to the research paper the abnormal 
returns of an anti-competitive merger is positive at the time of merger announcement 
and negative in anti-trust challenge. In case of efficiency enhancing merger, the 
pattern is difficult to determine. Efficiency that occurs as a result of the merger may 
lower the prices and enhance the competition and it may also result in a situation 
where major players merger to form a cartel of sort leading to higher prices. 
1321Page 
Achampong, Francis. K and Zemedkun, Wold (1995)" in their paper discussed the 
interest of the management in a merger decision and makes a study of the various 
factors influencing it for which non-parametric statistical tools are used. It further 
elaborates that personal interest might also play a part and this aspect is explored 
ethically in the light of various theories. It is suggested that as mergers dilute the 
internal ownership it benefits the management as they can greater control and use the 
finances as pleases them. Various ethical theories are provided to provide guidelines 
on the basis of which a decision related to a merger should be taken by the mergers to 
protect the interest of the shareholders. The managers should not base their decision 
for personal gains under the pretence of ignorance. The study shows that self-interest 
plays a critical role and ethical theories can be used as a basis. However these cannot 
be forced on the management as it is a matter related to conscience, values and 
principles and it is difficult to keep a check or frame a legal framework for the same. 
Lee, Kyungmook. and Pennings, Johannes M. (1996)^ ^ said in their paper that 
resource complementarity and organizational compatibility are vital factors affecting 
M&A outcomes. They analyzed 461 M&A's in the history of Dutch Accounting 
Industry during the period 1880-1990 and focused on two classes of events following 
M&A's-organizational dissolution and involvement in subsequent M&As, with the 
firm continuance following the M«&A as the "non-event." They analyzed both the 
acquiring and acquired firm and mainly focused on the survival of the created firm. 
They concluded that compatibility is not associated with the dissolution rate but 
related to the probability that the firm will engage in additional M&A's. According to 
them for finding a strategic fit it is imperative to find complementary partners or firms 
with which it would be profitable to integrate and would also permit full utilization of 
resources. Undertaking future acquisitions can always not be a cited as a reason for 
determining whether a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is compatible or not. Also 
the study is based on a single industry and cannot be generalized. Also the study does 
not undertake financial appraisal to determine merger success. 
Lubatkin, Michael, et al. (1998)^ ^ took the case of firms of Britain and France to 
analyze the concept of administrative approach as reflected in the four integrating 
mechanism, i.e. structural, systems, social and managerial. In cross border mergers 
the administrative approach was reminiscent of respective national heritages. They 
concentrated on studying the influences that administrative heritage has on the 
integrative mechanisms used in domestic and cross-national mergers. They concluded 
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that the acquiring firms were generally stable in their policy making and made both 
strategic and resource decision centrally or allow their subsidiaries complete latitude. 
A suggestion is made to establish a transnational network which would link 
headquarters and subsidiaries in an asymmetrical integrative mechanism. However the 
study is conservative in context with the global environment where mergers are 
becoming increasingly popular as it is based on two nations only, i.e. Britain and 
France. Also implementation costs of administrative heritage and influence of these 
costs are ignored. Barnes Paul (1998) '^ attempted to make a foray in predicting and 
identifying takeover targets. He took cue from cases in UK and USA where takeover 
targets are chosen and forecasted by employing methods like bankruptcy position. 
According to him published accounting data alone or along with share price changes 
would not serve the purpose of effective forecasting. He concluded that his study 
supported efficient capital market hypothesis. This paper is mainly based on the 
predictive accuracies of the model but the results showed that takeover targets could 
not be predicted. Fluck, Zsuzsanna and Lynch, Anthony W. (1999)^ ^ examined a 
recent trend where there is a tendency by firms to divest post-merger and it is noted 
that these firms performance is satisfactory in the interim period. A theory and model 
of mergers and divestiture is prepared to explain the said phenomenon in creation of 
value-increasing mergers. Also it demonstrates merging as a technology that allows 
marginally profitable projects to be undertaken and finds no diversification benefits 
associated with merger. It predicts that conglomeration which is undertaken to utilize 
financial synergies increases in situations when profitability is low and when 
managers at helm are in total control. However changes occurring in different 
business cycles are difficult to predict. The theory is applicable in situations of 
financial stress and those facing managerial problem and cannot be universally 
applied. Komoto, Keisho (1999)^ * examined the increasing trend in mergers and 
acquisitions in 1999 and explored the post-merger results through Return on Assets 
(ROA) and equity ratios for analyzing earnings and financial conditions respectively. 
The financial statements of listed companies in a particular industry based on Tokyo 
Stock Exchange's 33-industry classification were used to find industry indicators for 
calculating the pre-merger and post-merger values. They found that mergers do not 
have a significant impact on business performance and effect on stock prices 
fluctuates depending on the industry involved. However, due to small sample size 
their results cannot be statistically verified. 
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Walker, M. Mark (2000) '^ investigated the impact of corporate strategy on the 
acquiring firm's shareholders by examining a sample acquisitions between January 1, 
1980 and December 30, 1996. The results of the study were that acquiring firm's 
shareholders earn higher returns following cash offers and in takeovers that expand 
the firms operations geographically or increase its market share. However there was 
no evidence to support whether acquiring firms consistently gain a strategic advantage 
over rival firms. He suggested that acquiring firms managers should carefiilly 
consider the amount and mode through which premium is paid and also contemplate 
about alternatives to corporate takeovers. The interests of the acquired firms' 
shareholders are not taken into account though. 
Kang, N and S. Johansson (2000)''*' analyzed the recent trends, both inward and 
outward in Mergers and Acquisitions in various developed and developing countries 
especially in OECD countries across various sectors and industries such as the 
automotive, telecommunications, steel, oil and gas, and pharmaceuticals and also 
stressed on various factors which led to a spurt in M&A's that increased six fold 
during the period 1991-98. M«feA's popularity as a direct mode of investment over 
other modes like greenfield investment is due to various factors at the macro level, 
industry level, firm level, technology related and government related. They fiirther 
pointed that, "However, the main driver of M&A's in place of greenfield investment 
is the need to acquire complementary intangible assets -technology, human resources, 
brand names, etc." It concludes that an efficiently structured merger leads to improved 
performance and efficiency of both host and home countries and also the individual 
firms involved. However the business environment surrounding mergers and 
acquisitions plays a crucial role in the success of M&A's. The financial performance 
of the firms involved is however not analyzed. It is the trends which are examined in 
detail. Kumar, Nagesh. (2000)^ ' recognized the growing importance and role of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in industrial restructuring and FDI all over the 
world which is one of the major reasons for the recent boom in M&A activity. He 
made an attempt to explore the M&A's in Indian Corporate sector associated with 
foreign MNE's and their Indian affiliates for the period April 1993 to mid February, 
2000 to analyze the industrial composition and motives behind the deals. 
Liberalization of FDI policies is cited as a major factor for the enhanced volimie of 
M&A's. It is found that the majority of deals were in the manufacturing sector and a 
rapid grov t^h is being registered in the service sector. The mergers are found to be 
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predominantly horizontal in nature. The nature of study is however, mainly 
descriptive where the policies, framework and environment surrounding M&A's are 
studied. Evaluation of mergers in terms of synergies and value created as a result of 
the merger is not done. Ghosh, Aloke and Lee, Chi-Wen Jevons (2000)^ ^ examined 
the association between abnormal returns and expected managerial performance of 
target firms and found that there are alternative motives behind acquisition. They 
analyzed a sample of 338 target firms and found that investors are more optimistic 
about disciplinary rather than non-disciplinary acquisitions. Agency theory suggests 
that economic gains/abnormal returns from disciplinary acquisitions will be hi^o ' 
when target firms have agency problems. They concluded that target firms with high 
abnormal returns are primarily acquired to discipline target firms. The gains available 
to shareholder are analyzed but the financial performance of the firm after the merger 
is not studied. 
Lyons, Bruce. R (2001)'^  reviewed the success of mergers as a corporate strategy and 
for the purpose a framework was designed to explain the concept of profit decrease in 
horizontal mergers due to exogenous increase in competition. It is also stressed that in 
case of unprofitable situations, mergers are a preferable mode of exit. It is suggested 
that the major aim of the competition policy should be the welfare of customers and 
not providing management consultancy from the fimds of the shareholders. However 
the study is limited to horizontal mergers, a particular kind of market structure. The 
post-merger synergies and other issues and complications arising after the merger are 
not dealt with over here. 
Ahuwalia, Montek. S. (2002)^ '* analyzed the economic reforms of 1991 which were 
a necessity in the wake of balance of payment crisis that pushed India towards being 
an open economy and eventually made it the fastest growing economy of the world. 
Implications of Industrial Policy 1991, Trade Policy, Infrastructure Development, 
financial Reforms etc are explored. He feels that though the reforms were formulated 
in a broad perspective absence of labor market reforms is felt. Liberalization measures 
in agriculture are advocated. Areas where reforms have not yielded the desired results 
are highlighted and suggestions are made towards the same. However the study is 
devoid of a comprehensive and clear cut mechanism for successfiil implementation of 
reforms in core sectors. Lall, Sanjay (2002)'^  discussed the growing popularity of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) as a strategic tool in investing overseas. It is now 
majorly responsible for bulk of FDI in developed world and increasing shares in 
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developing world. The paper attempts to investigate the associated economic costs 
and benefits. According to the author, FDI and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
are propelled by identical factors like technology, globalization, competition, 
liberalization etc. in the comparative analysis made in the paper the author opines that 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are superior to FDI as an investment tool. 
However the paper mainly focuses on theoretical analysis involving the advantages 
and disadvantages surrounding Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) and FDI and there 
is no analysis or comparison on the basis of value or synergies created after the 
merger. 
Brito, Duarte (2002)''* in his paper discussed the welfare impact of a merger and 
promoted the use of complementary entry analysis by authorities for evaluating 
mergers. The purpose is to impress upon the fact that besides the post-merger impact 
study, the viability of the merger should be evaluated and also merger as a mode of 
entry, should be compared to other alternatives especially in issues relating to 
competitive firms. The main idea is to enable the authorities to have first-hand 
information about cost reductions to take a decision on efficiencies on the basis of 
which the decision to reject or accept a merger can be undertaken as the firms might 
exaggerate the value of the proposed cost reductions unduly. For the purpose a model 
is developed and the Researcher concludes that in the task of calculating the 
profitability of the merger, an analysis is required to measure the efficiency gains 
involved. The two important considerations are the number of insiders and the cost 
reductions involved. An input is provided here to the authorities to use this model for 
the purpose of maximising customer's surplus and ensuring maximum welfare. 
However it is to be noted that when a merger is undertaken, the authorities do not 
evaluate them only on the basis of cost reductions and other economics involved. The 
level of priority of goods concerned, nation's security, trade policy, foreign policy etc. 
are various other determinants employed while rejecting or accepting a merger 
proposal. Erard, Brian and Schaller, Huntley (2002) '^opined that regarding 
various issues related to M&A no optimizing model has been prepared yet. In this 
paper they prepared a model to link a firm's acquisition activities to its investment 
choices. A sample of 503 firms is taken and based on standard assumption, a 
theoretical fi-amework is developed which predicts that both investment and 
acquisitions are positively related to firm's shadow value of capital. Investment and 
acquisitions are studied as a mode but post-merger analysis is not done. Mazumder, 
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S Mitra and Ghoshal, T (2003)^ * in their paper talk about the various challenges 
faced by the Indian Steel Industry in a globalized arena and does a SWOT analysis fx 
the same. Various measures are suggested for bringing about a turnaround fix 
effective svirvival and growth. It studies the various problems and turmoil's fliat 
surrounded the steel industry. A deep and intensive study of the Indian Steel Industry 
is made as regards various major plants. Further various problems and challenges are 
discussed relating to price, demand, consumption and globalization. Various strat^es 
are suggested but theory and practice may not be the same. Besides no practical 
model is used to test the solutions and strategies suggested. 
Weber, Roberto A. and Camerer, Colin F. (2003)^', conducted laboratory 
experiments to examine merger failures which emerge as a result of conflicting 
organizational culture. It is generally observed that corporate mergers fail and an 
attempt is made to study cultural conflict as a reason for the same as this dimension is 
generally ignored during valuation of firms leading to overpayment. Cultural 
incompatibility makes it difficult for employees of the merged organization to view 
things in the same perspective. The study concludes on the note that in the absence of 
a mechanism to create co-ordination, cultural conflicts arises resulting in failure of 
mergers. However, causal affects of cultural integration is yet to be determined. 
Despite the effort it is observed that cultvire is a diversified phenomenon and no 
prescribed and universal formula can be applied in different situations. Perry, Jeffery 
S. and Herd, Thomas J. (2004)'*° in their paper devoted attention to the increasing 
number of failures being reported in the mergers taking place and he attributed them 
to poor synergy, bad timing, incompatible cultures, off strategy decision making, 
hubris and greed. According to them there is generally a huge gap between planning 
and implementation due to which exercising due diligence becomes inevitable in the 
challenging global environment. They suggested various tips for structuring 
successful mergers and emphasized on employing professional services to calculate 
expected synergies and other complex issues for effecting successful mergers and 
acquisitions. The solutions or the guidelines offered in the form of a theoretical 
firamework and may have certain implications and problems when applied practically. 
V, Harsh H. and Srividya, C.G. (2004)'** examined the rationale and superiority of 
M&A's over other modes of investment which according to them were easy entry, 
snuffing competition, access to funds, tax benefits, capturing market share etc. They 
discussed dynamic valuation techniques which are earning based valuation, market 
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based valuation and asset based valuation. The choice of method depends on a host of 
factors like timing of sale, stock market situation, economic cycles, and global 
situations etc. Case studies was done on IBM's acquisition of Daksh e-services, 
Citigroup's acquisition of e-Serve International and a hypotheses on a listed software 
company merging with a unlisted company. They concluded that a large number of 
methods should be employed to derive a range of values for calculating the valuation 
of a firm keeping in mind the risky issues related to synergy realization e.g. social and 
cultural issues. Financial and profitability analysis of the merging firm is not done 
though to evaluate the mergers undertaken. Nocke,Volker and Yeaple, Stephen 
(2004)''^  provided a theoretical framework of international commerce for analyzing 
the pros and cons of various modes of investment where key factors are heterogeneity 
in firm's capabilities, international mobility of these capabilities and their price 
determination based on endogenous supply and demand. Through equilibrium 
analysis of a model, equilibrium pattern of export, greenfield FDI and international 
mergers is determined. Through statistical tools, models and equations it is shown that 
for the composition of international commerce source of firm heterogeneity is a vital 
factor. Also cross border mergers and acquisitions involve either the most or the least 
efficient active firms depending on whether the firms differ in their mobile or non-
mobile capabilities. The merger market clearing condition is also considered as an 
important aspect where the effect of country and industry characteristics on aggregate 
industry efficiency is mediated by the merger market. They also concluded that cross 
border M&A's are noted to be generally less beneficial to host country's economy 
than greenfield FDI. However, the firm's characteristics assumed in this model might 
not exist in all cases. 
Bruner Robert (2004)^ "' dealt with the various applications associated with mergers 
and acquisitions. It throws lights on the ethical issues and the rationale of entering 
into deals. The strategies and the origin of transactions are traced. The various waves 
and drives of merger and acquisition activities are discussed. The methodology and 
strategy to be adopted for affecting a deal and cross border deals are examined. The 
various methods and ways that can be adopted for valuing a firm prior to the merger 
and also the resultant synergies are proposed. It is followed by an elaborate 
fi-amework which is suggested to take into accoimt various aspects right fi-om the 
selection of the target to managing the risk after the merger or acquisition has been 
formally done. Corporate governance and other issues arising as a result of the merger 
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in the form of competition from rivals and behavioral issues of employees are also 
taken up. The various forms of mergers and acquisitions that are auctions, takcovo" 
and the defences adopted in the face of these are also mentioned. 
Man, Ard-Pieter de. and Duysters, Geert. (2005)'", focused on the effect of 
innovative performance of the companies involved in various alliances. The y 
investigated the trends in strategic technology alliances and Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) which according to them was a strategic tool in keeping up with the rajMdly 
changing technology despite the poor success rate of mergers. They found that the 
innovativeness of firms was propelled by alliance. However the analysis did not focus 
much on the quantitative aspect. The paper concentrates on the innovation aspect only 
which is an important factor but there are other critical aspects involved in Metgws 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) too which are overlooked here. Bogetoft, Peter and 
Wang Dexiang (2005)^ i^n their study made an attempt to introduce simple production 
models for the purpose of estimating potential gains from mergers. For the purpose a 
model is developed and the gains are divided into technical efficiency, size and 
harmony. Different alternatives are undertaken for evaluating the same. Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is undertaken for estimating potential gains from 
mergers with the case study being focused on Denmark relating to merger of 
agricultural extension offices. The study finds that a merger might cause a unit to 
improve its performance on an individual basis and also affect its scale of operations, 
mix of inputs available and outputs demanded. This framework can be applied for 
keeping multiple input multiple output framework during the process of production 
and be used in areas such as environment regulation and be used to develop responses 
to them as well for developing a process in which the needs of different farms can be 
met through mergers. 
Aganval, Manish. and Singh, Harminder. (2006)"** investigated in their paper the 
role of insider trading activity in Indian Capital Market based on private and non-
public information prior to merger aimouncements. For the purpose a modified market 
model is used which is based on a sample of 42 Companies for which merger 
announcement date was during the period 1996-99. The authors recommend 
investigation in six Companies by relevant authority, i.e. SEBI regarding possible 
insider trading as it leads to inefficiency and distortion in the performance of capital 
markets. In the paper the stock price movements around merger movements are 
explored to investigate discrepancies but insider frading may not be the only reason 
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for abnormal movement in stock quotes. Besides, insider trading is not a very big 
revelation in Indian market and even if it is detected it is extremely difficult to prove. 
Mehta, Jay and Kakani, Ram. Gupta (2006)^ '' focused on concentration of banks 
into few larger banks and aimed to study the motives behind Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M«&A's) in the Indian Banking Sector and compares it with the scenario 
in the international arena. They recognized that the environment has a major role to 
play in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The major motives for M&A's are cited 
as stability, return and risks to shareholders, CAR norms and other regulatory 
fi-amework, management of bankruptcy risks and growth. Also M&A's are used as a 
tool and opportunity for development. A study of cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in banks is also made. They concluded that ease in regulatory 
framework and the existing poor infi"astructure are the major reason for the increased 
consolidation in the banking sector. The paper discusses the motivations that lead to 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) but does not evaluate or analyze, whether the 
motivation actually yields synergistic results and profits. Breinlich, Holger. (2006)'*' 
explored the growing importance and increase of M&A's in the wake of liberalization 
for the purpose of industrial restructuring where resources are transferred fi-om less to 
more productive firms and in the bargain the quantitative magnitude of overall 
transfers significantly increase. An attempt is made in this study to investigate; 
whether CUFTA increased M&A activity, resources are actually transferred fi-om less 
to more productive firms in M&A activity, investigate amount of inter-firms transfer 
of output and employment in North America due to M&A where sample period is 
1985-1988. Results of the research show that M&A are important altematives to the 
adjustment mechanism of firm and establishment closure and contract contractions as 
emphasized in earlier studies. Also M&A activity show stronger inter-industry 
variation and is negatively related to initial tariff levels. CUFTA based in 1989 is 
taken as a basis which is about two decades back. Also the characteristics of CUFTA 
may not apply in other cases. 
Spearot, Allen (2007)'", studied a model of domestic and foreign Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) with heterogeneous firms in relation to a closed economy and 
shows that aggregate productivity in acquisition is positively influenced by the 
transfer of capital fi-om the least efficient to higher efficient firms for the purpose of 
which a non-parametric test is imdertaken. The study is extended to open market 
economy models as well. The Researcher concludes that tariff choice of domestic and 
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foreign government should be expected to influence firm decision both within and 
outside border. The theoretical relationship between trade policy choice of outsiders 
and composition of investment in New Zealand is not collaborated by empirical 
evidence. Pradhan, Jaya. Prakash. (2007)^ " studied the recent wave of rising 
overseas acquisitions by Indian Multinationals and also the associated trends and 
location determinants. The recent trend affirms the use of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) as a popular tool for structuring overseas investments as a response to the 
growing globalization of world economies and the corresponding liberalization of 
Indian economies. The positive micro and macro-economic indicators further assisted 
in pushing the overseas acquisitions of Indian firms. The manufacturing sector leads 
the number of acquisitions at 47.5percent followed closely by services at 44.9pCTcent. 
Indian firms generally target developed countries for acquisition. The motives range 
fi-om market access to benefits fi"om operational synergies and also exploiting 
advantages that are not present in the home market. The empirical analysis also 
focuses on the motivational aspects where it is foimd that Indian firms tend to 
concentrate in markets where skilled manpower is abundant and imports fi'om India 
are of a significant proportion. The study does not explore much the benefits, value, 
synergy or the profitability of the concerns that are involved in such overseas 
acquisitions which is a critical aspect to evaluate the viability of the Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) that are being undertaken at a brisk pace. Devos, Erik et al 
(2008)^ ' explored the gap in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) studies by analysing 
the importance of various sources that cause a gain in mergers. The paper contradicts 
previous findings that synergies are created due to taxes, market power or 
improvement in the performance or efficiencies. For the purpose Value Line Forecast 
of cash flows is of 264 large mergers is made relating to acquiring, target and 
combined firms. Merger synergies is calculated and the average gains fi-om the 
mergers are calculated which come out to be lO.OSpercent. According to the study 
that in case of mergers 1.64percent is contributed by tax saving and operating synergy 
provide for the remaining 8,38percent as regards additional value. The Researchers 
suggest that these gains in mergers are more importantly dependent on resource 
allocation as compared to tax planning and increased market power. The study 
however relies on cash flow and does not take into consideration other qualitative 
aspects that culture and technical know-how. Besides the resource allocation, the 
utilization of resources is also an important aspect. 
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Foster, Stanley Reed et. al. (2007)^ i^n their book dealt with the concept and various 
issue related to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The basic terms related to 
mergers are described followed by the process related to the same. It deals with the 
selection of the target company and the legal framework and also the issues of 
valuation and pricing in detail. Various sources for financing and the procedures to be 
followed for finalizing the deal are discussed at length. The integration efforts to be 
employed after the merger with relevant examples are discussed. Various case studies 
and legal aspects are discussed to throw light on the practical implications. 
Gaughan, Patrick (2007)^ "' in his book gave an elaborate description of various issue 
related to mergers relating to the types, valuation, financing, objectives etc. A brief 
overview of the history related to mergers is followed by the legal framework and 
merger related strategies. A section is also devoted to various aspects of hostile 
takeover relating to the measures and tactics employed for the same. The various 
aspects of corporate restructuring are described in detail followed by bankruptcy 
situations with special reference to USA. For the purpose pf structuring a deal 
valuation of the target company is vital. The author deals various methods of 
valuation and also the tax related issues. Galpin, Timothy J. And Hemdon, Mark 
(2007)^ '* in their book provide detailed guide lines for bringing affecting a successftil 
merger or acquisition deal. The motives behind structuring a deal are discussed 
followed by the various steps which the authors suggest are necessary for a successftil 
deal. They sfress on diligence and enterprising management. Various models are 
suggested for organizing and coordinating the deal. The management has to integrate 
the employees and gamer their cooperation for making the deal a success for which 
effective communication is suggested. Special focus is given to cultural integration 
and addressing problems that are faced in implementing a deal. Various case studies 
are also taken up for the same. 
Mantravadi, Pramod. And Reddy, A. Vidyadhar (2008)^ ^ analyzed the impact of 
mergers on operating performance of acquiring corporate in different industries based 
on pre-merger and post-merger financial ratios with samples involving public limited 
and traded companies in India between 1991 and 2003. The results suggest that there 
are minor variations in terms of operating performance following the mergers. 
However differential impact is noticed, that is the type of industry has an impact on 
the post-merger performance. A period of 3 years before and after the merger is taken 
to assess the impact of merger which is not appropriate as the affect of the merger is 
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not visible in the short-period. The sample size undertaken is small to generalize the 
results. Also the study has ignored the impact of differences in accounting methods of 
different firms. Nayyar, Deepak (2008) ^' did a study on the rapid expansion of 
foreign direct investment and overseas acquisition from India in the past decade. 
Liberalization measures provided the impetus but it was the capacity and ability of 
Indian firms which mainly facilitated the FDI flows and acquisitions. The expansion 
of FDI from India has been attributed to the growing Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) abroad. The share of India in total purchases by developing countries, 
reported as cross-border mergers and acquisitions, was 3.2percent but the 
determinants of FDI fail to shed light on the recent surge in overseas Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M«&A's) which are mainly in the manufacturing sector. However, the 
economic implications relating to internationalization of firms at micro and macro 
levels are not explored deeply in this paper. Margsiri, Worawat. et al. (2008)" 
explores internal investment and acquisition as modes for growth where the former 
consumes considerable time and the latter provides instant cash flow. In their research 
paper the authors aimed to investigate the relationship between pre-merger 
announcement price run-up and negative announcement returns with the integration 
cost and synergies resulting from the acquisition. The Researchers believe that 
internal investment is a fall back strategy in case negotiations for investments fail 
which would affect both the decision to acquire as well as the acquisition price. It is 
also seen that acquisitions with low level of synergies or relatively high integration 
costs do not maximize the social surpluses. The Researchers find that there are 
negative stock reactions in case of acquisitions initiated by buyer while in case of 
seller it leads to negative stock movement when seller has significant bargaining 
power. The paper mainly concentrates on movement of stock prices and the more vital 
concept of synergy and value creation is overlooked. 
Wang, Cong and Xie, Fei (2008)^ * explored the benefits that arise from change in 
control as a result of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). According to the paper in 
cases where the acquirer is dominant than the target in terms of shareholders rights, it 
would benefit the resultant corporate governance at the target and the reverse case 
would be present in case where the target shareholders rights are stronger. For the 
purpose 396 acquisitions by US firms between 1990 and 2004 are undertaken and the 
results indicate that they support the assumption above, where stronger the acquirer 
shareholders rights as compared to that of the target, higher would be the synergy 
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created. It is found that stock market anticipates the efficiency gains to be reaUzed and 
reacts to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) announcements accordingly. The 
managerial capability and ignorance is ignored. In the paper the shareholders rights is 
considered as a basis for determining managerial control but it caimot be treated as the 
only ground. Also the entire focus is on the control at the target immediately after the 
merger but in reality the efficiency of the managerial control should be evaluated on 
the basis of the synergy and performance after the merger has been structured. 
Steigner, Tanja (2008)^' in his thesis analyzed with the return of bidder companies in 
USA in regards to cross border Mergers and Acquisitions (M«feA's). According to the 
study the cultural aspect is a cause of concern for the shareholders initially but later 
the bidder firms get positive benefit fi"om the exchange of technical expertise. A 
hypotheses study is made to explain abnormal bidder firms returns by making a 
comparison of first mover hypotheses to late mover hypotheses in cross border 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The findings suggest that these acquisitions do 
not create value for the strategic pioneers unless the cultural distance between USA 
and the target country is large and when the cultural distance is small it leads to 
positive effect for the followers. Chaufla, Sandeep (2008)^ in his paper provide an 
insight into the regulatory environment in India with regards to the investment climate 
relating to the tax aspects. India is an attractive investment decision mainly due to the 
growing economy, robust GDP, unutilised resources, skilled manpower and a well-
developed regulatory environment. Post-liberalisation FDI rules have been relaxed 
where up to lOOpercent FDI is allowed in most sectors. The paper fiirther provides the 
various forms of ownership structure that can be used in India. Provisions under 
Company Act 1956, FEMA 1999 and Income Tax Act 1961 etc. are studied to 
provide a synoptic view of the regulatory environment. The paper provides a synoptic 
and theoretical view of the regulatory environment. However the paper ignores the 
practical aspects relating tom application and overlooks the present environment 
relating to the market conditions etc. 
Hunt, Peter A. (2009)^ ' in his book provided a guide to creating shareholders value. 
He dealt intricately with aspects related to shareholders value and the valuation and 
financial analysis of mergers and acquisitions. It deals with the various parameters 
that are required to be studied for the purpose of analysis of financial statement and 
cash flows. It also suggests undertaking comparisons between companies and 
transactions for studying the viability of the deal structured. Various methods to 
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analyse the merger, leveraged buyout and stock price are mentioned. For the purpose 
of studying the practical implications of mergers and acquisitions case studies are 
undertaken. Other forms of deal like divestitures, sale of assets, joint ventures etc are 
also discussed. It is followed by aspects related to corporate restructuring and 
recapitalization. The legal framework surrounding the merger acquisition deals and 
the anti-takeover measures are also elaborately dealt with. Methods and strategies for 
finalizing a deal are discussed further along with the suggestions for effecting a post-
merger integration. 
DePamphilis, Donald (2010)" in his book gave a detailed description of various 
concepts related to mergers and acquisitions and its impact on various parties who are 
affected by it along with few case studies. The laws and regulations as applicable to 
mergers and acquisitions in USA are also dealt with elaborately. It is followed by 
extensive review of the process of mergers and acquisitions. A detailed study of the 
acquisition of Merill Lynch by Bank of America is provided along with merger and 
acquisition valuation and modelling. Various modes of valuations are discussed 
elaborately along with the analysis of the Privately Held Companies. Cross border 
mergers and acquisitions are analyzed along with various alternative ways of 
restructuring and expanding. The author has discussed the various issues related to 
mergers and acquisitions in the light of various relevant case studies. 
5.4 Research Gap 
Review of literature done above sheds light on various gaps in the previous researches 
carried out in this field. The Researcher intends to put in an honest effort to provide 
her sincere contribution in this regard. 
It is seen that in most works, it is the trends, policies; framework and requisites are 
investigated while the profitability and financial analysis of the mergers are not given 
due importance as was done in the case of Kang, N and S. Johansson (2000)*^ and 
V, Harsh H. and Srividya, C.G. (2004)*'*. Also it is observed that the assumptions 
about characteristics of the firm, market condition, regulatory fi-amework etc. might 
not apply in all cases. As is seen in the case of Breinlich, Holger. (2006)'^ the 
provisions of CUFTA do not apply in all Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). Some 
studies highlight the problem as in the case of Agrawal, Anup. et al. (1992)** which 
reports that shareholders of acquiring firms suffer lOpercent loss as result of merger 
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but appropriate measures to make the merger profitable are not dealt with. While 
some studies mention the theoretical implications of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) they do not look into the practical application of it as is seen in the case of 
Perry, Jeffery S. and Herd, Thomas J. (2004)'^  and Lee, Kyungmook. aod 
Pennings, Johannes M. (1996)^. 
However the major limitation is seen that in most of the studies, post-merger analysis, 
i.e. analyzing how the merged or resultant company performs financially after the 
merger is not done which is extremely important to study the viability and success of 
the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) as is seen in Vithala, R. Rao. (1991) , 
Jemison, David B. and Sitkin, Sim B (1986)^ °, Ghosh, Aloke and Lee, Chi-Wen 
Jevons (2000) '^, Kumar, Nagesh. (2000)'\ Lall, Sanjay (2002)^ ^ and Lyons, 
Bruce. R (2001)'^ 
Some studies cannot be generalized as the sample size taken is very small as in Sluck, 
Richard A. (1972)'^ while some works suffer fi-om statistical limitations as in 
Slusky, Alexander R. and Caves, Richard E. (1991)^ '^  and Shughart II, William F. 
and ToIUson, Robert D (1984)^1 
The Researcher has made an effort to address these research gaps and has made an 
attempt to make a complete and conclusive study on Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) .The research related to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in different 
countries is compiled, analyzed and reviewed in order to develop an understanding 
about the topic and also understand the work that has been carried out in this area. It is 
found that Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is of late becoming a potent tool in the 
hands of the Indian corporate. It is found that though lot of studies have been done on 
this topic the merger mania in the last few years is creating waves all over the world 
and the thesis has been so designed so as to evaluate the latest Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) involving Indian corporate in the Indian Steel Industry which is 
having a huge international presence. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The critical review of literature gives a wide understanding related to the previous 
research work on the topic of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The research work 
to be carried out is designed on the basis of previous work, present data and future 
prospects along with innovative methods and ideas. The research gap is traced and the 
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work that the Researcher intends to do in this thesis is proposed. Having reviewed the 
available literatxire on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) the Researcher moves on to 
develop a research design and methodology in the next chapter for the thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Desisn and Methodolosv 
6.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter reviews a wide amount of literature on Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in both the domestic and international arena. It reviews various 
studies entailing diversified aspects of mergers and acquisitions in various sectors. It 
traces the research gap in the studies reviewed and proposes research work to be 
undertaken for the thesis. 
This chapter highlights the scope and objectives of the study and also the research 
design and methodology employed by the Researcher in the study. All the statistical 
and accounting tools that are used to measure the impact of the merger are discussed 
elaborately here. 
6.2 Scope of the Study 
In the year 1991 the economic boundaries of India were opened due to which the 
investment climate in India underwent sweeping changes. The economic and 
corporate scene in India is discussed at length in order to investigate the past and 
present scenario of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). A realistic attempt is made to 
make a prediction about the future of the ongoing drive of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) on the basis of trends and reports. 
The study encompasses mergers and acquisitions taking place in various sectors 
worldwide. An attempt has been made to cover all relevant mergers which have taken 
in various important sectors both in the domestic and international scene. Also the 
various issues relating to mergers and acquisitions are being investigated in detail. A 
separate section is devoted to study the impact of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
in the Steel sector predominantly. 
The study forays into the Financial Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) to 
study the synergies and values that are created as a result of the merger. Various 
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measures are employed for that purpose to discuss the financial and operating 
performance of the entities involved before and after the merger. The main idea is to 
assess the impact of the merger in terms of performance of the companies and find out 
if the effect has been positive or negative. 
6.3 Objectives of the Study 
The main objectives this thesis deals with are enlisted as below: 
i. Study the major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals that have taken 
place globally and in India. Analysis of success of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) as a tool of investment, expansion and growth. 
ii. Sector-wise study of global and domestic Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
in terms of value of deals. 
iii. Study the growth and development of Indian Steel Sector since 1991 and 
evaluate its financial performance in the last few years. 
iv. Examine the Pre and Post merger financial reports to examine whether the 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) led to a profitable situation for the 
merging and the merged firms. For the purpose various accounting and 
statistical measures are used. 
V. Investigate the reaction of the market to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
by making a comparison of the movement of Market Price per Share (MPS) 
and Earning per Share (EPS) both before and after the deal. 
vi. Analyze the relation between the movement of the Profitability and MPS 
before and after the merger to explore the reaction of the investors to a merger 
announcement. 
vii. Calculate the effect of merger on financial and operating performance before 
and after the merger. 
viii. Detailed introspection of the motives and success rate of major Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) deals that have taken place in the Steel Sector as a part 
of corporate structuring both globally and at the domestic level. In the thesis a 
detailed introspection is made of the same to analyze the motives and success 
of these Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
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6.4 Hypotheses of the Study 
1. Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Profitability 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
Profitability 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-
merger Profitability 
2. Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Capital Employed 
Turnover Ratio (CETR) or Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio (FATR) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
CETR or FATR 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-
merger CETR or FATR 
3. Testing the relationship between Pre and Post Merger Interest Coverage 
Ratio (ICR) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post-merger 
ICR 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and Post-
merger ICR 
4. Testing the relationship between Pre Merger Profitability and Pre 
Merger Market Price per Share (MPS) 
HQ (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
5. Testing the relationship between Post Merger Profitability and Market 
Price per Share (MPS) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Post-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post-merger 
Profitability and MPS 
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6. Testing the relation between Pre Merger Market Price per Share (MPS) 
and Post Merger Market Price per Share (MPS) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger MPS and 
Post-merger MPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger MPS 
and Post-merger MPS 
7. Testing the relationship between Pre Merger Earnings per Share (EPS) 
and Post Merger Earnings per Share (EPS) 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger EPS and 
Post-merger EPS 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger EPS 
and Post-merger EPS 
8. Testing the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger Profit Margin 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no effect of Merger on the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Margin 
Ho (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is an effect of Merger on the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Margin 
9. Testing the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger Profit Rate 
Ho (Null Hypothesis) = = There is no effect of Merger on the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Rate 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is an effect of Merger on the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Rate 
6.5 Research Desien 
The study is designed to study a wide range of International and Indian Companies 
that expand through Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). An attempt is made to 
collect data and use it for testing abnormal returns around the announcement of a 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The Researcher studies the financial profile of 
the merging and the merged company both before and after the merger and applies 
various financial and accounting tools to evaluate the effect of the merger on the 
financial and operating performance of the undertakings involved. The financial data 
of the acquiring company before and after the merger is collected. These are 
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organized in the form of Comparative Statements and Ratio Analysis. The data for Pre 
and Post Merger is analysed separately and then relevant statistical tools are used to 
test the effect of the merger on the financial and operating performance of the entities 
involved. 
6.5.1 Instruments of Data Collection 
Relevant literature and other research material were extensively analysed for the 
purpose of the study to develop know how about the various aspects related to the 
topic. Various libraries and databases maintained were studied in order to collect the 
secondary data. Online databases of various agencies and universities were also 
accessed for the purpose of data collection which helped in the formulation of the 
Research Design. 
Major thrust of the study is based on secondary data which has been gathered from 
available published records in Annual Reports of Companies, Newsletters, Reports, 
Surveys, Websites, and Proclamations etc. Data has been collected from the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) which currently is maintaining database on 
tender offers relating to the companies registered on Indian Stock Exchanges. Maricet 
prices of shares and other relevant information about the stocks of companies has 
been collected fi-om the database of Companies maintained by various Stock 
Exchanges, i.e. NSE, BSE, NYSE, Singapore Stock Exchange, London Stock 
Exchange, etc. Data has also been collected fi"om Centre for Monitoring Indian 
Economy (CMIE) which has been publishing data on Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) since January 1997. Relevant data related to Steel Industry in India has been 
accesses fi-om the database maintained by the Ministry of Steel, Government of India. 
Data was also collected through Worid Investment Reports, UNCTAD, Grant 
Thornton Reports, AT Kearney Reports, PricewaterhouseCoopers Reports, RBI 
Monthly Bulletin, Economic Surveys, Handbook of Statistics, Mergermarket Report, 
Budgets and other relevant sources. 
6.5.2Data Compilation and Tabulation 
After collecting the data fi"om various published resources the data was verified 
against alternate data bases to be assured about the accuracy and reliability of the 
data. It was compiled and tabulated by using various software programs as well as 
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manually for the purpose of interpretation and analysis. The information so 
interpreted was then used for analysing the financial viability of the deals undotaken 
6.5.3 Presentation Instruments 
The data collected would be analysed and presented using tables, schedules, pie 
charts, bar diagrams and graphs etc. 
6.6 Research Methodoloev 
For the purpose of analyzing the profitability of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
various accounting and financial measures are undertaken. 
The sales and cost of sales of the company to be analysed for few years before and 
after the merger or acquisition are undertaken. Annual percentage changes are 
computed to investigate the financial performance in terms of annual percaitage 
changes in the figures. The movement in the figures around the announcement of the 
merger or acquisition is studied in detail. 
Financial ratios are also calculated to analyze the profitability, capital structure, 
liquidity, productivity and solvency of the concern. These ratios are calculated for 
several years before and after the merger and the changes in them for each year are 
reported. 
Various Hypotheses are formulated to find if there is an effect of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) on Profitability, Fixed Assets Turnover Ratio (FATR), Capital 
Employed Turnover Ratio (CETR), Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR), Earnings per 
Share (EPS) and Market Price per Share (MPS). For the purpose of analysis 
Correlation Coefficient (r). Coefficient of Determination (r^), Regression Analysis 
and Student-T test are undertaken. 
Also Profit Rate and Profit Margins before and after the merger or acquisition are 
calculated for the concerned firms in order to find the impact of the merger on the 
financial and operating performance. 
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6,7 Statistical Tools and Techniques Used 
i. Correlation Coefficient (r): In cases where relationship between two or 
more variables is to be analyzed correlation coefficient (r) is used. It helps in 
determining the direction and degree of relationship while the cause and effect 
carmot be found by this technique. The degree of relationship depends on the 
value of (r) found which is explained below 
Table 6.7.1: Determining the Degree of Correlation 
Degree 
1. Perfect 
2. Limited 
a. Very High 
b. High 
c. Moderate 
d. Low 
3. Absence 
Positive 
+1 
Above +.9 and up to +.99 
Above +.75 and up to +.9 
Above +.25 and up to +.75 
Above 0 and up to +.25 
0 
Negative 
-1 
Above -.9 and up to -.99 
Above -.75 and up to -.9 
Above -.25 and up to -.75 
Above 0 and up to -.25 
0 
Source: Gupta, K.L (2004) "Business Statistics" 6"' Edition, Agra, Navyug Sahitya 
Sadan. 
However the existence of correlation does not always imply that there is a causation 
effect or a functional relationship but implies just an existence of covariance. 
For the purpose Karl Pearson's correlation coefficient' (r) is calculated which is 
calculated as below: 
VE^xy2 
Where 
x=(X-X)andy=(Y-Y) 
X = Mean of Series X 
Y = Mean of Series Y 
i. Coefficient of Determination (r^ ) 
After having calculated the correlation coefficient (r) we can find out the coefficient 
of determination (r^ ) by squaring the value of correlation coefficient (r). It explains 
the percentage variation in the dependent variable Y which can be expressed in the 
terms of the independent variable X. This helps in ascertaining the Coefficient of 
Determination.^  
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ii. Regression Analysis 
Once the degree and direction of the relation is found out we move on to formulate 
the regression equations. It helps us to establish the cause and effect relationship 
between the two variables that is estimating the value of one variable if we have the 
value of another. Correlation Coefficient (r) provided us with just the degree and 
direction while the regression analysis attempts to estimate the value of one variable if 
the value of the otiier variable is given. It helps us to find out how many units 
movement will result in the dependent variable as a result of a unit movement in the 
independent variable. The Researcher has used linear regression analysis and has 
formulated regression lines for the purpose. 
The regression line formulated for the purpose is 
Y= a + bX 
Where; 
Y = Dependent variable 
a = intercept 
b = Slope 
X= Independent variable 
For the purpose of formulating the equation the value of the two numerical constant a 
and b are required to be computed which is done through the following formulae^. 
K-"K = r5x (X-X) 
5y 
Where 
Y= value of Y variable to be predicted 
Y = Arithmetic mean of Y Series 
r = correlation coefficient 
5x= standard deviation of X series 
8y= standard deviation of Y series 
X= value of X variable correponding to which the value of Y variable is to be 
calculated 
X = Arithmefic Mean of X series 
In place of r 6x when actual mean is taken then ^dxdy can be used 
5y IdV 
dx = deviation firom series X 
dy = deviation fi-om series Y 
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iii. Testing of Hypothesis'* 
Testing of Hypothesis means formulation of an assumption about the population from 
which the sample is drawn and then test to find whether the formulated hypothesis is 
true or not. For the purpose of Hypothesis testing first of all a hypothesis is formed. 
A sample is collected and then it is tested whether the hypothetical value and the 
actual value are the same. In the study nine hypotheses have been formulated and 
brief descriptions of all have been provided. 
iv. Null Hypothesis and Alternative Hypothesis^. 
The usual approach is to formulate two hypotheses that is the Null Hypothesis and 
Alternative Hypothesis. 
a) Null Hypothesis (Ho) assumes that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the sample and the population for the matter under 
consideration 
b) Alternative Hypothesis (Ha) assumes that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the sample and the population for the matter under 
consideration. 
V. Level of Significance^ 
After that a level of significance is required to be set up and is expressed in 
percentage. It is basically the probability of rejecting the Null Hypothesis when it is 
true. The Researcher has tested the level of significance for Spercent level. It means 
that the probability that an error is being committed is 5 in 100. 
vi. Student t-test^ 
The t-test is applied when the size of the sample is less than 30 and is derived 
mathematically under the assumption of normal population. 
S Vm + n: 
Xi =Mean of first sample 
X2=Mean of second sample 
ni = number of observations in first sample 
n2 = number of observations in second sample 
S= Combined Standard Deviation 
s=Vy(x.-x.)^+yrx,-x;^ 
Viii + n 2 - 2 
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The degree of freedom (v) is calculated as ni + n2 - 2. Once the de^ee of freedom is 
found the table values for Spercent level of significance is found. If the calculated 
value oft is greater than the value oft at Spercent level of significance (to.os), the Null 
Hypothesis is rejected and the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. Alternately if the 
calculated value is less than the table value of t at Spercent level of significance (to.os) 
then the Null Hypothesis is accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. 
6.8 Sample Size and Period of Study 
For the purpose of the study major steel producers of India have been taken and the 
major deals affected by then have been scrutinized. The study takes up the major 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals which have taken place in the private and 
public sector. In Chapter 8 five significant domestic deals are studied while Chapter 9 
takes up three major cross border deals in the steel sector. 
The major deals that have taken place in the steel sector since 1991 to 2009 have been 
taken up in brief in Chapter 7. The deals to be analyzed have been taken randomly 
over the period 1991 to 2009. The financial profiles of the companies involved have 
been scrutinized minutely before and after the merger in order to study the impact of 
the merger or acquisition on the performance of both the merged and merging entity 
both before and after the merger. 
6.9 Brief Description of Samples (Deals) Undertaken: 
For the purpose of study nine major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) involving 
Indian Steel producers are undertaken. Five domestic deals and four cross border 
deals are taken up. A brief description of the deal and the companies involved is 
provided below. 
I. Domestic Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A*s) 
i. Merger between SAIL (Steel Authority of India Limited) and Visvesvaraya 
Iron and Steel Limited: The merger between SAIL and its subsidiary 
Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited was carried out in 1998-99 
a. SAIL which is a public sector undertaking is one of the largest producers of steel 
in India and has five integrated steel plants in different parts of the country. It is 
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owned and operated by the Government of India and is among the top five profit 
earning corporate of the country, 
b. Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited which is located in Bhadravati and is 
involved in the production of alloy steel and pig iron. It was taken over as a 
subsidiary of SAIL in 1989. It was running into heavy losses and subsequently 
merged with SAIL in 1998-99. 
ii. Merger between SAIL (Steel Authority of India Limited) and IISCO (Indian 
Iron and Steel Company): With the wave of consolidation sweeping the Steel 
industry SAIL also joined the mania and merged it's another loss making 
subsidiary and ftirther enhanced its operating capacity. 
a) SAIL is one of the fastest growing public sector units in India and the merger with 
SAIL provided it with an impetus in production capabilities while it is engaged in 
huge modernization and expansion programs for its plants. 
b) IISCO Steel plant is located at Bumpur near Asansol and was the second 
integrated steel plant to be set up in India after Tata Iron and Steel Company 
(TISCO). It was taken over by the Government in 1972 and later nationalized and 
made a subsidiary of SAIL. It was merged with SAIL in 2005-06. 
iii. Merger between Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA) and India Charge 
Chrome Limited (ICCL): IMFA merged its subsidiary ICCR with itself in 2006 
with a view to consolidate its operations and financials in 2006. The merger made 
IMFA the largest fiilly integrated producer of Ferro alloys in the country. 
a) IMFA is based in the eastern state of Orissa was set up in 1962 and is India's 
largest producer of Ferro alloys. 
b) ICCL was set up in 1982 at Bhubaneswar in Orissa and was a subsidiary of IMFA 
till it was merged with its parent company in 2006. 
iv. Takeover by Pittsburgh Iron and Steel Limited of Bellary Steels and Alloys 
Limited: Pittsburgh Iron and Steel Limited entered in to the manufacturing and 
trading of steel through its merger with Bellary steel in 2006. 
a) Pittsburgh Iron and Steel Limited: SandY Mills which was formed in 1964 
discontinues its business in textile and ventured into steel with the acquisition of 
Bellary Steel in 2006. 
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b) Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited: Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited is situated in 
Bellary and was incorporated on 17 May 1984 in Kamataka. It mainly deals with 
the manufacturing and marketing of reinforcement bars and carbon and alloy steel 
rounds. 
V. Takeover by JSW Steel of Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited 
(SISCOL): JSW took over SISCOL in 2007 in a deal where 1 share of Jindal was 
exchanged for 22 shares of SISCOL 
a) JSW Steel: JSW Steel has carved out a niche for itself and is one of the fastest 
growing enterprises in India. It is a part of the $8 billion O.P Jindal Group. 
b) SISCOL: The Company was incorporated as a public company in 1991 and was 
merged with JSW Steel in 2007. 
II. Cross border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
i. Takeover by Tata Steel of NatSteel: Tata Steel acquired the Singapore based 
NatSteel for a deal valued at US$ 468.1 million in 2005 as part of its strategy to be 
a world class facility in terms of steel. In the process it got access to new 
technology and access to new market. 
a. Tata Steel was established in Jamshedpur in 1907. Tata steel has grown to be 
the world's sixth largest steel producer which has operations in more than 20 
countries. 
b. NatSteel is based in Singapore and is one of the largest player in steel in the 
Asia-pacific region and has operations in seven countries 
ii. Takeover of Corns by Tata Steel: After hectic lobbying and rival bidding Tata 
Steel was finally able to carve out a deal where it took over Corns for US$ 12.04 
billion which was the largest ever by an Indian company. 
a. Tata Steel has now a huge global presence with operations in more than 20 
countries and commercial presence in 50. Its recent spate of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) has fiirther consolidated its position as a major steel 
group. 
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b. Corus was formed as a result of the merger between British Steel and 
Koninklijke Hoogovens. It is the largest producer of steel in Europe and had 
operations in UK and Europe. 
iii. Takeover by Essar Steel of Algoma Steel: Essar Steel took over Canada's 
Algoma Steel for 1.85 billion Canadian dollars in 2007 which was expected to 
give access to Essar Steel to the market in North America 
a. Essar Steel is a major producer of steel in the world and has got operations in 
Canada, USA and Asia. It is India's largest exporter of flat steel products. 
b. Algoma Steel established in 1901 is based in Ontario in Canada and mainly 
deals in rolled steel products. It was acquired in 2007 by Essar steel and was 
renamed as Essar Steel Algoma Inc. 
6,10 Comparative Analysis, Ratio Analysis, Profit Rate and 
Profit Marsin 
i. Comparative Analysis: 
Annual Percentage changes for sales and cost of sales is calculated to find out the 
percentage variations. The percentage variation around the announcement of the 
merger helps in analyzing the effect of the merger or acquisition. Also the percentages 
have been calculated elsewhere for Profit Rate and Profit margin for the purpose of 
comparative analysis and calculating the impact of the merger on the movement of 
figures on the financial and operating efficiencies of the concerns involved. 
ii. Ratio Analysis^ 
a. Ratios Used 
1. Debt Equity Ratio (DER)= Lone term Debt 
Shareholders' Equity 
Shareholders Equity = Equity Shareholders fiind + Reserves and Surpluses 
2. Current Ratio (CR) = Current Assets 
Current Liabilities 
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3. Capital Employed Turnover Ratio (CETR) = Sales 
Capital Employed 
4. Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio (FATR) = Sales . 
Fixed Assets 
5. Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) = Earnings before Interest and Tax TEBIT) 
Interest Expenses 
6. ProfitabiUty (percent) = Profit after Tax * 100 
Sales 
b. Statistical Implications of Ratio Analysis 
The ratios which are calculated are divided into two sections that are Pre Merger and 
Post Merger Ratio Analysis. The Researcher then applies statistical tests on them to 
tests the impact of the merger on these ratios. The correlation coefficient (r) is 
calculated to find out the degree and direction of relationship between the pre and post 
merger ratios. Coefficient of determination (r^ ) is then calculated to explain the 
percentage of variance which is explained by the known variable. It is followed by 
Regression Analysis where equations are formed to find out the cause and effect 
relationship between the tested variables. Finally student-test is undertaken to test the 
statistical significance of the relationship. It is tested at Spercent level of significance. 
ill. Profit Rate and Profit Margin^ 
a. Profit Margin= Profit after Tax (PAT). 
Net Sales (NS) 
b. Profit Rate = Profit after Tax (PAT). 
Total Assets (TA) 
The Profit Margin and Profit Rate are calculated for each year and then a pre merger 
and post merger average for each company analysed is carried out in order to 
ascertain the impact of the merger on the financial and operating performance. The 
Profit Margin gives an idea of the financial efficiency while the Profit Rate gives 
information about the operating efficiency. The percentage change after the merger or 
acquisition in each of the two is then calculated to assess its impact on them. 
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6,11 Importance and Utility of the Study 
There have been fundamental changes in the world economy which has greatly 
changed the economic set up of economies worldwide. The period after 1990's saw 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) rise by six fold during 1990-98 with an increasing 
tendency towards very large scale unions (Kang, N and S. Johansson (2000)'"). 
Countries like USA which had abundant financial capital and state of art technology 
took keener interest in carving out Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) to extend and 
capture newer markets. While in some cases Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) was 
the only alternative to survive the global onslaught and competition. It was a strategy 
for survival. Changes in government policies and legal framework which have made 
the legal and economic boundaries more transparent and also the opening and 
shrinking of economic boundaries is one of other major motivation for the upward 
surge in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
In the last decade mergers and acquisitions have been a worldwide phenomenon. 
Increasing mergers are taking place not only in the USA but all over the world. 
The need of mergers and acquisitions in the global economy can be justified through 
the following points: 
a) Synergies created by Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
The primary reason cited for fostering mergers and acquisitions is creation for 
synergy. Literally speaking synergy refers to a process where combined worth of two 
identities is more than the sum of their individual worth (i.e. 2+2=5). In other words 
synergistic operating economies are created which are expected to arise from the 
combination of two separate identities and create mutual benefit as the outcome or 
output is expected to increase more than proportionately. The joint entity is expected 
to create more shareholder value than it would have been created individually. 
While acquiring a firm different models of valuation are used. However, the acquiring 
firm generally pays a price which is more than the pre-merger valuation. The 
premium paid is attributed to the synergistic forces which are expected to be created 
after the merger. The buyer effects the merger in the hope that he would be able to 
benefit from the synergies that would be created after the merger. 
For the seller the synergy represents the future prospects of their concern. The given 
equation helps to calculate the synergy and evaluate the financial sense of the deal:" 
Pre-merger value ofboth firms + Synergy = Pre-merger stock price 
Post- merger number of shares 
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The basic aim is to find out whether the buyer is benefited by the post-merger value of 
the firm or not. However the expected synergies do not take place often. 
Synergies are classified in to various heads which are summarized below: 
Operating Synergy: The concept of creation of operating synergy is related to creation 
of economies of scale and scope. A merger or acquisition may enhance both scale and 
scope. Acquiring a new facility may add to the available factors of production 
creating economies of scope through diversification where the available skills and 
resources are utilized to produce a related line of goods and services. Economies of 
scale may also be created by increasing the level of production. The fixed cost is 
distributed over a larger number of goods and services. The increased operations 
create synergies which are realized in the form of reduction of cost. However the 
anticipated synergies have to be evaluated against the cost to be incurred in bringing 
about the integration of facilities . 
Financial Synergy: It refers to the integration of enterprises for the purpose of 
creating synergies or benefits in the financial aspect by entailing reduction in the cost 
of capital. This can be done for both the acquiring and the acquired firm as well. 
Financial synergy can be achieved by investing in unrelated business thereby reducing 
the associated systematic risk, increasing the size of the company or by creating an 
internal capital market". However there is a school of thought that vehemently opposes the 
creation of financial synergies and says that it does not exist in efficient capital markets. 
Managerial Synergy is also a form of synergy anticipated to be realized after the 
merger or acquisition is affected. A merger or acquisition also involves integration of 
the managerial acumen and each one's managerial efficiency might complement the 
other where specialization of one might used for the benefit for other and thereby 
create managerial synergies. 
b) Easy and Quick Entry: Mergers are an easy growth strategy as entry to a new 
market is provided. Firms while expanding their operations do not have to start firom 
scratch as they simply merge with a fiinctional entity and get the benefits of 
synergistic operations as well. The cost and risk involved is also comparatively less as 
functional capabilities are already available. Also in case of territories where 
governmental restrictions exist in terms of setting up new businesses, merging opens 
the backdoor. An attempt of this sort has been made by Wal-Mart by merging with 
Bharti in India to enter in the retail sector of India''*. 
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c) Eliminating Competition and Dependence: Mergers and Acquisitions are an 
effective tool for meeting competition. A horizontal merger between firms dealing 
with the same business makes them complementary rather than as competitors. Both 
firms use each other's areas of specialization in arena of marketing, production, 
technology, infrastructure, etc. irrespective of the state of development. Elimination of 
competition proves to be a big booster. In an underdeveloped country, big firms 
merge and acquire smaller firms to attain monopoly as was done by the cola giants. 
Coca-cola and Pepsi in India. In a developed economy, competition is wiped out 
through these consolidation strategies. 
A vertical merger or acquisition enables the merging firm to acquire a hold over its 
supply chain and establish a backward linkage. Also efficient control over the 
marketing channels and direct contact with customers can be established for forward 
linkage. An integrated unit is in a better position to control and monitor its supplies 
and resources making it more efficient. 
d) Economies of Scale: A large number of resources are at the disposal of the merged 
entity and the bigger size enables it to benefit from economies of scale which accrue 
due to better utilization of resources and benefits available from all areas like, 
marketing, production, finance, human resource, technology, research and 
development etc. 
Duplication of efforts are done away with and better utilization o resources lead to 
decreased cost and improved operational efficiency. 
e) Diversification: Once a firm has established itself in a certain market, it looks for 
expanding its operations to other areas. In other words it looks for geographical and 
market diversification to benefit from its existing goodwill and market position. 
Merger is indeed one of the easiest ways to diversify, as in this case there is an 
understanding with an existing firm and the cost and formalities to start a new 
business can be done away with. The conglomerate undertaking that is created 
enhances the debt, financial, business, production, marketing capacity. Besides the 
risks are also diversified and the management of the acquired firm can provide 
necessary inputs for efficient operations. 
f) Availing Tax Concessions: Another motivating factor for mergers and 
acquisitions is the tax concessions available by the government in this regard. Section 
72A provides for the merger of a sick unit in to a profit making company which 
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enables the latter to set-off its profits against the losses of the former which reduces 
its tax liability'^. 
g) Benefits of Synergy: Synergistic benefits as mentioned above relates to the 
increase in output more than proportionately than the sum of inputs of individual 
firms and refers to better use of complementary resources. 
h) Boon to Small Firms: Though small units enjoy various benefits and concessions 
from the government, there is always a desire to grow big. Besides in today's era of 
MNC's and other bigwigs it is becoming increasingly difficult for smaller units to 
compete and survive. Merger and acquisition is proving to be an efficient tool for 
these firms to sustain. These combine with other smaller firms or a bigger firm as they 
do not have the financial capability to expand alone. Also they benefit from 
technological expertise and also have to offer efficient management and other 
advantages to the acquiring or merging firms in turn. 
i) Balanced Growth and Complementary Skill Sets: Mergers and acquisitions are 
a potent tool for fostering balanced growth. It is often seen that different entities have 
different areas of proficiency. For example there might be a firm having superior 
know-how regarding technology, while another may be specializing in marketing or 
production. If a merger is effected between these, all of them can benefit mutually 
from each other's capability and complementary skills. 
j) Cross-selling: If two related enterprises merge they can benefit from cross-selling 
their products to each other's customers. For example if a merger is effected between 
a bank and an insurance undertaking, the insurance unit can sell its policies to the 
bank customers and the bank can encourage the customers of the insurance unit to 
open their accounts with the bank and hence the customer base of both the 
undertakings would be widened. 
k) Potential Turnaround Situation: For a sick unit mergers and acquisitions provide 
a fresh lease of life protecting the diversified interests of all the concerned parties, i.e. 
shareholders, creditors, employees, managers etc. For this reason mergers are 
supported by the government also as they provide a ray of hope to the ailing and sick 
units and provide an opportunity for them to recover and survive. 
1) Increase in Shareholders Wealth: An announcement of merger generally gives 
an impetus to the shareholders wealth and the synergistic operations lead to an 
increase in the Return per Share (RPS) and the market price of shares. However the 
shareholders of the acquired company are better off the shareholders of the merged 
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entity. The shareholders of the merging firm gain in the long run due to the growth 
prospects available. 
m) Benefits to Management: it is very important to involve the management of 
the firm while effecting mergers because an unwilling management may pose lot of 
problems while effecting a merger. Managers usually benefit from increased salary, 
perks, bonus, security, stature etc. if doubts exist in the mind of the management in 
terms of their fiiture and job security after the merger, they do not cooperate, which 
results in difficulties in effecting the merger or acquisition. 
6.12 Limitations of the Study 
The major limitation of the study relates to availability of published data relating to 
the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's), trend and the associated financials of the 
industry. Also the financials of the companies which are involved in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) are not readily available. In case of non-listed companies it is 
even more difficult. The study related to the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) of 
the Indian Steel Industry since liberalization and there is no single data base which 
keeps the financial profiles of all the relevant companies since then. The effect of the 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is felt after few years and it is seen that the data 
base for years before the merger is not maintained necessarily. Also it is seen that 
once the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) has been effected the financial details of 
the merging or acquired entity is difficult to access as often the merged or the holding 
entity does not maintain the data base for them and especially for previous years. 
The problems faced by the Researcher in the computation of the data are mainly due 
to availability of data in the published sources. The annual reports of the companies 
have been collected from various sources but in certain cases due to the absence of 
certain figures few ratios could not be calculated. However an earnest attempt is made 
here to collect authentic data from various sources to ensure that the reliability of the 
results is not affected in any manner. Moreover the tests are calculated at Spercent 
level of significance which means that there is a probability that in a sample of 100 
the result might be wrong 5 times. 
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6.13 Conclusion 
In the present chapter the scope and objectives of the study has been carved out The 
Research Design and Methodology has been discussed at length along with die 
description of various hypotheses that are undertaken. The samples, instruments of 
data collection and methods of tabulation are also discussed. The various statistical 
and accounting measures used in the study by the Researcher are discussed in detail. 
A mention of the limitations faced in the collection of the data has also been made. 
After having discussed the Research Design and Methodology the next chapter deals 
with the study of the Indian Steel Industry since liberalization. It further gives a bird's 
eye view of the major Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) that have taken place both 
in the domestic and international scene in the Indian Steel Industry. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In Section-B, the Researcher develops the research design and methodology for the 
thesis in order to provide the direction for carrying out the research related work. In 
this chapter the Indian Steel Industry is previewed regarding its growth and 
development vis-a-vis economic liberalization. The level of production, consumption, 
imports and exports are examined to trace the growing stature and its present global 
standing. The major steel producers and the recent financial performance of the Indian 
Steel Industry are also studied. In the end, major domestic and cross-border Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals that have taken place in the Indian Steel Industry are 
scrutinized. 
7.2 Indian Steel Industry: An Overview 
With the abolition of price regulation in 1992 the prices of steel are no longer 
regulated by the government but it is the demand and supply forces which determine 
the prices. In the past few years the steel industry has been experiencing an increase in 
the prices in India. The domestic inflation in India has been on the rise and coupled 
with the increase in the prices of raw material and increased demand for steel from 
both domestic and intemational quarters, it has put an upward pressure on the steel 
prices. Besides putting pressure on major steel producers to increase the production 
the government took measures like imposition of ISpercent export duty to curb the 
exports in May 2008.' In terms of the steel sector India certainly seems to be firmly 
placed as one of the powers to reckon with in the world being the eighth largest 
producer of steel in the world. It is credited with producing quality products and has 
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been classified in Tier II category quality products according to the ratings of "World 
Steel Dynamics". While EU and Japan are in top slot, USA and Korea are in the same 
class as is India .^ 
As per the annual Report 2009-10 by the Ministry of Steel, India has climbed up the 
ladder in terms of ranking and is currently the fifth largest producer of steel in the 
world and is expected to become the second largest producer by 2012.^  
Table 7.2.1: Major Steel Producers in India 
Major Steel Producers 
(Government Undertakings) 
Steel Authority India Limited (SAIL) 
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited 
National Mineral Development Corporation 
Limited 
Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Limited 
Manganese Ore (India) Limited 
MSTC Limited 
Ferro Scrap Nigam Limited 
Sponge Iron India Limited (SIIL) 
Metallurgical Engineering Consultancy Ltd 
(MECON) 
Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited 
(HSCL) 
Bharat Refractories Limited 
Bird Group of Companies 
Major Steel Producers 
(Private) 
Tata Steel Ltd (TSL) 
JSW Steel Ltd 
Essar Steel Ltd. 
Jindal Steel and Power Ltd 
ISPAT Industries 
Uttam Galva Steels Ltd 
Source: Compiled from various Journals, Books, Websites and Articles'* '^^ ^ 
Table 7.2.2 lists the top steel producers of the world in 2008. The merger of Arcelor 
and Mittal had created the world's biggest steel producer which was having 
production facilities that were almost three times the second largest steel producer 
Nippon Steel. The acquisition of Corns made Tata Steel the eighth largest producer of 
steel in the world with 24.4 million metric tonnes of production capacity. It is 
observed that while the difference in terms of production capacity for the top ten 
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producers is marginal, it is just the top producer Arcelor-Mittal which is way ahead of 
its competitors. Keeping in view the current consolidation trend the position of any 
steel producer in the world rankings is not guaranteed. 
Table 7.2.2: Top Steel Producers of the World (By Production in 2008) 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Company 
ArcelorMittal 
Nippon Steel 
Baosteel Group 
POSCO 
Hebei Steel Group 
JFE 
Wuhan Steel Group 
Tata Steel 
Jiangsu Shagang Group 
US Steel 
Production 
metric tons) 
103.3 
37.5 
35.4 
34.7 
33.3 
33.0 
27.7 
24.4 
23.3 
23.2 
(million 
Source: List of Steel Producers, Retrieved from 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_steel_producers), 2008 
The financial performance of the steel sector as a whole is discussed in Table 7.2.3. 
For 2004 the DER is comfortable at 2.56 while the CR is low at 0.90. The ICR is also 
reasonable at 2.91 while the Total Income/ Average Total Assets is less than 1 at 0.97 
with 7.16percent profits being registered. For 2005 the DER fell by a huge margin to 
1.34 while the CR increased to 1.25. The ICR was very high at 6.79 and the efficiency 
improved with Total Income/ Average Total Assets at 1.18. The level of profits was at 
12.75percent. For 2006 the DER fell further to 1.17 while CR was stable at 1.26. ICR 
dropped to 4.77 while Total Income/ Average Total Assets dropped to 1.01. The 
profitability also dropped to 8.31percent. The DER fell below 1 to 0.99 and CR rose 
to 1.42. The ICR rose again to 5.79 and Total Income/ Average Total Assets was 
same at 1.01. Profitability was at 9.57percent. For 2008 the DER fell fiirther to 0.87 
while CR slipped to 1.30. The ICR fell to 5.36 while the Total Income/ Average Total 
Assets fell below 1 to 0.95. The profitability increased to 9.89percent. The DER 
increased to 1.03 and CR was at 1.23. The ICR was at 3.47 while the Total Income/ 
Average Total Assets fell to 0.80. The Profitability fell to 7.02percent. 
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Table 7.2.3: Recent Financial Performance of the Indian Steel Industry 
Year 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
2.56 
1.34 
1.17 
0.99 
0.87 
1.03 
Current 
Ratio 
(CR) 
0.90 
1.25 
1.26 
1.42 
1.30 
1.23 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR 
2.91 
6.79 
4.77 
5.79 
5.36 
3.47 
Total 
Income/ 
Average 
Total 
Assets 
0.97 
1.18 
1.01 
1.01 
0.95 
0.80 
Profitability 
(Percentage) 
% 
7.16 
12.75 
8.31 
9.57 
9.%9 
7.02 
Source: Executive summary: Steel: 2003-04 to 2008-09, Centre for Monitoring Indian 
Economy (CMDE), Retrieved from 
http://www.business-
beacon.com/kommon/bin/sr.php?kall=wind&tab=6020&catcode=0101010501020000 (2009) 
73 Growth and Development of Indian Steel Industry since 
Liberalization 
The world war had an adverse impact on the iron and steel plants of most of the 
countries. For instance prior to 1945 Japan was a leader in the development of iron 
and steel but its plants and resources were severely hampered due to the war. 
Manchuria which was India's contemporary at a time in terms of production also was 
adversely affected due to the war. India was the only Asian coimtry which came out 
unscathed out of the impact of the World War II and thus had the opportunity for 
rapid enhancement in the production and output of Iron and Steel .^ 
As compared to other major economies of the world India, took part in the economic 
reforms relating to liberalization and globalization of the economy quiet late. The 
landmark year was 1991 and it took place in the backdrop of severe balance of 
payment crisis. However it is noticeable that the economic reform which took place 
was at a rapid pace, average growth rate for the period between 1992-93 to 2001-02 
being around 6.0 percent which placed it among one of the fastest growing economies 
of the world .^ 
The Indian Steel Industry is divided into producers of finished steel, semi-finished 
steel, stainless steel and pig iron. Both public and private enterprises form a part of 
the Steel Industry. It has become one of the fastest in terms of growth and relies on 
export as a major stimulant*. 
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The year 1991-92 was a landmark year in the history of India as it was this year that 
economic reforms were introduced and changed the destiny of the country for years to 
come. Though the decision was taken in the back drop of balance of payment crisis, it 
has surely catapulted India to the position of one of the fastest growing developing 
country alongside China. The industrial sector was expected to face certain setbacks 
in 1991-92 due to the massive macro-economic changes initiated. The first eight 
months of the year 1991-92 had faced a mild recession leading to slowing down of 
industrial production. 
Table7.3.1; Annual Growth Rates in Major Sectors of Industry 
(In Percentage (%)) 
Year 
Weight 
April-October 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
Mining 
11.46 
1.7 
-0.2 
3.9 
Manufacturing 
77.11 
12.7 
-2.5 
3.7 
Electricity 
11.43 
7.4 
9.7 
4.2 
General 
100 
10.6 
-0.6 
3.8 
Source: Economic Survey 1992-93, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. 
Retrieved from http://indiabudget.nic.in/previouses.htm (1992-93) 
On January 16,1992 the price and distribution controls on iron and steel items that are 
manufactured by the integrated steel plants were withdrawn along with the Freight 
Equalization Scheme. However priority quota was to be maintained for the demands 
of defence, railways, small-scale industries, exporters of engineering goods and the 
North Eastern region. 
The production of saleable steel for the period April-December was 6.61 million 
tonnes. The finished steel production was 9.73 for the same period where the 
contribution of the secondary producers was 4.64 million tonnes. Production of pig 
iron steel was around 1.02 million tonnes .^ 
For the year 1992 the industrial production did not change much and rather the 
manufacturing output fell marginally while the growth in mining sector fell sharply 
mainly due to a fall in demand owing to a weak economy. Supply side was also 
adversely affected due to shortage of imports and their rising costs'". Capital market 
was fi-eed and various restrictions under FERA were removed along with 
liberalization in foreign exchange. The deregulation of steel led the steel producers to 
hike their prices by ISpercent in order to meet the inflation in the input prices. The 
imports were fi-eely allowed and the prices also gradually stabilized across the 
country. 
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The year 1992 saw the production of finished carbon steel was 14.33 tonnes where the 
secondary producers had a share of 14.5percent while in case of Pig Iron the 
production was 1.59 tonnes but the secondary producers share was lesser at 
6.3percent. Production of DRI was even lesser at 1.31 tonnes. The total value of 
imports was Rs 1441.32 crores against an export of Rs 708 crores. The consumption 
of steel was 14.84 million tonnes. For the year 1993 the production of finished carbon 
steel was at 15.20 million tonnes while for pig iron it was at 1.85 million tonnes. The 
value of Imports increased by 6.9percent while that for exports increased by a huge 
139.95percent. On the other hand, the consumption for finished steel increased by 
1.08 percent. In the year 1994 the total production of carbon steel was stable at 15.2 
million tonnes while that of Pig iron increased to 2.25 million tonnes. Import 
increased by 3.41 percent against a 79.33percent increase in exports. The consumption 
also increased by 2.13percent. For 1995 carbon steel production increased to 17.82 
million tonnes while the production of pig iron saw an increase to 2.79 million tonnes. 
In this year the trend reversed with imports increasing by 67.92percent while exports 
fell by 20.75percent. The consumption increased by 21.81 percent. For the year 1996 
the production of Carbon steel increased fiirther to 21.4 million tonnes while imports 
fell by -3.72percent and exports again increased by 3.74percent. The consumption 
also increased by 14.85percent. For the year 1997 the carbon steel production was at 
22.72 million tonnes while that of Pig iron was at 3.3 million tonnes. The imports fell 
by -2.25percent while the exports increased by 45.61percent. Consumption increased 
by 3.22percent. For 1998 the carbon steel production was at 23.37 million tonnes 
while the imports fell again and the exports increased by 23.99percent. In 1999 both 
the imports and exports fell by -9.81 percent and -18.42percent respectively. For 200 
the carbon steel production increased to 26.71 million tonnes while that of pig iron 
was at 3.18 million tonnes. Imports, exports and consumption surged significantly by 
34.39percent, 54.22percent and 8.03percent respectively. In 2001 the imports fell 
again by 25.81percent while the exports increased marginally by 0.67percent. In 2002 
the imports fell fiirther by -15.75percent while exports were at the same level. The 
year 2003 saw imports rise again by 9.27percent but the exports increased 
significantly by 65.53percent. The year 20004 saw the production of carbon steel at 
36.19 million tonnes while imports and exports increased by 9.27percent and 
19.25percent respectively. For the year 2005 the imports increased by 27.82percent 
while exports fell by 17.21percent while the consumption increased by 10.33percent. 
In the year 2006 imports also doubled by 82.55percent while exports saw a fall by -
1.53percent. The production of carbon steel increased to 55.15 million tonnes in 2007 
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while that of pig iron was at 4.99 million tonnes. Imports increased by 15.22percent 
while exports increased by 12.16percent. The consumption increased by 30.47percent. 
For 2008 imports again increased by a huge 48.35percent against a fall in exports by -
7.66percent. In the year 2009 the production increased to 59.02 tonnes for carbon 
steel while it fell to 5.23percent for pig iron. Imports fell by -21.76percent while 
exports fell by -19.28percent. For the first time in two decades a fall in consumption 
was seen at -0.62percent. The year 2010 saw production of carbon steel fall to 
48.11 percent while that for pig iron at 4.3percent. The imports increased by 
1.2percent and a fall in exports was witnessed at -40.73percent. The consumption saw 
a major fall in the wake of global recession at -25.23percent. 
The above discussion highlights a steady increase in production, export and 
consumption. The fall in recent years can be attributed to the fall in the global demand 
owing to recessionary forces. 
Figure 7.3.1: Production, Import, Export and Consumption of Steel 
160 
140 
120 
100 
-Total Production of Carbon steel (Million tonnes) 
•Total Production of Pig Iron (Million tonnes) 
"Percentage Change in Import of Iron and steel 
•Percentage Change in Export of Iron and Steel 
•Percentage Change in Consumption of Finished Steel 
Source: Table 7.3.2, Table 7.3.3, Table 7.3.4, Table 7.3.5 and Table 7.3.6 
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Table 7.3.2: Production of Finished Carbon Steel (In Million Tonnes) 
Year 
1991-1992 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-06 (Provisional) 
2006-2007 
2007-2008 
2008-2009 
2009-2010 
(Apr-Dec) (Provisional) 
Main 
Producers 
7.96 
8.41 
8.77 
9.57 
10.59 
10.54 
10.44 
9.86 ^ 
11.2 
12.51 
13.05 
14.39 
15.19 
15.61 
16.236 
17.39 
17.765 
17.02 
12.887 
Secondary 
Producers 
6.37 
6.79 
6.43 
8.25 
10.81 
12.18 
12.93 
13.24 
15.51 
17.19 
17.58 
19.28 
21 
24.44 
26.4 
37.756 
40.565 
42 
35.224 
Grand 
Total 
14.33 
15.2 
15.2 
17.82 
21.4 
22.72 
23.37 
23.82 
26.71 
29.7 
30.63 
33.67 
36.19 
40.05 
42.636 
55.146 
58.233 
59.02 
48.111 
Percent Of Share 
Of Secondary 
Producers 
14.50% 
44.70% 
42.30% 
46.30% 
50.60% 
53.60% 
55.32% 
57.32% 
58.07% 
57.88% 
57.40% 
57.27% 
58.03% 
61.02% 
61.92% 
68.46% 
69.54% 
71.16% 
73.21% 
Source: Joint Planning Committee (JPC), Ministry of Steel, Government of India, 
Retrieved from http://steel.nic.in/development.htm, (April 2010) 
(b) Pig Iron Production 
The total production of Pig Iron was 5.289 million tonnes in 2008-09 as compared to 
1.59 million tonnes in 1991-92. Earlier Pig Iron was produced primarily by the 
integrated steel plant of SAIL and RINL. Of late, the share of stand-alone pig iron 
units has increased significantly. 
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Table 73.3: Producer - Wise Production of Pig Iron (In Million 
Tonnes) 
Year 
1991-1992 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-06 (Provisional) 
2006-2007 
2007-2008 
2008-2009 
2009-2010 
Apr-Dec (Provisional) 
Main 
Producers 
1.49 
1.68 
1.98 
2.01 
1.74 
1.73 
1.7 
1.37 
1.24 
0.96 
1.02 
1.11 
0.97 
0.625 
1.006 
0.86 
0.936 
0.589 
0.575 
Secondary 
Producers 
0.1 
0.17 
0.27 
0.78 
1.06 
1.57 
1.68 
1.6 
1.94 
2.15 
3.05 
4.18 
4.25 
2.603 
2.85 
4.133 
4.378 
4.7 
3.729 
Grand 
Total 
1.59 
1.85 
2.25 
2.79 
2.8 
3.3 
3.39 
2.97 
3.18 
3.11 
4.07 
5.29 
5.22 
3.228 
3.856 
4.993 
5.314 
5.289 
4.304 
Percentage share of 
the Secondary 
Producers 
6.30% 
9.20% 
12.00% 
28.00% 
37.90% 
47.50% 
49.50% 
53.87% 
61.08% 
69.13% 
75.04% 
79.05% 
81.48% 
80.63% 
73.91 % 
82.77% 
82.38% 
88.86% 
86.64% 
Source: Joint Planning Committee (JPC), Ministry of Steel, Government of India, 
Retrieved from http://steel.nic.in/development.htm, (April 2010) 
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Table 7.3.4: Import of Iron and Steel (In '000 Tonnes) 
Year 
1991-1992 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-2006 
2006-2007 
Partly Estimated 
2007-2008 
2008-2009 
Partly Estimated 
2009-2010 
April-Dec Partly 
estimated 
Pig Iron 
152 
73 
21 
1 
8 
15 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
2 
8 
3 
3 
11 
8 
10 
Steel 
TOTAL 
(CARBON) 
1043 
1115 
1153 
1936 
1864 
1822 
1815 
1637 
2200 
1632 
1375 
1510 
1650 
2109 
3850 
4436 
6581 
5149 
5211 
Total Value 
(Pig Iron + 
Steel) 
(Rs. In 
Crores) 
1441.32 
1676 
1613 
2536 
3181 
3053 
2904 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A.. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
Percentage Change 
for Steel 
TOTAL 
(CARBON 
6.903164 
3.408072 
67.9098 
-3.71901 
-2.25322 
-0.38419 
-9.80716 
34.39218 
-25.8182 
-15.7475 
9.818182 
9.271523 
27.81818 
82.55097 
15.22078 
48.35437 
-21.7596 
1.204117 
Source: Joint Plamiing Committee (JPC), Ministry of Steel, Government of India, 
Retrieved jfrom http://steel.nic.in/development.htm, (April 2010) 
Although India started exporting steel way back in 1964, exports were not regulated 
and depended largely on domestic surpluses. However, in the years following 
economic liberalisation, export of steel recorded a quantum jump. 
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Table 7.3.5: Export Of Iron and Steel (In '000 Tonnes) 
Year 
1991-1992 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-06 
2006-2007 
Partly 
estimated 
2007-2008 
2008-2009 
Partly 
Estimated 
2009-2010 
Apr-Dec 
Partly 
Estimated 
Pig 
Iron 
-
16 
620 
466 
502 
451 
785 
281 
290 
230 
242 
629 
576 
393 
440 
350 
560 
350 
227 
Semis 
5 
154 
585 
399 
395 
300 
503 
174 
328 
195 
270 
460 
701 
261 
350 
665 
373 
554 
293 
Finished 
Carbon Steel 
368 
741 
1020 
873 
925 
1622 
1880 
1770 
2670 
2805 
2730 
4506 
5221 
4381 
4478 
4750 
4627 
3482 
2099 
Total 
Steel 
373 
895 
1605 
1272 
1320 
1922 
2383 
1944 
2998 
3000 
3000 
4966 
5922 
4903 
4828 
5415 
5000 
4036 
2392 
Total 
Value Rs 
Crores 
283 
708 
1678 
1438 
1939 
2231 
2512 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.N.A. 
Percentage 
Change for 
Total Steel 
139.9464 
79.32961 
-20.7477 
3.773585 
45.60606 
23.98543 
-18.4222 
54.21811 
0.066711 
0 
65.53333 
19.25091 
-17.207 
-1.52968 
12.15824 
-7.6639 
-19.28 
-40.7334 
Source: Joint Planning Committee (JPC), Ministry of Steel, Government of India, 
Retrieved from http://steel.nic.in/development.htm, (April 2010) 
Apparent consumption (i.e. production + imports - exports +/- variation in stocks) of 
finished steel, year-wise, has been shown below. Apparent consumption represents 
the actual demand of steel in a particular period/year. It has increased from 14.84 
million tonnes in 1991-92 to 54.833 in 2008-09. 
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Table 7.3.6: Apparent Consumption of the Finished Steel (Carbon) 
(in million tonnes) 
Year 
1991-1992 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-06 (Provisional) 
2006-2007 
2007-2008 
2008-2009 
2009-2010 (Apr-Dec) 
(Provisional) 
Apparent Consumption of 
Finished Steel 
14.84 
15 
15.32 
18.66 
21.43 
22.12 
22.63 
23.15 
25.01 
26.87 
27.35 
28.897 
31.169 
34.389 
38.151 
49.777 
55.174 
54.833 
40.997 
Percentage Change 
over Previous Year 
1.078167 
2.133333 
21.80157 
14.84459 
3.219785 
2.305606 
2.297835 
8.034557 
7.437025 
1.786379 
5.656307 
7.862408 
10.33078 
10.93954 
30.47364 
10.84236 
-0.61804 
-25.233 
Source: Joint Planning Committee (JPC), Ministry of Steel, Government of India, 
Retrieved from http://steel.nic.in/development.htm, (April 2010) 
As regards Additional Capacity Creation in Private Sector Since 1991 it is seen that 
after de-licensing of Indian Iron and Steel Industry and as a result of the steps taken 
for creation of additional capacity in the private sector, 19 projects involving a total 
investment of Rs. 30,835 crores equivalent to a capacity of approx. 13 million tonnes 
per annum have already been cleared by Financial Institutions and are in various 
stages of implementation. Already 8 units with a total capacity of Approx 5.45 million 
tonnes have already been commissioned ". 
The present scenario has witnessed a sea of changes over the past decade where there 
the competition is no longer restricted to within the domestic frontiers and 
correspondingly it has created a competitive and globalized environment where only 
the fittest can survive. There can be no compromises on the issues of performance. 
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efficiency, utilization of resources, productivity, price reduction, cost control and 
most importantly customer satisfaction. The Steel Industry as it stands today is 
globalized where production facilities of different countries complement each other in 
order to sustain, survive and excel in meeting out the competition that exists in the 
global market arena. Technological obsolescence is another major issue faced by this 
industry, where the latest technology has to be incorporated from time to time in order 
to keep the competitive edge. The country or the unit that succeeds in maintaining 
technological superiority gets an unsurpassable lead over its competitors. 
7.4 Major Mersers and Acquisitions (M&A 's) in the Indian 
Steel Sector 
After discussing the growth and development of the Indian Steel Sector since 1991 
the Researcher makes an attempt to shed light on the recent Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) deals that have occurred in the steel industry of India. Table 7.4.1 highlights 
some of the major deals. 
The deal between Rolloy Metals Ltd and Graham Firth Steel was affected on the order 
of Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) in 1991. The merger of 
Titaghur Paper Mills and Titagarh Steels was under the diversification programme 
undertaken by the latter in 1994. The merger of Powmex Steel in 1995 did not go very 
well with GKW Steels which suffered losses out of its steel division in the latter 
years. The year 1995 also witnessed the merger between Comet Steels and Jai Corp. 
The merger of Lloyd Steel in 1997 was a part of the backward integration strategy of 
Lloyd Metals and Engineers Ltd. 
In 1999 SAIL merged its loss making enterprise Visvesvaraya with itself The 1999 
takeover of JSW Steel by Jindal Iron and Steel was a part of corporate restructuring 
rather than a strategic deal and so was the takeover of Tata Steel by Tata Sons. The 
merger with of Tata SSL which was a leading manufacturer of steel wires, ropes and 
profiles with TISCO was again a corporate restructuring move. Electrosteel castings 
which is the largest ductile manufacturer in the country merged Calcutta Steel with 
itself in 2002. The takeover of the two companies of Lanco Group that is Lanco 
Kalhasthi Castings Ltd and Lanco Industries Ltd gave an edge to Electrosteel Castings 
in the sphere of cast iron and ductile iron cast pipes. Kawasaki steel of Japan took 
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over a lOpercent equity stake in Neel Metal Products of India for Rs 10 million in an 
agreement to provide it with the requisite technology for automotive steel sheets. 
Also ALA. Engineering Ltd went on to takeover Welcast Steels Ltd in the year 2003. 
Jindal Iron and Steel company (JISCO) and Jindal Vijayanagar Steel Limited (JVSL) 
were merged to form JSW Steel Limited. Jindal Iron and Steel Limited entered into a 
private equity deal with the Bahrain based Citicorp Banking Corp in 2003 which was 
done through direct investment and secondary market. 
SAIL merged its loss making subsidiary IISCO in 2004 and expanded its operating 
capacity. Tata Steel took over Singapore based NatSteel in 2005 and gave a push to its 
global operations and access to foreign suppliers and customers. JSW Steel merged 
Euro Ikon Iron Steel Private Ltd, Euro Coke Energy Private Ltd and JSW Power Ltd 
in 2005 and expanded its operational capacity further. 
Pittsburgh Iron and Steel limited in its bid to enter into the steel business merged with 
Bellary Steel in 2006. Indian Metals and Ferro alloys merged its subsidiary Indian 
Charge Chrome Limied in 2006. Tata Steel kept up its global consolidation move with 
the acquisition of Millenium Steel of Thailand for US$ 167 million. It then went on to 
make the biggest acquisition ever by an Indian corporate by acquiring Corns which 
was Anglo-Dutch at US$ 12.04 billion which made it the world's fifth largest steel 
group. 
Essar steel also made foreign purchases in 2007 which seemed to be the order of the 
day with the ongoing consolidation in the steel industry worldwide. It acquired the 
Canadian based Algoma Steel for 1.85 billion Canadian dollars and also the US based 
Minnesota Steel for an undisclosed amount. Another major steel producer of India 
JSW steel also made its presence felt in the global scenario with the purchase of three 
US Companies of Jindal United Steel, Saw Pipes USA and Jindal Enterprises for a 
combined value of $ 900 million with the idea of merging the three in future. JSW 
took over SISCOL in 2007 in its bid to expand and pumped in funds to boost its 
operating capacity. Kirloskar Brothers took over the loss making Kolhapur Steel to 
increase its operational capacity in 2008. 
In 2009 through its subsidiary Tata Steel Global Mineral Holdings Pte Limited 
additional shares of Riversdale Mining Limited of Australia were purchased which 
took its stake to 19.38percent. Essar Steel acquired Shree Precoated Steels in 2009 
which was expected o provide a big boost to its production capacity. World largest 
steel maker Arcelor-Mittal through their subsidiary Arcelormittal Netheriand B .V 
acquired a stake in Uttam Galva Steel Limited and hence made an entry in the Indian 
market in 2009. 
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Table 7.4.1: Major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in Indian Steel Industry 
Year 
1991 
1994 
1995 
1995 
1997 
1999 
1999 
1999 
2002 
2001 
2002 
2002 
2002 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2005 
Nature of 
Deal 
Merger 
Merger 
Merger 
Merger 
Merger 
Merger 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Merger 
Merger 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Merger 
Takeover 
Merger 
Takeover 
Merger 
Target/SeUer Co. 
RoUoy Metals Ltd. 
[merged] 
Titaghur Paper 
Mills Co. Ltd. 
Powmex Steel 
Comet Steels Ltd. 
[merged] 
Lloyds Steel Inds. 
Ltd. 
Visvesvaraya Iron 
and Steel Ltd. 
[merged] 
J S W Steel Ltd. 
Tata Steel Ltd. 
Tata S S L Ltd. 
[merged] 
Calcutta Steel Co. 
Ltd. [merged] 
Lanco Kalahasthi 
Castings Ltd. 
[merged] 
Lanco Industries 
Ltd. 
Neel Metal 
Products Ltd. 
Welcast Steels Ltd. 
Jindal Iron and 
Steel Co, Ltd. 
[merged] 
Jindal Iron and 
Steel Co. Ltd. 
[merged] 
Indian Iron and 
Steel Co. Ltd. 
[merged] 
NatSteel 
Euro Coke and 
Energy Pvt. Ltd. 
[merged] 
Merged/Acquirer 
Co. 
Graham Firth Steel 
Products (india) 
Ltd. 
Titagarh Steels 
Ltd. [merged] 
GKW Ltd 
Jai Corp Ltd. 
Lloyds Metals and 
Engineers Ltd 
Steel Authority Of 
India 
Jindal Iron and 
Steel Co. Ltd. 
[merged] 
Tata Sons Ltd. 
Tata S S L Ltd. 
[merged] 
Electrosteel 
Castings Ltd. 
Electrosteel 
Castings Ltd. 
Electrosteel 
Castings Ltd. 
Kawasaki Steel 
Corp, Japan 
A IA Engineering 
Ltd. 
J S W Steel Ltd. 
Citicorp Banking 
Corpn, Bahrain 
Steel Authority Of 
India Ltd 
Tata Steel 
J S W Steel Ltd. 
Value of Deal 
Stock Deal 
Stock deal 
NA 
NA 
NA 
ND 
NA 
NA 
Stock Deal 
Stock Deal 
(1:25) 
Stock deal 
Stock deal 
Rs 10 million 
NA 
NA 
US$ lOMM 
approximately 
NA 
US$ 468.1 
million 
Stock Deal 
(1:19) 
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2005 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2009 
2009 
Merger 
Merger 
Takeover 
Merger 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Takeover 
Euro Ikon Iron and 
Steel Pvt. Ltd. 
[merged] 
J S W Power Ltd. 
[merged] 
Bellary Steels and 
Alloys Ltd. 
Indian Charge 
Chrome Ltd. 
[merged] 
Millenium Steel 
Corns Group Pic 
Tata Steel Ltd. 
Algoma Steel Inc. 
Minnesota Steel L 
LC 
Saw Pipes Usa Inc 
Jindal United Steel 
Corpn. 
Jindal Enterprises 
L L C 
Southern Iron and 
Steel Co. Ltd. 
[merged] 
Kolhapur Steel Ltd. 
Riversdale Mining 
Ltd. 
Shree Precoated 
Steels Ltd. 
Uttam Galva Steels 
Ltd. 
J S W Steel Ltd. 
J S W Steel Ltd. 
Pittsburgh Iron and 
Steels Ltd. 
Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys Ltd 
Tata Steel 
Tata Steel U K Ltd. 
Rawmet Ferrous 
Inds. Pvt. Ltd. 
Essar Steel 
Holdings Ltd. 
Essar Steel 
Holdings Ltd. 
JSW Steel Limited 
JSW Steel Limited 
JSW Steel Limited 
Jindal Iron and 
Steel Co. Ltd. 
[merged] 
Kirloskar Brothers 
Ltd. 
Tata Steel Global 
Minerals Holdings 
Pte Ltd. 
Essar Steel Ltd. 
Arcelormittal 
Netherland B .v 
Stock Deal 
(1:16) 
Stock Deal 
(1:25) 
NA 
NA 
US$167 million 
US$ 12.04 
billion 
Rs 101 crore 
1.85 billion 
Canadian Dollars 
NA 
Combined value 
of US$ 900 
million 
Stock deal 
(1:22) 
NA 
NA 
Rs 600 crores 
Rs 422 crores 
Source: Compiled from Centre of Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Retrieved 
from http://www.business-
beacon.com/kommon^in/s .^php?stext=steel&mrg=mrg«&tak=tak&mnasrchsub=Searc 
h&tab=5010&kall=wind&catcode=0101010501020000 (2009) and various other 
Journals, Articles and Websites. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The chapter traces the growth and development of the Indian steel industry as a 
global industry sine liberalization reforms in 1991. The growth in production and 
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consumption since 1991 depict the steady increase in both the demand and supply. 
Also the increases in exports are traced while imports show a hike generally during 
times where there are unfavourable macro factors. The major producers of steel in the 
world and in India are discussed at length which is followed by a report on the recent 
financial performance of the Indian Steel Industry. The major Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) deals are also extensively dealt with a brief description of all. 
Having sUadied the background of the Indian Steel Industry the next chapter involves 
a detailed financial analysis of five major domestic Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) that have taken place in India. The impact of the merger on the performance 
of both the acquiring and the acquired entity are taken into account for the same. 
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Chapter 8 
Analysis of Domestic Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A ^ s) of Steel 
Industry in India 
8.1 Introduction: 
The preceding chapter presented a synoptic view of the Indian Steel Industry and the 
major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) which have taken place. The present 
chapter provides a detailed financial analysis on five major domestic Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) that have taken place and critically analyze the same. The main 
objective is to find out the Post Merger performance of the companies and compare 
them with the Pre Merger results in order to find out the profitability and rationale of 
the merger. Various accounting and financial tools are employed for the analysis. 
8.2 Visvesvarva Iron and Steel Limited (VISL) and Steel 
Authority of India Limited (SAIL) (1998-99) : Pre and 
Post Merser Performance Assessment 
a) Visvesvarava Iron and Steel Limited (VISL) 
VJsvesvaraya Iron and Steel Ltd was taken over as subsidiary of SAIL in 1989 and the 
former was subsequently merged with the latter in 1998-99 mainly because both were 
involved in the business of steel and alloys. 
The merger was expected to provide a boost to the operating capacity of SAIL and a 
hope for VISL to come out of losses. 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
The financial analysis of both the undertakings is done in Table 8.2.1 and 8.2.2. The 
total income for the year 1994 was Rs 209.63 crore. The PAT net of PiScEATotal 
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Income was -9.97 with RONW and ROCE at -60.32 percent and 14.66 percent. The 
total income increased by 4.17 percent in 1995 but the PAT net of P&E/Total Income, 
RONW and ROCE deteriorated further to -11.83 percent, 74.47 percent and -12.25 
percent respectively. In the year 1996 the income registered an increase of 6.92 
percent. The dismal condition of the concern however continued with PAT net of 
P&E/Total Income at -18.64 percent. The RONW and ROCE also worsened to -
108.04 percent and -16.4 percent respectively. In 1997 the income again increased by 
11.91 but there was no improvement in the operations with PAT net of P&E/Total 
Income at -37.56 percent the RONW was at a dismal -93.12 percent and ROCE was at 
a sorry -38.28 percent. The trend of rising income was also stalled in the year 1998 
with income falling by 13.12 percent. The PAT net of P&E/Total Income was at 
37.29 percent, RONW at 52.19 percent and ROCE at 34.17 percent. 
Table 8.2.1: Pre-Merger Total Income of Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Ltd (1994-
1998) 
(Figures in Rupees Crore) 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Total Income 
209.63 
218.36 
233.48 
261.29 
227 
Percentage Increase over Previous Year 
4.17 
6.92 
11.91 
-13.12 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Center of Monitoring Indian Economy 
<http://www.businessbeacon.com/konunon/bin/sr.php?kall=wcoshv&repnum=2595&ver=pf 
&cocode=269343> 
Table 8.2.2 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Source: Co 
: Pre-Merger Ratios of Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Ltd. (1994-1998) 
PAT netofP&E/total 
Income 
(Percentage) 
-9.97 
-11.83 
-18.64 
-37.56 
-37.29 
mpiled and Calculated 1 
Return on Net 
Worth 
(RONW) 
-60.32 
-74.47 
-108.04 
-93.12 
-52.19 
Tom Center of Mo 
Return on Capital 
Employed 
(ROCE) 
-14.66 
-12.25 
-16.4 
-38.28 
-34.17 
nitoring Indian Economy 
<http://www.businessbeacon.com/kommon/bin/sr.php?kall=wcoshv&repnum=2595&ver=pf 
&cocode=269343> 
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Figure 8.2.1: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limted 
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Source: Table 8.2.2 
Testing of Hypotheses: 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre-merger 
Profitability of Visvesvaraya Steel and Post Merger Profitability of 
SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre-
merger Profitability of Visvesvaraya Steel and Post Merger 
Profitability of SAIL 
Table 8.2.3 investigates the profitability aspect and finds that the correlation 
coefficient (r) is -0.30 which reflects moderate degree of negative correlation between 
the two parameters. The regression equation Y on X where Y is the dependent and X 
is the independent variable shows that one unit of change in X, i.e. pre-merger 
profitability of Visvesvarya leads to -0.43 unit changes in the post-merger profitability 
of SAIL. The intercept is high at -28.06 showing that the post-merger profitability of 
SAIL was affected by other factors more than the pre-merger profitability of SAIL. 
The coefficient of determination (r ) is at 0.09 indicating that a very minimal amount 
of variance is explained that is the pre-merger profitability of Visvesvarya has a 
limited impact on the post-merger profitability of SAIL. The statistical significance is 
tested using the t-test. The t-test value comes out to be 0.47 when four years before 
and after the merger are undertaken while the table value oft for v=8 at to.os is 2.31. 
The calculated value being less than table value leads to acceptance of Null 
Hypotheses signifying that there is no relation between the pre and Post Merger 
profitability 
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However if we take in to consideration eleven years of post-merger, it gives the t-
value at 2.22. The table value oft for v=14 at to.os is 2.15. Here, Null Hypothesis 
rejected and Alternative Hypothesis accepted stating that there is a relation 
between the two and it is statistically significant. 
Thus the merger has an effect on the operations of Visvesvaraya which tumed into a 
profit making enterprise. The operation of Visvesvaraya has a negative impact on the 
operation of SAIL. It had to recoup from the loss making operations of Visvesvarya. 
It is thus noted that the merger takes time for showing effects too. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre-merger 
CETR of Visvesvaraya Steel and Post Merger CETR of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre-
merger CETR of Visvesvaraya Steel and Post Merger CETR of 
SAIL 
Further Table 8.2.3 explores the CETR and shows that that there is a moderate degree 
of negative correlation between the pre-merger CETR of Visvesvaraya and post-
merger CETR of SAIL reflecting that it had a negative impact on the latter. However 
the regression equation where post-merger CETR of SAIL is the dependent variable 
and pre-merger CETR of Visvesvarya is the independent variable shows that a unit 
change in CETR of Visvesvaraya had a -0.01 units change on the CETR of SAIL. The 
constant is high at 0.64 showing that other factors had a greater role to play in the 
movement of CETR of SAIL. The coefficient of determination (r^) is also on the 
lower side at 0.41 supporting the view that the two variables are not closely related. 
The t-test conducted for five years before and after the merger give the t-value at 4.43 
while the table value of t for v=8 at to.os is 2.31. Hence the Null Hypothesis is 
rejected while the Alternative is Hypotheses accepted signifying that the relation is 
statistically significant. 
When eleven years of post-merger are undertaken, the t-test undertaken shows that the 
t-value is 6.96 while the table value of t for v=14 at to.os is equal to 2.15. The 
calculated value is more than the table value indicating that the results are statistically 
significant and the Null Hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypotheses 
accepted. 
Hence the CETR of Visvesvarya had a limited impact on the movement of CETR of 
SAIL after the merger. 
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Table 8.2.3: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of 
Visvesvaraya 
Variables 
1. X=Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
Visvesvarya 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
SAIL 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
CETR of 
Visvesvarya 
V=Post-Merger 
CETR of SAIL 
*Five years of Pre and 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
-0.30 
-0.64 
* Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.09 
0.4096 
*ost Merger undertaken 
Profitability and 
*Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.43X -28.06 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.01X+0.64 
CETR of 
T-test 
t=0.47* 
t=2.22** 
t=4.43* 
t=6.96** 
**Five years of Pre-Merger and eleven years of Post Merger undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.2.2 and Table 8.2.7 
The pre-merger analysis of Visvesvarya Iron and Steel Limited reflect that the 
financial condition of the concern was not stable. There was a consistent fall in the 
PAT, RONW and ROCE for Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited from 1994-98. For 
the year 1998 the total income fell by -13.12 but the main source of worry was the 
PAT net of P&E/total Income (Percentage) at -7.29 percent and it was negative for 
consecutive five years. The hypothesis testing though regression analysis shows that 
the profitability and CETR of VISL had a limited impact on the Post Merger 
financials of SAIL, i.e. at -0.43 and -0.01 units. The correlation coefficient was 
negative in both cases. VISL was a loss making unit and its merger with its parent 
company gave it a new lease of life. The merger made it possible for SAIL to write 
off its losses and get deductions on tax payments. The dismal state of affairs led to a 
proposal of its being taken over by the Defence Ministry as 60 percent of its products 
that is alloy steel were required by it. The proposal however did not materialize and 
its association with SAIL continued. It was in November 2004 that VISL started 
making profits and since then it has been a profitable concern for SAIL' 
b) Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) 
SAIL is one of the largest steelmaker of India and ranks among the top five corporate 
in India in terms of profit earning. It is the 16"' largest producer of steel in the world. 
It is wholly owned by the government of India and trades publically in the market. It 
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has five Integrated Steel Plants, three Special Steel Plants and one subsidiary .^ In this 
section its merger with its special Steel plant Visvesvarya Iron and Steel Plant (VISL) 
in Kamataka is analysed. 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
The year 1993 saw the sales of SAIL at Rs 10175 crores against an expenditure of Rs 
9776 crores. The ratio analysis shows that the year 1993 saw ICR at 1.63 and CETR 
at 1.16. The DER indicated the leverage at 1.81 while die FATR was also impressive 
at 0.94. Profits were achieved at 4.16 percent. The year 1994 saw sales increase by a 
fiuther 14.71 percent against a surge of just 7.48 percent in expenditure. ICR 
improved to 1.71 while CETR also moved to 2.00. DER was ideal at 2 while the 
FATR was stagnant at 0.94. The profits also moved up marginally to 4.67. The 
liberalization measures taken up were having a positive impact but overall the demand 
of steel was most stagnant and was facing increased competition fi-om the domestic 
sector. However the situation looked upbeat and it was hoped that it would improve 
soon. SAIL was at its feet coping up with the changes with the exports surging by 130 
percent^ . 
For the year 1995 sales increased by another 18.82 percent against an increase of 
12.46 percent in expenditure. The ICR improved to 2.64 indicating that the company 
was equipped with financial surplus with the company in meeting its expenses. CETR 
also moved up to 1.29 and FATR remained at 0.94. DER fell marginally to 1.86 
lowering the debt burden while the profitability almost doubled to 7.99 percent. For 
1996 sales increased by a lesser rate at 6.08 percent while the expenditure increased at 
a higher rate at 10.23 percent. ICR and DER were relatively stable at 2.63 and 1.84 
respectively while CETR fell down to 1.14 and FATR to 0.71 but the profits moved 
up marginally to 8.97 percent. The year was a landmark in the financial history of 
SAIL with the highest ever turnover and profits achieved. The figures revealed that a 
better strategy was employed which was yielding the desired results. The management 
adopted certain changes in the production, marketing and financial strategy in the 
form of product mix, technology, exports etc which worked in the company's favour. 
The same year SAIL for the first time issue GDR (Global Depository Receipts) worth 
US$ 125 million^ For the year 1997 the ICR dropped to 1.50, CETR to 0.76 and 
FATR to 0.72. The DER rose to 2.18 but the cause for worry was the fall in profits to 
3.64 percent. For 1998 the sales rose by 3.49 percent against a rise of 1.34 percent in 
expenditure. The ICR fell fiarther to 1.10 CETR to 0.69 and FATR to 0.69. The DER 
continued to rise to 2.36 increasing the debt proportion of the company and making it 
more leveraged. The management had an issue or two to handle with profitability 
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dropping further down to 0.91 percent. As is evident by the figures the year was not 
very smooth. The major reasons being increased competition from domestic and 
international quarters coupled with a fall in the demand for Steel. It was a call to the 
management to introspect and make an even more concerted effort to bring out cost 
control and present the product to the customers in a more desirable way. It was not a 
situation to panic but definitely warranted a serious look into the affairs. 
Table 8.2.4: Pre and Post-Merger Sales of SAIL (1993-2009) 
Figures in Rupees Crore 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Sales 
10175 
11671 
13867 
14710 
14131 
14624 
Percentage increase 
over previous year 
14.71 
18.82 
6.08 
-3.94 
3.49 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Sales 
14963 
14311 
14110 
13519 
16837 
21297 
28523 
27860 
33923 
39508 
43150 
Percentage increase 
over previous year 
2.32 
4.36 
-1.40451 
-4.18852 
24.54324 
26.48928 
33.92966 
-2.324 
21.76238 
16.46376 
9.218386 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from the Annual Reports of SAIL from 1994 to 
2009. Retrieved from http://www.sail.co.in/ 
Table 8.2.5: Pre and Post-Merger Expenditure of SAIL (1993-2009) 
Figures in Rupees Crore 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Sourc< 
Expenditure 
9776 
10507 
11816 
13025 
13730 
13914 
i: Compiled and 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
7.48 
12.46 
10.23 
5.41 
1.34 
Calculated from tl 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
le Annu 
Expenditure 
13460 
13109 
11943 
12508 
14672 
16645 
17426 
20479 
22957 
26553 
32208 
al Reports of SJ 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
3.26 
-2.61 
-8.89465 
4.730805 
17.30093 
13.44738 
4.6921 
17.5198 
12.1002 
15.66407 
21.29703 
UL from 1994 to 
2009. Retrieved from http://www.sail.co.in/ 
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Table 8.2.6: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of SAIL (1993-1998) 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
1.63 
1.71 
2.64 
2.63 
1.50 
1.10 
Capital 
Employed To 
Turnover 
(CETR) 
1.16 
1.07 
1.29 
1.14 
0.76 
0.69 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
1.81 
2.00 
1.86 
1.84 
2.18 
2.36 
Fixed Asset 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
1.19 
0.72 
0.69 
Profitability 
(%) 
4.16 
4.67 
7.99 
8.97 
3.64 
0.91 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.2.4, Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
Figure 8.2.2: Pre- Merger Ratio Analysis of SAIL (for merger with VISL) 
10 
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1 
0 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
•Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) 
•Debt Equity Ratio (DER) 
•Profitability 
•Capital Employed To Turnover (CETR) 
•Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio (FATR) 
Source: Table 8.2.6 
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Table 8.2.7: Post-Merger Ratio Analysis of SAIL (1999-2009) 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
0.17 
0.04 
0.56 
-0.09 
0.76 
3.88 
16.43 
13.07 
29.29 
46.39 
29.59 
Capital 
Employed To 
Turnover 
(CETR) 
2.3 
5.03 
5.26 
6.87 
7.67 
11.79 
4.2 
3.48 
2.82 
2.7 
2.18 
Debt Equity 
Ratio (DER) 
0.60 
0.85 
0.89 
0.91 
1.16 
1.59 
1.59 
1.48 
1.54 
1.6 
1.41 
Fixed 
Asset 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
3.05 
3.17 
3.42 
6.23 
6.5 
1.87 
0.58 
0.35 
0.24 
0.13 
0.27 
Profitability 
(%) 
-12.32 
-12.02 
-51.67 
-12.63 
-1.81 
11.8 
23.9 
14.4 
18.28 
19.08 
14.31 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.2.4, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 
Figure 8.2.3: Post-Merger Ratio Analysis of SAIL (for merger with VISL) 
-Interest Coverage Ratio 
-Working Capital Turnover Ratio 
-Capital Employed To Turnover 
-Debt Equity 
-Profitability 
Source: Table 8.2.7 
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Testing of Hypotheses: 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post-merger Profitability of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post-merger Profitability of SAIL 
Table 8.2.8 depicts the correlation coefficient (r) between the X and Y that is the pre 
and Post Merger profitability of SAIL is -0.74 which signifies a moderate degree of 
negative correlation. The regression equations fiirther show that for every one unit of 
change in the pre-merger profitability of SAIL, the Post Merger profitability was 
affected by -5.27 units. The constant is also high at 13.49 hinting at the role of various 
other factors besides the pre-merger profitability having a role to play in the 
movement of Post Merger profits of SAIL. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is at 
0.54 indicating that a significant amount of variance is affected by the variable X on 
Y. The t-test undertaken for analyzing the pre and Post Merger values shows that the 
t-value for values undertaken six years before and after the merger gives the t value at 
2.08. The table value oft for v=10 is 2.23. The calculated value being less than the 
table value leads to acceptance of Null Hypotheses and rejection of Alternative 
Hypotheses showing that there is no relation between the post and Pre Merger 
profitability and it is statistically insignificant at 95 percent significance level. 
However when a span of eleven years after the Post Merger are taken into 
consideration, it gives the value of t as 0.45. The table value oft for v=15, to.os is 2.13. 
Here again the calculated value being less than table value leads to acceptance of the 
Null Hypothesis and rejection of the Alternative Hypothesis showing that the 
relation between the pre and Post Merger profitability is statistically insignificant. 
Hence even in the longer run the relation is statistically insignificant here. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post-merger CETR of SAIL 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post-merger CETR of SAIL 
Table 8.2.8 fiirther depicts the relation between the pre and Post Merger CETR of 
SAIL. The correlation coefficient is -0.84 reflecting a high degree of negative 
correlation. Regression equation shows that for every one unit of change in the Pre-
merger CETR of SAIL the Post-merger CETR falls by -1.19. The constant or 
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intercept is not very high at -0.21 undermining the importance of other factors. The 
coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.702 showing that a considerable amount of 
variance is explained by the movement in variable X. The value of t for the six years 
of pre and Post Merger is 0.118 while the table value of t for v=10 at to.os is 2.23 
indicating that the calculated value being less than table value leads to acceptance of 
Null Hypothesis and of rejection of Alternative Hypothesis stating that there is a 
relation between the pre and Post Merger CETR. 
When eleven years of Post Merger are undertaken t value is 4.20 against the table 
value of t for v=15, to.os is 2.13. The calculated value is more than the table value 
indicating that the relation is statistically significant and in the longer run there is an 
effect of the merger on the Post Merger CETR. The Alternative Hypothesis is 
accepted and the Null Hypothesis is rejected here. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation behveen the Pre and 
Post-merger ICR of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post-merger ICR of SAIL 
The relation between the pre and Post Merger ICR is shown in Table 8.2.8. The 
correlation coefficient (r) is -0.62 which shows a moderate degree of negative 
correlation. Regression equation shows that for every one unit of change in the pre-
merger ICR, the Post Merger ICR falls by -1.61 units. The intercept is at 3.90 
reflecting the role of other factors. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) at 0.3844 
reflects that not a large amount of variance in Post Merger ICR is explained by the 
pre-merger ICR. The t-test undertaken shows that the value of t for six years of pre 
and Post Merger at 1.48 while the table value of t for v=10 at to.os is 2.23. The 
calculated value being less than the table value due to which Null hypothesis is 
accepted and Alternative Hypothesis is rejected showing that the relation is 
statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the pre and Post Merger 
ICR. When the value of t is calculated taking into consideration eleven years of Post 
Merger it gives the t value at 1.64 where the table value of t for v=15 at to.os is 2.13. 
Here again the calculated value is less than the table value showing that there is no 
relation between the pre and Post Merger ICR and it is statistically insignificant. Null 
Hypothesis is accepted while the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 8,2.8: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, CETR and ICR of 
SAIL 
Variables 
1. X=Pre-Merger 
Profitability of Sail 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of SAIL 
2. X= Pre-Merger CETR 
of SAIL 
Y=Post-Merger CETR 
of SAIL 
3. X= Pre-Merger ICR of 
SAIL 
Y=Post-Merger ICR of 
1 SAIL 
•Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
-0.74 
-0.84 
-0.62 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.54 
0.702 
0.3844 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-5.27X+13.49 
Y on X is 
Y=-1.19X-0.21 
Y on X is 
Y=-1.61Y+3.90 
**T-test 
t=2.08* 
t=0.45** 
t=0.118* 
t=4.20** 
t=1.48* 
t=1.64** 
•Six Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Six Years of Pre Merger and Eleven Years of Post-Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.2.6 and Table 8.2.7 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Post-merger 
Profitability and MPS of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post-
merger Profitability and MPS of SAIL 
Table 8.2.9 highlights calculations done to find out the relation between the Post 
Merger Profitability and Market Price per Share to see if the market price moves 
according to the profitability or not. It is seen that the correlation coefficient (r) is 
0.66 reflecting a moderate degree of positive correlation between the profitability and 
MPS. The regression equations shows that when the profitability is taken as the 
dependent variable and MPS as the independent variable then a unit change in MPS 
leads to 0.25 units change in the profitability. The constant is also considerably high 
showing that when the value of the slope is zero the movement in X or profitability 
can be about -12.77 units. Also when the MPS is taken as dependent variable and the 
profitability as the independent variable it shows that a unit change in the profitability 
leads to 1.72 units change in the MPS. Here the intercept is very high at 55.94 
showing that MPS is affected by many other factors besides the profitability. The 
coefficient of determination (i^ ) is 0.4356 indicating that a considerable amount of 
variance can be explained by these factors. The calculated value oft is 2.85 and the 
table value of t for v=l 8 at to.os is 2.10. Hence the calculated value being more than the 
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table value leads to rejection of the Null Hypothesis and acceptance of the 
Alternative Hypothesis indicating that the relation is statistically significant. 
Table 8.2.9: Post Merger Analysis of MPS and Profitability of SAIL 
Variables 
4. X=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
SAIL 
Y= Post Merger 
MPS of SAIL 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.66 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
Cr^ ) 
0.4356 
*Regression 
Equations 
X on Y is 
X=0.25Y-12.77 
Y on X is 
Y=1.72X+55.94 
*T-test 
2.85 
*Ten years of Post Merger undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.2.7 and Appendix 5 
Table 8.2.10 indicates the Profit Margin and Profit Rate. For Visvesvarya the Pre-
merger average of Profit Margin is very low at -0.23 while for SAIL it is at 0.051. The 
Post-Merger statistic also does not change much for SAIL and it is 0.053. However 
when we compare it with the Pre-Merger Profit Margin of VISL, the result is 
impressive where it turned fi-om a negative -0.23 to a positive 0.053. Thus the merger 
does not have a major impact on the Profit Margin of SAIL. The Profit Rate shows 
that the pre-merger average is 0.027 while the post-merger average is at 0.0456 
showing a slight improvement. The percentage change in the Profit Margin for SAIL 
is 3.92 percent while the percentage change for the Profit Rate is 70.37. Hence the 
Post-Merger results reflect an improvement over the Pre-merger ones. The operating 
efficiency however improved at a much higher degree than the financial efficiency. 
Table 8.2.10: Pre and Post Profit Rate and Profit Margin for Merger between 
SAIL and Visvesvarya 
a) Visvesvarya 
b) SAIL. 
Net Sales 
Profit Marein= PAT . 
NS 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
-0.23 
0.051 
Post-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.053 
Percentage 
Change 
-
3.92 
Total Assets 
Profit Rate= PAT. 
TA 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.027 
Post-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.046 
Percentage 
Change 
70.37 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.2.1, Table 8.2.2, Table 8.2.3, Table 8.2.4, 
Appendix 2 and Appendix 4 
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The analysis of SAIL in case of merger with Visvesvaraya shows that the profitability 
declined after the merger but it was due to the recession in the global and domestic 
steel industry. A restructuring plan was devised to bring about a turnaround in order 
to separate its non-core business from its main business of production and sale of 
steel^ The Testing of Hypothesis for various financial parameters reveals that the 
relation between the Pre and Post Merger Profitability, CETR and ICR is statistically 
insignificant. Only when six years of Pre Merger is compared to eleven years of Post 
Merger of CETR, the relation is significant. Hence the testing of Hypothesis supports 
the notion that the merger did not have much impact on the fmancials of SAIL. The 
relation between the Post Merger Profitability and MPS is however significant. The 
MPS is greatly affected by Profitability and other factors. The Profitability is affected 
by 0.25 units with a unit change in MPS while MPS is affected by 1.72 units change 
for a unit change in profitability. The intercept is high at 55.94. The study of the Profit 
Rate and Profit Margin also highlights the limited impact of the merger on the 
financial performance and greater effect on the operational performance with the 
increase in the Post Merger Profit Margin by 3.92 percent while the Post Merger 
Profit Rate increased by 70.37 percent. 
The detailed post-merger analysis of sale, expenditure and ratio analysis of SAIL is 
presented in the following paragraphs where its subsequent merger with IISCO in 
2006 is analyzed. 
8.3 Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited (IISCO) and 
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) (2005-2006) : Pre 
and Post Mer2er Performance Assessment 
The Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO) in Bumpur was the country's second 
integrated steel plant in India after Tata Iron and steel Company. It was taken over by 
the Government of India in 1972 and subsequently nationalized. It was made a 
subsidiary of SAIL in 1979. It was merged with SAIL on 15 February 2006 and there 
was Rs 9600 modernization program inaugurated by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan 
Singh on 24'*' December 2006 which is the largest investment in West Bengal in the 
last ten years.^  
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a) Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited (IISCO) 
After the announcement of the merger in 2004 between the West Bengal based Indian 
Iron and Steel Company (IISCO) which was 100 percent subsidiary of SAIL with its 
parent company it was finally formalized in 2005-06. The merger required the 
approval of Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) due to the 
financial position of IISCO which revealed its dire economic conditions. It was 
running in to losses for around 30 years. Being the oldest integrated steel plant, the 
government sought the merger plan as a device to moot it out of its financial losses. 
Its financial losses were estimated to be around Rs 955 crores'. The merger with 
SAIL was expected to provide the much required influx of finance and technology. 
SAIL was also expected to benefit firom the iron-ore reserves of IISCO. 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
Table 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 analyze the pre-merger financial position of IISCO. The total 
income in 1999-00 was Rs 944.98 crores. The DER was negative at -0.88 and CETR 
was also dismal at -0.62. Huge financial losses were incurred to the time of 40.36 
percent. The condition was no better in the following year in 2000-01 with the income 
falling by -0.25 percent while the expenditure was at 1113.26 percent. The DER 
worsened to -3.51 while liquidity was also low at 0.70. The FATR was respectable at 
2.70 but the CETR was extremely low at -24.83. The losses fell but sfill were 
alarming at -21.59 percent. 
For the year 2001-02 the income increased by 1.70 percent against an increase of 0.93 
percent in expenditure. The DER was still negative at -0.59 while the CR fell further 
to 0.53. FATR was satisfactory at 2.84 and CETR bettered to -4.24. The trend of 
decline in losses continued with losses being reported at -20.04 percent. The increase 
in output and better technology and product mix helped reducing the losses but cost 
reduction was still an issue at hand along with sluggish demand of Steel. The year 
2002-03 saw income increase by 0.11 percent against a fall in expenditure by -7.63 
percent. DER improved slightly but continued to be negative at -0.33. Liquidity 
worsened with CR falling to 0.35. FATR fiirther improved to 3.02 while the CETR 
was at -2.36. The losses again increased to -22 percent. For the next year that is 2003-
04, the total income increased by 6.06 percent against an increase of 6.12 percent in 
expenditure. DER was at a low of -0.18 percent while the CR was at 0.34. FATR 
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increased to 3.40 while the CETR improved to -1.73. The losses further increased to -
24.30. It seemed that the management of IISCO was not able to handle the issue at 
hand and the rising input cost did not help their cause further. For the year 2003-04 
the income increased by another 15.12 percent against a fall of -3.42 percent in 
expenditure. The situation with the capital structure did not show much improvement 
with the DER at-0.47 while the CR also fell to a low of 0.23. FATR rose to 4.12 while 
the CETR worsened to -2.09. However the remarkable drop in the losses provided the 
much needed motivation to the management and employees of IISCO with the losses 
at-3.26 percent. 
Hence it is seen that the financial condition of IISCO was not very promising. The 
recent drop in the quantum of losses was an encouraging sign though and its merger 
with SAIL was expected to make a positive impact on its financial and operating 
performance. 
Table 8.3.1: Pre-Merger Total Income of Indian Iron and Steel Company (1999-
2004) 
Year 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
Total 
Income 
944.98 
942.64 
958.62 
959.70 
1017.84 
1171.73 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
-0.25 
1.70 
0.11 
6.06 
15.12 
Expenditure 
1113.26 
1123.64 
1037.93 
1101.47 
1063.805 
Fi ?ures in Rs Crore 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
0.932397 
-7.62789 
6.1218 
-3.41952 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Report of IISCO from 1999 to 2004. 
Retrieved from http://www.business-
beacon.com/kommon/bin/sr .php?kall=wcos&cocode=98859&type=s&tab= 1010 
Table 8.3.2 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Source: Com 
: Pre Merge 
(1999-2004] 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
-0.87487 
-3.51185 
-0.58916 
-0.3341 
-0.1752 
-0.47203 
piled and Cah 
r Ratio Analysis of Indian Iron and Steel Company 
1 
Capital 
Employed 
To 
Turnover 
(CETR) 
0.704031 
0.53369 
0.352972 
0.337633 
0.228863 
:ulated from Tab 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
2.70858 
2.838169 
3.016312 
3.396876 
4.115449 
e 8.3.1 andAp 
Fixed Asset 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
-0.62112 
-24.8325 
-4.23981 
-2.35816 
-1.73028 
-2.08786 
pendix 6 
Profitability 
(%) 
-40.36 
-21.59 
-20.04 
-22.00 
-24.30 
-3.26 
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Figure 8.3.1: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of IISCO 
10 
0 
-10 
-20 
-30 
-40 
-50 
'004 
•Debt Equity Ratio (DER) • ^ ^Cur ren t Ratio (CR) 
•Fixed Assets turnover Ratio (FATR) Capital Employed Turnover Ratio (CETR) 
•Profitability 
Source: Table 8.3.2 
Testing of Hypotheses: 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability of HSCO and Post-merger Profitability of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability of HSCO and Post-merger Profitability of 
SAIL 
Table 8.3.3 undertakes the analysis of the relation between the premerger profitability 
of IISCO with the Post Merger profitability of SAIL. The correlation coefficient (r) is 
at -0.71 which reflects a moderate degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of 
determination (r^) at 0.5036 reflects that only half of the variance is explained by the 
explanatory variable. The regression equations show that for a unit change in X that is 
the pre-merger profitability of IISCO the pre-merger profitability is affected by 0.19 
units. The constant is also high at 19.77 indicating the role of other variables. The t-
value for four years of pre and Post Merger undertaken is 6.84 while the table value of 
t for v=6 at toos is 2.43. The calculated value being more than the table value leads to 
rejection of the Null Hypothesis and acceptance of the Alternative Hypothesis. 
Hence the values are statistically significant and the merger has an effect on the post-
merger profitability. 
However when six years of Pre Merger and four years of Post Merger are imdertaken 
the value oft is calculated as 6.30 while the table value oft for v=8 at toos is 2.31. 
Again the calculated value is more than the table value which leads to rejection of 
Null Hypothesis and acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis implying the merger 
had an effect and the relation obtained is statistically significant. 
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2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
CETR of HSCO and Post-merger CETR of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger CETR of HSCO and Post-merger CETR of SAIL 
Table 8.3.3 fiirther explores the relation between the pre-merger CETR of HSCO and 
Post Merger CETR of SAIL. The correlation coefficient (r) is 0.31 showing moderate 
degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.09 which 
shows that a very low proportion of variance in post-merger CETR of SAIL is 
explained by pre-merger CETR of IISCO. The regression equation depicts that a unit 
change in the pre-merger CETR of IISCO leads to just a 0.022 unit change in the 
post-merger CETR of SAIL. The constant or intercept is also not very high at 1.57. 
Further t-test is undertaken to test the statistical significance. The calculated value oft 
is 6.84 when four years before and after the merger are taken up. The table value oft 
for v=6 at to.os is 2.43. As the calculated value is more than the table value the results 
are statistically significant and the Null hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative 
Hypothesis is accepted. Hence there is a relation between the Pre and Post Merger 
CETR. However when six years of Pre-Merger are undertaken it gives the t-value at 
1.58 while the table value oft when v=8 at to.os 2.31. The calculated value being less 
than the table value leads to the conclusion that the data is statistically insignificant 
and the Null Hypothesis is accepted against the Alternative Hypothesis stating that the 
merger has no effect on the Post Merger CETR. 
Table 8.3.3: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability and CETR of IISCO 
and SAIL 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
IISCO 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
SAIL 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
CETR of IISCO 
Y=Post-Merger 
CETR of SAIL 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=-0.71 
=0.31 
Coefficient of 
Determination 
(H) 
0.5036 
0.093 
Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.19X+19.77 
Y on X is 
Y=0.022X+1.57 
T-test 
t=6.84* 
t=6.30** 
t=7.43* 
t=1.58** 
*Four years of Pre and Post Merger undertaken 
••Six years of Pre-Merger and Four years of Post Merger undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Tables 8.3.2 and 8.3.7 
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The financials of IISCO show that the company was running into losses at around 20 
percent and it was only in 2001 that the rate of losses fell to -3.26 percent. The test of 
the two Hypothesis relating to the Pre Merger Profitability and CETR of IISCO with 
the Post Merger statistics of SAIL shows that the both the relations are statistically 
insignificant. The correlation coefficient (r) is however negative at -0.71 indicating 
the negative impact which was however only -0.19 units. IISCO was running into 
losses prior to the merger and consequently had a negative impact on the profitability 
of SAIL while the CETR had a positive impact on the CETR of SAIL. The correlation 
was of low degree but it should be kept in mind that the setting off of losses may have 
reduced profitability but at the same time the tax liability as well. In case of CETR the 
effect on CETR of SAIL is just 0.02 units. 
b) Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIU 
In tune with the ongoing consolidation of the global Steel Industry SAIL integrated 
its subsidiary IISCO with the parent company with effect fi-om 1 April 2005 under 
the 'Pooling of Interest Method' which resulted in the clubbing of assets, liabilities, 
reserves and surplus of IISCO with SAIL*. Thus it added another integrated plant to 
its fold and enhanced its size and scale of operation with the hope to benefit firom the 
economies of scale and operations. 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
The year 1998-99 saw sales at Rupees 13138 crores against an expenditure of Rupees 
11635 crores. ICR is very low at 0.17 while the WCTR is comfortable at 2.3 and 
CETR is low at 0.60. The proportion of debt is high 3.05 while losses were high at -
12.32 percent. For the year 2000 the sales increased by 8.93 percent against a 12.67 
percent increase in expenditure. ICR is very low at 0.04 while the WCTR is high at 
5.03 and the CETR is at 0.85. The DER increases further to 3.17 while losses drop 
marginally -12.02 percent. The financial year 2001 saw the sales of the company 
decline by 1.4 percent and the expenditure by 8.89 percent. ICR is low at 0.56 but it is 
still a massive improvement over the previous years at 0.04 and working capital 
turnover ratio is at 5.26. The CETR is fairly low at 0.89 which is relatively the same 
with the previous years at 0.85. The DER at 3.42 which is higher than the previous 
years at 3.17 signifies the higher proportion of debt in the capital structure which is 
risky. The company is running into losses with profitability being negative at -51.67 
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percent. The steel industry was facing troubled times with an average growth of 
around just 4 percent in the last 6 years as compared to a 18 percent growth in 
previous years. 
For the year 2002 interest coverage ratio at -0.09 put question marks on the ability of 
SAIL in fulfilling its interest payments. The WCTR improved to 6.87 and so did the 
CETR to 0.91 indicating better utilization. Efficiency in operations was reflected in 
reduction of losses to -12.63 percent although there was a reduction in sales by 4.19 
percent and an increase in expenditure by 4.73 percent. Sales were recorded low at 
both the domestic and international market. Also the year 2001 was marked by a 
global recession that had an effect on the earnings. The sales of by-products, scraps 
and secondary products were also recorded at lower levels. The reduced cost of sales 
was mainly due to the cost control measures undertaken. 
The year 2003 saw the sales increase by a whopping 24.54 percent and expenditure by 
17.3 percent indicating a high level of trading. The ICR bettered to 0.76. The WCTR 
and CETR also improved significantly to 7.67 and 1.16 respectively giving positive 
signals about the financial position of the concern. The DER continued to be a cause 
of concern indicating higher risk proportion with it being at 6.5. It is seen that the 
concern almost breaks even with the net loss at 1.81 percent. The positive 
performance was attributed mainly to higher sales volumes and steel prices. Better 
product mix adopted also yielded the desired results. The cost control mechanism was 
also proving its effectiveness. Borrowings were also substituted by lower interest 
carrying instruments. 
The year 2004 saw the sales increase by 26.49 percent against a 13.45 percent 
increase in expenditure. The intensive cost control and other efficiency measures 
undertaken by the management bore results with the ICR improving to 3.88, WCTR 
at 11.79 and CETR to 1.59. It reflected financial stability and efficient operations. The 
DER also lowered dramatically to 1.87 indicating a lower reliance on debt reducing 
the risk proportion. Most importantly a profit of 11.8 percent was registered 
confirming the financial health of the concern. The accumulated losses were wiped 
off. There was also a transfer fi-om Bond Redemption Reserve. The recessionary trend 
being experienced since the last few years seemed to have ended with global demand 
of steel especially in Asia experiencing a sharp upward movement. 
The year 2005 saw the sales increase by an even higher 33.93 percent while the 
expenditure increased by just 4.69 percent. The ICR improved significantly to 16.43 
211 I Page 
percent while the WCTR fell to 4.2. The CETR was the same at 1.59. However the 
profits improved comprehensively to a satisfying 23.9 percent. The DER at 0.58 
indicated the borrowings were reduced to a limit where the net borrowings were lesser 
than the equity indicating greater reliance on owned funds. 
Post-Merger Analysis 
The year 2006 saw the sales fall by 2.32 percent and expenditure increase by 17.52 
percent. The ICR declined slightly to 13.07 and WCTR to 3.48. The CETR and the 
DER also went down slightly to 1.59 and 0.58 respectively. The rate of profitability 
also dropped to 14.4 percent. The lowering of profitability is attributed to the increase 
in the price of coking coal, demurrage rates and fi-eight rates. The lowered prices of 
steel did not help the cause either. However the company continued to have higher 
production.. In the third consecutive year The Institute of Cost and Works 
Accountants of India (ICWAI) under its National award for excellence in Cost 
Management-2005, conferred upon the Company "Good Performance Award" as a 
recognition to Company's efforts in the areas of cost management and attainment of 
cost consciousness in the organisation. The year 2007 saw the sales rise by 21.76 
percent against a 12 percent rise in expenditure. The ICR more than doubled to 29.29 
indicating higher ability to meet interest payments with the DER falling fiirther to 
0.24. The WCTR fell slightly to 2.82 and CETR to 0.24. However profitability was 
recorded at a higher 18.28 percent highlighting the operational efficiency of the 
company on the foundations of modernization and expansion which were undertaken 
on the basis of the various mergers. The higher capacity utilization recorded at 114 
percentwas indeed phenomenal. 
The year 2008 saw the sales notch up by another 16.46 percent and expenditure by 
15.66 percent. The ICR rose to a very high of 46.39 while DER reduce to 0.13 percent 
indicating that the concern could raise debt but it was not doing the same. A WCTR at 
2.7 indicated an efficient use of the working capital as did the CETR at 1.6. The year 
saw production levels break new records with profitability rising by another 19.08 
percent. The expansion plans of the entity were on course with internal resources of 
funds available to fiind the various modernization, development and expansion plans. 
The demand in the market was also favourable and it was ably supported by concrete 
cost cutting measures and efficient operations. The MPS rose by 63.72 percent to Rs 
185 in 2008. The year 2009 saw the sales rise by another 9.22 percent against a 21.29 
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percent increase in expenditure. The figures put a question mark on the cost cutting 
programs that were implemented at SAIL. With the increase in DER to 0.27 the ICR 
declined to 2.18. The WCTR and CETR did not change much at 2.18 and 1.41 
respectively. The profitability however dropped to 14.31. The entire economy was 
under the grip of global recession due to which a fall in profits was anticipated. 
However, the beginning of the year saw sharp rise in prices and demand for steel 
before sluggishness was reported in economies worldwide due the economic crisis 
that had erupted in the USA. The company continued to register profits due to the 
strategic measures adopted by the management early in the year. 
Table 8.3,4 
Year 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
Pre-Merger and Post-Merger 
Pre-Merger 
Sales 
13138 
14311 
14110 
13519 
16837 
21297 
28523 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
8.93 
-1.40451 
-4.18852 
24.54324 
26.48928 
33.92966 
Analysis of Sales of SAIL (1999-2009) 
Figures in Rupees crore 
Year 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
Post-merger 
Sales 
27860 
33923 
39508 
43150 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
-2.32444 
21.76238 
16.46376 
9.218386 
Source: Compiled and Calculated ft-om Annual Report of SAIL fi-om 1999 to 2009. 
Retrieved fi-om www.sail.co.in 
Table 8.3.5: 
Year 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
Pre and Post-Merger Analysis of Expenditure of SAIL (1999-2009) 
Figures in Rupees crore 
PRE-MERGER 
Expenditure 
11635 
13109 
11943 
12508 
14672 
16645 
17426 
Percentage 
Increase 
over 
Previous 
Year 
NA 
12.67 
-8.89465 
4.730805 
17.30093 
13.44738 
4.6921 
Year 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
POST-MERGER 
Expenditure 
20479 
22957 
26553 
32208 
Percentage 
Increase 
over 
Previous 
Year 
17.5198 
12.1002 
15.66407 
21.29703 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Report of SAIL from 1999 to 2009 
Retrieved from www.sail.co.in 
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Table 8.3.6: Pre- Merger Ratio Analysis of SAIL (1999-2005) 
Year 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
0.17 
0.04 
0.56 
-0.09 
0.76 
3.88 
16.43 
Pre-Merger 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
Ratio (WCTR) 
2.3 
5.03 
5.26 
6.87 
7.67 
11.79 
4.2 
Capital 
Employed To 
Turnover 
(CETR) 
0.60 
0.85 
0.89 
0.91 
1.16 
1.59 
1.59 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
3.05 
3.17 
3.42 
6.23 
6.5 
1.87 
0.58 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.3.4, Appendix 3 and Appendix 
Profitability 
(%) 
-12.32 
-12.02 
-51.67 
-12.63 
-1.81 
11.8 
23.9 
4 
Table 8.3.7: Post- Merger Ratio Analy; 5is of SAIL (2006-2009) 
Post-Merger 
Year 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
Source: Co 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
13.07 
29.29 
46.39 
29.59 
mpiled and C 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
Ratio (WCTR) 
3.48 
2.82 
2.7 
2.18 
alculated from Tabh 
Capital 
Employed To 
Turnover 
(CETR) 
1.48 
1.54 
1.6 
1.41 
; 8.3.4, Appendix 3 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
0.35 
0.24 
0.13 
0.27 
and Appenc 
Profitability 
(%) 
14.4 
18.28 
19.08 
14.31 
ix4 
Figure 8.3.2: Pre- Mei^er Ratio Analysis of SAIL (for merger with IISCO) 
•Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) 
•Working Capital Turnover Ratio (WCTR) 
•Capital Employed To Turnover (CETR) 
-Debt Equity Ratio (DER) 
•Profitability 
Source: Table 8.3.6 
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Figure 8.3.3: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of SAIL (for merger with IISCO) 
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•Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) — W o r k i n g Capital Turnover Ratio (WCTR) 
•Capital Employed To Turnover (CETR) ^ — D e b t Equity Ratio (DER) 
•Profitability 
Source: Table 8.3.7 
Testing of Hypotheses: 
Table 8.3.8 evaluates the Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, CETR and 
ICR. The Hypotheses studied are evaluated below. 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post-merger Profitability of SAIL 
Hu (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post-merger Profitability of SAIL 
The correlation coefficient (r) between the Pre and Post Merger profitability is 0.01 
which signifies a low degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination 
(r ) is very low at 0.0001 which shows that a very small part of variance in Post 
Merger profitability is explained by the Pre Merger profitability. The regression 
equation Y on X shows that for a unit change in X that is the pre-merger profitability 
of SAIL the Post Merger profitability is affected by 0.001 units. The constant is high 
at 16.51 indicating the role of other factors. The calculated value oft is 1.4 when four 
years of pre and Post Merger are undertaken. The table value of t for v=6 at to.o5 is 
2.45. The calculated value is less than the table value so the data is regarded as 
statistically insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is accepted and the Alternative 
Hypothesis is rejected. It is concluded that the merger has no effect in determining 
the profitability and there is no relation between the pre and Post Merger values. 
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The value oft is further calculated by taking in to consideration thirteen years of Pre 
Merger and four years of Post Merger. The value oft comes to be 1.96 while the table 
value of t for v=15 at to.os is 2.13. Here again the calculated value is less than the table 
value. Hence in the longer run also the data is statistically insignificant and the pre-
merger values do not have a relation with the Post Merger values leading to the 
acceptance of the Null Hypothesis and rejection of the Alternative Hypothesis. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post-merger CETR of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post-merger CETR of SAIL 
Table 8.3.8 further investigates the relation between the pre and Post Merger CETR of 
SAIL. The correlation coefficient (r) is 0.06 indicating a low degree of positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.0036 showing that a very small 
part of the variation in CETR is explained by the merger. The Regression equation Y 
on X shows that for every one unit change in X that is the pre-merger CETR the Post 
Merger CETR is affected by 0.14 units which explains a very small part of the 
variation. Further the t-test undertaken gives the value of t at 1.15 when four years of 
pre and Post Merger are undertaken. The table value oft when v=6 at to.os is 2.45. The 
calculated value being lesser than the table value leads to rejection of the 
Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of the Null Hypothesis. Hence it is 
believed that the data is statistically insignificant and the merger does not have an 
effect on the CETR value after the merger. 
Further when the values are calculated for thirteen years of pre-merger and four years 
of Post Merger, the t value is 0.15. The table value oft when v==15 at to.os is 2.13. Here 
again the calculated value is lesser than the table value leading to the interpretation 
that the data is statistically insignificant in the longer run as well. Null Hypothesis is 
accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that the 
merger does not have an effect in the movement of the CETR. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post-merger Profitability of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post-merger Profitability of SAIL 
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Table 8.3.8 presents the relation between the Pre and Post Merger ICR as well. The 
correlation coefficient (r) comes out to be 0.21 indicating a low degree of positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^) is 0.044 which shows that a v«y 
minimum percentage of the variance is explained by the merger. The regression 
equation further shows that for every one unit change in pre-merger ICR of SAIL that 
is X, the Post Merger ICR or Y is affected by 0.38 units. The value of intercept is very 
high at 27.60 indicating a strong play of other factors in the movement of the ICR. 
The value of t is calculated as 3.12 when four years of pre and Post Merger are 
undertaken. The table value of t for v=6 at to.os is 2.45. The calculated value being 
more than the table value leads to the conclusion that the relation is statistically 
significant and the Null Hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypothesis b 
accepted. Hence the merger has an effect on the movement of ICR. When the t value 
is calculated taking into account thirteen years of Pre Merger and four years of Post 
Merger the value of t is 6.76 while the table value of t when v=15 at to.os is 2.13. 
Hence in the longer run also the relation is statistically significant and the Alternative 
Hypothesis is accepted against the Null Hypothesis. Hence the merger has an effect 
on the movement of the ICR. 
Table 8.3.8: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, CETR and ICR of 
SAIL 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
Sail 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
SAIL 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
CETR of SAIL 
Y=Post-Merger 
CETR of SAIL 
3. X= Pre-Merger 
ICR of SAIL 
Y=Post-Merger 
ICR of SAIL 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.01 
=0.06 
=0.21 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
(r') 
0.0001 
0.0036 
0.044 
^Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=0.001X+16.51 
Y on X is 
Y=0.014X+1.49 
Y on X is 
Y=0.38X+27.60 
T-test 
t=1.4* 
t=1.96** 
t=1.15* 
t=0.15** 
t=3.12* 
t=6.76** 
*Four Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
••Thirteen Years of Pre Merger and Four Years of Post-Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.3.6 and Table 8.3.7 
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Table 8.3.9 deals with the study of the relation between the Profitability and Market 
Price per Share of SAIL. It aims to establish the relationship between the profitability 
and MPS before and after the merger. 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability and Pre-merger MPS of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability and Pre-merger MPS of SAIL 
Table 8.3.9 studies the relation between the Pre Merger profitability and MPS of 
SAIL. The correlation coefficient (r) is at 0.75 indicating a high level of positive 
correlation while the coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.563 indicating that a high 
level of variance is explained by the variables. The equation X on Y shows that for 
every one unit change in Y that is the Pre-merger MPS of SAIL the Pre-merger 
Profitability is affected by 0.85 units. The intercept is also high at -24.44 indicating 
the effect of other factors, the equation Y on X shows that for every one unit change 
in X there is a corresponding 0.67 unit's change in Y that is the Pre-merger MPS. The 
data is fiirther analyzed for statistical significance for the purpose of which t-test is 
done. The t value comes out to be 1.82. The table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.45. 
As the calculated value is less than the table value the relation is not statistically 
significant and it leads to acceptance of Null Hypothesis and rejection of 
Alternative Hypothesis. Hence it is concluded that there is no relation between the 
Pre-merger MPS and Profitability of SAIL. 
5. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Post Merger 
Profitability and Post-merger MPS of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post 
Merger Profitability and Post-merger MPS of SAIL 
Table 8.3.9 examines the relation between the Profitability and MPS of SAIL after the 
merger. The correlation coefficient (r) is 0.83 signaling a high level of positive 
correlation while the coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.69 indicating that a large 
percentage of variation in variables is explained. The regression equation X on Y 
shows that for every unit change in Y that is the Post Merger MPS the Post Merger 
profitability is affected by 0.05 units while the intercept is high at 11.04 indicating the 
role of other factors. The Equation Y on X shows that for every one unit change in X 
that is the Post-Merger Profitability of SAIL there is 15.01 units change in Y that is 
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the Post Merger MPS of SAIL. The constant is extremely high at -128.64 indicating a 
strong play of other factors. The t value is calculated as 4.51 as while the table value 
oft for v=8 at to.os is 2.45. The calculated value being more than the table value leads 
to the conclusion that the relation is statistically significant and the Null Hypothesis 
is rejected >vhile tlie Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. Hence there is a relation 
between the MPS and Profitability of SAIL after the merger. 
Table 8.3.9: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and Profitability ol 
Variables 
4. X=Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
SAIL 
Y=Pre Merger 
MPS of SAIL 
5. X=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
SAIL 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of SAIL 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.75* 
=0.83** 
Coefficient of 
Determination 
(r^ ) 
0.5625* 
0.6889** 
Regression 
Equations 
X on Y is 
X=0.85Y-24.44* 
Y on X is 
Y=0.67X+25.24* 
X on Y is 
X=0.05Y+11.04** 
Y on X is 
Y=15.01X-128.64** 
fSAIL 
T-test 
1.822* 
4.51** 
*Six Years of Pre Merger taken 
**Four Years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.3.6, Table 8.3.7 and Appendix 5 
Table 8.3.10 makes an attempt to study the impact of the merger on the MPS and EPS 
of SAIL. 
6. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
MPS and Post-merger MPS of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger MPS and Post-merger MPS of SAIL 
From Table 8.3.10 it is discernible that the correlation coefficient (r) between the Pre 
and Post Merger MPS is 0.52 which reflects a moderate degree of Positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.267 indicating that only a quarter 
of the proportion of movement of the variable is explained by merger. The regression 
equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the pre-merger MPS the 
Post Merger MPS is affected by 0.2 units. The constant is at 13.6 signifying that when 
the slope is zero the Y intercept is affected by 13.6 units indicating the existence of 
other factors. When the values are tested for statistical significance it gives the t value 
at 3.73 when four years of pre and Post Merger are undertaken. The value of t when 
v=6 at to.05 is 2.78. The calculated value is more than the table value which leads to the 
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conclusion that the relation is statistically significant. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected and the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted stating the merger has an effect 
on the movement of pre and Post Merger MPS. 
Further when the value of t when six years of pre-merger and four years of Post 
Merger are undertaken gives the t value at 4.13. The table value of t when v=8 at to.os 
is 2.45. The calculated value being more than the table value leads to the acceptance 
of the Alternative Hypothesis again. It is concluded that the merger has an effect on 
the movement of MPS in the longer run as well. Hence the relation is found to be 
statistically significant. 
7. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
EPS and Post-merger EPS of SAIL 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger EPS and Post-merger EPS of SAIL 
The next Hypothesis examined in Table 8.3.10 is the relation between the Pre and 
Post Merger EPS of SAIL. The correlation coefficient (r) is 0.11 reflecting a low 
degree of positive correlation while the coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.012 
showing that a minor variation in the movement is explained by merger. The 
regression equation shows that for every unit change in X that is the Pre-merger EPS 
the Post Merger EPS is affected by 0.19 units while the constant is high at 114.11 
indicating the effect of other factors. The t-value for four years of Pre and Post 
Merger is 3.49 while the table value oft for v=6 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value 
being more than the table value gives the inference that the data is statistically 
significant and the merger has an effect in the movement of EPS. When the t value is 
calculated for six years of Pre Merger and four years of Post Merger it comes out to 
be 2.60 while the table value oft for v=8, at to.os is 2.45. The calculated value is again 
higher than the table value leading to the conclusion that the relation is statistically 
significant and the merger has an effect in the movement of the Pre and Post Merger 
EPS. The Null Hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypothesis is 
accepted. 
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Table 8.3.10: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and EPS of SAIL 
Variables 
6. X=Pre-Merger 
MPS of SAIL 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of SAIL 
7. X=Pre-Merger 
EPS of SAIL 
Y=Post Merger 
EPS of SAIL 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
0.517 
0.11 
* Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.267 
0.012 
^Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=0.2X+13.6 
Y on X is 
Y=0.19X+114.11 
T-test 
t=3.73* 
t=4.13** 
t=3.49* 
t=2.60** 
*Four Years of Pre and Post Merger undertaken 
**Six years of Pre-merger and Four years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 5 
8. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Margin 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Margin 
9. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Rate 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Rate 
Table 8.3.11 presents a detailed analysis as regards the pre and Post Merger Profit 
Rate and Profit margin for IISCO and SAIL. The Pre-merger Profit Margin for IISCO 
is very low at -21.925 while that for SAIL is also negative at -0.012. The Post-Merger 
Profit Margin is healthy at 0.165 signifying that the post-merger performance is much 
better as compared to that of the pre-merger. The Profit Rate of IISCO before the 
merger is -0.1192 while that for SAIL is -0.172. Both are negative and very low. 
However the Post Merger Profit Rate of SAIL is a positive 0.153 highlighting again 
that the post-merger operations are much better than the Pre-Merger in terms of the 
Profit Rate as well. The percentage increase in the Profit Marin for SAIL is 
exceptionally high at 1505.96 percent while for the Profit Rate it is 189.21 percent. 
Hence both the financial and operating efficiency increased manifold after the merger. 
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Table 8.3.11: Pre and Post Merger Profit Rate and Profit Margin for SAIL and 
IISCO 
a) IISCO 
b) SAIL. 
Net Sales 
Profit Marein= PAT. 
NS 
Pre-merger 
Average 
-21.925 
-0.01175 
Post-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.1652 
Percentage 
Change 
1505.96 
Total Assets 
Profit Rate= PAT. 
TA 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
-0.11918 
-0.1715 
Post-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.153 
Percentage 
Change 
189.21 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.3.1, Table 8.3.2, Table 8.3.4, 
Appendix 2, Appendix 4 and Appendix 6 
SAIL was making profits since 2004 and the trend continued after the merger as well. 
However the testing of Hypothesis shows that it's only the relation between the Pre 
and Post Merger ICR which is statistically significant. However the degree of 
correlation is low at 0.21. The Pre Merger analysis of Profitability and MPS depicts 
that the relation between the two parameters is statistically insignificant. However 
Post Merger the relation is statistically significant and there is a high degree of 
positive correlation. The Profitability is affected by 0.05 units for a unit change of a 
unit of MPS while MPS is changed by 15.01 units change for a change in 
profitability. The intercept is high at -128.62. The hypothesis testing the Pre and Post 
Merger MPS and EPS shows that there is an effect of the merger on the two variables. 
For MPS the relation is moderate at 0.52 while for EPS it is of a low degree at 0.11. It 
is interesting in the light that the Pre Merger profitability did not have a statistically 
significant relation with the Post Merger profitability. The analysis of Profit Margin 
and Profit Rate show significant improvement in the financial and operating 
efficiency. The post-merger Profit Margin increased by 1505.96 percent, while the 
Post Merger Profit Rate increased by 189.21 percent. Hence the merger did positively 
affect the financials of SAIL and there were also benefits in terms of greater size and 
production capabilities. 
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8,4 Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA) and Indian 
Charee Chrome Limited (ICCL) (2005-06) : Pre and Post 
Mer2er Performance Assessment 
a) Indian Charge Chrome Ltd (ICCL) 
Indian Charge Chrome Limited was established in 1983 and was a subsidiary of 
Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). It was subsequently merged with its parent 
company in October 2006. The merger enabled IMFA to consolidate itself and 
become the largest fully integrated producer of Ferro alloys in the country and it was 
done under the scheme of debt restructuring. The merger ratio was fixed as 1 share of 
IMFA for every 14 shares of ICCR.' 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
The analysis in Tables 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 reveals the financial condition of Indian Charge 
Chrome Limited before the merger with Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys materialized. 
The operating income of Indian Charge Chrome limited was Rs 164.29 crore and cost 
of sales was Rupees 132.69 crores for the year 2001. The ICR and FATR were very 
low at 0.005 and 0.55 respectively raising questions about the financial conditions and 
operating efficiency of the firm. The CR was reasonable at 1.08 while the net worth 
was negative with the DER at -0.28. The concern was however running into heavy 
losses with the loss at -191.67 percent. The year 2002 saw the operating income fall 
by -6.85 percent while the cost of sales rose by 14.30 percent reflecting inefficiency in 
operations. The ICR and CR fell further to -0.09 and 0.45 respectively. The FATR 
was relatively same at 0.57 while the losses ballooned to -240.83 percent. DR 
continued to be negative at -0.17. The year 2003 saw operating income rise by 18.22 
percent and the cost of sales rise by 9.91 percent. ICR, CR and FATR were all 
relatively same at -0.05, 0.35 and 0.77 respectively. There was not much 
improvement at the level of profitability which stood at a disturbing figure of-213.06 
percent. For 2004 the operating income rose by an impressive 29.58 percent against a 
4.28 percent increase in cost of sales. DER didn't change much at -0.14. There was 
improvement in ICR, CR, and FATR which notched up to 0.26, 0.58 and 0.88 
respectively. The net loss also reduced to a considerable extent to -30.06 percent. 
The year 2005 saw the sales surge by 33.86 percent against a 34.11 percent increase 
in cost of sales. The DER continued to be a cause for worry at -0.19. The ability to 
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meet financial expenses improved with the ICR improving to 0.80. The CR also 
moved up to 0.78 and FATR to 1.05. The losses dropped down drastically with the 
losses at -1.42 percent. 
Table 8,4,1: Pre-Merger Operating Income and Cost of Sales of Indian Charge 
Chrome Ltd (2001-2005) Figures in Rs Crore 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Operating 
Income 
164.29 
153.04 
180.92 
234.43 
313.81 
Percentage Increase 
over previous year 
-6.85 
18.22 
29.58 
33.86 
Cost of Sales 
132.69 
151.67 
166.7 
173.84 
233.13 
Percentage Increase 
over previous year 
14.30 
9.91 
4.28 
34.11 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Reports of Indian Chrome Charge Limited 
from 2001 to 2005. Retrieved from http://money.rediff.com/companies/indian-charge-
chrome-ltd/14520004/ratio 
Table 8,4,2: Pre-Merger Ratio Analysis of Indian Charge Chrome Ltd (2001-
2005) 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Source: ( 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
-0.28 
-0.17 
-0.13 
-0.14 
-0.19 
Compiled an 
Interest Coverage 
Ratio (ICR) 
0.005 
-0.09 
-0.05 
0.26 
0.80 
d Calculated from Annual 
Current 
Ratio 
(CR) 
1.08 
0.45 
0.35 
0.58 
0.78 
leports of In( 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio (FATR) 
0.55 
0.57 
0.77 
0.88 
1.05 
iian Chrome Chare( 
Profitability 
(%) 
-191.67 
-242.28 
-213.06 
-30.06 
-1.42 
; Limited 
from 2001 to 2005. Retrieved from http;//money.rediff.com/companies/indian-charge-
chrome-ltd/14520004/ratio 
Figure 8.4.1: Pre-Merger Ratio Analysis of Indian Charge Chrome Ltd 
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In Table 8.4.3 the Researcher studies the relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability, CETR and FCCR of Indian Charge Chrome Limited (ICCL) with Indian 
Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post -
merger Profitability of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and 
Post -merger Profitability of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
(IMFA). 
The relation between the Pre Merger profitability of Indian Chrome Charge Limited 
(ICCL) and Post Merger Profitability of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited 
(IMFA) gives the correlation coefficient (r) at 0.89 which is a high degree of positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is worked out as 0.7921 which 
indicates that a high percentage of variance is explained by this relation. The 
regression equation Y on X indicates that for every unit change in X that is the Pre 
Merger profitability of ICCL there is 0.08 units change in Y that is the Post Merger 
profitability of IMFA. The constant is high at 20.53 indicating the effect of other 
factors on Y. The t test is calculated as 2.13 for years of Pre and Post Merger. The 
table value of t when v=6 at to.os is 2.48. The calculated value is less than the table 
value which leads to rejection of Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of the 
Null Hypothesis. The relation is not signiTicant statistically between the pre and Post 
Merger values. Further when the t-value is calculated for five years of Pre Merger and 
four years of Post Merger it comes out to be 2.59. The table value of t when v=7 at 
to.05 is 2.37. The calculated value is more than the table value. Hence the relation is 
statistically significant and it leads to acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis and 
rejection of Null Hypothesis. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
FATR of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post -merger 
FATR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre Merger 
FATR of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post -merger 
FATR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
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The next Hypothesis examines the relationship between the Pre Merger FATR of 
Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post Merger FATR of Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). The correlation coefficient (r) comes out as 0.90 which 
is a very high degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 
also high at 0.81 indicating that a high degree of variation is determined by this 
relationship. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every one unit change in 
X that is the Pre Merger FATR of hidian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) the Post 
Merger FATR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA) is affected by 1.45 
units. The intercept is low at 0.46. The value oft is calculated as 4.34 when four years 
of pre and Post Merger are undertaken. The table value oft when v=6 at to.os is 2.45. 
The calculated value is more than the table value which leads to the conclusion that 
the relation is statistically significant. The Null Hypothesis is rejected while the 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. Hence there is a relation between the Pre and 
Post Merger values. Further when the t value is calculated for five years of Pre 
Merger and three years of Post Merger it comes out to be 4.95. The table value of t 
when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. Here again the calculated value is more than the table value 
due to which it is inferred that the relation is statistically significant. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. There is a 
relation between the Pre and Post Merger FATR. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
ICR of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post -merger 
ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger ICR of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post -
merger ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
The above Hypothesis examines the effect of merger on the ICR before and after the 
merger. The correlation coefficient (r) between the Pre Merger ICR of Indian Chrome 
Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post Merger ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
Limited (IMFA) is calculated as 0.97 which is a very high degree of positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) comes out to be 0.9431 which 
signifies that almost all the variance is explained by this relationship. The regression 
equation gives the cause and effect relationship where every unit change in X that is 
the Pre Merger ICR of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) leads to 9.16 units 
226 I P a g e 
change in Y that is the Post Merger ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited 
(IMFA). The intercept is at 2.32. The t value is calculated as 2.15 when four years of 
Pre and Post Merger are undertaken. The table value of t when v=6 at to.os is 2.48. The 
calculated value being less than the table value leads to rejection of the Alternative 
Hypothesis and acceptance of the Null Hypothesis. Hence the relation is 
statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger 
ICR. 
The t value is further calculated for five years of Pre Merger and four years of Post 
Merger. It gives the t value at 2.48. The table value oft when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. The 
calculated value is more than the table value. Hence the Null Hypothesis is accepted 
and the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. There is a relation between the Pre and 
Post Merger values of ICR. 
Table 8.4.3: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, FATR and ICR for 
ICCL and IMFA 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of Indian 
Chrome Charge 
Limited Y=Post-
Merger Profitability of 
Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys 
2. X= Pre-Merger FATR 
of Indian Chrome 
Charge Limited 
Y=Post-Merger FATR 
of Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys 
3. X= Pre-Merger ICR of 
Indian Chrome Charge 
Limited Y=Post-
Merger ICR of Indian 
Metal and Ferro 
Alloys 
* Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.89 
=0.90 
=0.97 
* Coefficient of 
Determination 
(r") 
0.7921 
0.81 
0.9431 
*Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=0.08X+20.53 
Y on X is 
Y=1.45X+0.46 
Y on X is 
Y=9.16X+2.32 
T-test 
t=2.13* 
t=2.59** 
t=4.34* 
t=4.95** 
t=2.15* 
t=2.48** 
*Four Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Five Years of Pre Merger and Four Years of Post-Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.4.2 and Table 8.4.8 
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Table 8.4.4 explores the relationship between the Pre Merger EPS of Indian Chrome 
Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post Merger EPS of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
Limited (IMFA). 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
EPS of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post -merger 
EPS of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger EPS of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Post -
merger EPS of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
The correlation coefficient (r) comes out as 0.893 indicating high degree of positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is calculated as 0.797 showing that a 
high degree of variance in the variables is explained by this relationship. The 
regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the Pre 
Merger EPS of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) there is 1.38 units change in Y 
that is the Post Merger ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). The 
value of intercept is very high at 97.37 indicating the effect of other factors. The t 
value is calculated as 2.68 for four years of Pre and Post Merger. The table value oft 
when v=6 at to.os is 2.48. The calculated value is more than the table value which leads 
to acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. Hence 
the relation is statistically significant and there is a relationship between the pre and 
Post Merger values of EPS. The t value for five years of Pre Merger and four years of 
Post Merger is calculated as 3.15 while the table value oft when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. 
Here again the calculated value is more than the table value which leads to 
acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. The 
relation is statistically significant. 
Table 8.4.4: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of EPS of ICCL and IMFA 
Variables 
4. X=Pre-Merger EPS of 
Indian Chrome Charge 
Ltd. 
Y=Post Merger EPS of 
Indian Metals and Ferro 
Alloys Ltd 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
0.893 
*Coefficlfent of 
Determination 
0.7974 
*Regression 
Equations 
YonXis 
Y=1.38X+97.37 
**T-test 
t=2.68* 
t=3.15** 
*Four years of Pre and Post Merger undertaken 
**Five years of Pre-merger and Four years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 16 and Appendix 18 
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The Pre Merger figures of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) show that the 
company was running into losses since 2001 but the volume of losses had 
considerably come down till 2005 to -1.42 percent. The test of Hypotheses reveals 
that the Profitability and ICR of ICCL had a relation with the Post Merger figures of 
IMFA only in the longer run. The FATR of ICCL had a statistically significant 
relation with the FATR of IMFA both in the shorter and longer run. The two variables 
had a very high degree of positive correlation at 0.91. The positive effect that the 
merger had on the operational efficiency was obvious. Even the EPS of ICCL had 
statistically significant relation with that of IMFA both in the short and long run. The 
degree of correlation was high at 0.89. The merger seemed to fulfill its objectives of 
financial and operating synergy. 
b) Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd 
Indian Metals and Ferro alloys (IMFA) is based in Orissa and is a fully integrated 
producer of Ferro Alloys. The merger effected in 2006 with Indian Charge and 
Chrome Limited (ICCL) in 2006 created a leader in Ferro alloys. 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
The pre-merger analysis of Indian Metals andFerro Alloys Limited is done here. The 
Net Sales for the year 2000 was Rupees 134.66 crores while the Expenses were 
Rupees 127.48 crores. The DER, CR and FATR were considerably high at 6.24, 3.81 
and 3.32 respectively. The ICR was reasonable at 1.15 while the profitability was 
recorded at 1.27 percent. The year 2001 saw the sales surge by 35.85 percent and 
expenses by 35.85 percent reflecting increase in scale of operations. The DER, CR 
and FATR continued to be on the higher side at 5.56, 3.33 and 4.06 respectively. ICR 
also moved up to 1.51 and profitability was recorded at 2.51 percent. For the year 
2003 the operating income fell by -6.59 percent while the expenses fell by 2.47 
percent. The ratios were also fairly stable with DER, CR, FATR and FCCR at 6.54, 
3.29, 4.06 and 1.02 respectively. The profitability however fell to 0.06 percent. In the 
year 2003 the sales increased by 18.74 percent while the expenses increased by 13.04 
percent. While the DER and CR fell down to 4.42 and 3.23 respectively, the FATR 
and ICR rose to 4.55 and 2.61. The positive performance was reflected in the 
increased profitability at 4.75 percent. For 2004 sales increased by a small margin at 
0.66 percent and expenses by 1.68 percent. The DER, CR and FATR all fell down to 
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2.47,2.43 and 4.38. The ICR however rose considerably to 6.58. The profitability also 
increased to 9.60 percent. The year 2005 saw the sales rise by 34 percent against a 
28.02 percent increase in expenses. The DER fell to 1.53 which reflected a 
considerable decrease in the risk proportion in the capital structure. The CR however 
again rose to 3.25 reflecting high degree of liquidity. The FATR and ICR were 
considerably high at 5.47 and 6.68 respectively reflecting efficiency of operations and 
sufficient cover for financing debts. The profitability rose further to 11.13. 
Post-Merger Analysis 
The first year afler the merger was affected, i.e. in 2006 the sales showed an increase 
of 98.78 percent against a 110.27 increase in cost of sales. The DER again rose to 
5.17 while CR fell to 2.89. The FATR and FCCR also fell by a huge margin to 1.19 
and 0.57 respectively. Profitability was respectable at 3.46 percent. For 2007 sales 
further increased by 28.24 percent while expenses increased by 17.20 percent. The 
DER fell to 4.49 and FATR to 1.65. The CR and ICR however rose to 3.24 and 2.07 
respectively. Profitability was also relatively stable at 2.90 percent. In the year 2008 
the sales continued to increase by 25.33 percent while the expenses were reported to 
have increased by 18.69 percent. The DER dropped to 2.39 which were a positive 
sign for the capital structure. The CR also fell to 2.34 indicating higher level of 
activity. The FATR was stable at 1.91 while the ICR was very comfortable at 5.90. 
The profitability was also very encouraging at 12.15 percent. The year 2009 which 
was marked by global recession saw the net sales surge by 16.21 percent against a fall 
of -21.07 percent in expenses which was commendable. The DER fell to 0.77 
showcasing higher proportion of owners fund in the capital structure. The CR also fell 
to 1.82. FATR and FCCR were calculated as 1.85 and 9.17 respectively. Profitability 
recorded to the tune of 25.99 percent was indeed remarkable taking into consideration 
the global scenario was marked by economic slowdown. 
Hence it is seen that Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA) which was financially 
stable and recording consistent profits seem to have received a shot in the arm with 
the merger with Indian Charge Chrome Limited (ICCL) as if reflected by the 
discussion above. 
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Table 8.4.5: Pre and Post Merger Net Sales of Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys 
(2001-2009) Figures in Rs Crore 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Pre Merger 
Net Sales 
134.66 
182.93 
170.88 
202.91 
201.57 
270.11 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
-
35.85 
-6.59 
18.74 
0.66 
34.00 
Year 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Post Merger 
Net Sales 
536.89 
688.5 
862.9 
1002.74 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
98.78 
28.24 
25.33 
16.21 
Source: Compiled and Calcu ated from Annual Reports of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
from 2000 to 2005 Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.coni/financials/indiarmietalsferroalloysltd/balance-sheet/IMF01 
Table 8.4.6: Pre and Post Merger Total Expenditure of Indian Metal and Ferro 
Alloys (2001-2009) 
Figures in Rs Crore 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Pre Merger 
Total 
Expenses 
127.48 
157.69 
153.79 
173.85 
176.77 
226.3 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
-
23.70 
-2.47 
13.04 
1.68 
28.02 
Year 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Post Merger 
Total 
Expenses 
475.83 
557.65 
661.89 
522.41 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
110.27 
17.20 
18.69 
-21.07 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Reports of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
from 2000 to 2005 Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/fmancials/indianmetalsferroalloysltd/balance-sheet/IMF01 
Table 8.4.7: Pre Merg 
(2001-05) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Source: Con 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
6.24 
5.56 
6.54 
4.42 
2.47 
1.53 
ipiled and Ca 
er Ratio Analysis of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd 
Pre-Merger 
Current Ratio 
(CR) 
3.81 
3.33 
3.29 
3.23 
2.43 
3.25 
culated from Table 8 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
3.32 
4.42 
4.06 
4.55 
4.38 
5.47 
.4.5, Appendix 17 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio (ICR) 
1.15 
1.51 
1.02 
2.61 
6.58 
6.68 
and Appendix 18 
Profitability 
(%) 
1.27 
2.51 
0.06 
4.75 
9.60 
11.13 
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Table 8.4.8: Post Merger Ratio 
(2006-09) 
• 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Source: Con 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
5.17 
4.49 
2.39 
0.77 
npiled and Ca 
Current 
(CR) 
2.89 
3.24 
2.34 
1.82 
Analysis of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd 
Post-Merger 
Ratio Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
1.19 
1.65 
1.91 
1.85 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio (ICR) 
0.57 
2.07 
5.90 
9.17 
culated from Table 8.4.5, Appendix 17 and Appendix 18 
Profitability 
(%) 
3.46 
2.90 
12.15 
25.99 
Figure 8.4.2: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
12 
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6 
4 
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3.25 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
•Debt Equity Ratio (DER) 
•Fixed Assets Turnover Ratio (FATR) • 
•Profitability (%) 
•Current Ratio (CR) 
•Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) 
Source: Table 8.4.7 
Figure 8.4.3: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd 
30 
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10 
5 
0 
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•Debt Equity Ratio (DER) 
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•Profitability {%) 
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•Current Ratio (CR) 
•Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) 
Source: Table 8.4.8 
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Table 8.4.9 deals with the Pre and Post Merger Profitability, FATR and ICR of Indian 
Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post -merger Profitability of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
aMFA). 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post -merger Profitability of Indian Metals and Ferro 
Alloys (IMFA). 
The first Hypothesis studies the relationship between the pre and Post Merger 
profitability of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). The correlation 
coefficient (r) is 0.837 while the coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.701. The 
regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the Pre 
Merger profitability of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA) there is a 
change of 1.80 units in Y that is the Post Merger profitability of Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). The intercept is also low at 0.35.The t value comes out 
at 0.80 for four years of Pre and Post Merger. The table value of t when v=6 at to.os is 
2.48. The calculated value being less than the table value leads to rejection of the 
Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of the Null Hypothesis. Hence the relation 
is statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger 
profitability values. When the t value is calculated for six years of Pre Merger and 
four years of Post Merger it comes out to be 1.29. The table value of t when v=8 at 
to.05 is 2.31. The calculated value is again less than the table value. Hence the Null 
Hypothesis is accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. The relation is 
statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the pre and Post Merger 
profitability of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post -merger FATR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post -merger FATR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
(IMFA). 
This Hypothesis examines the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger FATR of 
Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). The correlation coefficient (r) is 
calculated as 0.62 which is a moderate degree of positive correlation. The coefficient 
of determination (r^ ) is 0.38 which indicates that 38.03 percent of variance is 
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explained by this relation. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit 
change in X that is the Pre Merger FATR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited 
(IMFA) there is 0.33 units change in the Post Merger FATR of Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). The t value for four years of Pre and Post Merger is 
calculated as 8.63 while the table value of t when v=6 at to.05 is 2.48. The calculated 
value being more than the table value leads to the conclusion that the relation is 
statistically significant and there is a relation between the Pre and Post Merger values. 
The Null Hypothesis is rejected in favor of the Alternative Hypothesis. The t 
value is further calculated for six years of Pre Merger and four years of Post Merger. 
It gives the t value at 7.17 while the table value oft when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The 
calculated value being more than the table value leads to rejection of Null 
Hypothesis and acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis. Hence there is a relation 
between the Pre and Post Merger values of FATR. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post -merger ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation bet^veen the Pre 
Merger and Post -merger ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
(IMFA) 
The third Hypothesis deals with the relation between the Pre and Post Merger values 
of ICR. The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as 0.942 which is a very high 
degree of positive correlation while the coefficient of determination (r^ ) of 
determination is 0.887. The regression Y on X shows that for every unit change in X 
that is the Pre Merger ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA) there is 
1.28 units change in the Post Merger ICR of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited 
(IMFA). The intercept is also low at 0.974. The t value is calculated as 0.085 while 
the table value of t when v=6 at to.05. The calculated value is less than the table value 
which leads to the relation being statistically insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is 
accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. The t value is further 
calculated for six years of Pre Merger and four years of Post Merger. It gives the t 
value at 0.57. The table value oft when v=8 at to.05 is 2.31. The calculated value is 
again less than the table value. Hence the relation is statistically insignificant and 
there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger ICR. The Null Hypothesis is 
accepted while the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 8.4.9: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, FATR and ICR of 
IMFA 
Variables 
I. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of Indian 
Metals and Ferro 
Alloys Y=Post-
Merger Profitability of 
Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys 
2. X= Pre-Merger FATR 
of Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys 
Y=Post-Merger FATR 
of Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys 
3. X= Pre-Merger ICR of 
Indian Metals and 
Ferro Alloys 
Y=Post-Merger FCCR 
of Indian Metal and 
Ferro Alloys 
•Correlation 
Coefncient 
(r) 
=0.837 
=0.6167 
=0.942 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.701 
0.3803 
0.887 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=1.80X-0.35 
Y on X is 
Y=0.33X-K).116 
Y on X is 
Y=1.28X-0.974 
T-test 
t=0.80* 
t=1.29** 
t=8.63* 
t=7.17** 
t=0.085* 
t=0.57** 
*Four Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Six Years of Pre Merger and Four Years of Post-Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.4.7 and Table 8.4.8 
Table 8.4.10 studies the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger EPS of Indian 
Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post -merger EPS of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys (IMFA). 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post -merger EPS of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
(IMFA) 
The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as 0.92 which is a very high degree of 
positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.846. The regression 
equation Y on X states that for every unit change in X that is the Pre Merger EPS of 
Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA) there is 1.27 units change in Y that is 
the Post Merger EPS of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA). The 
intercept is high at 32.57 indicating the strong influence of other factors. The value of 
t is worked out as 1.26 for four years of Pre and Post Merger. The table value oft 
when v=6 at to.os is calculated as 2.48. The calculated value being less than the table 
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value leads to rejection of Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of NBU 
Hypothesis. Hence the values are statistically insignificant. The t value is finthcr 
calculated as 1.83 for six years of Pre Merger and four years of Post Mergw. Tlie 
table value when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value is again lesser than the table 
value leading to rejection of Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of Null 
Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger values of 
EPS and the relation is statistically insignificant. 
Table 8.4.10: Pre and Post Merge 
Variables 
5. X=Pre-Merger 
EPS of Indian 
Metals and 
Ferro Alloys 
Ltd 
Y=Post 
Merger EPS of 
Indian Metals 
and Ferro 
Alloys Ltd 
•Correlation 
CoefHcient 
(r) 
0.9198 
;r Analysis of EPS of IMFA 
* Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.846 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=1.27X+32.57 
**T-test 
t=1.26* 
t=1.833** 
*Four years of Pre and Post Merger undertaken 
**Six years of Pre-merger and four years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 18 
5. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Margin 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Margin 
6. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Rate 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Rate 
Table 8.4.11 deals with the pre and Post Merger Profit Margin and Profit Rate of 
Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) and Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited 
(IMFA). The Pre Merger profit margin of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) is -
1.36 while that for Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA) is 0.05. The Post 
Merger Profit Margin is 0.11 which reflects satisfactory improvement over the Pre 
236 I P a g e 
Merger figures. The Pre Merger Profit Rate of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) 
is -0.44 while that for Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA) is 0.06. The 
Post Merger Profit Rate of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited (IMFA) is O.IO 
which is again an improvement over the Pre Merger figures. 
Table 8.4.11: Pre and Post Merger Profit Rate and Profit Margin for Indian 
Chrome Charge Limited and Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
a) Indian 
Chrome 
Charge 
Limited 
b) Indian 
Metals 
and 
Ferro 
Alloys 
Net Sales 
Profit Marein= PAT . 
NS 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
-1.36 
0.05 
Post-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.11 
Percentage 
Change 
-
120 
Total Assets 
Profit Rate= PAT. 
TA 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
-0.44 
0.06 
Post-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.10 
Percentage 
Change 
-
66.67 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 8.4.1, Table 8.4.5, Appendix 15, 
Appendix 16, Appendix 17 and Appendix 18 
IMFA was a steady and profitable enterprise with the company managing to cam 
profits over ten years that is fi-om 2000 to 2009 at a satisfactory and steady rate. The 
profitability rate seemed to be picking after the initial slowdown just after the merger. 
The Hypotheses testing reveals that there is a statistically significant relation between 
the Pre and Post Merger FATR of IMFA having a moderate degree of positive 
correlation at 0.62. The relation between the Pre and Post Profitability, ICR and EPS 
is statistically insignificant. The Profit Margin after the merger shows an increase of 
120 percent while the Profit Rate registered an increase of 66.67percent. Hence the 
merger appeared to have accrued financial and operating synergies after the merger in 
these terms. 
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8.5 Bellarv Steel and Alloys Limited and Pittsburgh Iron and 
Steel (2005-06) : Pre and Post Mer2er Performance 
Assessment 
Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited situated in Bellary was incorporated on 17 May 
1984 in Kamataka and mainly deals with the manufacturing and marketing of 
reinforcement bars and carbon and alloy steel rounds. 
a) Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
The analysis presented in Tables 8.5.1, 8.5.2 and 8.5.3 reflects upon the financial 
position of Bellary Steel before and after the merger with Pittsburgh Iron and Steel. 
In the year 2001 the Sales turnover stood at Rs 263.03 crores while the expenditure 
was at Rs 244.48 crores. The DER was high at 4.24 while the CR was more than 
comfortable at 2.65. FATR was however low at 0.29 and so was the ICR at 0.42. 
Losses were being reported at -6.64 percent. The year 2002 saw the sales fall by -
41.72 percent while the expenditure also fell by -53.52 percent indicating a fall in the 
scale of operations. There were a huge percentage of debt ftinds with the DER at 
14.72. The liquidity was also in doldrums with the CR at 0.39. FATR fell fiirther to 
0.14 while ICR became negative at -7.04. Huge losses were reported with the 
Profitability at -117.02 percent. 
The year 2003 witnessed fall in sales by another -87.10 percent against a fall in 
expenditxire by -89.27 percent. The net profit at -501.82 reflected that the concern was 
running into serious losses. The MPS also fell by -73.335 to Rs 0.8. DER was very 
high at 22.74 while the CR improved to 1.12. FATR was again very low at 0.016 
while ICR fell further to -0.005.The year 2004 saw the operations of Bellary Steel and 
Alloys Ltd in trouble with the sales falling by a huge -71.17 percent against a 55.62 
percent fall in the expenditure for the similar period. The Net Profit was at a dismal -
391.40 percent and FATR at 0.004 was a reflection of the dismal state of affairs. The 
ICR was at -0.12. CR was stable at l.Ol.DER at -43.64 reflected a major problem 
with the capital structure. For 2005 the sales increased by 329.47 percent against a 
270.24 percent increase in expenditure. The story of losses continued with the net loss 
at -300.74 percent. Capital structure was still in trouble with the DER at -15.47. 
FATR bettered slightly to 0.016 and ICR was at -0.05. CR fell sHghfly to 0.95. In the 
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year 2006 the sales turnover increased by 47.92 percent against 71.04 percent increase 
in expenditure. A huge volume of loss was again recorded at -224.05 percent while 
the DER was still negative at -9.98. CR was stable at 0.98.FATR was at 0.022 while 
ICR was still negative at -0.14. The MPS moved up by 257.81 percent to Rs 6.87. 
Post-Merger Analysis 
The Post Merger analysis of Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited reveals that the sales 
fell by -0.31 percent in 2007 against a fall of-0.41 percent in expenditure. Losses 
continued with the net loss for the year at -297.06 percent. The DER and FATR were 
also not encouraging at -7.14 and 0.02 respectively. CR was at 0.91 while ICR was no 
better at -0.11. The year 2008 was no better with the global recession also gripping 
the economy with net losses at -229.46 percent. The increase in sales by 39.50 and 
expenditure by 25.59 was however encouraging. The DER continued being negative 
at -5.73. FATR was at 0.026. CR was relatively stable at 0.90 and ICR was far from 
satisfactory at-0.14. 
For 2009 the sales turnover fell by -20.83 percent and Expenditure increased by 4.48. 
The losses increased to -360.2 percent. DER was at -4.91 and FATR was at 0.018. CR 
was at 0.81 while ICR was ay 0.11. 
The merger did not see any positive effect on operating results of Bellary Steel and 
Alloys Limited with losses being recorded before and after the merger. 
Table 8.5.1: Pre and Post Merger Sales of Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited 
(2001-2009) Figures in Rs Crore 
Pre Merger 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Sales 
Turnover 
263.03 
153.29 
19.77 
5.70 
24.48 
36.21 
Percentage 
Increase over 
previous Year 
-41.72 
-87.10 
-71.17 
329.47 
47.92 
Post Merger 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Sales 
Turnover 
36.10 
50.36 
39.87 
Percentage 
Increase over 
previous Year 
-0.31 
39.50 
-20.83 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Report of Bellary Steel and Alloys 
Limited from 2000 to 2006. Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/fmancials/bellarysteelalloys/balance-sheet/BSA01 
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Table 8.5.2: Pre- Merger and Post-Merger Expenditure of Bellary Steel and 
Alloys Limited (2001-2009) Figures 
in Rs Crore 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Pre Mer| 
Expenditure 
244.48 
113.64 
12.19 
5.41 
20.03 
34.26 
ger 
Percentage 
Increase over 
previous Year 
53.52 
-89.27 
-55.62 
270.24 
71.04 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Post Merger 
Expenditure 
34.12 
42.85 
44.77 
Percentage 
Increase over 
previous Year 
-0.41 
25.59 
4.48 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Report of Bellary Steel and Alloys 
Limited from 2000 to 2006. Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/bellarysteelalloys/balance-sheet/BSA01 
Table 8.53: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited 
(2001-2006) 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Source: Con 
Pre Merger 
DER 
4.24 
14.72 
22.74 
-43.64 
-15.47 
-9.98 
ipiled and Calc 
CR 
2.65 
0.39 
1.12 
1.01 
0.95 
0.98 
ulated from Tal 
FATR 
0.29 
0.14 
0.016 
0.004 
0.016 
0.022 
)le 8.5.1, Appe 
ICR 
0.42 
-7.04 
-0.005 
-0.12 
-0.05 
-0.14 
ndix 11 and A] 
Net Profit 
% 
-6.54 
-117.02 
-501.82 
-391.40 
-300.74 
-224.05 
ppendix 12 
Table 8.5.4: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited 
(2007-2009) 
2007 
2008 
2009 
urce: Co 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
-7.14 
-5.73 
-4.91 
mpiled and Ca 
Post Merger 
Current 
Ratio (CR) 
0.91 
0.90 
0.81 
culated from T 
Fixed 
Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.02 
0.026 
0.018 
able 8.5.1, ApF 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
-0.11 
-0.05 
-0.11 
>endix 11 an( 
Profitability 
(%) 
-297.06 
-229.49 
-360.20 
J Appendix 12 
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Figure 8.5.1: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited 
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Source: Table 8.5.3 
Figure 8.5.2: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of Bellary Steel and Alloys Limited 
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Table 8.5.5 explores the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger Profitability, 
FAIR and ICR of Bellary Steels. 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-Merger Profitability of Bellary Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-
Merger Profitability of Bellary Steel 
The study of the Pre and Post Merger profitability of Bellary Steels gives the 
correlation coefficient (r) at -.44 which is moderate degree of negative correlation. 
The coefficient of determination (r^) comes out as 0.1936 indicating that only a small 
part of the variance is explained by this relation. The regression equation Y on X 
gives further insight into the relation. For every one unit change in X that is the Pre 
Merger profitability of Bellary Steels the Post Merger profitability that is Y is affected 
by -0.34 units. The value of constant is extremely high at 400.50. Hence there is a 
strong play of other factors and there is limited relation between X and Y. Student t-
test is also done to test the relation for statistical significance. The t value is woriced 
out as 0.16 when three years of Pre and Post Merger are undertaken. The table value 
of t when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value of t is less than the table value 
which leads to the inference that the relation is statistically insignificant. The Null 
Hypothesis is accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence there is 
no relation between the Pre and Post Merger profitability of Bellary Steels. Further 
the t value is calculated for six years of Pre Merger and three years of Post Merger 
and it comes out to be 0.349. The table value of t when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. The 
calculated value being less than the table value leads to the conclusion that the 
relation is statistically insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is accepted while the 
Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger FATR of Bellary Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger FATR of Bellary Steel 
Table 8.5.5 also explores the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger FATR of 
Bellary Steels. The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as -0.05 indicating a low 
degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^) is 0.0025 showing 
that a very small part of the variance is explained. The regression equation Y on X 
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shows that for every one unit change in X that is the Pre Merger FAIR of Bellaiy 
Steels the Post Merger FATR that is Y is moved by -0.024 units. The intercept is also 
low at 0.022. The t value is calculated as 1.278. The table value of t when v=4 at to.os 
is 2.78. The calculated value is thus lesser than the table value. Hence the relation is 
statistically insignificant which leads to rejection of Alternative Hypothesis and 
acceptance of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is no effect of merger on the Pre and 
Post FATR. The t value is fiirther calculated for six years of Pre Merger and three 
years of Post Merger. It gives the t value at 0.884. The table value of t when v=7 at 
to.os is 2.37. The calculated value is again less than the table value which leads to the 
inference that the relation is statistically insignificant in the longer run too. The Null 
Hypothesis is accepted while the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence there is 
no effect of merger on the Pre and Post Merger FATR. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger ICR of Bellary Steel 
Htt (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger ICR of Bellary Steel 
The relation between the Pre and Post Merger ICR is explored further in Table 8.5.5. 
The correlation coefficient (r) is calculated as 0.97 indicating a very degree of positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) comes out as 0.9409 showing that a 
major percentage of the variance is explained by this relation. The regression Y on X 
shows that for every unit change in X that is the Pre Merger ICR of Bellary Steels, the 
Post Merger ICR that is Y moved by 0.716 units. Intercept value is also low at 0.016. 
Student t-test is further undertaken which gives the t value as 5.78 when three years of 
Pre and Post Merger are undertaken. The table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The 
calculated value being more than the table value leads to the acceptance of 
Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of the Null Hypothesis. The relation is taken 
to be as statistically significant and it is inferred that there is a relation between the 
Pre and Post Merger values. Further six years of Pre Merger and three years of Post 
Merger are taken up for the calculation of t value. It comes out as 0.643 while the 
calculated value oft when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. The calculated value being less than the 
table value leads to the conclusion that the relation is statistically insignificant. The 
Null Hypothesis is accepted while the alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence 
there is no effect of merger on the value of ICR after the merger. 
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Table 8.5.5: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, FATR, ICR of BeUary 
Steels 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
BeUary 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
Bellary 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
FATR of Bellary 
Y=Post-Merger 
FATR of Bellary 
3, X" Pro-Merger 
ICR of Bellary 
Y=Post-Merger 
ICR of Bellary 
*Correlation 
Coefiicient 
(r) 
=-0.44 
=-0.05 
=0.97 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.1936 
0.0025 
0.9409 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.34X-400.50 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.024X+0.022 
Y on X is 
Y=0.716X-0.016 
**T-test 
t=0.l6* 
t=0.349** 
t=1.278* 
t=0.884** 
t=5.78* 
t=0.643** 
*Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Six Years of Pre Merger and Three Years of Post-Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.5.3 and 8.5.4 
Table 8.5.6 explores the relationship of the Profitability of the firm with the MPS 
before and after the merger. 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability and Pre-merger MPS of Bellary Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability and Pre-merger MPS 
The study of Pre Merger Profitability and Pre Merger MPS gives the correlation 
coefficient (r) at 0.03 which indicates a low degree of positive correlation. The 
coefficient of determination (r^ ) is also very low at 0.0009. According to the 
regression equation Y on X for one unit of movement in Y that is the Pre Merger 
MPS, the Pre Merger profitability is affected by 2.40 units. The intercept is also high 
at -251.21 which reflect the strong play of other factors. The equation-Y on X shows 
that for one unit movement in X that is the Pre Merger Profitability, the Pre Merger 
MPS is moved by 0.00041 units. Intercept is at 2.27 units. The t value is undertaken at 
6.70. The table value oft when v =7 at to.os is 2.37. The calculated value is more than 
the table value. Hence the relation is statistically significant which leads to 
acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. Hence 
there is a relation between the Pre Merger Profitability and MPS of Bellary Steel. 
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5. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Post Merger 
Profitability and Post -merger MPS of Bellary Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post 
Merger Profitability and Post -merger MPS 
Further the relation between the Post Merger profitability and MPS is examined. The 
correlation coefficient (r) comes out as 0,77 which is a high degree of positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is also high at 0.5929 implying that 
the variance is explained by this relation. The Regression equation X on Y shows fliat 
for every one unit of movement in Y that is the Post Merger MPS the Post Mager 
profitability is affected by 31.19 units. The constant is extremely high at 364.51 
indicating the effect of other factors. The equation Y on X shows that for every one 
xmit change in X that is the Post Merger profitability the Post Merger MPS is moved 
by just 0.019 units. The intercept is high at 7.84 giving indications of the role of other 
factors. The t value is calculated as 7.93. The table value oft when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. 
The calculated value being more than the table value leads to the acceptance of the 
Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of the Null hypothesis and it is implied that 
the relation is statistically significant. 
Table 8.5.6: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and Profitability of Bellary 
Steel 
Variables 
4. X=Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
Bellary Steel 
Y=Pre Merger 
MPS of Bellary 
Steel 
5. X=Post Merger 
Profitability of 
Bellary Y=Post 
Merger MPS of 
Bellary 
*CorreIation 
Coefficient 
=0.03 
=0.77 
*Coefficlent of 
Determination 
0.0009 
0.5929 
^Regression 
Equations 
X on Y is 
X=2.40Y-251.21 
Y on X is 
Y=0.00041X+2.27 
X on Y is 
X=31.19Y+364.51 
Y on X is 
Y=0.0191X+7.84 
T-test 
6.70* 
7.93* 
*Six Years of Pre Merger taken 
**Three Years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 8.5.3, Table 8.5.4 and Appendix 12 
Table 8.5.7 finds out a relation between the Pre Merger and Post Merger MPS and 
also the Pre and Post Merger EPS. 
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6. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
MPS and Post -merger MPS of Bellary Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger MPS and Post -merger MPS of Bellary Steel 
The correlation coefficient (r) between the Pre Merger and Post Merger MPS comes 
out to be 0.93 which reflects a very high degree of positive correlation. The 
coefficient of determination (r^ ) is calculated as 0.859 indicating that a large 
proportion of variance is explained by the relation. The equation Y on X shows that 
for every unit change in X that is the Pre Merger MPS, the Post Merger MPS is 
moved by 0.46 units. The value of intercept is low at 0.78. The value oft is calculated 
as 0.220 while the table value when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value is less 
than the table value. It leads to rejection of Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance 
of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger 
values. Further when the test is applied for seven years of Pre Merger and three years 
of Post Merger it gives the t value at 0.28 while the table value oft when v=8 at to.os is 
2.31. Here again the calculated value is less than the table value which leads to the 
conclusion that the relation is statistically insignificant even in the longer run. The 
Null Hypothesis is accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence 
there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger MPS. 
7. HQ (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
EPS and Post -merger EPS of Bellary Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger EPS and Post -merger EPS of Bellary Steel 
The relation between the Pre and Post Merger EPS is further studied. It gives the 
correlation coefficient (r) at -0.43 indicating a moderate degree of negative 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.2292 indicating that only a 
limited variance is explained by this relation. The regression equation Y on X shows 
that for every unit change in X that is the Pre Merger EPS, the Post Merger EPS is 
moved by -0.027 units which is very less. The intercept is also low at -1.8. The t-test 
is fiirther undertaken. It gives the value of t as 1.129 when three years of Pre and Post 
Merger are undertaken. The calculated value of t when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The 
calculated value being less than the table value leads to the conclusion that the 
relation is statistically insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is accepted while the 
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Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence there is no relation between the Pre and 
Post Merger EPS. Further when the value oft is calculated for six years of Pre Merger 
and three years of Post Merger are undertaken it gives the t value at 1.33. The table 
value of t when v=7 at to.os is 2.45. The calculated value is gain less than the table 
value indicating that the relation is statistically insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is 
accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence there is no relation 
between the Pre and Post Merger values of EPS. 
Table 8.5.7: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and EPS of Bellary Steel 
Variables 
8. X=Pre-Merger 
MPS of Bellary 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of Bellary 
9. X=Pre.Merger 
EPS of Bellary 
Y=Post Merger 
EPS of Bellary 
^Correlation 
CoefHcient 
(r) 
0.93 
-0.48 
•Coefficient 
of 
Determination 
0.859 
0.2292 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=0.46X+0.78 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.027X-1.8 
T-test 
t=0.220* 
t=0.28** 
t=1.129* 
t=1.33*** 
*Three years of Pre and Post Merger undertaken 
**Seven years of Pre-merger and Three years of Post Merger taken 
*** Six years of Pre-merger and Three years of Post Merger taken 
Source; Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 12 
Bellary Steel's historical performance was dismal with losses being incurred since 
2001 and they seemed to just magnify after the merger and increased manifold over 
time. The study of Hypotheses reveals that the Pre Merger Profitability, FATR and 
ICR did not have a statistically significant relation with the Post Merger figures. The 
ICR in the short run was though affected having a high degree of positive correlation. 
However both in the Pre Merger and Post Merger stage there is a statistically 
significant relation between the Profitability and MPS. hi the Pre Merger stage the 
degree of correlation is low at 0.03 while the degree of correlation is high at 0.77. 
Post Merger the Profitability is affected by 31.19 units while intercept is high at 
364.51 units. In case of MPS it is affected by just 0.019 units due to a unit change in 
profitability. The Pre Merger MPS and EPS also do not seem to have a relation with 
the Post Merger statistic. Hence individually the MPS or EPS are not affected by 
merger. 
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b) Pittsburgh Iron and Steel Ltd 
S and Y Mills Limited was incorporated in 1994 and the company dealt mainly with 
the manufacturing of textiles and expanded to the segment of readymade garments. 
To cope up with the accumulated losses in 2001, the company eventually sold off its 
manufacturing unit and Elgo Impex Private Limited acquired the promoter shares. 
The new management discontinued the textile business and made an entry into the 
manufacturing and trading of steel'°. The merger with Bellary Steel and Alloys 
Limited was affected on 20 March 2006" 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
The year 2000 saw the sales of Pittsburgh Iron and Steel at Rs 17.46 crores. The 
PAT/Total Income is at 4.5 percent. DER is at l.l. The sales for 2001 rose by 1.20 
percent while the PAT/Total Income fell to 3.5 percent and DER was relatively stable 
at 1.04. Trouble began to brew with the sales falling by 1.75 percent in 2002. The 
PAT/Total Income fell dramatically to -3.08 percent. DER however increased to 1.23. 
The year 2003 saw the sales fall by a huge -39.06 percent. The PAT/Total Income 
also fell to -18.1 percent while the DER dropped to 0.88. For 2004 the fall in sales 
continued unabated with a fall of -57.47 percent while the cost of sales was Rs 4.62 
crores for the period. The PAT/Total Income was at a dismal -14.85 percent. The 
DER fell further to 0.74. The CR was at 2.68 while the FATR was at 0.87. The year 
2005 also did not bring any good news with sales falling by another -48.22 percent 
against a 21.43 percent fall in cost of sales. The PAT/Total Income was worrisome at 
-39.61, while the proportion fell drastically with DER at 0.11. The CR was high at 
3.51 while the FATR was at 2.31. Sales continued to fall and the fall was by -47.64 
percent in 2006 against a huge 42.98 percent fall in cost of sales. The PAT/Total 
Income fell to a disturbing -85.31. The loans were nil. CR was very high at 8.7 
indicating the low level of operations. FATR was at 9.62. 
Post-Merger Analysis 
The year 2007 saw surprisingly the sales surge to 6.01 crores that is an increase by 
365.89 percent against an increase of 189.37 percent in cost of sales. The positive 
results led to PAT/Total Income to 0.24 percent. There were no loans. Current assets 
were put in use as the CR fell to 1.11 while the FATR at 44.73 reflected high level of 
activity. The year 2008 saw recession struck which led to a fall in liquidity and 
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demand all over the globe which led to no sales being reported for the year 2008 and 
2009. The cost of sales for 2008 fell by 98.83 percent. The PAT/Total Income 
showcased the trouble at Pittsburgh Iron and Steel which was at -2006.22 in 2008. 
The CR was at 1.11 in 2008 and 5.81 in 2009 depicting the low level of activity. 
Table 8.5.8: Pre- Merger and Post-Merger Sales of Pittsburgh Iron and Steel 
(2000-2009) Figures in Rs Crore 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Pre Merger 
Sales 
17.46 
17.67 
17.36 
10.58 
4.5 
2.33 
1.29 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous year 
1.20 
-1.75 
-39.06 
-57.47 
-48.22 
-47.64 
Post Merger 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Sales 
6.01 
No Sales 
No Sales 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous year 
365.89 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Report of Pittsburgh Iron and Steel 
from 2000 to 2006. Retrieved from http://www.business-
beacon.com/kommon/bin/sr.php?kall=wmnahv&repnum=5433&cocode=31979&deal 
type=M&dealdate=20060320&dealno=l 
Table 8.5.9: Pre- Merger and Post-Merger Cost of Sales of Pittsburgh Iron and 
Steel (2004-2008) 
Figures in Rs crore 
Year 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Pre Mer| 
Cost of sales 
4.62 
3.63 
2.07 
ger 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous year 
-21.43 
-42.98 
Year 
2007 
2008 
Post Merger 
Cost of sales 
5.99 
0.07 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous year 
189.37 
-98.83 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Report of Pittsburgh Iron and Steel 
from 2000 to 2006. Retrieved from http://money.rediff.com/companies/pittsburgh-
iron-and-steels-ltd/16020124/profit-and-loss and http://www.business-
beacon.com/kommon^in/sr.php?kall=wmnahv&repnum=5433&cocode=31979&deal 
type=M&dealdate=20060320&dealno=l 
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Table 8.5.10: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Pittsburgh Iron and Steel 
(2000-2006) 
Pre-Merger 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
PAT/Total 
Income % 
4.5 
3.55 
-3.08 
-18.1 
-14.85 
-39.61 
-85.31 
Debt Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
1.1 
1.04 
1.23 
0.88 
0.74 
0.11 
no loans 
Current Ratio 
(CR) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
2.68 
3.51 
8.7 
Fixed Asset 
Turnover Ratio 
(FATR) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.87 
2.31 
9.62 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.5.8, Appendix 13 and Appendix 14 
Table 8.5.11: Post-Merger Ratio Analysis of 
2009) 
Pittsburgh Iron and Steel (2007-
Post-Merger 
Year 
2007 
2008 
PATATotal 
Income % 
0.24 
-2006.22 
Debt Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
no loans 
no loans 
Current Ratio 
(CR) 
1.11 
5.81 
Fixed Asset 
Turnover Ratio 
(FATR) 
44.73 
no sales 
Source; Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.5.8, Appendix 13 and Appendix 14 
Figure 8.5.3: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Pittsburgh Iron and Steels 
20 
0 
-20 
-40 
-60 
-80 
-100 
•PAT/Total Income % 
-Current Ratio 
•Debt Equity Ratio 
• Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio 
Source: Table 8.5.10 
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Table 8.5.12 deals with the relation between the Pre-Merger Profitability and FATR 
of Pittsburgh and Post Merger Profitability and FATR of Bellary 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability of Pittsburgh and Post -merger Profitability of Bellary 
Steel 
H„ (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability of Pittsburgh and Post -merger Profitability of 
Bellary Steel 
Table 8.5.12 gives the correlation coefficient (r) between Pre Merger profitability of 
Pittsburgh and Post Merger profitability of Bellary is 0.62 which reflects a moderate 
degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^) is 0.3844 which 
means that only a small part of the variance is explained by this relation. The 
regression equation Y on X shows that for every 1.14 unit change in X that is the Pre 
Merger Profitability of Pittsburgh there is a 1.14 unit change in Y that is the Post 
Merger profitability of Pittsburgh. The constant is extremely high at 242.41 indicating 
the strong play of other factors in determining the Post Merger profitability of Bellary. 
The t test is conducted for three years of Pre and Post Merger and it gives the t value 
at 9.27 while the table value oft when v=4 at to 05 is 2.78. The calculated value is more 
than the table value which leads to acceptance of the Alternative Hypothesis and 
rejection of the Null Hypothesis. Hence the relation is statistically significant. There 
is a relation between the Pre and Post Merger values. Further the t values are 
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calculated for seven years of Pre Merger and three years of Post Merger. It gives the 
value at 5.79 while the table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. Here again the 
calculated value is more than the table value which means that the relation is 
statistically significant. The Null Hypothesis is rejected and the Alternative 
Hypothesis is accepted even in the longer run. Hence there is a relation between the 
Pre and Post Merger values. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability of Pittsburgh and Post -merger Profitability of Bellary 
Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability of Pittsburgh and Post -merger Profitability of 
Bellary Steel 
Further the relation between the Pre Merger FATR of Pittsburgh and Post Merger 
FATR of Bellary is examined. The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as 0.0729. 
The coefficient of determination (r^ ) comes out as 0.0729 indicating that a very small 
part of the variance in the variables is explained by this relation. The regression 
equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the Pre Merger 
profitability of Pittsburgh there is a 0.01 unit change in Y that is Post Merger 
profitability of Bellary. The value oft test is calculated as 1.34 while the table value 
of t when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value is less than the table value which 
means that the relation is statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the 
Pre and Post Merger values. The Null hypothesis is accepted while the Alternative 
Hypothesis is rejected. 
Table 8.5.12: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability and FATR of 
Pittsburgh Iron and Steel 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
Pittsburgh 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
Bellary 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
FATR of 
Pittsburgh 
Y=Post-Merger 
FATR of Bellary 
*CorreIation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.62 
=0.27 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.3844 
0.0729 
^Regression 
Equations 
Yon X is 
Y=1.14X+242.41 
YonXis 
Y=0.01X+0.72 
T-test 
t=9.27* 
t=5.79** 
1.34* 
*Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
** Seven Years of Pre Merger and Three Years of Post-Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Tables 8.5.4 and 8.5.10 
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3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
EPS of Pittsburgh and Post -merger EPS of Bellary Steel 
H„ (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger EPS of Pittsburgh and Post -merger EPS of Bellary Steel 
Table 8.5.13 studies the relation between the Pre Merger EPS of Pittsburgh and Post 
Merger EPS of Bellary Steels. The correlation coefficient (r) comes out as -0.271 
which is a moderate degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of determination 
(r*) is also very low at 0.073 which indicates that a very small variance in the 
variables is explained by this relation. The regression equation Y on X shows that for 
every one unit change in X that is the Pre Merger EPS of Pittsburgh there is a -0.247 
unit's variation in Y that is the Post Merger EPS of Bellary Steels which shows a very 
weak relation. The intercept is at 2.19. The t-value is calculated as 1.92 while the 
table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value being less than the table 
value leads to rejection of the Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of the Null 
Hypothesis. 
Table 8.5.13: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of EPS of Pittsburgh and Bellary 
Variables *CorreIation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
*Coefficient 
of 
Determination 
(r") 
^Regression 
Equations 
*T-test 
3. X=Pre-Merger 
EPS of Pittsburgh 
Y=Post Merger 
EPS of Bellary 
-0.271 0.073 Y on X is 
Y=-0.247X-2.19 
1.92 
*Three years of Pre and Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated firom Appendix 12 and Appendix 14 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Margin 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Margin 
5. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Rate 
H„ (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Rate 
Table 8.5.14 gives a description of the Pre and Post Merger Profit Margin and Profit 
Rate for Bellary Steels and Pittsburgh. The Pre Merger Profit Margin for Bellary is -
2.54 while for Pittsburgh it is -0.235. Hence both were running into losses. The Post 
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Merger Profit margin for Bellary worsened to -3.362 while for Pittsburgh it was very 
low at 0.00832. The Pre Merger Profit rate for Bellary Steels is -0.034 while for 
Pittsburgh it is -0,4975. The Post Merger Profit Rate for Bellary Steels didn't improve 
much at -0.0588 while for Pittsburgh also it was dismal at -0.00495. 
Table 8.5.14: Pre and Post Merg 
between Bellary and Pittsburgh 
4. Bellary 
5. Pittsburgh 
er Profit Rate and Profit Margin 
Profit Marcm= PAT . 
NS 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
-2.54 
-0.235 
Post-
merger 
Average 
-3.362 
0.00832 
Percentage 
Change 
-32.36 
103.54 
for Merger 
Profit Rate= PAT. 
TA 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
-0.034 
-0.49745 
Post-
merger 
Average 
-0.0588 
-0.00495 
Percentage 
Change 
-72.94 
99.00 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 8.5.1, 8.5.8, Appendix 11, Appendix 12, 
Appendix 13 and Appendix 14 
The financials for Pittsburgh Iron and Steel Limited was in a bad state with losses 
being incurred at a consistent basis. The test of Hypothesis reveals that the 
profitability of Pittsburgh had an impact on the profitability of Bellary while there 
was no effect on the EPS and FATR. The Profit Margin and Profit Rate for both the 
entities also did not pose a satisfactory picture. To sum up the merger was not going 
anywhere and both the units individually as well as jointly were making no headway. 
The decision of promoters to foray into the business of Steel by merging with Bellary 
Steel was questionable with the latter suffering fi-om losses. 
8.6 Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited (SISCOL) 
and JSW Steel (2007-08) : Pre and Post Mereer 
Performance Assessment 
a) SISCOL 
The Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited (SISCOL) was incorporated in 1991 
and dealt mainly with the manufacture and sale of pig iron and coke with its plants 
located in Tamil Nadu. It was acquired in January 2005 by the OP Jindal Group on 4 
January, 2005 and Rs 5800 million expansion program was launched with the aim to 
hike its capacity to one million tines by December 20O6'l At the time of the 
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acquisition SISCOL had accumulated losses up to Rs 350 crore but the takeover 
helped it to tune them down to Rs 130 crore'^ The merger between JSW Steel 
Limited and Southern Iron and Steel Company (SISCOL) was announced in 2008 and 
was effective from 8 March 2008. The scheme of amalgamation was transfer of shares 
where JSW Steel would issue 1 equity share for every 22 held in SISCOL'*. 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
In the year 2003 the operating income of SISCOL was Rupees 273.45 crore and 
expenses were Rs261.35. The DER was very high at 24.42 and it is symbolic of 
serious problems regarding the composition of the capital structure where it is highly 
leveraged on debt. The CR for 2003 was 0.85 highlighting the liquidity issues. The 
ICR which was at -0.37 further laments the financial difficulties. The FATR was low 
at 0.31. The loss of -16.71 percent reflects that there was trouble brewing up. 
Operating Income jumped by a phenomenal 25.73 percent in 2004 and the cost of 
sales also increased by 29.46 percent. The CR and FATR were stable at 0.99 and 0.38 
respectively. The ICR worsened to -0.43. The Net loss increased to -44.62 percent 
which was a sign of worry. The year 2005 saw operating income fall by 0.08 percent 
against a similar fall of-15.04 percent in cost of sales. CR increased to 1.26 showing 
signs of improvement in the financial affairs. The FATR also notched up to 0.39 
while the ICR at 3.33 was a sign of relief for the management. The most important 
aspect was that profit was recorded at 12.32 percent showing that the concern was 
back on track as regards financial performance. 
The year 2006 saw operating increase by a fiirther 57.15 percent while the cost of 
sales increased by 50.62 percent. The capital structure of the company was also put 
into order which made the DER positive at 6.27. However the company needed 
fiirther influx of equity capital as the debt proportion was very high. The CR 
improved to 2.13 signalling better liquidity and the FATR rose to 0.47 highlighting 
efficient operations. The ICR at 0.87 was very low and profits dropped marginally to 
8.29 percent. The year 2007 saw the Operating income rise by 38.67 percent against a 
32.95 percent increase in cost of sales. The DER was relatively stable at 6.54 but still 
on the higher side while the CR dropped to 1.04. FATR was at 0.41 while the ICR 
improved to 1.98. The profitability was also stable at 7.97. 
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Table 8.6.1: Pre- Merger Operating Income of SISCOL (2003-2007) 
Figures in Rs Crore 
Year 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Operating Income 
273.45 
343.82 
316.85 
497.93 
690.46 
Percentage Increase 
25.73 
-0.08 
57.15 
38.67 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Reports of SISCOL 2003 to 2007. 
Retrieved from http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/southemironsteel/profit-
loss/SIS04 
Table 8.6.2: Pre-Merger Cost of Sales of SISCOL (2003-2007) 
Figures in Rs Crore 
Year 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Total Expenses 
261,35 
338.35 
287.45 
432.96 
575.64 
Percentage Increase 
29.46241 
-15.0436 
50.62098 
32.95455 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Reports of SISCOL 2003 to 2007. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/southemironsteel/profit-loss/SIS04 
Table 8.6.3: Pre- Merger Ratio Analysis of SISCOL (2003-2007) 
Year 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
24.42 
-7.89 
-11.62 
6.27 
6.54 
Current 
Ratio (CR) 
0.85 
0.99 
1.26 
2.13 
1.04 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio (FATR) 
0.31 
0.38 
0.39 
0.47 
0.41 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
-0.37 
-0.43 
3.33 
0.87 
1.98 
Net profit 
(%) 
-16.71 
-44.62 
12.32 
8.29 
7.97 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.6.1 and Appendix 8 
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Figure 8.6.1: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of SISCOL 
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Table 8.6.4 examines the relationship between the Pre Merger Profitability and ICR of 
SISCOL with JSW's Post Merger results. 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability of SISCOL and Post-merger Profitability of JSW Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) - There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability of SISCOL and Post-merger Profitability of JSW 
Steel 
The correlation coefficient (r) between X and Y that is the Pre-inerger profitability of 
SISCOL and Post Merger profitability of JSW is 0.82 which reflects a high degree of 
positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^) is also high at 0.6724 
indicating that a high percentage of variance is explained by this relation. The 
regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the pre-
merger profitability the Post Merger profitability is affected by 2.01 units. The 
intercept is also high at 9.85 indicating the presence of other factors. The relation is 
tested for statistical significance and it gives the t value at 0.07 when three years of 
pre and Post Merger are undertaken. The table value oft when v=4 at toos is 2.78. The 
calculated value being less than the table value leads to the conclusion that the 
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relation is statistically insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is accepted and the 
Alternative Hypothesis is rejected and the inference is that there is no relation 
between the Pre-Merger Profitability of SISCOL with the Post Merger profitability of 
JSW. Further when five years of pre-merger and three years of Post Merger are 
undertaken the value oft is worked out as 1.08. The table value oft when v=6 at to.os 
is 2.45. The calculated value is again less than the table value leading to the 
conclusion the relation is statistically insignificant. The Null Hypothesis Is accepted 
stating that there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger Profitability. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
ICR of SISCOL and Post-merger ICR of JSW Steel 
Hu (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger ICR of SISCOL and Post-merger ICR of JSW Steel 
Further the relation between the Pre Merger ICR of SISCOL and Post Merger ICR of 
JSW Steel is examined. The correlation coefficient (r) is 0.98 which indicates a very 
high degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is also very 
high at 0.9604 indicating that the pre-merger statistics plays an important in 
determining the Post Merger figures. The regression equation show that for every unit 
change in X that is the pre-merger ICR of SISCOL the post merger ICR of JSW is 
moved by 1.43 units. The intercept is at 1.82. The t-value is calculated as 2.16 while 
the calculated value of t when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value being lesser 
than the table value leads to the acceptance of the Null Hypothesis and rejection of the 
Alternative Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation between the Pre Merger ICR of 
SISCOL and Post Merger ICR of JSW Steel. Further the t value is calculated for five 
years of Pre-merger and three years of Post Merger which gives the t-value at 3.12. 
The table value oft when v=6 at to.os is 2.45. The calculated value being more than the 
table value leads to the conclusion that the data is statistically significant and the 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted stating that there is a relation between the Pre 
Merger ICR of SISCOL and Post Merger ICR of JSW Steel. 
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Table 8.6.4: Pre and Post Merg 
and JSW 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
SISCOL 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
JSW Steel 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
ICR of SISCOL 
Y=Post-Merger 
ICR of JSW 
Steel 
* Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.82 
=0.98 
er Analysis of ProfitabiUty and ICR of SISCOL 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.6724 
0.9604 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=2.01X-9.85 
Y on X is 
Y=1.431X+1.82 
T-test 
t=0.07* 
t=1.08** 
t=2.16* 
t=3.12** 
•Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Five Years of Pre Merger and Three Years of Post-Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.6.3 and 8.6,9 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
EPS of SISCOL and Post-merger EPS of JSW Steel 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger EPS of SISCOL and Post-merger EPS of JSW Steel 
Table 8.6.5 explores the relationship between the Pre-merger EPS of SISCOL and 
Post-merger EPS of JSW. It gives the correlation coefficient (r) as 0.86 which is a 
high degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r*) is 0.733 
which signifies that the Post Merger MPS has a strong relation with the Pre Merger 
EPS. The regression equation further explains this relationship. It shows that for every 
one unit change in the Pre Merger EPS of SISCOL, the Post Merger EPS of JSW is 
affected by 16.03 units. The intercept is also high at 15.16 indicating the presence of 
other factors as well. The relation is fiirther tested for statistical significance for which 
t test is done. The value of t is computed as 2.79 when three years of Pre and Post 
Merger are undertaken. The table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated 
value being more than the table value leads to the conclusion that the relation is 
statistically significant. The Alternative Hypothesis is accepted stating that there is a 
relation between the Pre Merger EPS of SISCOL and the Post Merger EPS of JSW 
Steel. When the t value is calculated for five years of Pre Merger and three years of 
Post Merger the t value is calculated as 3.74 while the table value of t when v=6 at 
to.05 is 2.45. The calculated value is more than the table value even at in the longer run. 
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It again leads to rejection of the Null Hypothesis and acceptance of the Alternative 
Hypothesis. Hence there is a relation between the Pre Merger EPS of SISCOL and 
Post Merger EPS of JSW Steel. 
Table 8.6.5: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of EPS of SISCOL and JSW 
Variables 
3. X=Pre-Merger 
EPS of SISCOL 
y=Post Merger 
EPS of JSW 
Steel 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
0.86 
•Coefficient 
of 
Determination 
0.733 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=16.03X+15.I6 
*T-test 
t=2.79* 
t=3.94** 
*Three Years of Pre and Post Merger undertaken 
**Five years of Pre-merger and Three years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 8 and Appendix 10 
The analysis of SISCOL reveals that the losses were converted into profits in 2004 
and the two undertakings were subsequently merged in 2008 and SISCOL got benefit 
of with the help of core competencies of JSW. The Hypothesis testing reveals that the 
Pre Merger Profitability and ICR of SISCOL did not have an impact on the Post 
Merger Profitability and ICR of SISCOL. The Post Merger ICR of JSW had a relation 
with the Pre Merger ICR of SISCOL when five years of Pre Merger and three years of 
Post Merger were undertaken. However the study of the Pre Merger EPS of SISCOL 
and Post Merger EPS of JSW Steel appear to have a relation revealing that the 
shareholders were affected. The degree of correlation is a high degree of positive 
correlation at 0.86. Thus we see that the association with JSW Steel had converted a 
loss making unit into a profitable venture 
b) JSW Steel 
JSW Steel was earlier known as Jindal Vijayanagar Steel Limited (JVSL) and it was 
started in 1994. It stands today as one among the largest Indian Steel Companies with 
a capacity of 7.8 million tones. SISCOL was acquired under a scheme of 
amalgamation which added 1 MTPA of production capacity which made it the second 
largest steel company in the private sector in India''. 
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Pre-Merger Analysis 
The year 2000 saw the Net turnover at Rs 807.33 crores against an expenditure of 
656.41 crores. The DER was on the higher side at 4.15 while the low CR spelled 
liquidity problems at 0.58. The FATR and ICR were very low at 0.54 and 0.29 
respectively. The company was running into losses at -18.35 percent. In 2001 the 
turnover increased by 43.76 percent and expenditure by 32.35 percent. DER notched 
up further to 4.51, CR to 0.71 and ICR to 0.78. The improvement was reflected in the 
results with losses falling to -4.28 percent. The year 2002 saw turnover rise by another 
49.56 percent against a 62.89 percent increase in cost of sales. DER rose to 6.98 
signaling influx of debt. The CR was at 0.96 while the FATR dropped down to 0.44. 
ICR was very low at 1.18 but losses again soared to -20.23 percent with the MPS also 
falling to Rs 2. For the financial year 2003 the Net Turnover was at Rs 2504.76 crore 
and the cost of sales was at Rs 1796.7 crore which was a 44.30 percent and 26.98 
percent increase respectively. The DER was on the higher side at 4.39. The CR was 
also low for comfort at 0.91. The FATR also did not reflect well on the operations at 
0.44 while ICR was high at 0.66. 
The year 2004 for JSW saw the Net Turnover rise by 30.94 percent against a rise of 
23.51 percent increase in cost of sales. The DER lowered down but was still on the 
higher side at 2.93. The CR improved to 1.12 and so did the FATR and ICR to 0.63 
and 1.73 respectively. Most importantly profits were registered which accounted for 
16.12 percent. The year was indeed a turnaround for the operations of the company 
with sales rising and control being visible in the cost of operations. It resulted in 
wiping 80 percent of the accumulated losses as well. The year 2005 witnessed the 
turnover becoming more than double at 103.65 percent while the cost of sale grew by 
90.38 percent. The DER lowered further to 1.13 while the CR was stable at 1.15. The 
FATR moved up to 1.04 and ICR to 4.14 which reflected efficiency in operations and 
liquidity. The profits dropped down marginally to 13.03 percent. There was a 
phenomenal jump in 2005 to Rs 360.55. With lowering of debt in the capital structure 
the financial expenses also went down. This year also marked the creation of India's 
third largest Integrated Steel manufacturer with the merger between JSW Steel and 
Jindal Iron and Steel being approved by the High Court. 
In the year 2006 the turnover declined by -7.48 percent while the cost of sales rose by 
a marginal 1.93 percent. Proportion of debt further reduced with the DER at 0.94. The 
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CR was however stable at 1.18. The FAIR also fell down to 0.74 reflecting that there 
was a drop in utilization of fixed assets. The ICR moved up further to 4.61. Level of 
profit was however relatively the same at 13.99 percent. This year the company 
underwent a merger with Euro Ikon Iron and Steel Pvt. Ltd., (Euro Ikon), Euro Coke 
and Energy Pvt. Ltd. (Euro Coke). The expansion plans of JSW Steel were evident. 
However the operational efficiency was commendable where profitability was 
maintained even when the cost of input was steadily increasing. The year 2007 again 
saw the turnover registering an increase of 38.42 percent, while the cost of sales 
increased by 30.08 percent. The capital structure became further equity based with 
DER falling to 0.75. The CR also dropped marginally to 1.09 while the FATR 
improved to 0.84 and ICR to 5.79. The profits were recorded slightly higher at 15,1 
percent. 
Post-Merger Analysis 
The expansion spree of JSW Steel continued with the amalgamation with Southem 
Iron & Steel Company (SISCOL). The financial results for this year hence include the 
results of SISCOL as well. The expansion had led to marked increase in the level of 
production and volume. Various cost control measures were also proving to be 
effective despite the rise in the cost of inputs. The sales rose by 33.50 percent against 
a 39.08 percent rise in cost of sales. The DER rose to 0.98 which was reasonable. The 
CR and FATR declined to 0.75 and 0.69 respectively while ICR continued to rise to 
6.40. The profits were stable at 15.13 percent. In the first year after the merger the 
MPS increased by another 66 percent showing that the market had responded 
positively to the merger with SISCOL though there might be other factors involved 
also. 
For the financial year 2009 where economies worldwide were in the grip of recession 
the rate of increase in sales increased by 22.60 percent against an increase of 39.63 
percent in cost of sales. The DER rose to 1.42 which reflected an increase in the debt 
composition but it was still under the ideal 2:1 mark. Liquidity worsened with CR at 
0.61 and ICR to 2.84 but liquidity problem was mainly due to the recession that had 
struck the world economy. The FATR was also relatively stable at 0.63 while 
profitability dropped to 3.28 percent. A clever change of strategy was made where the 
domestic market was targeted in the wake of global recession and it yielded results 
too. The company was able to earn profits in a year when the world steel production 
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contracted by 25 percent due to cut in production and demand. The year 2010 is 
studied for the first nine months. Sales were lesser by 0.81 percent but the whole year 
is not considered here. The DER was 1.53 and ICR at 5.06. A very healthy profit at 
9.4 percent accrued which was very encouraging. 
Table 8.6.6: Pre and Post-Merger Turnover of JSW Steel (2000-2010) 
(Figures in Rs Crore) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Source: ( 
Pre-merger 
Net 
Turnover 
807.33 
1160.60 
1735.75 
2504.76 
3279.78 
6679.36 
6180.1 
8554.36 
[Compiled and Ci 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous year 
43.76 
49.56 
44.30 
30.94 
103.65 
-7.48 
38.42 
ilculated from the / 
Year 
2008 
2009 
2010 
(nine 
months) 
r^uiual repo 
Post-merger 
Net 
Turnover 
11420 
14001.25 
13887.24 
rtsof JSWStee 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
33.50 
22.60 
-0.81 
from 2000 to 2009. 
Retrieved from http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/jswsteel/balance-sheet/JSW01 and 
http://www.j sw.in/ 
Table 8.6.7: Pre- Merger and Post-Merger Cost of Sales of JSW (2000-2010) 
(Figures in Rs Crore) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
PRE-MERGER 
Cost of Sales 
656.41 
868.77 
1415.15 
1796.97 
2219.39 
4225.3 
4306.75 
5602.15 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
32.35 
62.89 
26.98 
23.51 
90.38 
1.93 
30.08 
Year 
2008 
2009 
POST-MERGER 
Cost of 
Sales 
7791.42 
10879.39 
Percentage increase 
over previous year 
39.08 
39.63 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from the Annual reports of JSW Steel from 2000 to 2009. 
Retrieved from http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/jswsteel/balance-sheet'JSW01 and 
http ://www.j sw .in/ 
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Table 8.6.8: Pre- Merger Ratio Anal> 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
4.15 
4.51 
6.98 
4.39 
2.93 
1.13 
0.94 
0.75 
sis of JSW (2000-2007) 
Pre Merger 
Current Ratio 
(CR) 
0.58 
0.71 
0.96 
0.91 
1.12 
1.15 
1.18 
1.09 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.54 
0.77 
0.44 
0.44 
0.63 
1.04 
0.74 
0.84 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
0.29 
0.78 
0.18 
0.66 
1.73 
4.14 
4.61 
5.79 
Profitability 
(%) 
-18.35 
-4.28 
-20.23 
-4.41839 
16.11937 
13.02685 
13.98505 
15.10341 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.6.6, Appendix 9 and Appendix 10 
Table 8.6.9: Post-Merger Ratio Analysis of JSW (2007-2009) 
Post Merger 
Year 
2008 
2009 
2010 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
0.98 
1.42 
1.53* 
Current Ratio 
(CR) 
0.75 
0.61 
NA 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.69 
0.63 
NA 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
6.40 
2.84 
5.06" 
Profitability 
(%) 
15.13301 
3.274708 
9.4" 
* Figure for Q3 
** Figure for 9 months 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.6.6, Appendix 9 and Appendix 10 
Figure 8.6.2: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of JSW Steel 
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Figure 8.6.3: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of JSW Steel 
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Testing of Hypothesis 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profitability of JSW Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profitability of JSW Steel 
Table 8.6.10 highlights the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger Profitability. 
The correlation coefficient (r) is at -0.44 indicating a negative degree of moderate 
correlation. The coefficient of determinafion (r^) is very low at 0.1936 which shows 
that a very small percentage of Post Merger profitability is affected by the Pre Merger 
Profitability. The regression equation shows that for every unit change in X that is the 
Pre Merger profitability, the Post Merger profitability that is Y is affected by -2.53 
units. The intercept is very high at 44.83 indicating that when the slope is zero, the 
Post Merger Profitability is 44.83 indicating the strong effect of other factors. The 
value of t is calculated as 0.85 when three years of Pre and Post Merger are 
undertaken. The table value oft when v=4 at to 05 is 2.78. The calculated value is less 
than the table value which leads to the conclusion that the relation is statistically 
insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is accepted which says that there is no relation 
between the Pre and Post Merger Profitability. Further when the t value is computed 
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for a longer period that is Eight Years of Pre Merger and three years of Post Merger it 
comes out to be 1.413. The table value of t when v=9 at to.os is 2.26, The calculated 
value is again less than the table value which again leads to the inference that the 
relation is statistically insignificant and the Null Hypothesis is accepted while the 
Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence there is no relation between the Pre and 
Post Merger Profitability of JSW Steel. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger ICR of JSW Steel 
H„ (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger ICR of JSW Steel 
Table 8.6.10 also examines the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger ICR of 
JSW Steel. The correlation coefficient (r) comes out to be -0.14 which indicates a low 
degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is also very low at 
0.0196 indicating that a very small percentage of the variance is explained by this 
relation. The regression equation shows that for every unit change in X that is the Pre-
merger Profitability of JSW the Post Merger Profitability is affected by -0.29 units. 
The intercept is high at 6.18 indicating the effect of other factors in the movement of 
Post-merger Profitability. 
The relation is fiirther tested for statistical significance which gives the t value at 0.07. 
The table value of t when v=4 at to.os is worked out as 2.78. The calculated value 
being less than the table value leads to the conclusion that the relation is statistically 
insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is 
rejected. Hence there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger values. The t 
test is further conducted for eight years of Pre Merger and three years of Post Merger 
which gives the t value at 1.753. The table value of t when v=9 at to.os is 2.26. The 
calculated vale being less than the table value leads to rejection of the Alternative 
Hypothesis and acceptance of the Null Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation 
between the Pre and Post Merger ICR of JSW Steel and the relation is statistically 
insignificant. 
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Table 8.6.10: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability and ICR of JSW 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
JSW 
y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
JSW Steel 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
ICR of JSW 
Y=Post-Merger 
ICR of JSW 
Steel 
*CorrelatioD 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=-0.44 
=-0.I4 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.1936 
0.0196 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-
2.53X+44.83 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.29X+6.18 
T-test 
t=0.85* 
t=1.413** 
t=0.07* 
t=1.753** 
*Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Eight Years of Pre Merger and Three Years of Post-Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.6.8 and 8.6.9 
Table 8.6.11 explores the relationship between the profitability of the firm with its 
MPS. An attempt is made by the researcher to study their mutual relationship. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability and Pre-merger MPS of JSW Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability and Pre-merger MPS of JSW Steel 
Table 8.6.11 explores the relationship between the Pre Merger Profitability and MPS. 
The correlation coefficient (r) comes out to be 0.68 indicating a moderate degree of 
positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) comes out to be 0.4624 
implying that a fairly high percentage of the variance is explained by this relationship. 
The Regression equation X on Y shows that for every unit change in Y that is the Pre-
merger MPS the value of X that is the Pre Merger Profitability is affected by 0.05 
units while the intercept is high at 6.10 indicating the stronger effects of other factors 
other than the MPS. The equation Y on X indicates that for every unit change in X 
that is the Profitability there is a 9.09 unit's change in Y that is the MPS. Hence MPS 
is affected strongly by profitability while the vice versa is not true. The t test is also 
taken to find out the statistical significance. The t value comes out as 2.02 while the 
table value oft is when v=9 at to.os is 2.37. The calculated value being lesser than the 
table value leads to the conclusion that the data is not statistically significant. The 
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Null Hypothesis Is accepted while the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence 
there is no relation between the Pre Merger Profitability and MPS of JSW Steel. 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Post Merger 
Profitability and Post-merger MPS of JSW Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post 
Merger Profitability and Post-merger MPS of JSW Steel 
Table 8.6.11 further examines the relationship between the Post Merger Profitability 
and MPS of JSW Steel. The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as 0.71 indicating 
a moderate degree of positive correlation while the coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 
0.5041 showing that half of the variance is explained by this relation. The Regression 
equation X on Y shows that for every unit change in Y that is the Post Merger MPS of 
JSW the value of X that is the Post Merger Profitability is affected by 0.098 unit's 
which is very low. The value of intercept is high at 2.38 representing the role of other 
factors. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is 
the Post merger Profitability, the Post Merger MPS is moved by 49.84 units. The 
value of intercept is very high at 238.75 units showing the dominant effect of other 
factors. The value oft is computed as 2.85 while the table value oft when v=9 at to.os 
is 2.37. The calculated value being more than the table value leads to the conclusion 
that the data is statistically significant. Null Hypothesis is rejected and Alternative 
Hypothesis is accepted. Hence there is a relation between the Post Merger 
Profitability and MPS 
Table 8.6.11: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and Profitability of JSW 
Variables 
3. X=Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
JSW Steel 
Y=Pre Merger 
MPS of JSW 
Steel 
4. X=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
JSW 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of JSW 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
1=0.68 
r=0.71 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
(r') 
0.4624 
0.5041 
'^ Regression 
Equations 
X on Y is 
X=0.051Y-6.10 
Y on X is 
Y=9.09X+135.06 
X on Y is 
X=0.098Y+2.38 
Y on X is 
Y=49.84X+238.75 
*T-test 
2.02* 
2.85** 
*Eight Years of Pre Merger taken 
**Three Years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.6.8, 8.6.9 and Appendix 10 
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5. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
MPS and Post-merger MPS of JSW Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger MPS and Post-merger MPS of JSW Steel 
Table 8.6.12 examines the relation between the Pre and Post Merger MPS of JSW 
Steel. The correlation coefficient (r) comes out to be 0.89 which represents a high 
degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is also high at 
0.796 reflecting that the relation explains a majority of the variance. The equation Y 
on X shows that for every one unit change in X that is the Pre-merger MPS the Post 
Merger MPS is affected by 3.85 units. The intercept is also very high at 784.86 
indicating that there is a strong role of other factors. The value of t is computed as 
1.28 when three years of Pre and Post Merger are considered. The table value of t 
when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value is less than the table value which leads 
to the conclusion that the data is statistically insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is 
accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. It is concluded that there is no 
relation between the Pre and Post Merger MPS. Further the t-value is calculated for 
eight years of Pre Merger and three years of Post Merger which gives the t value as 
3.05. The table value oft when v=9 at to.os is 2.37. The calculated value is more than 
the table value which leads to the conclusion that the data is statistically significant. 
The Null Hypothesis is rejected and the alternative Hypothesis is accepted. Hence in 
the longer run the merger has an effect on the Post Merger MPS. 
6. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
EPS and Post-merger EPS of JSW Steel 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger EPS and Post-merger EPS of JSW Steel 
Table 8.6.12 fiirther explores the relationship between the Pre and Post Merger MPS 
of JSW Steel. The correlation coefficient (r) is 0.51 which is a moderate degree of 
positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is .2632 which means that a 
quarter of the movement of variances in the relationship is explained. The regression 
equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the pre-merger MPS the 
value of Y that is the Post Merger MPS is affected by 1.52 units. The value of 
intercept is also high at -39.67 indicating the role of other factors. Further the t test is 
conducted. The value of t for three years of Pre and Post Merger is worked out to be 
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0,22, The table value of t when v=4 at to.05 is 2.78. The calculated value is less than 
the table value which leads to the conclusion that the data is statistically insignificant. 
The Null Hypothesis is accepted while the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. 
Hence there is no relation between the Pre and Post Merger EPS. Further the t values 
are calculated for eight years of Pre Merger and three years of Post Merger. The t 
value comes out to be 3.50. The table value of t when v=9 at to.os is 2.37. The 
calculated value is more than the table value which leads to the conclusion that the 
relation is statistically significant. The Null Hypothesis is rejected while the 
Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. Hence there is a relation between the pre and 
Post Merger EPS in the longer run. 
Table 8.6.12: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and EPS of JSW Steel 
Variables 
5. X=Pre-Merger 
MPS of JSW 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of JSW 
6.X=Pre-Merger 
EPS of JSW 
Y=Post Merger 
EPS of JSW 
*CorreIation 
CoefTicient 
(r) 
r=0.89 
r=0.51 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
(r') 
0.796 
0.2638 
^Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=3.85X-
784.86 
Y on X is 
Y=1.52X-39.67 
*T-test 
t=1.28* 
t=3.05** 
t=0.22* 
t=3.50** 
*Three years of Pre and Post Merger taken 
•*Eight years of Pre-merger and Three years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 10 
7. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Margin 
H„ (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Margin 
8. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Rate 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Rate 
Table 8.6.13 explores the Pre and Post Merger Profit Margin and Profit Rate for 
SISCOL and JSW. The Pre Merger Profit Margin for SISCOL is -0.65 while for JSW 
it is 0.014. The Post Merger Profit Margin of JSW Steel is 0.903 reflecting a 
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significant improvement in the Post Merger Profit Margin. Further the Post Merger 
Profit Rate is examined. It gives the Pre Merger Profit Rate for SISCOL as -0.02 
while for JSW as 0.0315. The Post-merger Profit Rate of JSW is calculated as 0.055 
which again shows a marked improvement over the Pre Merger figures. 
Table 8.6.13: Pre and Post Merger Profit Rate and Profit Margin for SISCOL 
and JSW Steel 
7. SISCOL 
8. JSW 
Net Sales 
Profit Marpin= PAT. 
NS 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
-0.65 
0.014 
Post-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.903 
Percentage 
Change 
635 
Total Assets 
Profit Rate= PAT. 
TA 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
-0.02 
0.0315 
Post-
merger 
Average 
NA 
0.055 
Percentage 
Change 
74.6 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 8.6.1, 8.6.6, Appendix 8, Appendix 9 
and Appendix 10 
After running into losses for years JSW Steel finally made a turnaround in its 
operations in 2004 and started making profits on a consistent basis. There is no 
relation between the Pre and Post Merger profitability on the basis of the test applied. 
However the benefits of merger are not expected to accrue in the first few years. The 
analysis of the relation between the profitability and MPS reveals that the relation 
between the Pre Merger profitability and MPS is insignificant. The relation between 
the Post Merger Profitability and MPS is on the contrary found to be significant with 
the correlation coefficient (r) high at 0.71. The value of Profitability is affected by 
0.098 units for a unit change in MPS while the MPS is affected by 49.84 units for a 
change of a unit in Profitability. The intercept is also high at 238.75. The relation 
between the Pre Merger EPS and MPS with the Post Merger EPS and MPS is also 
found to be significant only in the longer run. The Profit Margin for JSW Steel 
increased by 635 percent and Profit Rate the by 74.6 percent. The losses incurred 
prior to 2004 are also responsible for this huge change in Profit Margin. 
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8.7 Conclusion: 
The analysis presented in the foregoing paragraphs examines the Pre and Post Merger 
financials of the firm involved in a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deal and 
analyses whether the merger had a positive, negative or limited effect on the 
performance. It is seen that SAIL merged its subsidiaries which were running into 
losses and enhanced its operational capacity and got tax incentives at the same time. 
The takeover of Bellary Steels by Pittsburgh which was done in order to enter steel 
segment seemed to lead both the entities nowhere where the losses continued. IMFA 
carried out the merger of its subsidiary ICCL with itself and became a leading player 
in the business and benefitted from significant financial and operating synergies. In 
the case of JSW and SISCOL deal we see that while JSW benefitted from increased 
production facilities SISCOL made a significant turnaround in operations which 
converted its losses into profits 
Having discussed five significant domestic Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&,A's) in the 
domestic sector the succeeding chapter moves on to analyze three major cross border 
deals that have taken place and also examines the rationale and benefits accruing to 
the Indian steel companies out of the merger and takeover in the international scene. 
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Chapter 9 
Analysis of International 
Mer2ers and Acquisitions (M&A^s): 
(Indian Steel Industry vis-a-vis 
International Steel Industry) 
9.1 Introduction: 
The preceding chapter dealt with the major Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the 
domestic sector that is the deals between the local companies of India. The financial 
aspects related to the merger have been discussed in detail to assess the viability and 
impact of the merger or acquisition. On the basis of the same methodology as 
designed in Chapter 6, the Researcher analyses three major cross border deals in the 
steel sector which have put us on the world map. In the recent years huge deals 
amounting to billions of dollars are being inked. Tata took over NatSteel and followed 
it with the takeover of Corns which was the largest ever takeover by an Indian 
corporate then. Essar Steel also went on to acquire the Canadian company Algoma 
Steel. It is interesting to examine the financials of the companies involved in the 
merger in the midst of all the hype created around the announcement of the merger or 
takeover. The growth of the Indian corporate from being acquired by foreign 
companies to a position where it is making significant deals across the globe is indeed 
commendable. The analysis of major cross border mergers and acquisitions in steel 
sector is presented in the following paragraphs. 
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9.2 NatSteel and Tata Steel: Pre and Post Mereer 
Performance Assessment 
a) NatSteel 
The National Iron and Steel Mills Ltd (NISM) was incorporated on 12 August 1961 
and in 1990 its name was changed to NatSteel. The NatSteel Group having divisions 
in Steel, Industrial and Electronics is headquartered in Singapore. For the purpose of 
this analysis the figures of NatSteel Group is undertaken to analyze the effect of 
merger on it. NatSteel being one of the largest countries in Asia Pacific and having a 
presence in seven countries gave access to Tata Steel in this area. NatSteel Holdings 
is headquartered in Singapore and is a leading supplier of premium steel. It became 
100 percent subsidiary of Tata in 2004 and a formidable combination was created to 
explore new markets and opportunities. NatSteel announced on 16 August 2004 about 
its decision to sell its steel business to Tata Steel for $486.4 million. 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
Tables 9.2.1, 9.2.2 and 9.2.3 provide a detailed description of the Pre merger analysis 
is done. In the financial year 2000 the total sales stood at S$ 1440714 mainly relying 
on electronic division which led to the Net Profit (NP) to stand at a remarkable 65.92 
percent. The cost of sales was at S$ 1256546. The CR at 1.54, FATR at 1.13 and 
WCTR at 2.1 were all impressive and satisfactory. The DER was however very low at 
0.02 indicating that that the business was primarily based on equity. The weak 
construction sector was adversely hampering the prospects of the steel sector. 
However, the trend was expected to reverse in the near fiiture. Besides three new steel 
products were launched NS500, NEW500 and NEF500 and the division also got 
ISO14001 certification. PBT stood at S$ 24.9 m which was low. The increasing cost 
and lower selling price were not helping its cause with a weak domestic market 
adding to its woes. The year 2001 saw the sales jump by 10.04 percent as compared to 
a 15.34 percent increase in cost of sales. The CR and FATR marginally changed to 
1.43 and 1.55 while the DER was still low at 0.12. However WCTR rose sharply to 
6.35 indicating higher trading and lower investment in working capital. A loss of 7.88 
percent was reported which was a cause of worry. With the macro-environment 
reflecting a sluggish economy, various initiatives were taken by the group to 
consolidate and compete. The cost involved in the rationalization of operations of the 
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steel division was a major reason for the loss reported in the steel division to the tune 
of S$21.3 million. 
The financial year 2002 saw sales jump by 9.68 percent while cost of sales increased 
by 7.07 percent only. The liquidity improved with CR at 2.45 while the FATR and 
WCTR were at 3.00 and 2.37. DER was at 0.02. The NP at 10.56 percent was most 
remarkable and satisfactory. However with a negative outlook for building and 
construction activity in Singapore, the ftiture does not look very bright for the steel 
division. The Iraq war and rising oil prices were also expected to cast a negative 
effect. The steel division registered a smart recovery to post a Profit before Tax (PBT) 
of S$ 25.9 million which mainly came from higher trading volume of NatSteel trade 
and also the overseas steel operations. The restructuring operations undertaken in 
2001 were yielding positive results in the form of better selling price, reduced cost 
and overall efficient operations. 
Trouble was brewing at NatSteel in the year 2003 with sales decreasing by 1.22 
percent and cost of sales increasing marginally by 1.03 percent. The Iraq wars and 
SARS outbreak had certainly negatively influenced the macro-environment but still 
the operations were fairly stable with CR at 2.29, FATR at 3.13 and WCTR at 3.54. 
The proportion of loan funds continued to be low with the DER at 0.04.The NP was 
positive at 4.67 percent. The overseas steel business benefitted fi-om the rising steel 
prices in the world market which resulted in a remarkable 84 percent jump in PBT of 
steel division to S$46,8 million. However lower demand was forecasted in the 
domestic market. In 2004, sales increased by 20.74 percent while cost of sales 
increased by 22.1 percent. The ratios also reflected stability with CR at 2.8, FATR at 
3.67 and NP at 5.90 percent. The WCTR and DER did not change much at 3.66 and 
0.03 respectively. For the improved performance the credit was to the steel, 
petrochemical and electronic division. The PBT of steel division had jumped by 49 
percent to S$ 46.8 million with improved market conditions both in Singapore and 
overseas. 
However on 16 August 2004, the company announced that it would sell its steel and 
related businesses to Tata Iron and Steel Company at a value of $486.4m. Hence, we 
see that in this case it was a profitable company that was being acquired. 
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Post-Merger Analysis 
From the calculations above in Tables 9.2.1, 9.2.2, 9.2.3 and 9.2.4 the post-merger 
analysis has been done. 
In the financial year 2005, the sales of NatSteel was at Singapore $303614 while the 
cost of sales was at Singapore $ 244309. The liquidity position was satisfactory with 
CR at2.16 while FATR and WCTR were at 0.88 and 1.53 respectively. DER was 
again extremely low at 0.07. The NP at 32.26 percent was highly impressive 
reflecting upon the profitable operations of the undertaking where the petrochemical 
division had a significant role. Higher cash reserves were attributed to the receipt of 
cash from the sale of steel division to Tata Steel. 
The growth story remained intact for NatSteel for the year 2006 as well with turnover 
increasing by 5.33 percent as compared to increase in cost of sales by 8.9 percent. CR 
at 2.06 reflected that there was adequate liquidity, FATR at 1.06 showed the efficient 
usage of fixed assets and WCTR at 1.86 was also fairly stable. DER remained the 
same at 0.07. The highlight was however the profits at 43.94 percent. 
The year 2007 saw turnover rising by an impressive 8.06 percent as compared to a 
4.45 percent rise in cost of sales. Liquidity was comfortable with CR at 2.75 while the 
FATR and WCTR were fairiy stable at 1,01 and 1.50 respectively. DER fell fiirther to 
0.03.and NP to 29.07 percent. This year was marked by an innovative drive with 
expansion in customers and products being undertaken. However both chemical and 
engineering division experienced a lower profit contribution which was in turn 
affected by a weak US$ and higher operating cost. For the year 2008 the sales rose by 
another 3.55 percent against a 4.67 percent increase in cost of sales. The debt 
proportion was minimal with the DER at 0.04 while CR was more than satisfactory at 
2.56. The FATR was stable at 1.11 and WCTR was at 1.53. The profitability was at 
21.07 percent amid a glum economic ouflook. 
The recessionary trend had an impact on NatSteel too with sales falling by -1.51 
percent in 2009 but cost fell more at -5.39 percent. The worldwide demand was facing 
a beating with the liquidity crisis in USA. DER continued to languish at 0.03 while 
CR rose to 3.05. The FATR fell to 0.97 while the WCTR rose to 1.87. The NP fell to 
18.98 percent but amidst the economic downturn the management must be more than 
happy to maintain that 
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It is seen from the above analysis that the financial profile of NatSteel was 
significantly affected after the sale of its steel division. The rate of profits increased 
significantly. The year before the acquisition a profit of 5.90 percent was recorded 
while immediately after the deal a profit of 32.26 percent was registered. The many 
fold increase was symbolic of the positive effect the deal had on the financials of 
NatSteel. 
Table 9.2.1: Pre and Post Merger Sales of NatSteel (2001-2004) 
Figures in Singapore Dollar (S$) 
Pre-merger 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Sales 
1440714 
1585395 
1738903 
1717735 
2073987 
Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
10.04 
9.68 
-1.22 
20.74 
Post-merger 
Year 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Sales 
303614 
319786 
345570 
357834 
352424 
Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
5.33 
8.06 
3.55 
-1.51 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from NatSteel Annual Reports 2000 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.nsl.com.sg/financialresults.html 
Table 9.2.2: Pre and Post Merger Cost of Sales of NatSteel (2001-2004) 
Figures in Singapore Dollar (S$) 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Pre-merger 
Cost of 
sales 
1256546 
1449331 
1551734 
1567709 
1914188 
% change 
-
15.34 
7.07 
1.03 
22.1 
Post-merger 
Year 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Cost of sales 
244309 
266066 
278449 
286685 
271244 
% change 
-
8.9 
4.65 
2.96 
-5.39 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from NatSteel's Annual Reports 2000 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.nsl.com.sg/fmancialresults.html 
Table 9.2.3: Pre-merger Ratio Analys 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Debt Equity 
Ratio (DER) 
0.02 
0.12 
0.02 
0.04 
0.03 
Current 
Ratio 
(CR) 
1.54 
1.43 
2.45 
2.29 
2.80 
is NatSteel (20( 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
1.13 
1.55 
3.00 
3.13 
3.67 
11-2004) 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover Ratio 
(WCTR) 
2.15 
6.35 
2.37 
3.54 
3.66 
Net Profit 
Ratio 
(N.P) 
(%) 
65.92 
-7.88 
10.56 
4.67 
5.90 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.2.1, Appendix 19 and Appendix 20 
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Table 9.2.4: Post-merger Ratio Analysis NatSteel (2005-2009) 
Year 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
0.07 
0.07 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
Current 
Ratio 
(C.R) 
2.16 
2.09 
2.75 
2.56 
3.05 
Fixed 
Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.88 
1.06 
1.01 
1.11 
0.97 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover Ratio 
(WCTR) 
1.53 
1.86 
1.50 
1.53 
1.87 
Net Profit 
Ratio 
(N.P) 
(%) 
32.26 
43.94 
29.07 
21.07 
18.98 
Source; Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.2.1, Appendix 19 and Appendix 20 
Figure 9.2.1: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of NatSteel 
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Figure 9.2.2: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of NatSteel 
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Table 9.2.5 deals with the Pre and Post merger analysis of Profitability, FATR and 
WCTRforNatSteel 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post -merger Profitability of NatSteel. 
Hu (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post -merger Profitability of NatSteel. 
The first Hypothesis studies the relationship between the pre and post merger 
profitability. The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as -0.003 which is a low 
degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.9"^ ^ which 
signifies that a very low degree of variance is explained by this relation. The 
regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the Pre 
merger profitability of NatSteel there is -0.0001 units change in Y which is the post 
merger profitability of Tata Steel. The value of intercept is very high at 29.08 
indicating the effect of other factors in determining the profitability. From the above 
figures it is seen that the merger does not seem to cause a major impact on the 
profitability of NatSteel .The t-value is worked out as 0.97 for five years of Pre and 
Post merger. The table value oft when v=8 at ato.os is 2.31. The calculated value is 
less than the table value which leads to the conclusion that the relation is statistically 
insignificant. The Null Hypothesis is accepted and the Alternative Hypothesis is 
rejected. Hence it is concluded that there is no relation between the pre merger and 
post merger profitability of NatSteel. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post -merger FATR of NatSteel. 
Htt (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post -merger FATR of NatSteel 
This hypothesis examines the relationship between the pre and post merger FATR of 
NatSteel. The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as 0.38 which is a low degree 
of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.545 which shows that 
only a small part of the variance is explained by this relation. The regression equation 
Y on X shows that for every one unit change in X that is the pre merger FATR of 
NatSteel there is a 0.03 unit change in Y that is the post merger FATR of NatSteel. 
The intercept is also low at 0.933. The value oft is worked out as 3.03 for five years 
of pre and post merger while the table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The 
calculated value is more than the table value which leads to the inference that the 
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relation is statistically significant and there is a relation between the pre merger and 
post merger values of Fixed Assets Turnover Ratio (FATR) for NatSteel. Hence the 
Null Hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post -merger WCTR of NatSteel. 
H„ (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation betv^ 'een the Pre 
Merger and Post -merger WCTR of NatSteel. 
The impact of the merger on the Working Capital Turnover Ratio (WCTR) of 
NatSteel is explored next. The correlation coefficient (r) between the pre merger and 
post merger WCTR is worked out as 0.76 which is a high degree of positive 
correlation while the coefficient of determination is (r^ ) is 0.570. The regression Y on 
X shows that for every unit change in X that is the pre merger WCTR there is 0.09 
units change in Y which is the post merger WCTR of NatSteel. The intercept is also 
low at 1.35. The t value is calculated as 2.60 for five years of pre and post merger. 
The table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value is more than the 
table value which means that the relation is statistically significant and it means that 
there is a relation between the pre-merger and post-merger WCTR. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
The merger does not seem to have an effect on the profitability but the above 
discussion concludes that the operations of the concern on the form of FATR and 
WCTR seemed to be affected by the deal. 
Table 9.2.5; Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, FATR and WCTR of 
NatSteel 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
NatSteel 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
NatSteel 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
FATR of NatSteel 
Y=Post-Merger 
FATR of NatSteel 
3. X= Pre-Merger 
WCTR of NatSteel 
Y=Post-Merger 
WCTR of NatSteel 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=-0.003 
=0.38 
=0.76 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
(r") 
Q9-06 
0.145 
0.570 
^Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-0001X+29.08 
Y on X is 
Y=0.03X+0.933 
Y on X is 
Y=0.09X+1.35 
**T-test 
0.97 
3.03 
2.60 
*Five Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 9.2.3 and Table 9.2.4 
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Table 9.2.6 gives an insight into the relationship of the profitability of the firm with 
its MPS to examine the effect on each other. 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability and Pre -merger MPS of NatSteel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post 
Merger Profitability and Post -merger MPS 
The fourth hypothesis examines the relationship between the Pre merger profitability 
with the pre merger MPS. The correlation coefficient (r) is 0.78 which is a high 
degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) at 0.604 reflects 
that a high degree of variance is explained by this relationship which is around 60.4 
percent. The regression equation X on Y shows that for every unit change in Y that is 
the Pre merger MPS of NatSteel there is 94.55 units change in X that is the Pre 
merger profitability of NatSteel. The intercept is also high at 45.62 indicating the role 
of other factors. Further the regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit 
change in X that is the Pre merger profitability of NatSteel there is a 0.0064 unit's 
change in Y that is the Pre merger MPS of NatSteel. The intercept is also not very 
high at 0.55. Hence it seems that profitability is affected by a higher degree by MPS 
while the reverse is not true. The value oft test is computed as 1.18 for five years of 
Pre merger while the table value is when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value is 
less than the table value which leads to acceptance of Null Hypothesis and rejection 
of Alternative Hypothesis. Hence the relation is statistically insignificant and there is 
no relation between the Pre merger MPS and Profitability of NatSteel. 
5. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability and Pre -merger MPS of NatSteel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post 
Merger Profitability and Post -merger MPS 
The next Hypothesis deals with the relationship between the Post merger Profitability 
and MPS of NatSteel. The correlation coefficient (r) comes out as 0.24 which is a low 
degree of positive correlation while the coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.055 
which means that the relation explains around 5.5 percent variation in values. The 
regression equation X on Y shows that for every unit change in Y that is the post 
merger MPS of NatSteel there is 8.84 units change in X that is the post merger 
profitability of NatSteel. The intercept is high at 18,03 highlighting the role of other 
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factors. The equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the post 
merger profitability of NatSteel there is a 0.062 unit's change in Y that is the Post 
merger MPS of NatSteel. The value of intercept is also not very high at 1.067. The t 
value is calculated for statistical significance and it comes out to be 6.24 for five years 
of post merger. The table value oft when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value 
being higher than the table value leads to rejection of Null Hypothesis and 
acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis. Hence the relation is statistically significant 
and there is a relationship between the Post merger values of Profitability and MPS. 
Table 9.2.6: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and Profitability of NatSteel 
Variables 
4. X=Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
NatSteel 
Y=Pre Merger 
MPS of NatSteel 
5. X=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
NatSteel 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of NatSteel 
•Correlation 
CoefTicient 
(r) 
=0.78 
=0.24 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.604 
0.055 
•Regression 
Equations 
X on Y is 
X=94.55Y-45.62 
Y on X is 
Y=0.0064X+0.55 
XonYis 
X=8.84Y+18.03 
Y on X is 
Y=0.062X+1.067 
T-test 
1.18* 
6.24* 
•Five Years of Pre and Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 9.2.3, Table 9.2.4 and Appendix 20 
Table 9.2.7 explores the relation between the Pre and Post MPS and EPS. 
6. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post -merger MPS of NatSteel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post -merger MPS of NatSteel 
The Hypothesis determines the relationship between the Pre and Post MPS of 
NatSteel. The correlation coefficient (r) comes out to be -0.57 which is a moderate 
degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is worked out as 
0.324 which means that just 32.4 percent of the variance is explained by this 
relationship. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X 
that is the Pre merger MPS of NatSteel there is a -0.64 unit's change in Y that is the 
Post merger MPS of NatSteel. The value of intercept is also low at 1.66. The t value is 
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calculated ad 3.78 for five years of pre and post merger while the table value oft 
when v=8 at toos is 2.31. Hence the relation is statistically significant as the calculated 
value is more than the table value. It leads to acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis 
and rejection of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is a relation between the Pre and Post 
merger MPS. 
7. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
EPS and Post -merger EPS of NatSteel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger EPS and Post -merger EPS 
The hypothesis between the pre and post merger EPS is examined here. It gives the 
correlation coefficient (r) at -0.548 which is a moderate degree of negative 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.30 which means that around 30 
percent of the variances are explained by this relationship. The regression equation Y 
in X shows that for every unit change in X that is the Pre merger EPS of NatSteel 
there is a -0.04 unit's change in Y that is the post merger EPS of NatSteel. The value 
of intercept is high at 26.77 indicating the role of other factors. The t value is 
calculated as 0.81 for five years of pre and post merger. The table value oft when v=8 
at to.05 is 2.31. The calculated value being lesser than the table value leads to rejection 
of Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of Null Hypothesis. Hence the relation is 
statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the Pre and Post merger 
values of EPS of NatSteel. 
Table 9.2.7: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and EPS of NatSteel 
Variables 
8. X=Pre-Merger 
MPS of NatSteel 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of NatSteel 
9. X=Pre-Merger 
EPS of NatSteel 
Y=Post Merger 
EPS of NatSteel 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
-0.57 
-0.548 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.324 
0.300 
'^ Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.64X+1.66 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.04+26.77 
T-test 
3.78* 
0.81* 
*Five years of Pre and Post merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Appendix 20 
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The financials of NatSteel show that the company was running into profits prior to the 
merger but after the merger took place in 2005 there was a significant increase in the 
rate of profits indicating that the sale of its steel division was proving to be profitable 
for the enterprise. The testing of various Hypotheses shows that the relation between 
the Pre and Post merger FATR and WCTR is significant while the one between the 
pre and post merger profitability is insignificant. In case of FATR the correlation 
coefficient (r) is moderate at 0.38 while for WCTR it is high at 0.76. The testing of 
Hypothesis to determine the relation between the profitability and MPS before and 
after the merger is interesting. The relation between the Profitability and MPS prior to 
the merger is statistically insignificant while the relation between the Profitability and 
MPS after the merger is statistically significant. The degree of correlation is low at 
0.24. The Profitability is moved by 8.84 imits for a unit change in MPS while the 
MPS is affected by 0.062 units for a units change in EPS. In case of EPS the relation 
between the Pre and post merger figures is insignificant while in case of MPS the pre 
and post merger data are statistically significant. However there is a negative 
correlation between the two at -0.55. 
b) Tata steel 
Tata Steel was earlier known as TISCO (Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited). It is 
the largest company in terms of domestic production. It is based in Jamshedpur in 
Jharkhand and is India's second largest and second most profitable company in 
private sector in India in 2008* 
The Pre merger financial analysis has been done below in Tables 9.2.8, 9.2.9 and 
9.2.10. 
Pre-Merger Analysis 
For the financial year 2000 the sales were at Rs 6886.28 crores and cost of sales at Rs 
4683.38 crores. DER was at 1.08 indicating equivalent proportion of owned and 
borrowed fiinds. CR was at 1.16. FATR was on the lower side at 0.84 while the ICR 
was comfortable at 2.21. Profitability was satisfactory at 6.14 percent. The year 2001 
saw fairiy stable ratios for Tata Steel with CR at 1.55, DER at 0.96. The ICR at 3.30 
reflected that the company had sufficient finances to meet its debt expenses while NP 
was a handsome 7.13 percent. The FATR was however low at 0.52 indicating scope 
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of utilization of fixed assets for improved operational efficiency. Sales rose by 12.68 
percent against an increase of 32.41 percent increase in cost of sales. 
The year 2002 saw sales decline by a disturbing 19.58 percent while cost of sales for 
manufacturing and other expenses for the same period increased by 2.89 percent. The 
CR was fairly the same at 1.63 along with an improved FATR at 0.89. The ICR also 
fell steeply to 1.75. DER further enhanced to 1.42 while NP sharply fell to 2.69 
percent. The year 2003 witnessed a dramatic comeback with sales increasing by 28.73 
percent and a marginal 1.56 percent increase in the expenses. The DER fell 
marginally to 1.33 while the CR also reduced to 1.36, The operational efficiencies 
improved with FATR notching up to 1.12. ICR was more than comfortable at 5.26. 
The vibrant activity was reflected in the NP at 10.34 percent. Being one of Asia's 
largest integrated steel plant there were new goals and objectives to be set out and 
achieved for the future. The year 2004 saw highest ever production of 4.06 million 
tones, sales increase by 21.73 percent while the expenses also increased by 14 percent 
for the period. However the liquidity was in troubled waters with CR at 1.02 and ICR 
at a huge 23.39 indicating too much cushion for debt which was a matter to be 
considered by the management. The major reason behind the fall in liquidity was the 
repayment of debt worth Rs 1036 crores. The FATR was at 1.19 and NP at 14.65 
percent. 
However with the economic scenario in India looking upbeat with increasing 
emphasis in infrastructure, the future looked bright and offered great prospects for the 
steel business. Being one of the lowest cost producers of steel in the world it was 
looking to capitalize on the economic scenario where a revival in the economic steel 
industry was being witnessed in the past few years. With GDP at 8.01 percent it was a 
sign of things to come. Towards the achievement of building a global business and 
expanding operations, the company decided to invest in the steel business of NatSteel 
Ltd. 
The Post merger analysis of Tata Steel is done in Tables 9.2.8, 9.2.9, 9.2.10 and 
9.2.11 
Post-Merger Analysis 
The profitability of Tata Steel after the acquisition of NatSteel is discussed here. The 
year 2005 saw sales jump by a phenomenal 33.19 percent while the manufacturing 
and other expenses increased by 17.66 percent. The CR improved marginally to 1.07 
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while FAIR and NP were at 1.38 and 21.88 percent respectively. The notable and 
worrisome feature was the ICR at 29.15 which was a little too much on the higher 
side mainly because of the DER at 0.39 indicating there was too much reliance on 
equity and debt options were not used optimally. Buoyed by the growth in the global 
steel industry, where steel consumption rose by 9.6 percent mainly relying on the 
growth in China, various initiatives and measures were taken at Tata Steel in order to 
capitalize on the situation at hand. 
In the year 2006 the rate of growth of sales moderated to 7.98 percent while the rate 
of growth of expenses to 7.65 percent. The financial ratios also confirmed the stability 
of the concern with CR at 1.15, FATR at 1.23 and NP at 20.45 percent. The ICR 
climbed further to 45.27 with the DER falling to 0.26. The robust economic 
environment had a positive influence but the profit margins were restricted by the 
depressed prices. The Indian growth story was also positive with GDP lurching 
around 8 percent. The acquisition of NatSteel also gave it an access to six countries in 
south-east Asia and China. The rate of growth of sales increased to 15.27 percent in 
2007 as compared to a 16.02 percent increase in cost of sales. Liquidity improved 
significantly with CR at 1,66. The ICR dropped to 37.13 and DER rose to 0.68. NP 
was stable at 21.36 percent and FATR was at 1.15, The demand for steel continued to 
be strong. Integration was also the order of the day with world's top two companies 
Arcelor and Mittal striking a merger and laying down a platform for future 
consolidations. For Tata Steel the year 2007 was indeed remarkable as it structured 
the largest ever acquisition by an Indian Company by acquiring Corns and emerging 
as the fifth largest steel company in the world. The market however was apprehensive 
of the largest ever acquisition structured by an Indian company. 
Despite the Corns acquisition that was undertaken, sales increased by 12.29 percent 
and manufacturing and other expenses by 7.69 percent in 2008. The liquidity dipped 
with CR at 1.22 and ICR at 9.10. DER and FATR were stable at 0.66 and 1.33 
respectively while NP was at 21,12 percent. The global meltdown was felt in the form 
of rising costs and reduced margins for the global steel industry but the figures 
suggested that the Tata-Corus acquisition was on the right track. For the year 2009 
the sales rose by 9.57 percent against a 33.33 percent increase in costs. The debt 
component increased with the DER at 0.89. The CR fell marginally to 1.15 while 
there was a sharp slump in FATR at 0.43 indicating fall in efficiencies. ICR also fell 
to 7.64 while profits were fairly stable at 21.39 percent. 
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Table 9.2.8: Pre and Post Merger Sales of Tata Steel (2001-2009) 
(Figures in Rupees Crore) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Pre-merger 
Sales 
6886.28 
7759.44 
7607.48 
9793.27 
11920.96 
Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
12.68 
-19.58 
28.73 
21.73 
Year 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Post-merger 
Sales 
15876.87 
17144.22 
19762.57 
22191.80 
24,315.77 
Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
33.19 
7.98 
15.27 
12.29 
9.57 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Tata Steel's Annual Reports 2000 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.tatasteel.com/investors/perfonnance/annual-report.asp and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/tatasteel/balance-sheet/TIS 
Table 9.2.9: Pre and Post Merger Expenses of Tata Steel (2001-2009) 
(Figures in Rupees Crore) 
Pre-merger 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Manufacturing 
& other 
expenses 
4683.38 
6201.1 
6380.35 
6480.13 
7358.82 
% 
change 
32.41 
2.89 
1.56 
13.56 
Post-merger 
Year 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Manufacturing 
& other 
expenses 
8658.41 
9320.50 
10813.84 
11645.24 
15,525.99 
% change 
17.66 
7.65 
16.02 
7.69 
33.33 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Tata Steel's Annual Rq>orts 2000 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.tatasteel.com/investors/performance/annuaI-report.asp and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/tatasteel^aIance-sheet/TIS 
Table 9.2.10: Pre-merger Ratio Analysis Tata Steel (2001-2004) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Debt Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
1.08 
0.96 
1.42 
1.33 
0.75 
Current 
Ratio 
(C.R) 
1.16 
1.55 
1.63 
1.36 
1.02 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.84 
0.52 
0.89 
1.12 
1.19 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
2.21 
3.30 
1.75 
5.26 
23.39 
Net Profit 
Ratio 
(N.P) 
(%) 
6.14 
7.13 
2.69 
10.34 
14.65 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.2.8, Appendix 21 and Appendix 22 
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Table 9.2.11: Post-merger Ratio Analy 
Year 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Debt Equity 
Ratio 
(DR) 
0.39 
0.26 
0.68 
0.66 
0.89 
Current 
Ratio 
(C.R) 
1.07 
1.15 
1.66 
1.22 
1.15 
sis Tata Steel (2005-2009) 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
1.38 
1.23 
1.15 
1.33 
0.43 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
29.15 
45.27 
37.13 
9.10 
7.64 
Net Profit 
Ratio 
(N.P) 
(%) 
21.88 
20.45 
21.36 
21.12 
21.39 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.2.8, Appendix 21 and Appendix 22 
Figure 9.2.3: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Tata Steel (Acquisition of NatSteel) 
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Figure 9.2.4: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of Tata Steel (Acquisition of NatSteel) 
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Table 9.2.12 gives an insight into the relationship between the Pre and Post merger 
Profitability FATR and ICR of Tata Steel. 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post -merger Profitability of Tata Steel. 
Hu (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post -merger Profitability of Tata Steel. 
The relation between the pre and post merger profitability of Tata Steel gives the 
correlation coefficient (r) at -0.45 which is a moderate degree of negative correlation. 
The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is at 0.2016 showing that only 20.16 percent of 
variance is explained. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit 
change in X that is the Pre merger profitability of Tata Steel there is a -0.0052 unit's 
change in Y that is the post merger profitability of Tata Steel. The intercept is high at 
21.28 indicating that there are other factors effecting the movement of Profitability. 
The value oft is calculated as 6.41 for five years of pre and post merger. The table 
value oft when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value is more than the table value 
leading to the inference that the data is statistically significant and there is a relation 
between the Pre and Post merger profitability. The Null Hypothesis is rejected while 
the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and Post -
merger FATR of Tata Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and 
Post -merger FATR of Tata Steel. 
The analysis of the Pre and Post merger FATR of Tata Steel gives the correlation 
coefficient (r) at 0.514 while the coefficient of determination (r^ ) is at 0.2644 showing 
that only 26.44 percent variance is explained. The regression equation Y on X shows 
that for every unit change in X that is the pre merger FATR of Tata Steel there is a -
4.90 unit's change in Y that is the Post merger FATR of Tata Steel. The intercept is at 
5.57 indicating that when the slope is zero there is 5.57 units change in Y. The t test is 
taken for statistical significance and it gives the value oft at 0.915. The table value of 
t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value is lesser than the table value which 
leads to the conclusion that the relation is s statistically insignificant and there is no 
relation between the pre and Post merger FATR. The Null Hypothesis is accepted 
while the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
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3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post -merger FATR of Tata Steel. 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post -merger FATR of Tata Steel. 
The study of pre and Post merger ICR reveal that for every unit change in X that is the 
pre merger ICR of Tata steel there is a change of -1.24 units change in the Post 
merger ICR of Tata Steel. The intercept is high at 34.56 indicating the effect of other 
factors in determining the ICR. The value oft test is calculated as 2.16 for five years 
of pre and post merger while the table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The 
calculated value being less than the table value leads to rejection of Null Hypothesis 
and acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis. Hence the relation is statistically 
insignificant and there is no relation between the Pre and Post merger values. 
Table 9.2.12: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, FATR and ICR of 
Tata Steel 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
Tata Steel 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
Tata Steel 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
FATR of Tata 
Steel 
Y=Post-Merger 
FATR of Tata 
Steel 
3. X= Pre-Merger 
ICR of Tata 
Steel 
Y=Post-Merger 
ICR of Tata 
Steel 
* Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=-0.45 
=-0.514 
=-0.6763 
^Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.2016 
0.2644 
0.4574 
*Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.0052X+21.28 
YonXis 
Y=-4.90X+5.57 
Y on X is 
Y=-1.24X+34.56 
*T-test 
6.41 
0.915 
2.16 
*Five Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.2.10 and 9.2.11 
Table 9.2.13 gives a synoptic view of the relation between the Profitability and the 
Market Price before and after the merger. 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre 
merger Profitability and Pre -merger MPS of Tata Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
merger Profitability and Pre -merger MPS of Tata Steel. 
The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as 0.86 which is a high degree of positive 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.7396 indicating that a high level 
of variance that is 73.96 percent is explainable. The regression equation X on Y 
shows that for every unit change in Y that is the pre merger MPS of Tata Steel there is 
a 0.06 unit's change in X that is the Pre merger Profitability of Tata Steel. The 
intercept is at 2.65 indicating that when the intercept is zero the value of X would be 
affected by 2.65 units. The equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X 
that is the pre merger profitability of Tata Steel there is 13.38 units change in Y that is 
the Pre merger MPS of Tata Steel. The value of intercept is high at 9.05 indicating the 
role of other factors. The value oft is computed as 2.92 for five years of pre merger. 
The table value oft when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value is more than the 
table value which leads to the conclusion that the relation is statistically significant 
and there is a relationship between the pre merger profitability and MPS of Tata Steel. 
The Null hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
5. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Post merger 
Profitability and Post -merger MPS of Tata Steel 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Post 
merger Profitability and Post merger MPS of Tata Steel 
Table 9.2.13 fiuther deals with the relationship between the post merger profitability 
and MPS of Tata Steel. The correlation coefficient (r) is -0.41 which is a moderate 
degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.1681 
indicating that 16.81 percent of the variance is explained. The regression equation X 
on Y shows that for every unit change in Y that is the post merger MPS of Tata Steel 
there is -0.001 units change in X which is the post merger Profitability of Tata Steel. 
The intercept is high at 21.75 indicating that it is affected by other factors other than 
MPS more. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X 
that is the post merger profitabiUty of Tata Steel the value of Y that is the post merger 
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MPS is moved by -140.41 units while the value of intercept is extremely high at 
3407.39 indicating the volatility of MPS which is affected by other factors 
significantly. The value of t is worked out as 5.04 for five years of pre and post 
merger while the table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value is 
more than the table which leads to acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis and rejection 
of Null Hypotiiesis. Hence the relation is statistically significant and there is a relation 
between Post merger values of MPS and Profitability. 
Table 9.2.13: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and Profitability of Tata 
Steel 
Variables 
4. X=Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
Tata Steel 
Y=Pre 
Merger MPS 
of Tata Steel 
5. X=Post-
Merger 
Profitability of 
Tata Steel 
Y=Post 
Merger MPS 
of Tata Steel 
•Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.86 
=-0.41 
•Coefficient of 
DeterminatioD 
0.7396 
0.1681 
•Regression 
Equations 
XonYis 
X=O.06Y+2.65 
Y on X is 
Y=13.38X-9.05 
X on Y is 
X=-0.001Y+21.75 
Y on X is 
Y=-140.41X+3407.39 
T-te$t 
2.92* 
5.04* 
*Five Years of Pre and Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 9.2.10, Table 9.2.11 and Appendix 22 
Table 9.2.14 gives an insight into the relationship between the Pre and Post MPS and 
EPS of Tata Steel. 
6. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post -merger EPS of Tata Steel 
Htt (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post -merger EPS of Tata Steel 
The correlation coefficient (r) between the Pre and Post merger EPS comes out to be -
0.619 which is a moderate degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of 
determination (r^ ) is calculated as 0.3832 indicating that only 38.32 percent of 
variance is explained by this relation. The regression equation Y on X shows that for 
every unit change in X which is the Pre merger MPS there is 1.57 units change in Y 
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that is the Post merger MPS. The value of intercept is very high at 582.71 indicating 
that other factors have a dominating role to play in the movement of MPS. The value 
oft is calculated as 3.77 for five years of pre and post merger while the table value of 
t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The calculated value being more than the table value leads 
to acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. Hence the 
relation is statistically significant and there is a relation between the Pre and Post 
merger MPS. 
7. Ho (Null Hypothesis) * There is no relation between the Pre and Post 
-merger EPS of Tata Steel. 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre and 
Post -merger EPS of Tata Steel. 
The analysis of relation between the Pre and Post merger EPS gives the correlation 
coefficient (r) at 0.86 which is a high degree of positive correlation while the 
coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.7382 which means that a high percentage that is 
73.82 percent of variance is explained. The regression equation Y on X shows that for 
every unit change in X that is the pre merger EPS there is a 0.143 units change in Y 
that is the post merger EPS. The value of constant is at 62.57 which indicate a 
significant role of other factors. The t value comes out to be 5.88 for five years of Pre 
and post merger while the table value comes out to be 2.31. Hence the calculated 
value being more than the table value leads to rejection of the Null Hypothesis and 
acceptance of the Alternative Hypothesis. Hence the relation is statistically 
significant and there is a relation between the Pre and Post merger values of EPS. 
Table 9.2.14: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and EPS of Tata Steel 
Variables 
8. X=Pre-Merger 
MPS of Tata 
Steel 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of Tata 
Steel 
7. X=Pre-Merger 
EPS of Tata 
Steel 
Y=Post Merger 
EPS of Tata 
Steel 
*CorreIation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=-0.619 
=0.86 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
(r^ ) 
0.3832 
0.7382 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-1.57X+582.71 
YonXis 
Y=0.143X+62.57 
T-test 
3.77* 
5.88* 
*Five years of Pre and Post merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Appendix 22 
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Table 9.2.15 calculates the Pre merger and Post merger Profit Margin and Profit Rate 
for NatSteel and Tata Steel. The pre merger Profit Margin for NatSteel is 0.153 while 
for Tata Steel it is at 0.82. The post merger Profit Margin for NatSteel moved up to 
0.324 indicating improved financial performance. The Post merger Profit Margin for 
Tata Steel is at 0.212. The percentage increase of Profit Margin for NatSteel is 111.77 
percent while for Tata Steel it is 158.54. Hence financially both the undertakings 
display improved performance. The Pre merger Profit rate for NatSteel is 0.0924 
while for Tata Steel it is 0.06. The Post merger profit Rate for NatSteel is 0.147 while 
for Tata Steel it is 0.355. Thus the Profit Rate for NatSteel increased by 59.09 percent 
and for Tata Steel by a huge 491.67 percent. Hence the operational performance of 
both the undertakings after the merger was highly impressive. 
8. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Margin 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Margin 
9. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
and Post-merger Profit Rate 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Rate 
Table 9.2.15: Pre and Post Merger Profit Rate and Profit Margin for NatSteel 
and Tata Steel 
NatSteel 
Tata Steel 
Net Sales 
Profit Marein= PAT . 
NS 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
0.153 
0.082 
Post-
merger 
Average 
0.324 
0.212 
Percentage 
Increase 
111.77 
158.54 
Total Assets 
Profit Rate= PAT. 
TA 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
0.0924 
0.060 
Post-
merger 
Average 
0.147 
0.355 
Percentage 
Increase 
59.09 
491.67 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.2.1, 9.2.8, Appendix 20, 
Appendix 21 and Appendix 22 
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Tata Steel earned profits on a steady basis over the last decade. The merger had an 
impact on the profitability of the entity with a moderate degree of correlation at 0.45. 
The FATR and ICR were however unaffected and were statistically insignificant. The 
relation between the MPS and Profitability shows that both the variables had a 
statistically significant relation both before and after the merger. However the degree 
of correlation fell fi-om a high degree at 0.86 to a moderate degree of negative 
correlation at 0.41. The post merger MPS was affected by -140.41 imits for a unit 
change in Profitability. The intercept was very high at 3407.39. Also the Pre merger 
MPS and EPS had a relation with the Post merger MPS and EPS respectively. The 
degree of correlation between the Pre and Post merger MPS is again negative at -0.62. 
The Profit Margin for both NatSteel and Tata Steel increased significantly. The Profit 
Margin for Tata Steel increased significantly by 491.67 percent indicating a marked 
improvement in the operating efficiency as compared to a 158.54 percent increase in 
profits 
9,3 Corus and Tata Steel: Pre and Post Merger Performance 
Assessment 
a) Corus 
Corns was formed on 6 October 1999 through the merger of British Steel and 
Koninklijke and grew to be the second largest producer of Steel in Europe with its 
operations mainly in UK, Netherlands, Germany, France and Belgium having 
approximately 37000 employees worldwide .^It was acquired by Tata Steel at 608 
pence per share on January 30 2007.^  
Pre Merger Analysis 
Tables 9.3.1 and 9.3.2 give a deep insight into the pre merger analysis of Corus. 
The year 2000 saw the turnover of Corus Group at £9509 million and the operating 
cost at £10542 million. The DER was very low at 0.53. The CR was satisfactory at 
2.32, FATR was at 2.30 and WCTR at 3.93. The ICR at -10.29 was extremely low. 
However the losses which stood at -9.89 percent were a cause for worry. It should be 
taken into consideration that this year saw restructuring expenses worth £1152 million 
and writing down of assets to the tune of £701 million. Otherwise the stainless steel 
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diviBion made operating profits to the tune of £150 million. There were encouraging 
trends relating to demand in this sector. 
However with major changes in management there was a sense of insecurity among 
the employees as well and the group was faced with major challenges to redeem its 
position and prove its competitiveness. The year 2001 saw the turnover fall by 19.35 
percent and operating cost by23.32 percent. The DER was stable at 0.53 while the 
other ratios were fairly satisfactory with CR at 1.95, FATR at 2.05 and WCTR at 
4.68. The ICR improved to -3.44 but was still negative. The losses dropped 
marginally to -5.46 percent. The operations at Corns were marred by looses and their 
cause was not helped by the global market which was weak in terms of demand 
resulting in excess supply and lower selling prices. 
The year 2002 saw turnover fall by a comparatively lesser margin at -6.27 and 
operating cost by 5.57 percent. The ratios did not change much with DER at 0.54 
signaling scope for further influx of debt, CR at 2.02 reflecting sound liquidity, FATR 
at 2.3 reflecting efficient utilization of fixed assets and WCTR at 4.31 reflecting 
adequate use of working capital. The ICR continued to be negative at -3.37.The losses 
however notched up a little to -6.37 percent. Though the management's efforts 
yielded results in terms of operational efficiency but the weakened global demand was 
a cause for worry. The year 2003 indeed posed various challenges to the Corns 
group. The efforts reflected in the results to some extent with the turnover increasing 
by 10.64 percent against an increase of 6.9 percent in operating cost. Debt proportion 
lowered further with the DER falling to 0.47. CR rose to 2.15 and FATR to 2.68. The 
WCTR also rose to 4.39 while the ICR dropped down to -1.57. Losses' dropping to -
3.84 was a positive sign. With failing of various plans and projects new initiatives 
were undertaken in the form of management team, strategies, plans and policies. 
Plans were made to make concerted efforts in areas of strength such as carbon steel. 
For the year 2004 the turnover further increased by 14.77 percent against an increase 
of 7.22 percent in operating cost. The ratios were fairly the same with DER at 0.44, 
CR at 2.24, FATR at 3.05 and WCTR at 4.01. The ICR became positive which was a 
sign of relief at 5.76. However the highlight of the financial results was the 
profitability which was recorded at 4.78 percent. 'Restoring Success' plan, undertaken 
in the previous financial year resulted in increased efficiency and performance. It was 
well reflected in the results. The favorable global and economic environment was an 
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added boost to the company in restoring its competitiveness in Europe. However it 
was important to the pattern of growth. 
For the financial year 2005 the turnover fell marginally by 1.90 percent against a fall 
of 2.72 percent in operating cost. DER was steady at 0.43. CR fell marginally to 1.81 
and FATR to 2.62 while the WCTR increased to 4.63. The reduced DER led to an 
increase in ICR to 6.56. It is notable that despite a capital investment of £423 million 
the position of Corus had strengthened in terms of liquidity reflecting upon the 
healthy state of financial affairs in a highly competitive and challenging global market 
where demand had slowed down. The "Restoring Success' plan was well on target 
with the estimations that 80 percent of the targets underlined were achieved by the 
year 2005. The year 2006 saw the turnover increase by another 6.31 percent against a 
0.09 percent increase in the operating cost. The ratios were more or less the same with 
DER at 0.35, CR at 1.88, FATR at 2.65 and WCTR at 4.72. The ICR was at 2.26. The 
profitability however reduced to 1.99 percent. In a bid to expand operations beyond 
Western Europe, Corus explored its options by considering various plans in Brazil, 
Russia and China. Ultimately the offer of Tata Steel, the world's fifth largest to 
acquire Corus at 608 pence per share was approved unanimously by the Board and the 
takeover was finally completed on 2 April, 2007. 
The above analysis shows that in the recent years Corus had recovered fi-om the losses 
it was experiencing few years back. Ratio analysis also reveals that the company was 
financially sound. 
Table 9.3.1: Pre Merger Turnover and Operating Cost of Corus Group (2001-
2005) (Figures in Pound (£) MilUon) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Pre Merger 
Turnover 
9509 
7669 
7188 
7953 
9332 
9155 
9733 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
-19.3501 
-6.272 
10.64274 
14.77711 
-1.8967 
6.31349 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Pre Merger 
Operating 
Cost 
10542 
8084 
7634 
8161 
8750 
8512 
9276 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
-23.3163 
-5.56655 
6.903327 
7.217253 
-2.72 
0.089756 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Reports of Corus from 2000 to 2006. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.corusgroup.coni/en/company/financial_information/report_and_accounts/ 
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Table 9.3.2: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Corus Group (2001-2005) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
0.53 
0.53 
0.54 
0.47 
0.44 
0.43 
0.35 
Current 
Ratio 
(CR) 
2.32 
1.95 
2.02 
2.15 
2.24 
1.81 
1.88 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
2.30 
2.05 
2.30 
2.68 
3.05 
2.62 
2.65 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(WCTR) 
3.93 
4.68 
4.31 
4.39 
4.01 
4.63 
4.72 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
-10.29 
-3.44 
-3.37 
-1.57 
5.76 
6.56 
2.26 
Profitability 
(%) 
-9.89 
-5.46 
-6.37 
-3.84 
4.78 
4.72 
1,99 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Annual Reports of Corus from 2000 to 2006 
Retrieved from 
http;//www.corusgroup.com/en/company/fmancial_information/report_and_accounts/ 
Figure 9.3.1: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Corus 
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Source: Table 9.3.2 
Table 9.3.3 gives a deep understanding of the relationship between the Pre Merger 
Profitability, FATR and ICR of Corus Group with the Post merger data of Tata Steel 
to study whether the financials of the Tata Steel were affected by that of the Corus 
Group. 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
Profitability of Corus and Post -merger Profitability of Tata Steel. 
H„ (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger Profitability of Corus and Post -merger Profitability of Tata 
Steel 
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The correlation coefficient (r) between the X and Y that is the pre merger profitability 
of Corns and the post merger Profitability of Tata Steel is worked out as -0.57 
indicating a moderate degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of determination 
(r^ ) is 0.3249 indicating that just 32.49 percent of the variance is explained by this 
relationship. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X 
that is the Pre merger Profitability of Corns there is a -0.053 unit's change in Y that is 
the Post merger profitability of Tata Steel. The intercept is high at 21.49 pointing 
towards the role of other factors in influencing the profitability. The value of t for 
three years of Pre and Post merger is 18.89 while the table value oft when v=4 at to.os 
is 2.78. The calculated value being higher than the table value leads to acceptance of 
the Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of the Null Hypothesis. Hence the data is 
statistically significant and there is a relation between the Pre and Post merger values. 
Further when the t value is calculated for seven years of Pre merger and three years of 
post merger it is worked out to be 6.69 while the table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 
2.31. Here again the calculated value is more than the table value. It means that the 
relation is statistically significant and there is a relation between the Pre and post 
merger values. The Null Hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypothesis is 
rejected. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
FATR of Corns and Post -merger FATR of Tata Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger FATR of Corns and Post -merger FATR of Tata Steel 
Further Table 9.3.3 explores the relationship between the Pre Merger FATR of Corns 
and the Post merger FATR of Tata Steel. The correlation coefficient (r) is 0.27 which 
is a moderate degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 
0.0729 which means that just 7.29 percent of the variation is explained by this 
relationship. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X 
that is the Pre merger FATR of Corus there is a 0.53 unit's change in Y that is the post 
merger FATR of Tata Steel. The intercept is also low at -0.50. The values are tested 
for statistical significance for which t-test is conducted. The t value is worked out to 
be 5.85 for three years of Pre and Post merger. The table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 
2.78. The calculated value is higher than the table value which leads to acceptance of 
the Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of the Null Hypothesis. Hence the 
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relation is statistically significant and there is a relation between the Pre and post 
merger values. 
Further the t values are calculated for seven years of Pre merger and three years of 
post merger. It comes out as 6.04 while the table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. 
Hence the calculated value being more than the table leads to the conclusion that the 
relation is statistically significant and there is a relation between the Pre and Post 
merger values. The Null Hypothesis is rejected while the Alternative Hypothesis is 
accepted. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
ICR of Corns and Post -merger ICR of Tata Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger ICR of Corns and Post -merger ICR of Tata Steel 
Table 9.3,3 further sheds light on the relation between the Pre and post merger values 
of ICR. The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as 0.38 indicating a moderate 
degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.1444 which 
means that 14.44 percent change in variance is explained. The regression equation Y 
on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the pre merger ICR of Corns there 
is a 2.78 unit's change in Y that is the post merger ICR of Tata Steel. The value oft 
for three years of Pre and Post merger is calculated as 1.35 while the table value oft 
when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. Hence the calculated value is less than the table value which 
leads to the conclusion that the relation is statistically insignificant and there is no 
relation between the Pre and Post merger ICR. The Null Hypothesis is accepted and 
the Alternative Hypothesis is rejected. 
The t value is further calculated for seven years of pre-merger and three years of post 
merger. It is worked out to be 2.75. The table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. 
Hence the calculated value is more than table value which leads to rejection of Null 
Hypothesis and acceptance of the Alternative Hypothesis stating that there is a 
relation between the Pre and Post merger ICR. The relation is slated to be statistically 
significant. 
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Table 9.3.3: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of ProfitabiUty, FATR and WCTR of 
Corns and Tata Steel 
Variables 
1. X=Pre-
Merger 
Profitability of 
Corus 
Y=Post-
Merger 
Profitability of 
Tata Steel 
2. X= Pre-
Merger FATR 
of Corus 
Y=Post-
Merger FATR 
of Tata Steel 
3. X= Pre-
Merger ICR of 
Corus Y=Post-
Merger ICR of 
Tata Steel 
•Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=-0.57 
=0.27 
=0.38 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.3249 
0.0729 
0.1444 
•Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.053X+21.49 
Y on X is 
Y=0.53X.-0.50 
Y on X is 
Y=2.78X+4.48 
**T-test 
t=18.89* 
t=6.69** 
t=5.85* 
t=6.04** 
t=1.35* 
t=2.75** 
•Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Seven Years of Pre and Three Years of Post Merger undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.3.2 and Table 9.3.8 
Table 9.3.4 deals with the relationship between the pre merger EPS of Corus and the 
post merger EPS of Tata Steel. 
4. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger 
EPS of Corus and Post -merger EPS of Tata Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger EPS of Corus and Post -merger EPS of Tata Steel 
The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out to be 0.90 which is a very high degree of 
positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is worked out as 0.81 which 
means that 81 percent of the variance is explained. The regression eqiiation Y on X 
shows that for every unit change in X that is the pre merger EPS of Corus there is 
0.30 units change in Y that is the Post merger EPS of Tata Steel. The value of t is 
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worked out to be 13.88 for three years of Pre and Post merger. The table value oft 
when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value being more than the table value leads to 
acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. The 
relation is statistically significant and there is a relation between the Pre and Post 
merger values. 
The t value is further calculated as 6.60 for seven years of pre merger and three years 
of post merger while the table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. Here again the 
calculated value is more than the table value which leads to acceptance of 
Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is a relation 
between the Pre and Post merger values which is statistically significant. 
Table 9.3.4: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of EPS of Corus and Tata Steel 
Variables 
4. X= Pre-
Merger EPS 
of Corus 
Y=Post-
Merger EPS 
of Tata Steel 
*Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.90 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
(r') 
0.81 
*Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=0.30X+63.24 
**T-test 
t=13.88* 
t=6.60** 
*Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
••Seven Years of Pre and Three Years of Post Merger undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 22 and Appendix 24 
From 2000 to 2003 Corus was registering losses and it was only in 2004 that Corus 
earned profits. However the rate of profits fi-om 2004 to 2006 was in the range of 2 
percent to 5 percent which was not very high. The test of hypothesis shows that the 
Profitability and FATR prior to the merger had a relation with that of the post merger 
Profitability and FATR respectively of Tata Steel. While Profitability had a negative 
correlation at -0.57, the FATR had a positive correlation with the post merger figure 
at 0.27. The ICR was affected only in the longer run. Pre merger EPS had a very high 
degree of positive correlation with the post merger EPS at 0.90 indicating the benefits 
accrued to the shareholders. 
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b) Tata Steel 
The Tata Corns acquisition was a much talked about and hyped one owing to the fact 
that it was the largest ever global acquisition ever by an Indian Company. The Anglo-
Dutch steel company Corns Group Pic (Corns) was acquired for US$12.10 billion . 
The ambitions of Tata Steel finally won it the bid for Corns which was making about 
four times more than the former. The deal catapulted the group to the fifth largest in 
the world and the second largest in Europe at that time. 
Table 9.3.5: Pre and Post Merger Sales of Tata Steel (2000-2009) 
(Figures in Rupees Crore) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Source: Cor 
Pre-merger 
Sales 
6886.28 
7759.44 
7607.48 
9793.27 
11920.96 
15876.87 
17144.22 
npiled and Calc 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
-
12.68 
-19.58 
28.73 
21.73 
33.19 
7.98 
ulated from Tata Si 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
eel's Annual 
Post-merger 
Sales 
19762.57 
22191.80 
24,315.77 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
15.27 
12.29 
9.57 
Reports 2000 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.tatasteel.com/investors/perfonnance/annual-report.asp and 
http://www.moneycontrol.coni/fmancials/tatasteel/balance-sheet/TIS 
Table 9.3.6: Pre and Posi 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Source: 
t Merger Expenses of Tata Steel (2000-2009) 
(Figures in Rupees Crore) 
Pre-merger 
Manufacturing 
& other 
expenses 
4683.38 
6201.1 
6380.35 
6480.13 
7358.82 
8658.41 
9320.50 
Compiled and Calcu 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
32.41 
2.89 
1.56 
13.56 
17.66 
7.65 
ated from Tata Ste 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
si's Annu 
Post-merger 
Manufacturing 
& other 
expenses 
10813.84 
11645.24 
15,525.99 
al Reports 2000 to 2C 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous 
Year 
16.02 
7.69 
33.33 
109. Retrieved 
from http://www.tatasteel.coni/investors/performance/annual-report.asp and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/tatasteeVbalance-sheet/TIS 
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Table 9.3.7: Pre-merger Ratio Analysis Tata Steel (2000-2006) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Debt Equity 
Ratio 
1.08 
0.96 
1.42 
1,33 
0.75 
0.39 
0.26 
Current 
Ratio 
(C.R) 
1.16 
1.55 
1.63 
1.36 
1.02 
1.07 
1.15 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.84 
0.52 
0.89 
1.12 
1.19 
1.38 
1.23 
Interest 
Coverage Ratio 
(ICR) 
2.21 
3.30 
1.75 
5.26 
23.39 
29.15 
45.27 
Net Profit 
(N.P) 
(%) 
6.14 
7.13 
2.69 
10.34 
14.65 
21.88 
20.45 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.3.5, Appendix 21 and Appendix 22 
Table 9.3.8: Post-merger Ratio Analysis Tata Steel (2007-2009) 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Debt Equity 
Ratio 
0.68 
0.66 
0.89 
Current 
Ratio 
(C.R) 
1.66 
1.22 
1.15 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
1.15 
1.33 
0.43 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
37.13 
9.10 
7.64 
Net Profit 
Ratio 
(N.P) 
(%) 
21.36 
21.12 
21.39 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.3.5, Appendix 21 and Appendix 22 
Figure 9.3.2: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Tata Steel (Acquisition of Corus) 
^n -, 
An -
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
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Figure 9.3.3: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of Tata Steel (Acquisition of Corns) 
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Source: Table 9.3.8 
Detailed analysis of the financial condition of Tata Steel is discussed at length 
above where its acquisition of NatSteel is discussed. 
Table 9.3.9 deals with the pre and post merger analysis of the Profitability, FATR and 
ICR. 
1. Ho (NuH Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger Profitability of Tata Steel. 
Ho, (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger Profitability of Tata Steel. 
The correlation coefficient (r) between the two variables is worked out as -0.573 
which is a moderate degree of negative correlation. The coefficient of determination 
(r^) is 0.3283 indicating that only 32.83 percent of the variance is explained by this 
relationship. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X 
which is the pre merger profitability of Tata Steel there is -0.02 units change in Y 
which is the post merger profitability of Tata Steel. The value of intercept is high at 
21.71 indicating the effect of other factors. The value oft for three years of pre and 
post merger is calculated as 1.04. The table value when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The 
calculated value is less than the table value which leads to acceptance of Null 
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Hypothesis and rejection of Alternative Hypotliesis. Hence the relation is 
statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the Pre and Post merger 
values. 
The t -value is further calculated for seven years of pre merger and three years of post 
merger. It gives the t value at 2.14. The table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The 
calculated value is less than the table value which leads to rejection of Alternative 
Hypothesis and acceptance of Null Hypothesis. Hence the relation is statistically 
insignificant and there is no relation between the Pre and Post merger values of 
Profitability. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger FATR of Tata Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger FATR of Tata Steel. 
The analysis of Pre and Post merger FATR reveals that the correlation coefficient (r) 
between the two is -0.49 which is a moderate degree of negative correlation. The 
coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.2401 which means that only 24.01 percent of the 
variance is explained by this relationship. The Regression equation Y on X shows that 
for every unit change in X which is the pre merger FATR of Tata Steel there is a 2.33 
unit's change in Y that is the post merger FATR of Tata Steel while the intercept at 
1.99 is also not very high. The relation is fiirther investigated for statistical 
significance which gives the t value at 1.07 for three years of pre and post merger. 
The table value of t when v=4 at to.os is 2.78 which leads to acceptance of Null 
Hypothesis and rejection of Alternative Hypothesis. Hence the relation is 
statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the pre and post merger 
values. 
The t-value is fiirther calculated for seven years of pre merger and three years of post 
merger. It gives the t value at 0.23 while the table value oft when v=8 at to.05 is 2.31. 
The calculated value is less than the table value which leads to acceptance of Null 
Hypothesis and rejection of Alternative Hypothesis. The relation is statistically 
insignificant and there is no relation between the pre and post merger values. 
307 I P a g e 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger ICR of Tata Steel. 
Htt (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger ICR of Tata Steel. 
The relationship between the pre and post merger ICR of Tata Steel is studied next. 
The correlation coefficient (r) is -0.73 which is a moderate degree of negative 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^) is 0.5388 which means that only 
53.88 percent of the variance is explained by this relationship. The regression 
equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the pre merger ICR of 
Tata Steel there is a change of-0.108 units change in Y that is the post merger ICR of 
Tata Steel. The intercept is high at 18.49 indicating the role of other factors. The value 
of t is calculated 0.575 for three years of pre and post merger. The table value of t 
when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value is less than the table value which leads 
to the rejection of Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of Null Hypothesis. The 
relation is statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the pre and post 
merger values. 
The t value is further calculated for seven years of pre merger and three years of post 
merger which comes out to be 1.20. The table value oft when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The 
calculated value is less than the table value which leads to rejection of Alternative 
Hypothesis and acceptance of Null Hypothesis. The relation is statistically 
insignificant and there is no relation between the pre and post merger values. 
Table 9.3.9: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, FATR and ICR of 
Tata Steel 
Variables 
^Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
•Coefficient of 
Determination •Regression Equations **T-test 
1. X = Pre-Merger 
Profitability of Tata 
Steel 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of Tata 
Steel 
=-0.573 0.3283 Y on X is Y=-0.02X+21.71 
t=1.04* 
t=2.14** 
2. X = Pre-Merger 
FATR of Tata Steel 
Y=Post-Merger 
FATR of Tata Steel 
=-0.49 0.2401 YonXis 
Y=2.33X+1.99 
t=1.07* 
t=0.227** 
3. X = Post-Merger 
ICR of Tata Steel 
Y=Pre-MergerICR 
of Tata Steel 
=-0.73 0.5388 Y on X is 
Y=-0.108X+18.49 
t=0.575* 
t=1.2** 
*Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
** Seven Years of Pre and Three Years of Post Merger undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 9.3.7 and 9.3.8 
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MPS is moved by -1584.93X which is very high. The value of intercept is also very 
high at 34175.36 which points towards the role of other factors. The high numbers 
indicate towards the volatility in the market as a result of the announcement of the 
highest ever acquisition by an Indian company. The t value is calculated as 2.9 for 
three years of post merger. The table value of t when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The 
calculated value being higher than the table value leads to acceptance of Alternative 
Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is a relation between the 
Post merger values of Profitability and MPS which is statistically significant. 
Table 9.3.10: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and Profitability of Tata 
Steel 
Variables 
4. X=Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
Tata Steel 
Y=Pre Merger 
MPS of Tata 
Steel 
5. X=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
Tata Steel 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of Tata 
Steel 
•Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=0.93 
=-0.96 
•Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.8591 
0.9139 
•Regression 
Equations 
X on Y is 
X=0.041Y+4.16 
Y on X is 
Y=21.10X-60.86 
X on Y is 
X=-0.00058Y+21.54 
Y on X is 
Y=-
1584.93X+34175.36 
T-test 
2.82* 
2.9** 
* Seven Years of Pre Merger taken 
**Three Years of Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Tables 9.3.7, 9.3.8 and Appendix 22 
Table 9.3.11 explores the relation between the Pre and Post merger MPS and EPS. 
6. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger MPS of Tata Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger MPS of Tata Steel. 
The Hypothesis between the Pre and Post merger MPS is analyzed first. It gives the 
correlation coefficient (r) at -0.37 which is a moderate degree of negative correlation. 
The coefficient of determination (r^ ) at 0.1376 indicated that only 13.76 percent of the 
variance is explained by this relationship. The regression equation Y on X showed 
that for every unit change in X that is the pre merger MPS of Tata Steel the post 
merger MPS is affected by -0.056 units. The intercept is high at 451.97 indicating that 
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the post merger MPS is moved by other factors in a much stronger degree than the pre 
merger MPS. The t-value for three years of pre and post merger is calculated as 0.274 
while the table value of t when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value is less than 
the table value which leads to acceptance of Null Hypothesis and rejection of 
Alternative Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation between the Pre and post merger 
MPS and the relation is statistically insignificant. 
Further the t value is calculated for seven years of pre merger and three years of post 
merger which comes out as 1.84. The table value of t when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The 
calculated value is less than the table value which leads to rejection of Alternative 
Hypothesis and acceptance of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation between 
the Pre and Post merger MPS in the longer run and it is statistically insignificant. 
7. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger EPS of Tata Steel. 
Htt (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger EPS of Tata Steel. 
The correlation coefficient (r) between the pre and post merger MPS is worked out as 
0.86 which is a high degree of positive correlation. The coefficient of determination 
(r^ ) is 0.729 which means that 72.9percent of the variance is explained by this 
relationship. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X 
that is the pre merger EPS the post merger EPS is affected by 0.196 imits while the 
intercept is high at 55.95 which indicates that other factors have an important role to 
play in the movement of EPS. The value oft for three years of pre and post merger is 
worked out as 1.76 while the table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated 
value being lesser than the table value leads to rejection of Alternative Hypothesis 
and acceptance of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation between the pre and 
post merger values of EPS and the relation is statistically insignificant. 
The t value is then worked out for seven years of pre merger and three years of post 
merger which comes out as 2.33. The table value oft when v=8 at to.os is 2.31. The 
calculated value is more than the table value which leads to acceptance of 
Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is a relation 
between the Pre and Post merger values of EPS which is statistically significant. 
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Table 9.3.11: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of MPS and EPS of Tata Steel 
Variables 
6. X=Pre-Merger 
MPS of Tata 
Steel 
Y=Post Merger 
MPS of Tata Steel 
7. X=Pre-Merger 
EPS of Tata 
Steel 
Y=Post Merger 
EPS of Tata Steel 
^Correlation 
Coefncient 
(r) 
-0.37 
0.86 
"CoefTicient 
of 
Determination 
(r') 
0.1376 
0.729 
^Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.056X+451.97 
Y=0.196X+55.95 
T-test 
t=0.274* 
t=1.84** 
t=1.76* 
t=2.33** 
•Seven years of Pre-merger taken 
** Three years Post Merger taken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 22 
Table 9.3.12 gives an insight in to the Pre and Post merger Profit Rate and Profit 
Margin. The pre merger Profit Margin for Corns is very low at -0.020 while that for 
Tata Steel is at 0.12. The Post merger Profit Margin for Tata is 0.213 which is a 77.5 
percent increase over the pre merger average. Corns was also benefiting fi^om being 
associated with a group having a Profit margin which was much higher than what it 
was having in the pre merger period. The Pre merger Profit Rate of Corns is worked 
out as -0.021 while that for Tata Steel is at 0.II8. The Post merger Profit Rate of Tata 
Steel is at 0.416 which is a 252.54 percent increase over the pre merger figure 
indicating extremely high operating efficiency. Hence the post merger averages 
reflect positively on the financial and operating efficiencies and performance. 
8. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Margin 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Margin 
9. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre Merger and 
Post-merger Profit Rate 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
Merger and Post-merger Profit Rate 
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9.4 Aleoma Steel and Essar Steel : Pre and Post Mereer 
Announcement 
a) AJgoma Steel 
Algoma Steel was established in 1901 in Ontario, Canada and is an integrated 
producer of steel, it was acquired in the year 2007 by Essar Steel Algoma Inc. and 
was renamed as Essar Steel Algoma Inc. as the formers wholly owned subsidiary. Its 
products are sold in USA and Canada. Essar offered to acquire Algoma Steel for 1.85 
billion CAD in cash and completed the acquisition on 20 June 2007. 
Pre Merger Analysis 
The financial analysis of Algoma Steel prior to it being taken over by Essar Steel is 
done in Tables 9.4.1, 9.4.2 and 9.4.3. The turnover for the year 2001 was 912 millions 
of Canadian Dollars while cost of sales was 961 millions of Canadian dollars. The 
DER was at 0.81 reflecting the low proportion of debt in the capital structure. The CR 
was reasonable at 1.73 while the FATR was at 1.27. The WCTR was too high at 6.66 
which needed the attention of the management for corrective action while the ICR 
was low at -9.81. The entity was in deep trouble with losses being reported to the tune 
of-39.8 percent. The mid-half of 2000 and the year 2001 saw turbulence in the global 
steel market, it led to lowered demand which resulted in lower production and selling 
prices, piling up on the misery of the company. Reorganization costs of $104 million 
were incurred for the period as well. At the same time attempts were made to 
restructure the company and reduce its debts through a strategy called 'the "Plan" 
which aimed to bring back the company to profitable state. For the year 2002 the sales 
increased by 13.05 percent against a fall of 9.78 percent in cost of sales. DER lowered 
to 0.63, FATR increased to 1.5 and WCTR decreased to 5.51 indicating an 
improvement in the operational efficiency of the concern which was reflected in the 
profitability being recorded at 4.17 percent. The ICR also moved up to 3.8 indicating 
the increased ability to finance debt expenses. 
The improvement in the world market in terms of demand and selling price was a 
boost for the company. Also the restructuring plans undertaken with a view to reduce 
debt and enhance profitability were yielding positive results. For the year 2003 the 
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sales rose by 10.40 percent against a 5.57 percent increase in cost of sales.DER and 
WCTR lowered down to 0.50 and 5.44 respectively. FATR at 1.73 reflected efficient 
use of fixed assets while the CR also improved to 2.30. The ICR again fell down to 
0.64. The level of profitability however dropped to 0.74 percent. The US economy 
was facing difficult times and selling prices dropped by 22 percent for the period. 
However, the situation demanded more concerted efforts on the part of the 
management of the Algoma Steel to revamp its operations. 
The year 2004 saw the sales rise by a whopping 58.42 percent against a 39.59 percent 
increase in cost of sales. The DER also fell substantially to 0.17 and WCTR to 2.15. 
The CR was fairly high at 5.39 while the FATR also rose to 2.80. The ICR at 29.46 
reflected that the debt proportion was too low and there were more than adequate 
financial resources to finance it. The efficiency in operations was evident with profits 
being reported at 19.07 which was major boost to the plans put in by the management 
which resulted in the most profitable year being recorded in the company's history. 
The spurt in demand due to positive global economic outlook was an added 
advantage. For the year 2005, sales rose by 6.35 percent against a huge 39.59 percent 
increase in cost of sales. The DER and CR fell further to 0.01 and 2.69 respectively. 
FATR and WCTR were fairly stable at 2.98 and 2.93 respectively and ICR was still 
high at 21.77. Profitability dropped down to 12.50 percent. The high cost of sales can 
be attributed to increased level of production activity and high cost of raw material. 
The year 2006 saw the sales rise by 1.15 percent against an increase of 4.04 percent in 
cost of sales. DER was at 0.01. CR rose to 3.71 while the FATR fell marginally to 
2.88. WCTR notched up to 3.19. Profitability was recorded at a satisfactory level of 
11.44 percent. The ICR was at 1622.5 due to the debt being very low. The year 2004 
onwards saw the DER falling and the ICR rising at huge rates. The reason was that 
the company undertook the redemption of the 11 percent notes constituting the long 
term debt due to which the debt proportion fell drastically and it led to the changes in 
the figures of DER and ICR. 
Algoma Steel had acquired financial strength on the basis of its dedicated efforts 
which enabled it to re-purchase $200 million of its common shares. On 15 April 2007 
the company accepted the acquisition bid by Essar Steel Holdings Limited of India 
providing for the acquisition of all its common shares at $56 per share. 
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Post Merger Analysis 
The analysis of the figures of Algoma Steel after the merger has been conducted is 
done in Tables 9.4.1, 9.4.2, 9.4.3and 9.4.4. 
The financials of Essar steel which was the merging company were maintained for 
financial year ending in the month of March while for Algoma it was done for the 
month ending in December. Post merger there was a need to reconcile the financial 
statements and both were synced to make the financial statement for the month ending 
March. However the year 2007 and 2008 thus saw some disturbances due to changing 
of the financial year ending. The sales for the year 2007 are seen to fall at the rate of 
53.01 percent while the cost of sales are seen to decrease by -53.01 but these figures 
are adjusted for the change in the financial year ending and hence these decrease in 
rates was not a cause of concern. The DER rose to 1.29 signaling influx of debt 
capital while the CR fell but was still comfortable at 1.42. The FATR fell to 0.45 
indicating a fall in the operating efficiency while the WCTR increased to 4.99. The 
ICR was still high at 53.77. A profit of 1.62 percent signified that the company barely 
managed to break even. 
For the financial year 2008 the sales surged 57.56& while the cost of sales moved up 
by 67.92 percent. DER notched up to 0.93 while the CR was at 1.43. The FATR 
moved up to 0.71 while the WCTR was very liigh at 7.79. The ICR became negative 
at -0.77 indicating the inability to finance debt while the company reported losses of-
0.79 percent. The year 2009 saw sales jump by another 77.40 percent while the cost of 
sales surged by 67.93 percent. The DER fell to 0.93 indicating that the proportion of 
equity was again higher than that of debt. CR fell slightly to 1.35 while the operating 
efficiency was back on track with the FATR at 1.03. WCTR need to be looked into by 
the management as it was exceptionally high at 17.06 while the ICR at 0.91 was low. 
However the good news for the management was the profits being recorded at 8.53 
percent. 
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Table 9.4.1: Pre and Post Merger Sales of Algoma Steel (2001-2009) 
Figures in Millions of Canadian Dollars 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Pre Merger 
Sales 
912 
1031 
1138.2 
1803.1 
1917,6 
1939.7 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
(%) 
-
13.04825 
10.39767 
58.4168 
6.350175 
1.152482 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Post Merger 
Sales 
911.4 
1436 
2547.5 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
(%) 
-53.01 
57.56 
77.40 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Algoma Steel Annual Reports 2001 to 2009. 
Retrieved from http://www.algoma.com/investors/financial-reports/ 
Table 9.4.2: Pre and Post 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Source: Co 
merger Cost of Sales of Algoma (2001-2009) 
Figures in Millions of Canadian Dollars 
Pre Merger 
Cost of Sales 
961 
867 
915.3 
1024.7 
1430.4 
1488.2 
mpiled and Cal 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
(%) 
-9.78148 
5.570934 
11.95237 
39.59208 
4.040828 
culated from Algo 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
ma Stee 
Post Merger 
Cost of 
Sales 
779.1 
1308.3 
2197.0 
Annual Repor 
Percentage 
Increase over 
Previous Year 
(%) 
-47.65 
67.92 
67.93 
ts 2001 to 2009. 
Retrieved from http://www.algoma.com/investors/financial-reports/ 
Table 9.4.3: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Algoma Steel (2001-2006) 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
0.81 
0.63 
0.50 
0.17 
0.01 
0.009 
Current 
Ratio 
(CR) 
1.73 
1.73 
2.30 
5.39 
2.69 
3.71 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
1.27 
1.5 
1.73 
2.8 
2.98 
2.88 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(WCTR) 
6.66 
5.51 
5.44 
2.15 
2.93 
3.19 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
acR) 
-9.8125 
3.8 
0.64 
29.46 
21.77 
1622.5 
ProfitabUity 
(%) 
-39.8 
4.17 
0.74 
19.07 
12.5 
11.44 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.4.1, Appendix 27 and Appendix 28 
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Figure 9.4.2: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of Algoma 
•Debt Equity Ratio (DER) 
•Fixed Assets Turnover Ratio (FAIR) 
• Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) 
•Current Ratio (CR) 
•Working Capital Turnover Ratio (WCTR) 
Source: Table 9.4.4 
Table 9.4.5 explores the relationship between the pre and post merger Profitability, 
F ATR and ICR of Algoma Steel. 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger Profitability of Algoma Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger Profitability of Algoma Steel. 
The correlation coefficient (r) between the pre and post merger profitability of 
Algoma Steel is calculated as -0.39 which is a moderate degree of negative 
correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^) is 0.1521 which means that just 
15.21 percent of the variance is explained by this relation. The regression equation Y 
on X shows that for every unit change in X that is the pre merger profitability of 
Algoma Steel there is a change of -0.46 units in Y which is the post merger 
profitability of Algoma Steel. The intercept is at 9.66 which indicate the role of other 
factors. The t value for three years of pre and post merger is calculated as 3.05 while 
the table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value being more than the 
table value leads to rejection of the Null Hypothesis and acceptance of the 
319 I P a g e 
Alternative Hypothesis. It shows that the relation is statistically significant and there 
is a relation between the pre and post merger values. 
The value oft is further calculated for six years of pre merger and three years of post 
merger which gives the t value at 0.14 while the table value oft when v=7 at to.os is 
2.37. The calculated value being less than the table value leads to rejection of the 
Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of the Null Hypothesis. Hence the relation 
is statistically insignificant and there is no relation between the pre and post merger 
values here. 
2. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger FATR of Algoma Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger FATR of Algoma Steel. 
The correlation coefficient (r) is worked out to be 0.39 which is a moderate degree of 
positive correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0.1521 which means that 
only 15.21 percent of the variance is explained by this relationship. The regression 
equation Y on X shows that for every unit change in X which is the pre merger FATR 
of Algoma Steel there is a 1.25 unit change in Y which is the post merger FATR of 
Algoma Steel. Tlie intercept is not very high at -2.89. The t value is calculated as 
12.31 for three years of Pre and Post merger. The table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 
2.78. The calculated value is more than the table value which leads to acceptance of 
Alternative Hypothesis and rejection of Null Hypothesis. Hence the relation is 
statistically significant and there is a relation between the pre and post merger values 
of FATR of Algoma Steel. 
The t value is fiirther calculated for six years of pre merger and three years of post 
merger and it comes out as 3.06 while the table value oft when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. 
The calculated value is again more than the table value which leads to rejection of 
Null Hypothesis and acceptance of Alternative Hypothesis. Hence there is a 
relation between the pre and post merger values of FATR and it is statistically 
significant. 
3. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger ICR of Algoma Steel. 
H« (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger ICR of Algoma Steel. 
The next hypothesis examines the pre and post merger ICR of Algoma Steel. The 
correlation coefficient (r) is worked out as -0.47 which is a moderate degree of 
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negative correlation. The coefficient of determination (r^ ) is 0,2209 which means that 
just 22.09 percent of the variance is explained by this relation. The t value comes out 
as 1.01 for three years of pre and post merger while the table value oft when v=4 at 
to.o5 is 2.78. The calculated value being less than the table value leads to rejectioo of 
Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is no 
relation between the Pre and Post merger values and the relation is statistically 
insignificant. 
The t value is further calculated for six years of per merger and three years of post 
merger and it comes out to be 0.66. The table value oft when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. The 
calculated value is again lesser than the table value which leads to rejection of 
Alternative Hypothesis and acceptance of Null Hypothesis. Hence there is no 
relation between the pre and post merger values of ICR and the relation is statistically 
insignificant. 
Hence it is seen here that in case of Profitability, the merger had an effect only in ttie 
longer run. FATR was affected by the merger both in the long and short run while 
ICR was not affected at all. It should be noted however that the acquisition took place 
only in recently and it is generally observed that the effect of a merger or acquisition 
take time to reflect in the financial results of the relevant concerns. The acquisition 
gave Essar Steel a strong foothold in the North American market, it had an 
opportunity to exploit the superior technology and wider market available as a result 
of the deal. 
Table 9.4.5: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of Profitability, FATR and ICR of 
Algoma Steel 
Variables 
1. X=Post-Merger 
Profitability of Algoma 
Y= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of Algoma 
2. X=Post-Merger FATR 
of Algoma 
Y= Pre-Merger FATR 
of Algoma 
3. X=Post-Merger ICR of 
Algoma 
Y= Pre-Merger ICR of 
Algoma 
^Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=-0.39 
=0.39 
=-0.47 
*Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.1521 
0.1521 
0.2209 
^Regression 
Equations 
Yon X is 
Y=-0.46X+9.66 
Y on X is 
Y=1.25X-2.89 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.16X+26.84 
**T-test 
t=3.05* 
t=0.138** 
t=12.31* 
t=3.06** 
t=1.01* 
t=0.66** 
*Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Six Years of Pre and Three Years of Post Merger undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 9.4.3 and Table 9.4.4 
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The year 2004 saw Essar Steel register an increase of 127.83 percent in sales while 
the cost of sales by 136.04 percent. DER fell to 4.01 which were encouraging while 
the CR and WCTR rose to 1.61 and 0.84. The WCTR was at 2.56 and ICR was at 
1.02. A profit was recorded at 1.62 percent. The analysis showed that Essar Steel was 
making great improvements in the operational and financial efficiency which was 
reflected in the results. For the year 2005, sales rose further by 65.17 percent and cost 
of sales by 36.96 percent. DER fell to 2.74 while all other ratios showed improvement 
with CR at 2.48, FATR at 1.33 and WCTR at 4.28. The ICR bettered to 2.81. The 
profit registered at 9.65 percent was the highlight of the financial affairs which was a 
reward to the efforts of the management and the workers. For the year 2006, sales 
rose by 1.08 percent against a rise of 18.41 percent in cost of sales. DER fell further to 
1.99, FATR to 0,65 and WCTR to 2.64. CR increased to 2.50 and ICR to 2.86. 
Profitability level was however maintained at relatively same position at 8.58 percent 
which was a promising sign for Essar Steel. The boost in the domestic demand and 
increase in the volume of exports were critical factors behind the increase in the sales. 
The fragmented steel industry was making headway progress in consolidation 
worldwide. 
Post Merger Analysis 
The financial year 2007 started on a positive note for Essar Steel with the sales 
shooting up by 32.54 percent and cost of sales by 33.14 percent. The DER furthered 
lowered down to 1.55 showing that the company was effectively reducing the debt 
burden in its capital structure. CR also lowered down to 1.26 while the WCTR 
increased to 9.02. FATR also improved marginally to 0.79. Profits reduced slightly to 
5.33 percent. The US economy showed signs of recovering from the recession though 
it still required time. The wave of consolidation in the global steel industry was 
evident from the major deals, i.e. the Arcelor-Mittal and Tata Corus deal that created 
many records. The year 2008 saw the positive trends in Essar Steel again with sales 
rising by 31.11 percent against a rise of 38.64 percent in cost of sales. Proportion of 
debt was further reduced with DER reducing to 1.32 signaling a move towards self 
reliance. CR also fell to 1.16 and so did the WCTR to 8.85 and ICR to 1.84. FATR 
however rose to 1.04 indicating efficient utilization of fixed assets. Profits fell to 4 
percent. De-leveraging resulted in the improvement of the credit profile as was 
evident in the rating published by ICRA Ltd (An associate of Moody's Investors 
Service). 
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The deal to acquire Canadian Steel major Algoma Steel was for $1.63 billion. Though 
it was not in the same league as was the Tata-Corus and Arcelor-Mittal deal, it helped 
Essar deal gain a significant foreign hold. The year 2009 saw sales rise by 8.80 
percent against 8.91 percent rise in cost of sales. The DER rose sUghtly to 1.53, CRto 
1.68, ICR to 2.28 and FATR to 1.12. WCTR fell slightly to 6.29 and profits slumped 
to 1.59 percent. The company made concerted efforts in expansion and restructuring 
along with maintaining the desired level of liquidity 
Table 9.4.6: Pre and Post Merger Sales of Essar Steel (2001-2009) 
(Figures in Rupees Crore) 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Pre Mergei 
Sales 
2297.13 
2934.64 
1625.46 
3703.27 
6116.71 
6182.58 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
27.75246 
-44.6113 
127.829 
65.17051 
1.076886 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Post Merg 
Sales 
8194.35 
10743.32 
11688.3 
er 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous 
year 
32.53933 
31.10643 
8.795977 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Essar Steel Annual Report 2001 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.essar.com/common.aspx?cont_id=V+5qalL+feY= and 
http://www.moneycontrol .com/financials/essa^steel^alance-sheet/ESO 1 
Table 9.4.7: Pre and Post Merger Cost of Sales of Essar Steel (2001-2009) 
(Figures in Rupees Crore) 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Pre Merger 
Cost of 
Sales 
1655.92 
2420.06 
1132.85 
2673.93 
3662.28 
4336.62 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
46.14595 
-53.1892 
136.0357 
36.96245 
18.41312 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Post Merger 
Cost of 
Sales 
5773.92 
8004.75 
8717.62 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
33.14332 
38.63632 
8.905587 
Source: Con^iled and Calculated from Essar Steel Annual Report 2001 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.essar.com/common.aspx?cont_id=V+5qalL+feY= and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/essarsteel/balance-sheet/ES01 
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Table 9.4.8: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Essar Steel (2001-2006) 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
5.52 
-26,96 
12.28 
4.01 
2.74 
1.99 
Current 
Ratio 
(CR) 
1.7 
1.22 
1.37 
1.61 
2.48 
2.50 
Pre Merger 
Fixed 
Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.44 
0.61 
0.35 
0.84 
1.33 
0.65 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(WCTR) 
2.54 
4.63 
1.63 
2.56 
4.28 
2.64 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
0.39 
-0.56 
1.22 
1.02 
2.81 
2.86 
Profitability 
(%) 
-15.06 
-40.87 
0.09 
1.62 
9.65 
8.58 
Source. Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.4.6, 9.4.8 and 9.4.9 
Table 9.4.9: Post Merger Ratio 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Debt 
Equity 
Ratio 
(DER) 
1.55 
1.32 
1.53 
Current 
Ratio 
(CR) 
1.26 
1.16 
1.68 
Analysis of Essar Steel (2007-2009) 
Post-Merger 
Fixed 
Assets 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(FATR) 
0.79 
1.04 
1.12 
Working 
Capital 
Turnover 
Ratio 
(WCTR) 
9.02 
8.85 
6.29 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
(ICR) 
2.14 
1.84 
2.28 
Profitability 
(%) 
5.33 
4.00 
1.59 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 9.4.6, 9.4.8 and 9.4.9 
figure 9.4.3: Pre Merger Ratio Analysis of Essar Steel 
20 
10 
0 
-10 
-20 
-30 
-40 
-50 
2001 2006 
•Debt Equity Ratio (DER) 
• Fixed Assets Turnover Ratio (FATR) 
•InterestCoverage Ratio (ICR) 
•Current Ratio (CR) 
•Working Capital Turnover Ratio (WCTR) 
• Profitability (%) 
Source: Table 9.4.8 
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Figure 9.4.4: Post Merger Ratio Analysis of Essar Steel 
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Table 9.4.10 deals with the Hypothesis to test the relation between the Pre and post 
merger profitability, FATR and ICR of Essar Steel. 
1. Ho (Null Hypothesis) = There is no relation between the Pre and 
Post merger Profitability of Essar Steel. 
Ha (Alternative Hypothesis) = There is a relation between the Pre 
and Post merger Profitability of Essar Steel | 
The correlation coefficient (r) between the Pre and post merger profitability is 
calculated as -0.69 which is a moderate degree of negative correlation while the 
coefficient of determination (r ) is 0.4761. It shows that 47.61 percent of the variance 
is explained by this relationship. The regression equation Y on X shows that for every 
unit change in X which is the pre merger profitability of Essar Steel there is a -0.30 
unit's change in Y which is the post merger profitability of Essar Steel. The intercept 
is at 5.62 indicating that other factors also have a role in the movement of the post 
merger profitability. The value oft is calculated as 1.09 for three years of pre and post 
merger while the table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. Hence the calculated value 
being less than the table value leads to rejection of the Alternative Hypothesis and 
acceptance of the Null Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation between the pre and 
post merger values and the relation is statistically insignificant. 
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The coefficient of detennination (r^) is 0.033 which shows that for a very smril 
percentage of the variance is explained. The regression equation Y on X shows thrt 
for every unit change in X that is the pre merger ICR of Essar Steel there is a -0.39 
unit's change in Y which is the post merger ICR of Essar Steel. The intercept at 2.18 
indicates that when the slope is zero there is 2.18 units change in the post mergra- ICR 
of Essar Steel. The value of t is worked out as 0.226 for three years of pre and post 
merger while the table value oft when v=4 at to.os is 2.78. The calculated value being 
less than table value leads to acceptance of the Null Hypothesis and rejection of the 
Alternative Hypothesis, Hence the relation is statistically insignificant. There is no 
relation between the pre and post merger values of ICR. 
The t value is further calculated for six years of pre merger and three years of post 
merger. It comes out to be 0.99. The table value oft when v=7 at to.os is 2.37. The 
calculated value is again less than the table value which leads to acceptance of Null 
Hypothesis and rejection of Alternative Hypothesis. Hence there is no relation 
between the Pre and post merger values of ICR and it is statistically insignificant. 
Table 9.4.10: Pre and Post Merger Analysis of ProntabUlty, FATR and ICR of 
Essar Steel 
Variables 
1. X= Pre-Merger 
Profitability of 
Essar Steel 
Y=Post-Merger 
Profitability of 
Essar Steel 
2. X= Pre-Merger 
FATR of Essar 
Steel 
Y=Post-Merger 
FATR of Essar 
Steel 
3. X= Pre-Merger 
ICR of Essar 
Steel 
Y=Post-Merger 
ICR of Essar 
Steel 
*Correiation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
=-0.69 
=0.012 
=-0.182 
*Coefficient of 
Detennination 
0.4761 
0.0001 
0.033 
^Regression 
Equations 
Y on X is Y=-
OJOX+5.62 
Yon X is 
Y=0.0073X-H).97 
Y on X is 
Y=-0.39X+2.18 
T-test 
t=1.09* 
t=0.84** 
t=0.18* 
t=1.26** 
t=0.226 
t=0.99 
•Three Years of Pre and Post Merger Undertaken 
**Six Years of Pre and Three Years of Post Merger undertaken 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 9.4.8 and 9.4.9 
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Table 9.4.12 examines the Pre and post merger Profit Margin and Profit Rate fx 
Essar Steel. The Pre merger Profit Margin for Algoma steel is 0.014 while that fiw 
Essar Steel is -0.060. The Post merger Profit Margin for Algoma Steel is 0.031 while 
for Essar Steel it is 0.036. The Profit margin for Algoma steel improves by 127.94 
percent while that for Essar Steel it improves by 700 percent. Hence both the entities 
showed marked financial improvement on an average. The Pre merger Profit Rate for 
Algoma Steel is 0.032 while that for Essar Steel is 0.0238. The post merger Profit 
Rate for Algoma Steel is 0.024 while that for Essar Steel is 0.0238. The post merger 
Profit Rate for Algoma Steel falls by -25.23 percent while for Essar Steel it increases 
by 316.36 percent post merger. Hence the operating efficiency for Algoma Steel falls 
while that for Essar Steel increases. 
Table 9.4.12: Pre and Post Merger Profit Rate and Profit Margin for Algoma 
and Essar Steel 
a) Algoma 
b) Essar 
Steel 
Net Sales 
Profit Marein= PAT 
NS 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
0.013625 
-0.060 
Post-
merger 
Average 
0.031 
0.036 
Percentage 
Change 
127.94 
700 
Total Assets 
Profit Rate= PAT. 
TA 
Pre-
merger 
Average 
0.03205 
-0.011 
Post-
merger 
Average 
0.024 
0.0238 
Percentage 
Change 
-25.23 
316.36 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Table 9.4.1, 9.4.6, Appendix 25, Appendix 26, 
Appendix 27 and Appendix 28 
Despite the huge losses incurred initially in the year 2001 and 2002, Essar Steel 
recovered and posted profits at a steady rate fi-om 2003 onwards. The test of various 
hypotheses reveals that the merger did not have an effect on any of the parameters, i.e. 
Profitability, FATR, ICR or EPS. For Algoma Steel the Profit margin increased by 
127.94 percent and the Profit rate fell by -25.23 percent. For Essar Steel both Profit 
Margin and Profit Rate increased substantially by 700 percent and 316.36 percent 
respectively. 
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9.5 Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter sheds light on the financial viability of major 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals that have taken place in the international 
arena. Cross border merger and acquisitions are mainly undertaken for global 
recognition and also to get access to modem technology, wider markets and customer 
base. Tata undertook the acquisition of NatSteel in Singapore and Corns in UK. Both 
the deals were massive and Tata steel entered the list of the top 10 producers of steel 
in the world. NatSteel was a profitable undertaking but after the association with Tata 
Steel its profits registered a faster rate of growth and Tata Steel also benefitted from 
favorable market reaction and enhanced production facilities. Corns was also not 
registering huge profits before the acquisition but it did make a turnaround after the 
merger. The financial profitability of Tata Steel after the merger was not affected 
positively and the market reaction in terms of the MPS was also not positive. The 
operational capacity however expanded by leaps and bounds and Tata Steel got access 
to European markets. Another major player Essar Steel also joined the global 
consolidation brigade of steel hidustry and acquired Algoma Steel of Canada which 
gave it access to North America markets. The financial performance of both Essar 
Steel and Algoma Steel were not very impressive and it is felt that the whole picture 
of the merger was yet to be felt in the performance. 
Having analyzed the mergers on the international arena the, Researcher moves on to 
identify the problems faced in effecting Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals and 
also suggest strategies for confronting the same which is done in the next Chapter. 
9.6 References 
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the domestic market. In the previous chapters these are analysed and investigated 
from financial, accounting and other aspects. Here an attempt is made by the 
Researcher to provide a synoptic view of the problems and issues at hand. Further 
prospects for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are studied strategies are carved out 
to make the most of the available opportunities, maximise potential and also deal with 
the various challenges at hand. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) as a tool is 
generally used by firms to enhance and diversify its present capacity in order to 
maximise growth and development for the purpose of which firms are willing to 
undertake major restructuring and revamping. The main idea is to gain entry into 
markets or achieve higher economies of scale and operations by creation of synergies. 
However the aim of achieving growth, diversification, development and expansion to 
a large extent depends on effective implementation of the plans and strategies that are 
chalked out for the purpose. 
There is generally a lot of excitement and anticipation regarding a Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) when undertaken especially when big names are involved as in 
the case of Chrysler-Daimler, Tata-Corus, Essar-Algoma, JSW-SISCOL, SAIL with 
IISCO and VISL or Arcelor-Mittal. However there are often a lot of surprises and 
disappointments faced later when the expected synergies do not materialize for the 
management, employees and the stockholders. 
10.3 Problems Encountered in Effecting Mereers and 
Acquisitions (M&A *s) 
While indulging in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) corporate firms are faced by a 
host of challenges and issues. Along with the prospect of growth, expansion and 
development the merging entities also face a high proposition of risk. The twin 
objectives of cost reduction and growth have to be achieved in tandem. It is even 
more difficult to achieve growth after the merger as compared to reduce cost^ . 
Despite the popularity of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) as a tool for investment, 
it is suggested by a large number of studies that the rate of success of mergers is not 
very high. Porter (1987)^  in his study found that 33 US companies out of those he 
studied for the period between 1950 to 1986 had divested more than half of what they 
had acquired. In this period it was reported that the rate of failure of such strategic 
alliances was estimated at between 50 to 70 percent. The alliances undertaken were 
334 I P a g e 
proving to be risky and prone to failure due to a large number of inherent problems 
persistent relating to management. However the situation in 1990's led to a spate of 
increase in the number of alliances due to the prevalent competitive global scenario 
where survival was the key factor. The failure or unsuccessful merger might have 
result in lower profitability; lower market prices, selling off of the acquired firm. 
Despite this the mode of consolidation and restructuring is inevitable and it warrants 
for an even more concerted effort by the management in the pre and post merger 
stages. 
Technological Obsolescence is a major motive for entering into alliances. For the 
purpose of up gradation of research and development and technological processes 
M&A is becoming a popular strategic tool. In the case of the mergers with enterprises 
running into losses like Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel (VISL), Indian Iron and Steel 
Company (IISCO) with one of the largest producers of steel in India that is SAIL, one 
of the major motive is to let these companies flourish under the protection of a 
profitable enterprise and benefit firom its technological competence. In case of foreign 
acquisitions as is seen in the case of Tata acquiring NatSteel in Thailand and Corns in 
Europe or Essar taking over Canada's Algoma Steel, acquiring the technological 
competence of these undertakings is definitely a major driving force behind the 
merger or acquisition. However, a majority of the studies still reported that a majority 
of the mergers fail which is realised in the form of various indicators like fall in the 
stock price of the acquiring firm's stock, decline in profitability of the acquired finn. 
It should be ensured that while integrating the processes and fianctions it is also 
important to integrate their enterprise and software 
Another major issue is the timing of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's). The 
acquiring company has to decide as to what is the optimum time of striking a deal 
which can maximise value for him. A major factor affecting the timing of the deal is 
the level of competition too. These days companies are cash rich and a large number 
of modes of financing are available. Hence, there are large numbers of potential 
bidders as compared to the number of targets .^ The global and domestic economic 
scenario may have a huge impact in pre and post merger decisions. The year 2007 saw 
a global slump with major economies going for a beating. An acquisition at that time 
may benefit the acquiring the company as the valuations might be low while the 
acquired company if making losses might get a lease of life. In the above case studies 
we see that the merger of ICCL-IMFA in 2005, IISCO-SAIL in 2006, Bellary 
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Pittsburgh in 2006, Tata NatSteel in 2005, Tata-Corus in 2007, Essar-Algoma Steel in 
2006 and JSW-SISCOL in 2008 took place when the global economy was in financial 
dsitress. The global recession struck the worldwide economies in September 2007 
which resulted in a huge slump of demand of steel and hence had an impact on the 
post merger results. Thus there was an impact irrespective of the financial and 
operating efficiencies. Otiier micro and macro environmental factors like political 
instability, rupee appreciation or depression, boom or slackened demand etc may 
affect the performance of the merged entities. 
Apart fi-om considering various parameters regarding the process of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's), a major concern relates to the financing of the scheme. 
Restructuring involves a significant amount of money and hence added responsibility. 
In the recent years it has been observed that the value of the deals is much larger than 
before and though companies may be cash rich there might be still shortage of fimds 
to pay for the deal. With the deal value running into millions companies resort to debt 
financing and a large number of banks are willing to aid in financing the deal on the 
basis of the financial capability of the company involved. However the debt raising 
may have a financial burden on the company as long as it is not repaid. In case of 
deals where the acquiring price is paid through share swapping it puts serious doubts 
in the minds of the existing investors as it dilutes their stake and ownership. In the 
case of Corns acquisition Tata went for a debt equity mix where debt was around US$ 
6.14 billion and equity amounted to US$ 7.56 billion. It was an all cash deal^ . 
Decision on finalizing the cost of deal is a very pertinent issue for both the acquiring 
and acquired firm as calculating the synergies that are expected to be created after the 
merger has taken place is a tricky issue. Tata Steel had to estimate the anticipated 
synergies before paying huge amounts of acquisition that is S$468.10 million for 
NatSteel^ and $12.1 billion for Corus .^ Essar had paid 1.85 billion CAD in cash for 
acquiring Algoma Steel in Canada. Financing is a major issue in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M«&A's) and when the money runs into millions and billions the 
management has to make sure that it gets all its strategies in place as a failure might 
dent the financial resources and capability for years. In cases where the deal involves 
share swapping and does not wholly deal in cash it is a tricky issue to determine the 
exchange ratio. In case of JSW and SISCOL merger it was set at 1 share of JSW for 
22 shares of SISCOL while in case of IMFA and ICCR it was 1 share of IMFA for 14 
shares of ICCR as discussed imder the Chapter 6. Also giving away shares leads to 
dilution in the stake of the existing shareholders and also the infiision of new owners 
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operating capacity which could be exploited for achieving synergies. Pittsburgh Iron 
and Steel which was earlier SandY Mills Limited dealt with textiles and decided to 
enter the business of steel. It decided to purchase Bellary Steels but it was already a 
loss making enterprise and the merger did not yield much benefit or synergies, hi the 
case of merger of IMFA with ICCR there were significant operational synergies 
which made the former the largest producer of Ferro-alloys. Tata's acquisition of 
NatSteel and Corns made it the fifth largest producer in world and access to global 
markets. In the same way Algoma Steel's acquisition gave Essar Steel access to the 
North American market. 
Another issue in financing a deal is the change in debt structure after the merger has 
been affected. In case of payment in cash it leads to large cash outflows. Cash 
payments are generally made by taking loan and it leads to leveraging of the capital 
structure and making the financial structure risky with the debt burden. In cases where 
equity is issued it leads to dilution of stake and hence again a risk is involved. Table 
10.3.1 highlights that the proportion in Debt after the merger increased in the capital 
structure of SAIL (after the merger with Visvesvaraya), JSW (after the merger with 
SISCOL), IMFA (after the merger with ICCR), NatSteel (acquired by Tata Steel), 
Tata Steel (acquired NatSteel) and Algoma Steel (acquired by Essar Steel). It declined 
for SAIL (after merger with IISCO), Pittsburgh (after merger with Bellary Steel) and 
for Essar Steel (after acquiring Algoma Steel) 
Table 10.3.1: Change in Debt Equity Ratio 
Company 
SAIL( Merger with Visvesvaraya) 
SAIL (merger with IISCO) 
JSW(Merger with SISCOL) 
Bellary(Merger with Pittsburgh) 
Pittsburgh (Merger with Pittsburgh) 
IMFA(Merger with ICCR) 
NatSteel (Acquired by Tata Steel) 
Tata Steel (Acquired NatSteel) 
Tata Steel (Acquired Corns) 
Algoma Steel (Acquired by Essar Steel) 
Essar Steel (Acquired Algoma Steel) 
Debt Equity Ratio 
(DER) before the 
merger 
2.36 
0.58 
0.75 
-9.98 
-85.31 
1.53 
0.03 
0.75 
0.26 
0.009 
1.99 
Debt Equity Ratio 
(DER) after the 
merger 
3.05 
0.35 
0.98 
-7.14 
0.24 
5.17 
0.07 
0.39 
0.68 
1.29 
1.55 
Source: Compiled and Calculated fi-om Tables 8.26, 8.2.7, 8.3.6, 8.3.7,8.4.7,8.4.8, 
8.5.3, 8.5.4, 8.5.10, 8.5.11, 8.6.8, 8.6.9, 9.2.3, 9.2.4, 9.2.10, 9.2.11, 9.3.7, 9.3.8, 9.4.3, 
9.4.4, 9.4.8, 9.4.9 
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Another important repercussion of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M«feA's) is seal on 
the movement of the market price of the shares and how well the merger goes with 
the investors. The SAIL-IISCO merger in 2005-06 saw the MPS rise by 31.75 percent 
in 2006 while by 36.15 percent in 2007. For JSW Steel the MPS increased by 66 
percent in the year following the merger while it fell by -71.70 percent in 2009 but it 
was greatly affected by the recessionary forces worldwide. Bellary Steel saw its MPS 
fell by -90.83 percent immediately after the merger in 2007. In case of NatSteel while 
the MPS had declined by -50.67 percent in the year prior to the merger it jumped by 
136.11 and 70.59 percent after the merger in the next two years. After the NatSteel 
merger the market responded positively with the MPS increasing by 56.81 percent 
and 33.80 percent in 2005 and 2007 respectively. However the Tata-Corus deal which 
was regarded as expensive and ambitious led to a fall in MPS by -16.18 percent the 
following year. 
Table 10.3.2: Change in MPS of Companies after the Merger 
Company 
SAIL (Merger with 
IISCO) 
JSW(Merger with 
SISCOL) 
Bellary Steel (Merger 
with Pittsburgh) 
NatSteel (Deal with Tata 
Steel) 
Tata Steel (Deal with 
NatSteel) 
Tata Steel (Acquired 
Corns) 
MPS for Year 
before the 
Merger 
63 
493.45 
6.87 
0.36 
225.96 
474.07 
MPS for Year 
after the 
Merger 
83 
819.1 
0.63 
0.85 
354.32 
397.36 
Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
31.75 
66 
-90.83 
136.11 
56.81 
-16.18 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Appendix 5, Appendix 10, Appendix 12, 
Appendix 20 and Appendix 22 
Also the size of the target and acquirer company should match each other for the 
purpose of integration. Acquiring a larger company involves greater complexities and 
smaller ones might not get the requisite attention. Corns was much larger than Tata 
but that did not deter the spirit of Tata Steel, hi other cases taken up in this thesis it is 
seen that the merged company was the subsidiary of the merging entity and post 
merger the merging company attempted to achieve economies of scale. 
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A major issue faced in the merger is the integration of accounting standards and 
practises followed by the merging units. They might be following different policies 
and post-merger difficulties may be faced in preparing consolidated accounting and 
financial statements. For example the financial year ending may be different; 
treatment of expensing etc might not be the same. Algoma Steel maintained its 
accounts with financial year ending in December but after the merger in order to 
integrate its accounts with Essar Steel it had to change the financial year ending to 
March. In case of foreign acquisitions the amounts and figures would be expressed in 
different currencies and suitable conversion rate would have to be decided for the 
same. While the figures of NatSteel were in Singapore Dollars, those of Corus were 
in UK Pounds while that of Algoma were in Canadian Dollars. It is important to 
ensure that a proper audit is done of the accounts of the acquired or merged firm to 
avoid discrepancy. It is also a challenge to prepare a consolidated statement of 
accounts of the two merging entities after the merger has taken place in order to 
absorb all the assets and liabilities. Different accounting principles might be followed 
for valuation of fixed assets, depreciation and other heads and the accountants have to 
devise a system to integrate them. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) would also require cultural integration of the 
two units. In case of cross border deals, it is even a bigger challenge due to varying 
work culture, work environment, management styles, government policies etc. It is 
also generally seen that initially there is resistance by the workers for the new 
management team to handle. Both operating and cultural integration may pose serious 
hurdles for implementing the merger. The employees of the acquired company may 
have to face a large number of changes in the work environment which may bring 
about resistance. It was seen in the case of Daimler-Chrysler merger which was 
viewed with great expectations as a merger between equals and expected to bring 
huge returns for both in the form of various synergies but on the contrary it led to fall 
in profitability and lay-offs mainly due to non-compatibility in the culttiral 
environment. Daimler being German and Chrysler being American had different work 
cultures which could not be synced effectively.* Though the intent might be there it is 
still an issue to actually implement it. Cultural values are intangible and cannot be 
measured or calculated. Even asking the employees directly through a questionnaire 
cannot be exhaustive information for developing strategies for the same as work 
culture is observed and studied through a period of time to study disciplines, 
conditions, beliefs and other cultural traits. It requires dedication and patience and 
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results might take a fair amount of time to reflect. After acquiring Corns, Tata Steel 
chose to retain key members of Corus to ease the transition due to the existent 
difference in culture. Cultural integration is an issue in domestic Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) as well as different states in India might have different local 
languages and customs taking into account the diversity of Indian culture. 
Another pivotal factor which is faced in the case of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) relates to integration of socio-cultural issues which has not been studied 
extensively yet and the work done is mostly confined to theoretical aspects'^. It has to 
be planned keeping in mind whether the main focus is immediate short-term 
integration or long term planning. 
The biggest problem involving a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is the 
complexity of its nature where integration of two different undertakings is required 
with an aim to make them functional as a single unit. It encompasses all the 
departments though it might be done to achieve certain specific advantages like 
technical, financial or human resource etc. Another aspect that must be kept in mind is 
that post-merger integration may involve additional costs and hence the acquirer 
should be prepared for it while calculating the expected returns. The cost would 
depend on the existing level of integration and cultural compatibility, nature of deal, 
nature of business etc. In the case of Pittsburgh which earlier dealt with textiles and 
made a deal with Bellary Steels to enter the business of steelmaking, huge 
restructuring was required, which did go down very well with the financial results. 
Figure 10.3.1: Success Rate of Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) 
Success Rate of M&A's 
Work, 20% 
Outright 
Disasters, 40% 
Neither Live nor. 
Die, 40% nSNoTk 
I Outright Disasters 
I Neither Live nor Die 
Source: Stress Points Along the Mergers, Acquisitions and Integration (MAI) Joumey, Osti & 
Associates, New York, 2003. Retrieved from http://www.ostiassociates.com/stressspoints.pdf 
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Figure 10.3.1 reflects the views of Peter Drucker who considers Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) unsuccessful. However the most vital issue was 
implementation of the objectives of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) which is a 
highly complex and complicated affair. Putting all the plans, policies and strategics 
into practice and deriving the expected synergies is the major concern. Often it 
happens that the implementation of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) being a 
tedious and complex issue consumes a large amount of time and issue like 
innovativeness, integration, optimization fail to get the deserved attention. For the 
success of a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) it is necessary to ensure positive 
integration of all the departments and units. It might be so that there is effective 
integration in some aspects while others are not able to produce the desired effects 
which might have a disintegrating effect on the merged unit. 
It is a difficult task in developing a team for the purpose of post-merger 
integration. It poses numerous challenges in the form of selection of membere, 
assigning them with responsibility, monitor their performance, provide incentives and 
get feedback. The team has to focus on all issues relating to integration of various 
facilities and it may also be necessary to provide sufficient training to the members 
for the same. It is often seen that the focus of the team is dedicated towards operations 
relating to finance and productions and issues like cultural integration are overlooked. 
Necessary training needs to be imparted to the employees relating to this aspect and 
sufficient finance and focus have to be allotted for such intercultural training 
programmes. At the very inception of the idea to merge, the issue relating to cultural 
synergy need to be recognized while evaluating the target company. Strategies to 
tackle with it shall also be developed at the initial stages to counter the resistance 
faced later to smoothen and iron out the cultural differences. It may be advisable to 
retain key members of management of the merged entity as was done by Tata in the 
case of Corns acquisition. 
At the rate the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) and acquisitions are growing both 
in the domestic and international arena; it calls for introspection on their viability and 
feasibility. It is necessary to examine the post-merger effect on the company and 
also the profitability and performance of the company. It is generally seen that there 
are movements in the market price around the merge announcements but these are 
generally based on anticipation and not actual productivity and performance. The 
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shareholders also watch these Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) and acquisitions 
with caution. While undertaking a deal, companies have to ensure that they have 
resources not only in terms of finance but also the ability to cope up with the global 
regulatory and economic framework, multiculturalism etc. It applies mostly to the 
mid-cap companies indulging in global acquisitions having limited exposure and 
experience on this front. Also it is most difficult to actually measure the synergies or 
benefits accruing from the merger. In the first few years the benefits or drawbacks of 
the merger or acquisition might not be visible as was seen in the case of acquisition of 
NatSteel and Corns by Tata and acquisition of Algoma Steel by Essar Steel. 
The future of the merged enterprise to a large extent depends on the expected 
synergies and also the performance of the acquired unit. Financial obligations increase 
as a result of the merger which is expected to be cleared with the expected increase in 
revenues and production capacity. However it might lead to a huge financial and 
operational issue if the expectations do not materialise and this is the case in all kinds 
of mergers and acquisitions undertaken. 
Haste in decision making is another major issue leading to issues later. It is often 
seen that the desire to put in place all plans and expecting inmiediate results leads to 
problems later. The pressure to affect a successful merger may lead to over-focus on 
financial issue and issue like operational, cultural, technological sync may be 
overlooked which might have repercussions in the longer run. The synchronization 
with the merged or acquired company may take time and has to be dealt with tact and 
vision in order to exploit the expected synergies. The focus should not be in making 
financial profits. In the mergers and acquisitions studies it is seen that in some cases it 
is the operational performance while in others it is the financial performance which is 
getting a boost as a result of the deal. Table 10.3.3 shows that the Profit Margin 
registered a greater increased in case of SAIL (merger with IISCO), IMFA (merger 
with ICCL), Pittsburgh (acquisition of Bellary), JSW Steel (acquired SISCOL), 
NatSteel (acquired by Tata Steel), Algoma Steel (acquired by Essar Steel) and Essar 
Steel (acquisition of Algoma Steel). On the other hand the Profit Rate increased by a 
greater margin for SAIL (merger with VISL), Tata Steel (acquisition of NatSteel, Tata 
Steel (acquisition of Corns) 
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Table 10.3.3: Change in Profit Margin and Profit Rate after the Merger 
Company 
SAIL (merger with VISL) 
SAIL (merger with IISCO) 
IMFA (merger with ICCL) 
Bellary (acquired by Pittsburgh) 
Pittsburgh (acquisition of Bellary) 
JSW Steel (acquired SISCOL) 
NatSteel (acquired by Tata Steel) 
Tata Steel (acquisition of NatSteel) 
Tata Steel (acquisition of Corns) 
Algoma Steel (acquired by Essar 
Steel) 
Essar Steel (acquisition of Algoma 
Steel) 
Percentage Change 
after the merger on 
Profit Margin 
(Financial) 
3.92 
1505.96 
120 
-32.36 
103.54 
635 
111.77 
158.54 
77.5 
127.94 
700 
Percentage Change 
after the merger on 
Profit Rate 
(Operational) 
70.37 
189.21 
66.67 
-72.94 
99 
74.6 
59.09 
491.67 
252.54 
-25.23 
316.36 
Source : Compiled and Calculated from Tables 8.2.10, 8.3.11, 8.4.11, 8.5.14, 8.6.13, 
9.2.15,9.3.12,9.4.12 
A Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is generally undertaken with the objective of 
realization of synergies. However calculation of synergies is a critical factor. It has 
to be ensured that it is neither overvalued nor undervalued. An undervalued synergy 
may lead to underutilization of resources and facilities while an overvalued synergy 
may lead to integration and management problems. At the time of calculation of the 
value of the deal to be paid, anticipated synergies are one of the core issues 
determining the valuation of the company to be acquired. It is often seen that these 
synergies are exaggerated and before the management realises it causes financial 
losses. In case of foreign acquisitions the synergies are expected to be created from 
economies of scale and operations. Besides India being rich in iron reserves provides 
the foreign counterpart with cheaper access to raw materials and the Indian companies 
get access to foreign markets and advanced technologies of production. India is 
known for being low cost producers and accessing foreign technologies might not let 
companies like Tata and Essar Steel retain that position. Their iron ore reserves may 
also deplete earlier due to excess production. Hence the synergies of scale may in the 
longer run cause adverse effects as well. Another problem that is faced is different 
set of metrics and parameters used by companies for valuation of performance and 
efficiency. Also the different accounting systems followed is a major concern. The 
344 I P a g e 
accounting, financial human resource strategies might be different for diffwent 
companies and it might prove difficult to develop and initiate a common model. 
Continuing with the model of the acquirer or acquired company may not always prove 
fruitful for the merged entity as it might not serve the needs in the changed 
circumstances. The parameters might be different in terms of units, weight, length or 
other dimensions and the employees might not smoothly adapt the change to a new 
measuring system. 
Cross border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are increasing both in number and 
relevance and face greater challenges not only due to the different economic 
environment but also the regulatory environment. The policies and rules followed 
by different countries are different. Some may encourage such kind of foreign 
alliances while some may have a host of restrictions imposed. Even in India, doors 
were opened only after liberalization measure undertaken n 1991 but still there are 
restrictions on FDI and FII in certain sectors like retail. While undertaking an 
acquisition in Thailand or Europe, the norms of not only the home country but also 
that of the country where the proposed investment had to be made were required to be 
deeply studied by Tata Steel. Similarly Algoma Steel's acquisition required Essar 
Steel to do a study of the Canadian regulations. 
Even in case of domestic deals it might be that different states have different tax 
rates applicable and these have to be kept in mind while making an inter-state 
acquisition so that the requirements of the states involved is satisfied. Post-merger it 
might be a daunting task for the management to gamer the confidence of the existing 
customers and ensure them of the maintenance of the quality services that they were 
getting before the merger with the added incentive of benefitting from post-merger 
integration. For this purpose it is necessary to ensure that there are positive vibes 
about the merged entity in the market as a negative media impact may compound the 
problems at hand gravely. The acquiring firm might get that done by convincing 
reputed analysts about the expected synergistic gains and values from the merger. 
Also the suppliers and supply chain management has to be apprised of the change in 
management and have to be taken in confidence so as to avoid glitches in supplies of 
inputs for ensuring smooth production process. Also the fiision of technology of the 
acquired and acquirer firm is before the merger explored only on theoretical basis and 
there might be various issues and challenges while practically implementing them. 
When huge established companies like Tata Steel and Essar Steel make acquisitions it 
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adds to the prestige of the company but in case of huge acquisitions as was in the case 
of Corus it puts question marks on the expected financial and operating syneigies. 
Also in case of government backed companies like SAIL which have undertook 
mergers with its loss making subsidiaries it is perceived as an opportunity to expand 
the operating capacity. The existing customers have faith in the capability of SAIL to 
absorb the new undertakings in its fold. The backing of the government is an added 
advantage. 
10.4 Strate2ies and Implications for Dealin2 with the 
Problems 
The news of a prospective Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) gathers a lot of 
attention but the fact remains that most of these fail to deliver the anticipated 
synergies with a large number of factors not falling in sync or the fears of the 
employees of the acquired company regarding their fiiture being not addressed to 
duly.Figure 10.4.1 highligjits the process undertaken for the purpose of fostering post-
merger integration. At the initial stages which are depicted in the model as 
'Approaching' the main focus is towards identification and detailed study about the 
target company. The strengths and weaknesses of the target are studied intricately 
with the objective of recognizing its capability. At this stage the main objective is 
formulating a vision as in the latter stages there will be efforts to bring into operation 
the vision which is envisaged at this stage. There are attempts to bring out strategic 
integration of various units and hence create value under the next stage depicted as 
'Engagement' in the model. This process is depicted in the model as "Understanding 
and Modelling: Value Creation Mechanisms". This stage is followed by Post Merger 
and Acquisition Integration. The first step is termed as 'Honeymoon' which involves 
static integration. This process involves exploring the various facets and units. The 
capabilities and facilities of both the units are integrated. It involves integration of the 
functional and operational processes. The last stage is termed as 'Family life' which 
refers to value creation. While the previous stage constitutes static integration, this 
involves dynamic integration. The whole process is termed in the model as 
"Understanding and Modelling: New Manufacturing Systems". An appropriate 
feedback system is also required to be developed through which the shortcomings are 
identified and corrective action is taken at the value creation mechanism. 
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Figure 10.4.1: Strategy for Post-Merger Integration 
Post Merger and Acquisition Integration 
Bkoproaciv 
Capability, 
Recognition 
& 
/isualizatio 
Source: Pursuing Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition Synergies, Institute for 
Manufacturing, University of Cambridge, Retrieved from 
http://www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/cim/projects/archive/integration.html (2003) 
It is imperative to ensure that the merger undertaken is not lopsided and synergies are 
evaluated in the right earnest objectively. It is extremely important to ensure that an 
optimum balance is ensured in all areas that are financial, technological, operational, 
managerial and cultural. The success of merger to a large extent would depend on the 
degree of balance that is created. A major deviation is warranted in the thought 
process where not only quantitative but also qualitative aspects have to be 
introspected in utmost detail for evaluating the feasibility of undertaking a Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's). while undertaking foreign acquisitions the main idea for 
Tata Steel and Essar Steel is to benefit from the technological competence of its 
European and Canadian counterparts and provide low cost of labour and raw 
materials. While India has a developing market with enormous untapped potential the 
foreign markets have an established customer base where profit margins are high. 
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Even in the domestic Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) a similar balance is 
attempted where companies try to capitalize on skills by SAIL, IMFA and JSW Steel. 
A major attraction with Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) especially the ones 
associated with foreign countries is the entry into new markets which enables the 
undertaking to get a hold and expand its operations in foreign territories and gain a 
share in the world market. The major reason behind the Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) strategy of Tata Steel can be attributed towards this motive and strategy 
where it initially acquired the Singapore based NatSteel in 2005 and the Anglo-Dutch 
steel company Corus Steel. In 2005 Tata Steel had acquired Millennium Steel of 
Thailand. The acquisitions in 2005 gave Tata Steel a strong presence in the Asian 
market and an additional customer base of two million tons of steel. The acquisition 
of Corus in 2007 made it the second largest in Europe and the fifth largest in world. 
The highlight of the Corus acquisition was the fact that Corus was making four times 
more than Tata and yet Tata acquired it after a fierce rival bidding. The spread of 
markets for Tata and Corus before and after the merger is discussed in Table 10.4.1. 
Tata was initially dominant just in India with a share of 69 percent while in Asia it 
was 23 percent while that for the rest of the world was low at 8 percent. For Corus the 
market was primarily concentrated in Europe with a market share of 49 percent in 
Europe, 29 percent in UK, 10 percent in North America, 9 percent in Asia and 3 
percent in ROW. The figures after the acquisition show how both the entities 
benefitted firom each other's market presence. Tata got entry in the European market 
while Corus got an entry into the Asian market and both together were expected to 
benefit from mutual synergies. The share in Europe of the merged entity was 37 
percent, in Asia it was 24 percent, in UK it was 22 percent. In North America it was 8 
percent while that for the rest of the world stood at 9 percent. Hence the base of the 
merged entity was more diversified than it was individually and both the companies 
could benefit from each other's presence. 
Table 10.4.1: Spread of Markets before and after the Acquisition 
Before the Acquisition 
Tata 
India 
Asia (ex India) 
Rest of the World 
(ROW) 
69% 
23% 
8% 
Corus 
Europe 
UK 
North 
America 
Asia 
ROW 
49% 
29% 
10% 
9% 
3% 
After the Acquisition 
Tata Corus 
Europe 
Asia 
UK 
North America 
ROW 
37% 
24% 
22% 
8% 
9% 
Source: Tata Steel Annual Report 2006-07. Retrieved from 
http://www.tatasteel.com/investors/tatasteelAR2006-07/index.html 
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Figure 10.4,2: Spread of Markets before and after the Acquisition (for 
acquisition of Corns by Tata) 
Rest of the _ . #— r . . . » 
World Tata (Before Acquistion) 
(ROW), 8%. 
I India 
I Asia (ex India) 
I Rest of the World 
(ROW) 
Corus (Before Acquistion) 
Asia, 9% 
ROW, 3% 
North 
America, 10% 
I Europe 
I UK 
I North America 
• Asia 
I ROW 
Tata Corus (After Acquistion) 
North ROWJ% 
America, 8% ^ ^ ^ ^ H 
^ 
^ 
Europe 
,37% 
UK, 22% 
I Europe 
I Asia 
I UK 
I North America 
I ROW 
Source: Table: 10.4.1 
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For the purpose of selection of the target company a deep and detailed study of the 
target company has to be done most intricately on the basis of financial and 
production statistics. Also the market performance, position, credit worthiness, future 
prospects would enable a company to zero in the target company which meet the 
needs and also decide a suitable price for the proposed deal. An original research 
would be required to be done dealing with all relevant aspects of the targets business 
relating to market share, products, customers base, production, creditors, future 
potential, financial position, technological competence etc. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the target have to be assessed in detail. While merging loss making 
subsidiaries SAIL had to assess the impact of their losses on its financial statements 
and also the benefit of greater economies of scale to be accrued. In its bid for 
expansion and creating greater operating capacity Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys 
(IMFA) took over Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCR) and so did JSW for 
SISCOL. However all didn't go well with the Bellary and Pittsburgh iron and Steels 
deal. In case of international acquisitions too, the benefit and the complexities 
associated with the target had to be deeply studied in order to deal with the situation 
in future. 
At the same time it is often seen that big companies acquire or merge companies 
which are running into losses. The decision may be strategic and might prove to be a 
shot in the arm for both the entities. The loss making company which has the required 
infi-astructure gets the necessary technological, financial and managerial influx. On 
the other hand, the acquiring company gets a imit at comparatively low valuation and 
if the latter was incurring losses, it can write them off against its profits and reduce 
tax liability. The Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) in India 
looks over this aspect. The merger of SAIL and Visvesvarya is an example of this. A 
loss making subsidiary was merged with the parent company. The merger of IISCO 
with SAIL was also on similar lines where the pre-merger profitability of IISCO had a 
negatively correlated relation with the post merger profitability of SAIL. Table 10.4.2 
gives a synoptic view of the pre and post merger Profit Rate and Profit margin for 
IISCO and SAIL. The Pre-merger Profit Margin for IISCO is very low at -21.925 
while that for SAIL is also negative at -0.012. The Post-Merger Profit Margin is 
healthy at 0.165 signifying that the post-merger performance is much better as 
compared to that of the pre-merger. The Profit Rate of IISCO before the merger is -
0.1192 while that for SAIL is -0.172. Both are negative and very low. However the 
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Post Merger Profit Rate of SAIL is a positive 0.153 highlighting again that the Post-
Merger operations are much better than the Pre-Merger in terms of the Profit Rate as 
well. 
Table 10.4.2: Calculation of Pre and Post Profit Rate and Profit Margin for 
Merger between SAIL and IISCO 
a) IISCO 
b) SAIL. 
Net Sales 
Profit Margin= 
Pre-merger 
Average 
-21.925 
-0.01175 
= PAT. 
NS 
Post-merger 
Average 
NA 
0.1652 
Total Assets 
Profit Rate= PAT. 
TA 
Pre-merger 
Average 
-0.11918 
-0.1715 
Post-merger 
Average 
NA 
0.153 
Source: Kaur, Kuldeep and Kushwinder, Kaur, "Growth and Profitability of Acquiring Firms in India", 
Paper presented at National Conference on Corporate Sector, Industrialization and Economic 
Development in India, March 27-28,2009, Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Table 8.3.11 and Appendix 4 
It might also be advisable for the companies undertaking Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) to study related mergers in the same industry in the past to develop an 
understanding of the issue, problems and strategies to be developed for undertaking a 
new alliance. In the steel industry the trend of consolidation has been growing very 
strongly and keeping up with the global trend the industries in India have been taking 
a plunge. The merger of Arcelor with Mittal in 2006 created the largest steel company 
in the world for which they paid 40.37 Euros per share'^. It was followed by 
acquisition of Corns by Tata which made it the fifth largest producer in the world. 
These acquisitions and mergers are necessary to meet and sustain the competition as a 
merger entity is in a better position to meet the challenge. 
In case of large projects it is advisable to enter into a Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) for the purpose of diversifying the risk among the partners and also 
ensure complementary technological expertise especially in the case of industries 
relating to developing of projects involving building of aircraft, arms, computers, steel 
where the costs runs into billions of dollars." 
It is essential to plan perfectly in order to structure and execute any business 
strategy. Taking into account the nature and complexity of carving out a Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) deal, it is extremely vital to set out the goals, targets and 
achievements most clearly and precisely. Instead of making a long list of goals and 
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targets it is necessary to make a phased list where the goals and targets to be achieved 
are identified in the order of priority. The long term and short-term goals should be set 
out for effecting a smooth transition. It would be simpler to set targets in a realistic 
manner as over exaggeration may lead to difficulty and eventually failure in execution 
of plans and policies. Also the set plans and targets have to be communicated to the 
concerned employees to ensure that the vision, goal and target is well understood by 
all which would be effective in achieving post-merger integration. The most difficult 
task is to set the targets according to priority. The foremost priority is to achieve 
integration and in the latter years benefit fi-om the operating and financial synergy. 
It is extremely necessary to make realistic and achievable targets in terms of 
synergies as well. It may be so that the excess estimation of operating synergy may 
lead to lags in quality. Realisation of cost synergies through cutting cost may lead to 
clostire of a vital unit or linkage which hampers the operation and performance, and it 
may be so that the technical synergies might not be compatible. Hence the 
management has to ensure that maintenance of value is not sacrificed for the sake of 
realization of synergies. After the Corns deal it was stipulated that Tata would not 
remain the lowest cost producer of Steel in the world as this advantage was hugely 
because of its access to raw materials and reserves but the excess burden on the 
resources due to increase in capacity fi-om 5.3 million tonnes to 27 million tonnes will 
drain the resources much earlier and adversely affect the cost advantage in the longer 
run as Corns had access to specialised facilities but not natural resources'^. 
Stringent control has to be exercised over the operations and employees. For the 
different modes of performance measurement indicators in terms of finance, accounts, 
human resources etc, it might be advisable to develop a new model taking into 
account the needs and ground realities. The accounting policies should be so 
designed that it suits the needs of the new undertaking; HRM policies should be 
accepted and approved by the employees to avoid resistance and fiiction; research and 
development issues should be dealt with in the light of the changing environment and 
needs; marketing policies have to be carved keeping in mind the brand value, old 
customers and the image to be created in the minds of the customers. Hence it is not 
always advisable to stick to the old protocols followed by the acquired or the 
acquiring firm and a new working environment might be required to be created in the 
dynamic and changing environment. It might also prove effective if there has been a 
pre-merger agreement on the enforcement of new metrics and protocols after the 
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merger or takeover has been affected. At the same time it is important to give time to 
the plans and strategies to give results. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is a h i ^ y 
complicated and complex affair and the results might not be instantly felt. The 
integration is a long term process and there should be periodic review of the plans and 
strategies but they should be given a reasonable amount of time to reflect in 
performance and results. The maximum importance ought to be given to the 
integration aspect. 
In the case of cross border acquisitions we see that generally the acquiring company 
retain key members of the acquired entity as in the case of Tata Steel and Essar Steel. 
It might be a good option to develop a team with the task of bringing about 
integration of various units post-merger. The team may include members from various 
units who may be offered incentives as well. A mechanism should be developed to 
provide coordination and address all issues at conflicts arising from the integration 
immediately. It should be assured that the people are the given the maximum 
emphasis in terms of creating value. Adequate training should be given to the 
employees and staff for the purpose of letting them develops proficiency in 
intercultural synergy mechanism and competence. They also encourage formation of 
teams and committees to overlook the process as was done by Tata Steel of which 
Ratan Tata was himself the Chairman'^  
The acquiring company has also to study and estimate the potential cost of the 
merger and also evaluate its resources as to whether it can afford the merger. It so 
happens in many cases that merger are undertaken which are ambitious and failure to 
meet the associated costs makes a hole in the acquirers pocket to such an extent that 
operations of the parent company are also negatively affected by it for a long period. 
The cost does not only involve the financial aspects but there are other related issues 
as well. It might be so that the parent company would have to put on hold some of its 
present projects or those it intended to undertake in the near future due to the merger 
or acquisition undertaken. Hence there would be an opportunity cost involved and that 
should also be counted as a notable aspect while undertaking a merger. In case of 
financially sound companies like SAIL, JSW steel, Essar Steel and Tata Steel also, the 
spate of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) was observed with caution by the 
investors. It led to a fall in the market price due to the doubt whether it would be able 
to recover from the huge financial outflow. 
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In order to bring about cohesion of socio-economic factors acculturation has to be 
developed smoothly in order to bring about congruence in operations. Figure 10.4.3 
gives an insight in the mode adopted for cultural integration of the units involved in 
the merger. The acquired firm faces a new management at the helm but it prefers to 
maintain its work culture and offers resistance. The firm that is acquiring has to 
ensure that while implementing its management and administration styles, due 
recognition is given to the culture of the acquired firm and the diversification is done 
keeping in mind the relatedness of the two firms involved. The acquiring and acquired 
firms both have to bring about integration, assimilation, separation and deculturation. 
The process would lead to congruence of the two individual management styles and 
culture leading to acculturative stress and eventually bring about successfiil 
implementation of the merger. 
Figure 10.4.3 emphasizes people and it is necessary to recognize the value of human 
resource as a lubricant for effecting a smooth merger. Employees may resist a merger 
and there might also be various apprehensions and it is necessary to address their 
concerns and provide them the necessary security and assurance for creating an 
efficiently performing merged unit. Cultural cohesion should be accorded the same 
level of priority and importance as operating, production and financial synergy as it is 
an all pervasive fiinction and deals with all the department and levels .It is required in 
dealing with the day to day affairs and business. For the purpose of avoiding conflicts 
and disputes and creating a mechanism of understanding and communication, 
integration of cultures is of paramount importance. The management should keep in 
mind that the success of operational and financial synergy depends on the human 
factor which is the intangible factor involved. It is the management's job to bring 
about a conjoint leadership mechanism of the two entities that integrates of cultures 
and also ensure that there is retention of quality talent and skills. Research suggests 
that the lack of intercultural understanding accounts for 65 percent of failed mergers. 
In the event of a mismatch of the cultural process it leads to a communication gap 
leading to a negative impact on the production and operations.'"* 
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Figure 10.4.3: Acculturative Model for the Implementation of Mergers 
Acquired Firm 
Desire to preserve own 
culture and practises. 
Attractiveness of the 
acquirer. 
t 
Mode of 
Acculturation 
Integration 
Assimilation 
Separation 
Deculturation 
Congruence 
Acquiring Firm 
Culture: Tolerance for diversity 
and ulticulturalism. 
Diversification Strategy: Degree 
of related ness of firms 
Acculturative Stress 
Mode of 
Acculturation 
Integration 
Assimilation 
Separation 
Deculturation 
Successful Implementation of 
the Merger 
Source: Nahavandi, Afsaneh and Malekzadeh Ali R. (1988)," Acculturation in Mergers and 
Acquisitions", The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, (Jan., 1988), pp. 79-90 
Apart from fostering cultural integration another issue at hand is employee's 
retention. At the time of restructuring depending on the policies formulated various 
employees lose their jobs to suit the new vision of the merged and resultant entity. 
Hov^ e^ver, it is a daunting task for the management to ensure that quality talent is not 
lost in the purpose. There will be certain key members who have to be retained due to 
their knowledge about the operations and functions of enterprise, relationships with 
customers, effective leadership, etc. The management has to ensure that it identifies 
and retains the key talent which would go a long way in making the merged entity's 
355 I P a g e 
performance improve and excel. While undertaking an acquisition it might not be 
always necessary to overtake the management in totality too but it might be a fair idea 
to retain the top management if it's doing its job well. Tata retained the top 
management of Corns and retained its CEO in order to facilitate the integration 
efforts'^ 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are generally undertaken to fuel the need of 
growth and expansion but the basic rationale should not be based on unrealistic 
ambitions. It might happen that entrepreneur goes for the deal to satisfy ambitions 
and for fame though it is not feasible for him on financial and other grounds. Also it 
may so happen that at times of rival bidding; the company losing the bid finds itself 
exposed in the market which may have a negative effect to its market value. It is too 
early to predict whether Tata actually paid excess for Corns but so did Mittal for 
Arcelor as compared to what they offered initially. The company's believed that they 
can recover from the synergies to be created and taking into account the present 
financial scenario the scene looks positive for creation of huge steel empires. 
For the purpose of calculating the cost or the premium to be paid for the deal the 
synergistic value and the net present value should be calculated in the most realistic 
terms possible. 
For the purpose of meeting the cost of the restructuring it might be an option to 
consider leveraging. Employment of debt capital has various advantages. It not only 
increases the availability of funds but reduces the tax liability as well as interest 
payable is taxed as an expense. The debt employed is loaned capital and hence comes 
the responsibility of being repaid. Hence there is extra caution in its use and cost 
control measures are employed even more diligently. Timely repayment of debt 
determines the credit worthiness and creation of value by the firm. These factors 
should also be given consideration while exercising the option of injecting debt 
capital. However the general trend is to employ a mix of debt, equity and cash 
financing. 
A decision of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) involves a large number of people 
and organizations besides the two entities coming together. It might be a good option 
to apprise all the elated parties about the facts and ground realities relating to the 
merging agreement. Though the final decision and intricate details would rest with the 
management but it might prove beneficial to hear the concerns of the investors, 
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creditors, suppliers, bankers, employees, major customers and other parties 
concerned. 
There are certain issues specific to different countries and the acquiring company has 
to make related adjustments. In case of domestic deals also the policies and practices 
followed should to be given due consideration. Labour laws in India are one such 
aspect. An acquiring or merging entity has to undertake the employee's liabilities 
relating to pensions, provident funds, medical etc. It may be required to bring about 
certain modifications in the same and all may not go well with the employees. Hence 
these should be dealt with most tactfully in order to ensure that the employee's 
interest and concerns are not harmed at any point of time. Forming unions is a 
common practice in India and it often leads to disturbance to the working 
environment in the form of strikes and lock outs. In the recent years there has been 
some improvement in the scenario with the increase in the level of competition and 
entry of MNC's in Indian market but still the issue is of considerable importance and 
should be dealt with utmost care. 
Another major problem faced in India is the diverse culture. As per the 2001 Census 
of India 29 languages are spoken by more than one million native speakers, and 122 
by more than 10,000* .^ The huge cultural diversity poses a major challenging in 
bringing about integration among two units which are belonging to different areas. 
The problem might be more compounded in case of cross border mergers. 
Besides empowering and enabling the management to take strategic decisions, the 
present recession has highlighted the need to have a risk management mechanism. 
Integration involves various complex issue which might face various hurdles and 
difficulties. However there might be a major issue involving a micro or macro factor 
leading the whole process to be severely affected. In such cases it might be advisable 
to have a team of professionals dealing with risk management in such situations 
involving unforeseen circumstances. 
Figure 10.4.4 illustrates a model to bring about Post-Merger integration of units. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) might be a growth which is done through either 
repetitive or a single deal. The reason or scope for the deal may vary across various 
options. It may be done with a view of expanding business options and opportunities 
or increasing the value of the business. It is sometimes done for restructuring and re-
engineering the businesses. It might be done for the purpose of sharing services too. 
Another relevant aspect is timing. It is very important to determine the pace at which 
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implementation is planned to b effected. The other available modes, options and 
initiatives are also explored. It is also to be determined that in what pattern the 
enterprise solutions have to be integrated and what will be the time factor for 
implementing them. The long and short term implementation strategies have also to 
be worked out. Another aspect highlighted in the model relates to the enterprise 
architecture. For the purpose of bringing about integration, various models would be 
required to be designed and worked out. Various interfaces would be required 
between the employees and there would be certain conversions required to merge the 
units functioning. The architectural change would involve IT department and data 
centres also as information and data bases would have to be integrated as well. The 
system strategy would have be brought together on identical technical platforms. The 
next aspect depicted in the model relates to cost. The foremost element relates to the 
cost of acquiring or ownership followed by those related to implementation. The 
change in the managerial staff would also entail certain cost along with the initial 
investment. All these constitute the Post-Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
Enterprise Solutions Strategy. 
Figure 10.4.4: Post Merger Enterprise Solutions Integration Decision Model 
M&A Scope 
^n^^rprise 
Architecture 
Growth Strategy 
M&A Strategy 
-Repetitive M&A's 
-Single M&A's 
&A Window 
Implementation Speed 
Other Ongoing Initiatives 
rise Solutions 
Implementation Strategy 
Integration Models 
usiness Scope \ Interfaces and Conversions 
Business Case-Value Propositions \ IT Organization 
Business re-engineering \ Data Centers 
Shared Services \ System Strategy 
echnical Platform 
ost of Ownership 
n^lementation Costs 
Change Management 
Initial Investments 
Post M&A 
Solutions 
SSQtSgy 
Source: Gauthier, Eric M, "Outlook Point of View, Ideas that Create the Future" November 
2001 Accenture Analysis. Retrieved from http://www.manda-
institute.org/docs/m&a/accenture_08_post-
merger%20and%20acquisitions%20integration%20an%20enterprise%20solutions%20enviro 
nment.pdf 
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The recession had a serious impact on the business of the exporters and the finns 
seeking targets for expansions in the west. It led to a situation where strategies and 
policies had to be redrawn. It focused on the need to look for customers and 
opportunities beyond the west. The present crisis disturbed the financial and economic 
values of a large number of firms and it requires a new and innovative approach for 
the purpose of valuations of firms for the purpose of undertaking Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) in the wake of the present recessionary trend of the economies 
which had led a to significant fall in the value of assets and other strategic 
investments. 
However in the globalized arena it might be noted that the combining of two units is 
no longer confined to statistical and accounting figures but it is the human aspect 
which is emerging to be one of the key features determining the success or failure of a 
merger or acquisition. The cohesion of cultural values and work culture is looming 
to be a vital factor. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) create opportunities in terms of growth, 
development and job creation and in the present era globalization is the key word 
where an isolated economy has limited fijture. The governments of states have also to 
realize the need for the hour and bring about flexibility in laws and policies 
accordingly. Agreements in the field of investment, labour, technology, labour etc 
have become a necessity rather than an option. Hence corporate restructuring at the 
national and international level is now a mode of survival, growth, expansion and 
development. It is imperative to understand that different industries are faced by 
different issues and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) being a complicated issue 
cannot be evaluated just on the basis of averages. A case by case approach has to be 
adopted for which a sophisticated perspective and not a generalized approach is 
mandatory.While striking a deal it is not only sufficient to evaluate the present timing 
for the purpose of deciding if it's appropriate but also the future ahead in terms of 
opportunities involving growth, competition, environment, research and 
development etc. 
In Figure 10.5.1, the emerging economies owing to their increased importance are 
grouped under one head that is Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) is a tool for both ambitious expansion and exploiting 
opportunities in emerging markets. Figure 10.5.1 laments the present scenario where 
acquisition is no longer a domain in the hand of the entrepreneurs of the developed 
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countries. The percentage of respondents from BRIC countries was the highest 
regarding willingness to undertake an acquisition. It is no longer an area which 
attracts investment but is making a stronghold in the sphere of undertaking global 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). The next in the list is North America at 48 
percent which has a history of undertaking acquisitions. It is followed by UK and 
Ireland at 40 percent and Mainland Europe at 30 percent. The percentage for the Rest 
of the world stands at 28 percent while the Global percentage is at 44 percent. Hence 
the estimated percentage for BRIC nations at 59 percent is way ahead of its 
counterparts highlighting the expected pattern for future growth of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) which are expected to be concentrated in these developing 
BRIC nations. Individual analysis of the BRIC nations reveals that China leads the 
pack at 67 percent followed by Brazil at 64 percent. India is lagging behind at 46 
percent and Russia at 40 percent. Post-liberalization India has made an amazing 
process making it one of the most promising economies. It is using the tool of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) for acquiring competence, technological skills, 
exposure and growth but still it is lagging behind considerable as compared to China 
and Brazil. 
Figure 10.5.1: Percentage of Respondents planning to grow through Acquisition 
in the next three years (Average) 
Source: "Mergers and acquisitions: Opportunities for global growth"Grant Thornton, 
International Business Report 2008 Retrieved from 
http://www.grantthomton.com.mk/Publications/Mergersacquisition.htm 
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10.6 Conclusion 
The analysis in the above paragraphs provides a detailed discussion about the various 
problems that are faced during Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). A study about 
qualitative aspects especially the socio economic factors reveal that is emerging as a 
major factor for the high failure rate of mergers. It suggests that operational and 
financial aspects are not enough to assess and evaluate a merger. The problems are 
discussed in the light of Mergers and Acquisitions (M«S:A's) in general and the case 
studies taken up for discussion in particular. It is seen that the developing economies 
are making significant deals and the upward trend is expected to increase at a faster 
rate in the fiature as well. The trend of consolidation and restructuring seem to be the 
order of the day where striking a deal with the big players in the business has become 
a recipe for survival and success. The strategies suggested are particularly directed 
towards the problems which have been identified by the Researcher. The fiiture 
prospects relating to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are also discussed briefly on 
the basis of various introspections, surveys and trends analysed in the thesis. The 
succeeding chapter is the final chapter of the thesis and it sums up the work done by 
the Researcher in the form of a brief sununary followed by the findings and 
limitations of the study. 
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prospects related to these countries are examined in order to understand the future 
trend of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in various countries. 
The Indian economy in its liberalised form is studied and it is traced as to how it 
developed and grew as an economic powerhouse after it was freed from the clutches 
of regulation in 1991 when the New Economic Policy was unveiled. The utility and 
importance of the study arise due to the host of benefits arising from the spate of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M«feA's). it has become a strategic tool for growth for 
various reasons which are creation of synergies, access into foreign markets, 
surviving competition, diversification, availing tax concessions etc. the Indian 
economy has come a long way from the time when Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) were restricted to big business houses and regions. 
The Indian market is an attractive destination to invest mainly due to the availability 
of large amount of raw materials, natural resources, low cost skilled labour, untapped 
market potential. Also the Indian corporate sector is eyeing and finalizing major 
domestic and cross border deals. The development of banking and finance sector is 
proving to be a big shot on the arm with the facility of huge amount of deals being 
financed easily. The growth of Indian economy can be gauged by its position in the 
FDI confidence Index. It stands third in the world at 1.64 behind USA at second 
position at 1.67 and China at first position at 1.93. 
The growth in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India has been steady and stable 
with the purchase in 1991 at US$ 1 million to US$ 1877 million in 2008 and sales 
from US$ 35 million in 1992 to US$ 2977 million in 2007. The study also provides 
details of the major companies and the number of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
made by them in the last few years where Hindalco Industries leads the pack. The 
largest ever acquisition in a foreign country was however made by Tata Steel when it 
acquired Corus for US$ 12.2 billion. The study provides a detailed account of sector-
wise Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) deals in India citing the year, name of 
acquired and acquiring company along with value of the deal structured. Also deals 
done by major companies like WIPRO, Accenture and Tata group are dealt with 
separately. 
The year 2007 witnessed one of the biggest financial crisis in the history of the worid 
economy with stocks and valuations at an all time low due to the liquidity crisis which 
erupted in USA. The study highlights its impact on the level of Mergers and 
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Acquisitions (M«&A's) in India where the number of deals fell by -41.19 percent and 
the value by -67.59 percent in 2009. 
The global economic environment and its impact on the direction and volume of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is dealt with separately where it is seen that 
earlier it was USA which was leading the pack in terms of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) but now it is facing stem competition from the developed economies. The 
growth in the number and value of deals since 1991 is discussed at length. The 
various motives behind Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) are also discussed which 
range from factors related to regulation, technology, economic, sfrategic and 
geographical. The study gives a detailed account of various merger and acquisition 
deals that have taken place in various sectors across the world in terms of year, name 
of acquiring and acquired company and the value of the deal. It is seen that the 
pharmaceutical and technology sector seemed to be involved in maximum number of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) transactions. After the recession many deals were 
witnessed in the financial sector in order to survive in the market, the global recession 
made a significant impact on the volume and value of deals which saw a sharp fall. In 
terms of volume deals fell by -18.15 percent and in terms of value by -33.29 percent 
in the year 2008. However there are certain sectors which seemed to be unaffected 
which were pharmaceuticals, transport and construction. In terms of future the BRIC 
countries are expected to lead the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) brigade with a 
maximum 59 percent of respondents planning to undertake a Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) deal. 
The recent spate of increased Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is particulary due to 
the opening of the economy with the introduction of the New Economic policy of 
1991. Though the measures were taken xinder emergency situation with the balance of 
payment crisis it has greatly worked in favour of the Indian economy which is 
projected as the next big thing on the economic platform alongside China. The legal 
framework prevalent in India regarding Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) is 
discussed under various relevant Acts which are listed below: 
1. Companies Act, 1956 
2. Substantial Acquisition Of Shares And Takeover Regulation, 1997 
3. The Competition Act, 2002 
4. The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 
5. Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 
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the merger or acquisition on the pre and post merger analysis. The ratios so calculated 
are tested to analyse the hypotheses that have been formed. The Researcher uses 
correlation coefficient (r) to determine the direction and degree of relation, coefficient 
of determination (r2) to explain the variation in terms of percentage, regression 
equations to find ten cause and effect relation. Finally the student t-test is done for 
testing the statistical significance. These tests are applied not only for the ratio 
analysis but also to test the effect of the merger on the pre and post merger EPS and 
MPS. The relation between the profitability and MPS is also calculated to find out the 
effect of the announcement of the merger and the financial performance of the 
merging and merged firms to study the long term effect on the market price. In the 
end Profit Rate and Profit Margin are calculated to find out the financial and operating 
efficiencies of the firms involved before and after the merger and relevant percentages 
are calculated to make a comparison of the same. 
Before applying the research methodology so designed the Researcher gives a brief 
overview of the Indian Steel Industry and traces its growth and development since 
liberalization when the New Economic Policy was announced in 1991. The removal 
of restrictions and regulations has greatly facilitates its growth and development over 
the years and today it stands among the top ten steel industries of the world. The 
growth in production, consumption and imports and exports over the year can be 
traced through the figures provided by the Joint Planning Committee and provided by 
the Ministry of Steel, Government of India. The steady growth over the years is 
evident by the figures and the growth percentages calculated. The impact of the 
recession on the steel industry which caused a slump in demand and corresponding 
fall in demand and production is also shown. The development as pushed the Indian 
Steel Industry to the fifth position in the world according to the 2009-2101 Annual 
Report prepared by the Ministry of Steel, Government of India, the acquisition of 
Corns has made Tata Steel the eighth largest producer of steel in the world in the year 
2008. The steady profitability of the Indian Steel Industry in recent times is also 
shown by the Researcher where the profitability for the year 2009 is registered at 7.02 
percent. The DER, CR, ICR are also satisfactory at 1.03,1.23 and 3.47 respectively. 
The study also provides a detailed study of the major Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) deals that have taken place in India since 1991. The volumes of the deals 
have grown at a phenomenal rate in the last twenty years. Also the trend of an Indian 
company making a foreign deal has been hitting headlines. The deal where Tata 
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acquired Corus for approximately US$12.2 billion is the largest ever by an Indian 
corporate. Other steel companies like Jindal, JSW and Essar Steel are also making 
significant progress in this direction, hi the public sector SAIL has been 
amalgamating companies with itself and boosting its operating capacity in the 
process. 
The pre-merger analysis of Visvesvarya does not have a great picture of the financial 
condition of Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited (VISL). There was a consistent fall 
in the PAT, RONW and ROCE for Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited firom 1994-
98. The hypothesis testing shows that the profitability and CETR of Visvesvaraya had 
a limited impact on the post merger financials of SAIL. Visvesvaraya was a loss 
making unit and its merger with its parent company gave it a new lease of life. The 
merger made it possible for SAIL to write off its losses and get deductions on tax 
payments. The dismal state of affairs led to a proposal of its being taken over by the 
Defence Ministry as 60 percent of its products that is alloy steel were required by it. 
The proposal however did not materialise and its association with SAIL continued. It 
was in November 2004 that VISL started making profits and since then it has been a 
profitable concern for SAIL. 
The analysis of SAIL as regards merger with Visvesvaraya shows that the profitability 
declines after the merger but it was due to the recession in the global and domestic 
steel industry. A restructuring plan was devise to bring about a turnaround in order to 
separate its non-core business from its main business of production and sale of steel. 
The Testing of Hypothesis for various financial parameters reveals that the relation 
between the Pre and Post merger Profitability, CETR and ICR is statistically 
insignificant. Only when six years of Pre merger is compared to eleven years of post 
merger of CETR, the relation is significant. Hence the testing of Hypothesis supports 
the notion that the merger did not have much impact on the financials of SAIL. The 
relation between the Post merger Profitability and MPS is however significant. The 
MPS is greatly affected by Profitability and other factors. The study of the Profit Rate 
and Profit Margin also highlights the limited impact of the merger on the financial 
performance and greater effect on the operational performance. 
In case of IISCO's merger with SAIL the Hypothesis relating to the Pre merger 
Profitability and CETR of IISCO with the post merger statistics of SAIL shows that 
the both the relations are statistically insignificant. IISCO was running into losses 
prior to the merger and consequently had a negative impact on the profitability of 
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SAIL while the CETR had a positive impact on the CETR of SAIL. The correlation 
was of low degree but it should be kept in mind that the setting off of losses may have 
reduced profitability but at the same time the tax liability as well. 
When we see the merger from the perspective of SAIL we see that SAIL was making 
profits since 2004 and the trend continued after the merger as well. However the 
testing of Hypothesis shows that it's only the relation between the Pre and Post 
merger ICR which is statistically significant. However the degree of correlation is 
low. The relation between the Pre and Post merger Profitability and ICR is 
statistically insignificant. The Pre merger analysis of Profitability and MPS depicts 
that the relation between the two parameters is statistically insignificant. However 
post merger the relation is statistically significant and there is a high degree of 
positive correlation. The hypothesis testing the Pre and Post merger MPS and EPS 
shows that there is an effect of the merger on the two variables. For MPS the relation 
is moderate while for EPS it is of a low degree. It is interesting in the light that the Pre 
merger profitability did not have a statistically significant relation with the post 
merger profitability. The analysis of Profit Margin and Profit Rate show significant 
improvement in the financial and operating efficiency. 
Hence the merger did not positively affect the financials of SAIL but there were 
benefits in terms of greater size and production capabilities. 
For the acquisition of SISCOL by JSW, the analysis of SISCOL reveals that the losses 
were converted into losses with the help of core competencies of JSW and after 
profitability was being achieved the two undertakings were subsequently merged in 
2008. The Hypothesis testing reveals that the pre merger Profitability and ICR of 
SISCOL did not have an impact on the post merger Profitability and ICR of SISCOL. 
The post merger ICR of JSW had a relation with the pre merger ICR of SISCOL when 
five years of pre merger and three years of post merger were undertaken. However the 
study of the Pre merger EPS of SISCOL and Post merger EPS of JSW Steel appear to 
have a relation revealing that the shareholders were affected. The degree of 
correlation is a high degree of positive correlation. Thus we see that the association 
with JSW Steel had converted a loss making unit into a profitable venture. 
After running into losses for years JSW Steel finally made a turnaround in its 
operations in 2004 and started making profits on a consistent basis. There is no 
relation between the Pre and Post merger profitability on the basis of the test applied. 
However the benefits of merger are not expected to accrue in the first few years. The 
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analysis of the relation between the profitability and MPS reveals that the relation 
between the Pre merger profitability and MPS is insignificant. The relation between 
the post merger Profitability and MPS is on the contrary found to be significant. The 
relation between the Pre merger EPS and MPS with the post merger EPS and MPS is 
also found to be significant. The Profit Margin for JSW Steel jumped by 635 percent 
while the Profit Rate increased by 74.6 percent. The losses incurred prior to 2004 are 
also responsible for this huge change in Profit Margin. 
Bellary Steel's historical performance was dismal with losses being incurred since 
2001 and they seemed to just magnify after the merger and increased manifold over 
time. The study of Hypotheses reveals that the Pre merger Profitability, FATR and 
ICR did not have a statistically significant relation with the post merger figures. The 
ICR in the short run was though affected having a high degree of positive correlation. 
However both in the pre merger and post merger stage there is a statistically 
significant relation between the Profitability and MPS. Prior to the merger the degree 
of correlation is low while post merger it is a high degree of positive correlation. The 
Pre merger MPS and EPS also do not seem to have a relation with the post merger 
statistic. 
The financials for Pittsburgh Iron and Steel Limited was in a bad state with losses 
being incurred at a consistent basis. The test of Hypothesis reveals that the 
profitability of Pittsburgh had an impact on the profitability of Bellary while there 
was no effect on the EPS and FATR. The Profit Margin and Profit Rate for both the 
entities also did not pose a satisfactory picture. To sum up the merger was not going 
anywhere and both the units individually as well as jointly were making no headway. 
The decision of promoters to foray into the business of Steel by merging with Bellary 
Steel was questionable with the latter suffering fi-om losses. 
The pre merger figures of Indian Chrome Charge Limited (ICCL) show that the 
company was running into losses since 2001 but the volume of losses had 
considerable come down till 2005. The test of Hypotheses reveals that the 
Profitability and ICR of ICCL had a relation with the post merger figures of IMFA 
only in the longer run. The FATR of ICCL had a statistically significant relation with 
the FATR of IMFA both in the shorter and longer run. The two variables had a very 
high degree of positive correlation. The positive effect that the merger had on the 
operational efficiency was obvious. Even the EPS of ICCL had statistically significant 
relation with that of IMFA both in the short and long run. The degree of correlation 
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was high. The merger seemed to fulfil its objectives of financial and operating 
synergy. 
IMFA was a steady and profitable enterprise with the company managing to earn 
profits over ten years that is firom 2000 to 2009 at a satisfactory rate. The Hypotheses 
testing reveals that there is a statistically significant relation between the Pre and post 
merger FATR of IMFA having a moderate degree of positive correlation. The relation 
between the Pre and Post Profitability, ICR and EPS is statistically insignificant. The 
Profit Margin after the merger shows an increase of 120 percent while the Profit Rate 
registered an increase of 66.67. Hence the merger appeared to have accrued financial 
and operating synergies after the merger. 
In case of international Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) we see that the financials 
of NatSteel show that the company was running into profits prior to the merger but 
after the merger took place in 2005 there was a significant increase in the rate of 
profits indicating that the sale of its steel division was proving to be profitable for the 
enterprise. The testing of various Hypotheses shows that the relation between the Pre 
and Post merger FATR and WCTR is significant while the one between the pre and 
post merger profitability is insignificant. The testing of Hypothesis to determine the 
relation between the profitability and MPS before and after the merger is interesting. 
The relation between the Profitability and MPS prior to the merger is statistically 
insignificant while the relation between the Profitability and MPS after the merger is 
statistically significant. In case of EPS the relation between the Pre and post merger 
figures is insignificant while in case of MPS the pre and post merger data are 
statistically significant. However there is a negative correlation between the two at -
0.57. 
The acquiring company Tata Steel earned profits on a steady basis over the last 
decade. The merger had an impact on the profitability of the entity. The FATR and 
ICR were however xmaffected and were statistically insignificant. The relation 
between the MPS and Profitability shows that both the variables had a statistically 
significant relation both before and after the merger. Also the Pre merger MPS and 
EPS had a relation with the Post merger MPS and EPS respectively. The Profit 
Margin for both NatSteel and Tata Steel increased significantly. The Profit Margin for 
Tata Steel increased significantly by 491.67 percent indicating a marked improvement 
in the operating efficiency. 
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In the case of Tata- Corus deal, from 2000 to 2003 Corus was registering losses and it 
was only in 2004 that Corus earned profits. However the rate of profits till 2004 to 
2006 was in the range of 2 percent to 5 percent which was not very high. The test of 
hypothesis shows that the Profitability and FATR prior to the merger had a relation 
with that of the post merger Profitability and FATR respectively of Tata Steel. While 
Profitability had a negative correlation the FATR had a positive correlation with the 
post merger figures. The ICR was affected only in the longer run. Pre merger EPS had 
a very high degree of positive correlation with the post merger EPS indicating the 
benefits accrued to the shareholders. 
The much hyped acquisition of Corus by Tata Steel reflected that the trend of 
profitability for Tata Steel continued.teh merger had no effect on the figures of 
Profitability, FATR or ICR as depicted by the test of Hypothesis. The relation 
between the Pre and Post merger figures is statistically insignificant. The relation 
between the MPS and Profitability before and after the merger is most interesting. 
Prior to the merger MPS and profitability had a statistically significant relation with a 
high degree of positive correlation. However after the merger there is a high degree of 
negative correlation indicating that the merger did not go down very well with the 
shareholders as per the market response. The EPS was affected by the merger only in 
the longer run. It is fiirther seen that the Profit Margin for Tata Steel increased by 77.5 
percent while the operational efficiency got a major boost with the Profit Rate moving 
up by 252.4 percent 
The Profitability of Algoma Steel was impressive before the merger. Though after the 
merger it dropped, it was back on track in 2009 at 8.53 percent. The testing of 
hypotheses reveals that FATR was affected as a result of the merger both in the small 
and long run while the profitability was affected in the small run. The ICR was 
however not affected. 
Despite the huge losses incurred initially in the year 2001 and 2002, Essar Steel 
recovered and posted profits at a steady rate fi-om 2003 onwards. The test of various 
hypotheses reveals that the merger did not have an effect on any of the parameters, i.e. 
Profitability, FATR or ICR. For Algoma Steel the Profit margin increased while the 
Profit rate fell. For Essar Steel both Profit Margin and Profit Rate increased 
substantially. 
The evaluating of problems relating to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) reveals 
that the major problems faced related to technological obsolescence, timing of 
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mergers, financing of scheme, cost of deal, competitive bidding, change in the debt 
structure, MPS, selection and size of target company, integration of accounting 
standards, cultural integrations, examining post merger effect, synergy calculation, 
different set of metrics and parameters, regulatory environment etc. 
For addressing the problems various strategies are proposed by the Researcher 
relating to using the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) tool for expanding and 
entering new markets, maintain balance, evaluating the potential of target company, 
tax planning, diversiiying risk, realistic targets, develop a professional team, emphasis 
on people, employee retention, premium calculation etc. 
From the point of view of future prospects the Researcher feels that this tool has got 
enormous scope for future deals both in the domestic and international arena. It not 
only acts as a mode to expand and grow but also offers wide employment 
opportunities. Also the ongoing recession has led the valuations to fall down. Also 
keeping in view the growth trajectory of the developing countries we feel that the next 
wave of Mergers and Acquisitions (M«&A's) is going to be dominated by them 
especially the BRIC countries that is Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
11.3 Findinss 
The trend of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) has greatly benefitted from the 
opening up of the economy but it is only in the recent years that prominent outbound 
deals are being done. 
The global Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) increased in terms of volume fi-om 13 
in 1991 to 319 in 2007 while the value increased from US$27 billion in 1991 to US$ 
70.4 billion in 2007. 
The opening of the economy has certainly gave an impetus to the trend of Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India but it has been only in the last decade that 
significant deals are being carved out as is evident from the volume and value of deals 
depicted in the thesis. Also a major proportion of FDI is contributed by Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A's) deals. 
The major objective for Indian corporate for effecting a merger or takeover is related 
to financial synergies followed by increased operational base and reach to new 
markets. As per various figures, surveys and projections it is the BRIC countries 
which are expected to lead their contemporise as regards affecting a merger and 
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acquisition deal. According to the 2010 Confidence Index by A.T Kearney India ranks 
third in the world behind only China and USA. 
The ease in access and relatively cheaper rates of debt financing is facilitating a large 
number of Mergers and Acquisitions (MifeA's) which is a major reason for the 
increased activity. A major factor which affected the Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A's) activity in the recent times is the global recession of 2007. In India the 
domestic deals fell by -46.73 percent in volume and cross border by -22.82 percent. 
Interestingly the value for domestic deals increased by 78.60 percent while for cross 
border deals it fell by -46.81 percent indicating the interest of the India Corporate 
Sector towards the domestic economy as a result of the recession. For the world 
economy the value of the deals fell by -34.71 percent in 2008 and 81.71 percent in 
2009. The developing economy suffered the highest fall in deals due to recession by -
96.72 percent. 
For the global economy Pharmaceutical sector registered a growth of 167.82 percent 
and transport by 68.93 percent for the period 2008 to 2009. The sector having the 
most vibrant activity as regards Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in India are 
telecommunication, Pharmaceutical and Steel. Among the companies involved in 
major deals in recent times are Tata, Ranbaxy Laboratories, Hindalco Industries. The 
acquisition of Corns by Tata Steel at US$ 12.2 is the largest ever cross border deal by 
an Indian Company. 
Besides acquiring and merging with new firms, many steel firms are merging with 
their subsidiaries in a bid to consolidate and expand the production faculties. This is 
in sync with the global consolidation trend where companies are engaging in huge 
restructuring and consolidation. With fierce competition the key to survival is large 
scale production and benefiting fi-om the related economies of scale. Recently major 
producers of steel that is Tata Steel, Essar Steel, JSW Steel, Jindal Steel, SAIL and 
IMFA have merged their subsidiaries to catapult as leading producers of steel 
The merger with Visvesvaraya in 1999 was beneficial for both the companies as 
Visvesvaraya got a lease of life given the losses it was incurring and SAIL expanded 
its operating capacity and also could write off its profits against the losses. However 
the loss making Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Limited did not have any positive impact 
whatsoever on the financials for SAIL. 
In case of merger of SAIL with IISCO in 2006 we see that it was again a merger of a 
loss making subsidiary of SAIL with itself The strategy was again to revive the loss 
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making unit with the merging of its operations with a profitable unit like SAIL, hi 
view of the global consolidation trend of consolidation in steel industry the merger 
was helpful as it expanded the operating capacity of SAIL besides providing it with 
reduced tax liability. Also it is seen that after the merger the Profitability and MPS 
had a statistically significant relationship. Also the merger is seen to have an effect on 
the MPS and EPS after the merger. The merger had a greater impact on the financial 
performance rather than the operating performance as is evident by the movement of 
the Profit Rate and Profit Margin. 
The merger between IMFA and ICCL reflected positively on the operational and 
financial statistics of IMFA where the profitability of IMFA was affected in the 
longer run and the FATR of IMFA was affected both in the long and short run by the 
statistics of ICCL. Also the degree of correlation was high. The EPS of IMFA and 
ICCL also had a high positive correlation. The comparison between the pre and post 
merger figures of IMFA highlights that the merger did have a positive effect as 
regards Profitability, ICR, FATR and EPS. The Profit Margin and Profit Rate also 
increased leading to the conclusion that the operating efficiencies were enhanced 
more than the financial efficiencies due to the merger. 
In case of the acquisition of Bellary Steel by Pittsburgh Iron and Steel the acquisition 
seemed to be going nowhere with the trend of losses continuing unabated after the 
merger for both the concerns involved. The Profit Margin and Profit Rate were dismal 
and the test of Hypothesis also reveals that the merger was proving to be a failure. 
The acquisition of SISCOL by JSW steel proved to be a boon for SISCOL which 
benefitted firom the core competencies of JSW and made a remarkable turnaround in 
operations and reported profits after the deal. It is seen that the post merger relation 
between MPS and Profitability is significant while the pre merger relation is not 
reflecting the positive impact the merger had on the MPS. The Profit Margin for JSW 
Steel jumped by 635 percent while Profit Rate increased by 74.6 percent. The losses 
incurred prior to 2004 are also responsible for this huge change in Profit Margin. 
In case of NatSteel, after the merger took place in 2005 there was a significant 
increase in the rate of profits indicating that the sale of its steel division was proving 
to be profitable for the enterprise. Here again the profitability and MPS have 
significant relation before the merger and not after the merger. While as regards MPS 
the merger had a negative impact on it. 
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Tata Steel earned profits on a steady basis over the last decade. The merger had an 
impact on the profitability of the entity. The FATR and ICR were however unaffected 
and were statistically insignificant. The relation between the MPS and Profitability 
shows that both the variables had a statistically significant relation both before and 
after the merger. Also the Pre merger MPS and EPS had a relation with the Post 
merger MPS and EPS respectively. The Profit Margin for both NatSteel and Tata 
Steel increased significantiy. The Profit Margin for Tata Steel increased significantly 
by 491.67 percent indicating a marked improvement in the operating efficiency. 
From 2000 to 2003 Corns was registering losses and it was only in 2004 that Corus 
earned profits. However the rate of profits till 2004 to 2006 was in the range of 2 
percent to 5 percent which were not very high. The test of hypothesis shows that the 
Profitability and FATR of Tata Steel prior to the merger had a relation the post 
merger figures. While Profitability had a negative correlation the FATR had a positive 
correlation with the post merger figures. The ICR was affected only in the longer run. 
Pre merger EPS had a very high degree of positive correlation with the post merger 
EPS indicating the benefits accrued to the shareholders. 
The much hyped acquisition of Corus by Tata Steel reflected that the trend of 
profitability for Tata Steel continued.teh merger had no effect on the figures of 
Profitability, FATR or ICR as depicted by the test of Hypothesis. The relation 
between the Pre and Post merger figures is statistically insignificant. The relation 
between the MPS and Profitability before and after the merger is most interesting. 
Prior to the merger MPS and profitability had a statistically significant relation with a 
high degree of positive correlation. However after the merger there is a high degree of 
negative correlation indicating that the merger did not go down very well with the 
shareholders as per the market response. The EPS was affected by the merger only in 
the longer run. It is further seen that the Profit Margin for Tata Steel increased by 77.5 
percent while the operational efficiency got a major boost with the Profit Rate moving 
up by 252.4 percent 
The Profitability of Algoma Steel was impressive before the merger. Though after the 
merger it dropped, it was back on ti-ack in 2009 at 8.53 percent. The testing of 
hypotheses reveals that FATR was affected as a result of the merger both in the small 
and long run while the profitability was affected in the small run only. The ICR was 
however not affected in either case. 
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Despite the huge losses incurred initially in the year 2001 and 2002, Essar Steel 
recovered and posted profits at a steady rate fi-om 2003 onwards. The test of various 
hypotheses reveals that the merger did not have an effect on any of the parameters, i.e. 
Profitability, FATR or ICR. For Algoma Steel the Profit margin increased while the 
Profit rate fell. For Essar Steel both Profit Margin and Profit Rate increased 
substantially. 
Ih4 Su2eestions and Recommendations 
11.4.1 Based on Findings of the Study 
The selection of the target company should be done most extensively. Care should be 
taken to ensure that the target and acquirer should complement and supplement each 
other in resources. When structuring a merger or acquisition the main idea is to 
exploit the post-merger synergy. However it is most important to ensure that these are 
valued in the right earnest. Both over-valuation and undervaluation might prove 
detrimental to the interest of the acquiring company. The value of deals in the case of 
mergers and acquisitions in the recent years is rurming into billions. It affects the 
liquidity and capital structure of the company. The success of the deal has a bearing 
on the financial capabilities of the company. While finalizing a deal its impact on the 
financial position for several years to come should be considered deeply. 
In the recent years there is a global trend of restructuring prevalent where Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A's) is proving to be a potent tool. However while taking a 
decision regarding a deal it is important to ensure that the acquisition move is not be 
solely based global trend but on individual assessment of the target company and 
other relevant details. 
Besides considering the relevant details regarding the company it is also important to 
consider the macro environment as it has a deep and profound impact on the fiiture of 
the deals. The timing of the merger or acquisition is one of the most important aspects 
of merger and acquisition deal. The perfect time may always not be when the market 
is in the state of boom. It might be profitable to target companies which have future 
prospects and purchase them while the valuations are low. hi the case of listed 
companies the parameters involve the MPS of shares which to a large extent depends 
on market psyche and sentiment and how the investors respond to the announcement 
of the deal. It is important to ensure that the confidence of the investors is maintained 
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for which disseminating information and not keeping them in the dark may prove to 
be an added advantage 
In the case of foreign acquisitions the main idea is to capture advanced technology 
and an entry in a new market. However the core competencies of the Indian Steel 
producers lie in low cost and care should be taken to ensure that the resources are not 
pushed beyond a certain extent which might affect the cost advantage adversely in the 
longer run. 
In the present global scenario the BRIC economies are making a considerable impact 
globally with their economic prowess. Besides concentrating on international markrts, 
the Indian Steel Industry should undertake massive development of infrastructure and 
expansion in the domestic arena and other developing economies. Efforts should be 
made to keep a hold of the untapped domestic market which appears to have great 
potential in the near future. Even the world's largest steelmaker Arecelor-Mittal is 
looking to enter India through acquiring stake in Uttam Galva Steel. The recent trend 
of the Indian Steel Industry is towards consolidation and restructuring. The main idea 
is to increase the production capacity and gain from economies from large scale. The 
idea of merging or being acquired may be the hope for survival of small producers as 
the trend shows that there would be few big producers rather than many small 
producers. 
The acquiring company should ensure that it does not involve or get muddled in rival 
bidding too deeply and end up paying more than what the acquiring company is 
valued. In the case of the high pitched Tata-Corus battle many industry experts feel 
that Tata might have ended paying a high price and the success of the acquisition is 
yet to be finally gauged. In the recent times the banking and financial industry has 
been flourishing at a remarkable pace. Their facilities in terms of loans should be 
judiciously used and should not be used to make unnecessary deals and create a debt 
burden which might be difficult to repay. 
The acquiring and acquired commonly have to take care to bring about not only post 
merger financial and operating integration but also integration of the people involved 
in order to create a positive environment. Acquiring loss making subsidiaries might be 
a good incentive to reduce tax-liability and increase operating capacity but in a large 
scale industry it should be ensure that the practise does not lead to a big dent on the 
financial performance as maintaining balance is crucial. 
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11.4.2 General Suggestions and Recommendations 
The most important aspect of a merger or acquisition is facilitating smooth post 
merger integration. For the purpose various steps need to be accorded highest level of 
importance. It might be advisable to do so in phases in order to facilitate the complex 
process. Merger and Acquisition is a potent and most useful tool to expand the global 
presence. With major companies worldwide engaging in it fiercely it might become a 
necessity rather than just an option for growth. It is necessary for big and small 
companies to recognize and accept this trend and adjust their business strategies 
accordingly. 
It is necessary to maintain balance in synergies and ensure that all aspects are given 
due importance and it does not lead to ignoring of one aspect for another. It might be 
advisable to study recent Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) in the same or related 
industries to develop an understanding of the same. However it cannot be solely relied 
upon and requires a detailed case by case study. The management of the company 
should be prepared to face new challenges and transform them into opportunities. A 
key aspect is irmovation and creativity. The management should be prepared to accept 
changes and employ strategies keeping in mind the changed circimistances and 
ground realties rather than focus on just set conventions and rules. It might be 
advisable to develop core strategic teams which are professionally trained to facilitate 
a merger and acquisition integration. 
It is imperative to maintain a policy of tolerance and cultural integration as it is 
necessary to sort out the human resource issue in the most amicable manner for post 
merger integration. The policy of employees retention is a sensitive aspect and care 
should be taken to maintain an environment where the focus is on efficiency and 
productivity and the workers are ably simulated and motivated to work in a new work 
environment after the merger. 
The management should also keep contingency measures and back up plans intact. In 
case the plans and strategies do not work out, risk management mechanism should be 
in place to address unforeseen circumstances. 
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11.5 Contribution to the Existing Stock of Knowledge on the 
Subject Matter 
The Researcher has attempted to make a sincere attempt for making a worthy 
contribution to the existing literature regarding Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's). 
The study aims to explore the effect of the merger on primarily the post-merger 
financial performance of the companies involved in the Merger and Acquisition 
(M&A's) activity. For the purpose the financials of both the acquired/merged and the 
acquiring/merging entities are taken into consideration. Though, Mergers and 
Acquisitions is a widely researched topic, the studies done on the post-merger 
performance are limited. The Indian Steel Sector is taken up for analysis which is 
experiencing vibrant activity in the past few years. Significant deals that have taken 
place both in the domestic and international scene are taken up for detailed analysis. 
The data is classified on the basis of pre-merger and post-merger activity and internal 
and external figures affecting the performance are accounted for. The effect of the 
profitability on the Market Price of Shares (MPS) and vice-versa is also explored. 
The study aims to study the viability of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
undertaken in the Indian Steel Industry on the basis of the post-merger financial 
performance. 
11.6 Directions for Future Research 
The Researcher suggests the following core areas for the purpose of fixture research 
related to the topic of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) 
i. The impact of the merger announcements on the share prices of the rival and 
bidding firms can be examined, 
ii. In the present era Human Resources is a vital factor in determining the 
success or failure of the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) and it is a 
qualitative aspect which is difficult to measure and quantify but has become 
extremely important in the present global economy where people and cultural 
cohesion is the key and especially in a cross border deal. 
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iii. Also in the wake of recent recession question marks are being raised about the 
valuations of deal done under depressed conditions where the target company 
is valued at a much lower price than it's worth. 
iv. Another important aspect is the determining the rate of exchange of 
currencies which keeps on fluctuating until the negotiations materialize and a 
rise or fall may work in favour of one company while harm another in case of 
cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A's) . There is a need to design 
an appropriate model or mechanism for that. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Data for Analysis of SAIL 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Equity 
Shareholders 
Fund 
5272.20 
5663 
6556 
7937 
8469.49 
8557.98 
Loan 
funds 
9521.27 
11272 
12136 
14476 
17421.21 
20014.61 
Fixed 
assets 
10855.05 
12397 
14726 
12397 
19566.69 
21181.59 
Current 
assets 
7111.84 
7945 
7920 
9186 
11811.27 
13459.96 
Current 
Liabilities 
3764.24 
4056 
4715 
5001 
5958.59 
6138.17 
Source: Compiled from the Amiual Reports of SAIL from 1994 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.sail.co.in and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/india/stockpricequote/steellarge/steelauthorityindia/SA 
Appendix 2: Data for Analysis of SAIL 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Capital 
Employed 
8746 
10900 
10762 
12956 
18486 
21145 
Interest 
Expense 
671 
765 
710 
808 
1179 
1554 
Total 
Assets 
18987.49 
21474 
23952 
28089 
31849.29 
34710.76 
PBIT 
1094 
1310 
1873 
2127 
1767 
1703 
EPS 
1.06 
1.37 
2.78 
3.30 
1.25 
0.78 
Net Profit 
423 
545 
1108 
1319 
515 
133 
Source: Compiled from the Armual Reports of SAIL from 1994 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.sail.co.in and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/india/stockpricequote/steellarge/steelauthorityindia/SA 
Appendix 3: Data for 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Gross Sales 
14944 
16250 
16233 
15502 
19207 
24178 
31805 
32280 
39189 
45555 
48681 
Analysis of SAIL 
Net Worth 
6886 
4765 
4163 
2252 
1989 
4659 
10011 
12386 
17184 
23004 
27984 
Loan funds 
21017 
15082 
14251 
14019 
12928 
8690 
5770 
4298 
4181 
3045 
7539 
Current 
assets 
11399 
8259 
8362 
7107 
7282 
8075 
14187 
17384 
20379 
26318 
34511 
Current 
Liabilities 
4880 
5027 
5274 
4849 
4777 
6025 
6608 
8108 
6500 
9439 
12228 
Source: Compiled from the Annual Reports of SAIL from 1994 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.sail.co.in and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/india/stockpricequote/steellarge/steelauthorityindia/SA 
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Appendix 4: 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Source: Com 
Data for Analysis of SAIL 
Capital 
Employed 
24826 
19105 
18265 
17056 
16541 
15218 
20064 
21782 
25476 
28450 
34552 
piled from the 
Interest 
Expense 
2017 
1789 
1752 
1562 
1334 
901 
605 
468 
332 
251 
253 
Annual Repor 
Total 
Assets 
29995 
25607 
2745.32 
26060.9 
25532.22 
22659.05 
28086.82 
30811.63 
33817.79 
40876.16 
53976.64 
ts of SAIL fro 
PBIT 
342.89 
71.56 
981.12 
-140.58 
1013.84 
3495.88 
9940.15 
6116.76 
8728.28 
11643.89 
7486.27 
m 1994 to 200 
Net Profit 
-1574 
-1720 
-729 
-1707 
-304 
2512 
6817 
4013 
6202 
7537 
6175 
9. Retrieved 
from http://www.sail.co.in and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/india/stockpricequote/steellarge/steelauthorityindia/SA 
Appendix 5: Post-Merger Earning per Share and Market Price per Share of 
SAIL (BSE: 500113) 
Year 
2000* 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Note: Prices 1 
Earnings 
per Share 
-4.16 
-1.76 
-4.13 
-0.74 
6.08 
16.5 
9.72 
15.02 
18.25 
14.95 
br March 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
-
-57.6923 
134.6591 
-82.0823 
-921.622 
171.3816 
-41.0909 
54.52675 
21.50466 
-18.0822 
Market Price 
per Share 
8 
6 
5 
9 
32 
63 
83 
113 
185 
96 
Percentage 
increase over 
previous year 
-
25 
-16.67 
80 
255.56 
96.88 
31.75 
36.15 
63.72 
48.11 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from the Annual Reports of SAIL from 1994 to 
2009. Retrieved from http://www.sail.co.in and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/india/stockpricequote/steellarge/steelauthorityindia/SA 
ii I P a g e 
Appendix 6: IISCO 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Borrowing 
1331.03 
133.31 
133.21 
135.97 
103.06 
264.91 
Net 
Worth 
-1521.41 
-37.96 
-226.1 
-406.97 
-588.25 
-561.21 
current 
assets 
517.47 
448.23 
303.63 
376.36 
269.44 
current 
liabilities 
735.01 
839.87 
860.21 
1114.7 
1177.3 
flxed assets 
348.02 
337.76 
318.17 
299.64 
284.715 
total 
assets 
1296.73 
1404.17 
1430.77 
1655.81 
1722.83 
Source: Compiled from Armual Report of IISCO from 1999 to 2004. Retrieved from 
http://www.business-
beacon.com/kommon/bin/sr.php?kall=wcos&cocode=98859&type=s&tab=1010 
Appendix 7: SISCOL 
Year 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Equity 
Shareholder 
s Fund 
34.05 
-119.35 
-80.61 
169.77 
223.85 
Total Debt 
831.49 
942.17 
936.68 
1065.17 
1463.95 
Fixed 
assets 
874.47 
908.57 
803.35 
1062.03 
1672.77 
Current 
assets 
76.91 
119.14 
238.06 
265.45 
319.19 
Current 
Liabilities 
89.24 
120.18 
188.69 
124.50 
307.13 
Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of SISCOL 2003 to 2007. Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/southemironsteel/profit-loss/SIS04 
Appendix 8: SISCOL 
Year 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Interest 
Expense 
34.15 
106.77 
10.69 
12.40 
52.64 
Total 
Assets 
954.79 
943.01 
1044.76 
1359.44 
1994.92 
PBIT 
-12.74 
-46.36 
35.54 
10.82 
104.37 
EPS 
-6.05 
-20.31 
5.17 
1.55 
2.06 
Net Front 
-45.70 
-153.4 
39.05 
41.27 
55.05 
Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of SISCOL 2003 to 2007. Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/southemironsteel/profit-loss/SIS04 
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Appendix 9: JSW Steel 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Net 
Worth 
987.62 
1102.71 
803.89 
1352.03 
1631.08 
3149.72 
4356.22 
5594.05 
7677.25 
7959.25 
Loan 
funds 
4098.47 
4974.60 
5612.31 
5940.64 
4787.03 
3568.44 
4096.05 
4173.03 
7546.53 
11272.63 
Current 
assets 
675.14 
669.63 
891.40 
737.50 
1004.80 
1849 
2745.42 
2479.18 
3086.54 
4631.64 
Current 
Liabilities 
1161.33 
939.27 
924.87 
817.02 
897.37 
1608.26 
2320.12 
2279.28 
4101.83 
7557.21 
Fixed Assets 
1495.06 
1507.27 
3944.88 
5692.64 
5206 
6422.46 
8351.49 
10183.76 
16550.73 
22224.21 
Total Assets 
6247.52 
7016.94 
7341.49 
8182.68 
7315.48 
8899.88 
11514.42 
13059.02 
20577.99 
28210.25 
Source: Compiled from JSW Annual Reports .Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/fmanciak{jswsteeybalance-sheet/JS'W01 and 
http://www.jsw.in/ 
Appendix 10: JSW Steel 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
MPS 
4.55 
4.75 
2 
3.9 
8.2 
360.55 
302.7 
493.45 
819.1 
231.85 
1051.3* 
Interest 
Expense 
197.67 
194.32 
444.35 
563.45 
409.28 
469.87 
360.32 
399.54 
440.4 
797.25 
EPS 
-1.23 
-0.38 
-2.72 
-0.86 
3.92 
64.98 
55.57 
80.11 
95.26 
22.7 
68.45* 
PBIT 
57.45 
151.39 
77.9 
370.19 
708.68 
1945.81 
1661.46 
2314.72 
2819.63 
2265.01 
Net Profit 
-148.18 
-49.62 
-351.07 
-110.67 
528.68 
870.11 
864.29 
1292 
1728.19 
458.5 
1306 
*MPS as on 23 February, 2010 
**Nine months 
Compiled from JSW Annual Reports. Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/jswsteen)alance-sheet/JSW01 and 
http://www.jsw.in/ 
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Appendix 11: BeUary Steel 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Net 
Worth 
205.83 
66.54 
52.94 
-32.7 
-104.6 
-184.08 
-291.32 
-406.89 
-550.5 
Loan 
funds 
871.96 
979.13 
1203.6 
1426.98 
1618.14 
1837.38 
2079.46 
2332.8 
2704.76 
Current 
assets 
254.83 
37.14 
123.54 
120.46 
114.98 
108.81 
108.47 
116.89 
111.83 
Current 
Liabilities 
96.29 
94.03 
110.28 
119.68 
120.7 
110.91 
119.43 
129.38 
137.34 
Fixed Assets 
919.23 
1102.54 
1243.26 
1393.5 
1519.27 
1655.47 
1799.1 
1938.41 
2179.76 
Total Assets 
1174.08 
1139.7 
1464.9 
1514.36 
1634.92 
1764.8 
1908.03 
2056.48 
2292.59 
Source: Compiled from Annual Report of BeUary Steel and Alloys Limited from 2000 
to 2006. Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/bellarysteelalIoys/balance-sheet/BSA01 
Appendix 12: BeUary Steel 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
MPS 
(Rs) 
4 
3 
0.8 
1.05 
1.92 
6.87 
0.63 
0.99 
4.04 
1.59 
Interest 
Expense 
29.38 
10.13 
45.67 
19.92 
66.93 
78.21 
96.65 
110.28 
126.86 
EPS 
(Rs) 
-3.57 
-33.75 
-18.67 
-3.05 
-10.06 
-1.11 
-1.46 
-1.58 
-1.96 
PBIT 
12.33 
-71.33 
-0.21 
-2.39 
-3.09 
-10.73 
-10.1 
-5.18 
-13.84 
Net Profit 
-17.2 
-179.38 
-99.21 
-22.31 
-73.62 
-81.13 
-107.24 
-115.57 
-143.61 
Source: Compiled from Annual Report of BeUary Steel and Alloys Limited from 2000 
to 2006. Retrieved from 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials^ellarysteelalloys^alance-sheet/BSA01 
Appendix 13: Pil 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Source: 
Sales 
(Rs.crore) 
17.46 
17.67 
17.36 
10.58 
4.50 
2.33 
Compiled 1 
ttsburgh Iron & Steels Ltd. 
FBDITA 
(Rs.crore) 
2.65 
2.50 
1.25 
-0.29 
0.36 
-1.02 
rom Annua 
PAT 
(Rs.crore) 
0.79 
0.63 
-0.54 
-1.94 
-1.17 
-0.76 
Report of 
PBDITA/Total 
income (%) 
15.11 
14.06 
7.12 
-2.59 
7.09 
-33.66 
i'ittsburgh Iron z 
PAT/Total 
income 
(%) 
4.50 
3.55 
-3.08 
-18.10 
-25.83 
-28.90 
ind Steel fro 
Debt to 
equity 
ratio 
1.1 
1.04 
1.23 
0.88 
0.74 
0.11 
m 2000 to 2 
Net cash 
flow 
(Rs.crore) 
0.19 
-0.22 
-0.99 
-0.07 
0.06 
006. 
Retrieved from http://money.rediff.com/compaiiies/pittsburgh-iron-and-steels-
ltd/16020124/profit-and-Ioss and http://www.business-
beacon.com/kommoiVbin/sr.php?kall=wmnahv&repnum=5433«&cocode=31979&dealtype=M 
&dealdate=20060320&deatao=l 
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Appendix 14: Pittsburgh Iron & Steels Ltd 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Profit 
0.79 
0.63 
-0.54 
-1.94 
-0.82 
-1.03 
-0.82 
-0.1 
-
Current 
Assets 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.70 
6.66 
0.75 
2.21 
3.29 
Current 
Liabilities 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.12 
5.98 
0.09 
0.63 
1.23 
Fixed Assets 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.06 
.08 
.08 
.47 
2.91 
Total 
Assets 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
6.22 
2.68 
0.84 
6.22 
2.68 
EPS 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
-1.93 
-2.43 
-1.94 
0.03 
-0.2 
Source: Compiled fh)m Annual Report of Pittsburgh Iron and Steel from 2000 to 2006. 
Retrieved from http://money.redifF.com/companies/pittsburgh-iron-and-steels-
ltd/16020124/profit-and-loss and http://www.business-
beacon.com/kommon/bin/sr.php?kall=wmnahv&repnum=5433&cocode=31979&dealtype=M 
&dealdate=20060320&dealno=l 
Appendix 15: Indian Charge Chrome Limited 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Net Worth 
-1803.78 
-2252.60 
-2637.59 
-2707.1 
-2679.98 
Loan 
funds 
501.32 
377.60 
331.47 
377.60 
501.32 
Current 
assets 
70.08 
68.84 
53.42 
97.67 
130.08 
Current 
Liabilities 
64.79 
154.58 
152.08 
166.60 
165.89 
Fixed 
Assets 
300.23 
267.08 
234.29 
267.08 
300.23 
Total 
Assets 
566.11 
532.18 
483.55 
494.82 
493.79 
Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of Indian Chrome Charge Limited from 2001 to 
2005. Retrieved from http://money.redifF.com/companies/indian-charge-chrome-
ltd/14520004/ratio 
and http://money.rediff.com/companies/indian-charge-chrome-ltd/14520004/ratio 
Appendix 16: Indian Charge Chrome Limited 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Interest 
Expense 
316.55 
345.99 
374.91 
106.65 
60.63 
EPS 
(Rs) 
-54.14 
-63.79 
-66.32 
-12.13 
-0.76 
PBIT 
1.65 
-31.67 
-18.69 
27.41 
48.3 
Net Profit 
-314.9 
-370.79 
-385.46 
-70.48 
-4.46 
Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of Indian Chrome Charge Limited from 2001 to 
2005. Retrieved from http://money.redifF.com/companies/indian-charge-chrome-
ltd/14520004/ratio 
and http://money.rediff.com/companies/indian-charge-chrome-ltd/14520004/ratio 
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Appendix 17: Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Net 
Wortli 
14.06 
16.56 
15.13 
23.42 
39.43 
66.06 
124.02 
137.78 
222.62 
458.33 
Loan 
funds 
87.73 
91.99 
98.91 
103.59 
97.19 
101.36 
641.32 
618.3 
531.67 
352.38 
Current 
assets 
83.03 
95.95 
103.49 
119.49 
154.15 
170.52 
481.81 
489.19 
526.64 
593.03 
Current 
Liabilities 
21.78 
28.80 
31.49 
37.03 
63.58 
52.46 
166.52 
151.2 
224.72 
325.02 
Fixed 
Assets 
40.55 
41.4 
42.05 
44.56 
46.05 
49.37 
450.05 
418.08 
452.37 
542.7 
Total 
Assets 
123.58 
137.35 
145.54 
164.05 
200.2 
219.89 
931.86 
907.27 
979.01 
1135.73 
Source: Compiled from Araiual Reports of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys from 2000 to 2005 
Retrieved from http://www.moneycontrol .com/financials/indianmetalsferroalloysltd/balance-
sheet/IMFOl and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financiaIs/indianmetalsferroalloysltd/balance-
sheet/IMFOl 
Appendix 18: Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Interest 
Expense 
12.06 
10.01 
9.12 
9.97 
5.37 
8.42 
53.02 
47.87 
43.97 
42.71 
EPS 
(Rs) 
1.42 
3.83 
0.09 
8.03 
16.11 
25.03 
12 
9.38 
49.17 
122.28 
PBIT 
13.88 
15.13 
9.27 
26.02 
35.32 
56.23 
30.42 
98.99 
259.24 
391.71 
Net Profit 
1.71 
4.59 
0.11 
9.64 
19.35 
30.05 
18.58 
19.99 
104.8 
260.64 
Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys from 2000 to 2005 
Retrieved from http://www.moneycontrol.com/fmancials/indianmetalsferroalloysltd/balance-
sheet/IMFOl and 
http://vvww.moneycontroI.com/financials/indianmetalsferroalloysltd/balance-
sheet/IMFOl 
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Appendix 19: Nat Steel 
Figures in S$ 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Shareholders 
fund 
1626890 
924232 
1167241 
882683 
970102 
424892 
451323 
520021 
500315 
495283 
Loan 
funds 
31884 
109091 
22046 
32857 
27464 
28300 
31997 
15361 
20591 
16958 
Current 
assets 
1899599 
831774 
1236519 
861138 
882174 
370093 
329738 
362756 
384240 
280740 
Current 
Liabilities 
1230042 
582147 
503930 
375410 
315180 
171488 
157605 
131780 
150164 
92121 
Fixed Assets 
1275497 
1025238 
578850 
549396 
565744 
346620 
301604 
341306 
321937 
361755 
Source: Compiled from NatSteel Annual Reports 2000 to 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.nsl.com.sg/financialresuIts.htnil and 
<http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/charts/charts.asp?ticker=NSL:SP 
Appendix 20: Nat Steel 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Total 
Assets 
3162089 
1846949 
1815369 
1400853 
1447918 
716713 
691499 
704062 
706177 
642495 
EPS 
(S$) 
253.4 
-35.7 
50.4 
21.5 
32.8 
18.72 
35.3 
29.3 
20.54 
17.7 
MPS 
S$ 
1 
0.6 
0.56 
0.73 
0.36 
0.85 
1.45 
1.51 
1.28 
1.15 
Figures in S$ 
Net Profit 
949652 
-124917 
183536 
80194 
122375 
97935 
140524 
100472 
75385 
66892 
Source: Compiled from NatSteel Annual Reports 2000 to 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.nsl.com.sg/fmancialresults.htmland 
<http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/charts/charts.asp?ticker=NSL:SP 
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Appendix 21: Tata Steel 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Source: 
Shareholders 
fund 
4558.40 
4888.43 
3518.55 
3186.02 
4515.86 
7059.92 
9755.3 
14096.15 
27300.73 
30176.26 
Compiled from Tata 
Loan 
funds 
4907.23 
4672.22 
4995.57 
4225.61 
3373.28 
2739.7 
2516.5 
9645.33 
18021.69 
26946.18 
Steel's Annua 
Current 
assets 
3025.11 
3225.61 
3562.33 
3648.1 
4083.01 
4083.58 
4237.6 
13701.89 
36962.44 
10285.09 
Current 
Liabilities 
2614.76 
2087.13 
2181.42 
2690.58 
3998.79 
3808.72 
3699.99 
8248.23 
30193.66 
8974.05 
Fixed 
Assets 
8227.16 
14978.25 
8563.15 
8738.35 
10051.97 
11544.89 
13935.01 
17146.74 
16726.75 
56854 
Reports 2000 to 2009. Retrieved from 
Total 
Assets 
12080.39 
12530.91 
12540.82 
12386.45 
14290.95 
15843.29 
18425.88 
31051.16 
53844.3 
67715.82 
http://www.tatasteel.com/investors/performance/annuaI-report.aspand 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/tatasteel/balance-sheet/TIS 
And http://www.moneycontrol.com/india/stockpricequote/steellarge/tatasteel/TIS 
Appendix 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
[ 22: Tata Steel 
PBIT 
1166.31 
1241.13 
647.65 
1603.69 
2857.45 
5445.99 
5361.7 
6456.58 
7996.34 
8806.11 
Interest 
529 
376.61 
369.75 
304.82 
122.17 
186.80 
118.44 
173.90 
878.70 
1152.69 
EPS 
(Rs) 
11.49 
14.64 
5.51 
27.43 
47.32 
62.77 
63.35 
65.28 
67.17 
69.45 
MPS 
Rs 
68.29 
72.09 
57.54 
78.81 
225.96 
354.32 
474.07 
397.36 
693.15 
206 
Net 
Profit 
422.59 
553.44 
204.90 
1012.31 
1746.22 
3474.16 
3506.38 
4222.15 
4687.03 
5201.74 
Sales 
6886.28 
7759.44 
7607.48 
9793.27 
11920.96 
15876.87 
17144.22 
19762.57 
22191.80 
24,315.77 
Source: Compiled and Calculated from Tata Steel's Annual Reports 2000 to 2009. Retrieved 
from http://www.tatasteeI.com/investors/performance/annual-report.asp and 
http://www .moneycontrol .com/financials/tatasteel/balance-sheet/TIS 
Andhttp://www.moneycontrol..com/india/stockpricequote/steellarge/tatasteel/TIS 
Appendix 23: Corns 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Source 
Shareholders 
fund 
3495 
3061 
2722 
2797 
3258 
3352 
3930 
: Compiled from / 
Loan 
funds 
1837 
1646 
1464 
1308 
1433 
1434 
1359 
Annual Rep 
Current 
assets 
4255 
3368 
3305 
3396 
4210 
4446 
4412 
orts of Corns 
Current 
Liabilities 
1834 
1729 
1636 
1583 
1883 
2467 
2348 
from 2000 to 2 
Fixed 
Assets 
4143 
3750 
3126 
2984 
3059 
3496 
3668 
.006 Retrieved 1 
Total 
Assets 
8398 
7118 
6431 
6380 
7269 
7942 
8080 
rom 
http://www.corusgroup.com/en/company/financial_information/report_and_accounts 
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Appendix 24: Corus 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
PBIT 
-1029 
-354 
-310 
-154 
680 
662 
457 
Interest 
-100 
-103 
-92 
-98 
-118 
-101 
-202 
EPS 
(Rs) 
-30.19 
-13.42 
-14.23 
-9.25 
10.05 
10.17 
21.1 
MPS 
Rs 
Net 
Profit 
-940 
-419 
-458 
-305 
446 
432 
229 
Sales 
9509 
7669 
7188 
7953 
9332 
9155 
9733 
Source: Compiled from Aiuiual Reports of Corus from 2000 to 2006 Retrieved from 
http://www.corusgroup.com/en/company/fmancial_information/report_and_accounts 
Appendix 25: Essar S 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Shareholders 
fund 
986.41 
-213.21 
427.3 
1165.69 
1724.86 
4031.47 
4467.95 
4631.33 
4775.66 
teel 
Loan 
funds 
5443.22 
5748.49 
5248.17 
4674.97 
4727.55 
8005.66 
6943.24 
6116.58 
7311.39 
Current 
assets 
2191.22 
3498.88 
3655.08 
3799.53 
2395.68 
3873.51 
4397.41 
3935.19 
4580.12 
Current 
Liabilities 
1286.47 
2865.56 
2660.27 
2355.1 
965.1 
1551.47 
3488.83 
3377.21 
2721.36 
Fixed 
Assets 
5282.06 
4787.64 
4588.76 
4396.23 
4606.92 
9468.78 
10430.8 
10364.23 
10469.74 
Total 
Assets 
7716.1 
8400.84 
8335.74 
8195.76 
7483.56 
13768.04 
15066.44 
14299.42 
15087.16 
Source: Compiled from Essar Steel Annual Report 2001 to 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.essar.com/common.aspx?cont_id=V+5qal L+feY= and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/fmancials/essarsteel/balance-sheet/ES01 
Appendix 26: Essar Steel 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Source: Com 
PBIT 
284.98 
-525.58 
365.57 
585.71 
1542.46 
1207.01 
1324.2 
1521.74 
1796.94 
ipiled from Essa 
Interest 
722.66 
939.05 
300.04 
575.27 
550.73 
422.67 
617.94 
829.47 
789.47 
ir Steel Annual 
EPS 
(Rs) 
-10.35 
-35.89 
0.05 
1.17 
11.63 
10.75 
4.38 
3.71 
1.62 
Report 2001 to 20C 
Net Profit 
-345.91 
-1199.37 
1.51 
59.99 
590.15 
530.18 
436.49 
428.62 
185.2 
)9. Retrieved frc 
Sales 
2297.13 
2934.64 
1625.46 
3703.27 
6116.71 
6182.58 
8194.35 
10743.32 
11688.3 
>m 
http://www.essar.com/common.aspx?cont_id=V+5qal L+feY= and 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/fmancials/essarsteel/balance-sheet/ES01 
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Appendix 27: Algoma Steel 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007* 
2008* 
2009* 
Shareholders 
fund 
300 
345 
370.1 
912.3 
893.5 
885.1 
580.1 
566 
945.5 
Long 
term 
debt 
243 
218 
183.3 
158.9 
9.2 
7.7 
749.1 
776.6 
876.4 
Current 
assets 
325 
445 
369.7 
1028.4 
1040.5 
832.3 
620.2 
613.1 
573.9 
Millions of Canadian dollars 
Current 
Liabilities 
188 
258 
160.6 
190.9 
386.6 
224.4 
437.5 
428.7 
424.6 
Fixed 
Assets 
716 
687 
659.1 
645 
643 
673.1 
2041.6 
2017.3 
2473.6 
Total 
Assets 
1041 
1132 
1028.8 
1673.4 
1683.5 
1505.4 
2661.8 
2630.4 
3047.6 
Source: Compiled from Algoma Steel Annual Reports 2001 to 2009. Retrieved from 
http;//www.algoma.com/investors/financial-reports/ 
Appendix 28: Algoma Steel 
Millions of Canadian dollars 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007* 
2008* 
2009* 
PBIT 
-157 
16 
12.6 
545 
363.5 
324.5 
69.9 
-57.8 
70.1 
Interest 
16 
20 
19.6 
18.5 
16.7 
0.2 
1.3 
74.8 
77.5 
EPS 
(Rs) 
-6.77 
1.42 
0.27 
8.83 
6.04 
6.1 
MPS 
Rs 
Net 
Profit 
-363 
43 
8.4 
343.8 
239.6 
221.8 
14.8 
-11.4 
217.3 
Sales 
912 
1031 
1138.2 
1803.1 
1917.6 
1939.7 
911.4 
1436 
2547.5 
Source: Compiled from Algoma Steel Annual Reports 2001 to 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.algoma.com/investors/financial-reports/ 
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